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

W. Napier

Æt. 70.

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THE

LIFE AND OPINIONS

OF

GENERAL

SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER,

G.C.B.

BY LIEUT.-GEN. SIR W. NAPIER, K.C.B.

ETC. ETC.

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IN FOUR VOLUMES.—VOL. II.

WITH PORTRAITS.

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Map of Scinde and Lines of Operations.

LIFE

OF

CHARLES JAMES NAPIER.

TWELFTH EPOCH.

FIRST PERIOD.

ENGLAND was at the commencement of 1839 in a very sullen mood. The working classes, suffering and justly angry at having been shuffled out of representative power, were accepting the Whig lesson of physical force: and many persons of influence in the state were willing, even eager, to bring affairs to that issue before the discontented could consolidate their strength. In the north insurrection was only prevented by the military, and command there was a most responsible post for a conscientious officer. It was suddenly offered to Charles Napier, and he accepted it though thoroughly sensible of its difficulties:—for him most onerous, as he had on many occasions entirely recognized the right of franchise demanded by the discontented: but he was as entirely opposed to its attainment by arms, for civil war was to him a sound of horror. He however remembered that his father, in 1798, with like commiseration for the wronged multitude, and like contempt for the government of the day had, though only a private person, stept between contending parties and staved off many terrible inflictions. He there-

fore hoped to do the same; and the more easily that the government was certainly not so anxious for the sword as irresponsible politicians were. He also felt conversant with the feelings of the working classes, having marked during his political career, how far designing agitators influenced wilful men and where honest delusion begun. His correspondence and journals shall now shew his secret sentiments, that they may be compared with the fair outside exacted by the world from public men however vexed by folly and wickedness, and he will not be found a *whited sepulchre*. His command did not however begin immediately; it was indeed offered in February and his desire was to proceed at once to the north, but delays were interposed, and meanwhile the following letters were addressed to his brother William.

"March 9th. Count Alfred de Vigny wrote a book to prove that soldiers were helots: Colburn offered me money to edit a translation, with preface and notes; and I have shewn that the British soldier is no helot but an integral part of a constitution superior to any other in Europe, and to all republics. This led to a tirade against the American system, shewing the necessity for military men to put down force by force. The folly of riotous assemblies assuming to represent the whole people of England, and a right to change laws by violence, is also strongly commented upon, and declaration made, that as an officer and a citizen I am bound on principle, and resolved, to maintain the constitution against Republican innovators. Hence, if it be my fate to fire on rioters it cannot be said I excited people to violence by my radicalism and then turned upon them; never did I excite any persons to violence, and I would fire on rioters. All that my editorial notes say is in my belief just and true, and consistent with my radicalism. Let this make you easy, for my notes were printed long since.

"March 15th. You were right. Matters are worse at Easter than they were when I was put off. I had no doubt

you were right, though you said Lord Fitzroy had a different opinion. Bunbury tells me McDonald, the Adjutant-General, writes, that the Chartists are preparing for extremities. Yet the ministers have kept me away from my district, and will probably send me in the midst of a blow-up when I shall not know what troops I have, or where they are; or what towns they may be most safely drawn from: in short without a knowledge of any of the things that ought to be at the ends of a man's fingers. My wish was to go privately to Nottingham before being appointed, but they threw cold water upon that, and McDonald said, By no means, see how D'Urban has been blamed for remaining at the Cape! as if there was the least resemblance in the two cases. O'Connell is very bad. His words have great effect here in making one people hate the other, for he tries to father everything on the English, no matter what their politics are. Colburn has my romance, *Harold*, but I can't get an answer from him! Davenport, who is a good fellow, is managing for me with Colburn, who wants me to edit the life of the duke, but I refused. I saw a letter from Alaric Watts, which says, that to his knowledge the duke's dispatches don't sell, and he is out of pocket a thousand pounds: this is curious.

"March 22nd. It is irritating to hear attacks on good government because the Chartists go wrongly to work; but I avoid all political argument, for by the time the stories reached the Horse Guards I should be made out a Republican Chartist. Poor men! they are giving vigour to the worst Toryism and the prospect is gloomy: if they fail an oligarchy becomes triumphant; if they succeed we shall have carnage. It looks as if the falling of an empire was beginning. Here all is ripe for a fight, O'Connell's fear alone keeps things quiet. Your notion of organizing gentlemen, armed for self-defence, is good."

This was not a project for arraying gentlemen against labouring men, but for uniting them with the steadier por-

tion of the operatives to shew the more violent how strong the opposition would be to a republic: it was contemplated only as a demonstration.

"Journal, March. The northern district embraces eleven counties, and it is said arms are being provided for insurrection: this is a result of bad government, which has produced want, and the people are rather to be pitied than blamed. They are indeed putting themselves in the wrong, but that does not make those right whose misgovernment has produced this terrible feeling, leading them to believe in every démagogue who preaches violence as a remedy for distress. Poor people! It is very painful to those who, like my brother William and myself, have long foreseen the result of Whig and Tory policy, to find now what we feared come to a head: however the Crown and constitution are not to be overset because a portion of the people follow the mad counsel of men like O'Connor, when by a juster course they could gain their rights without convulsion. My hope is that some better advisers will keep them quiet; for though of all misfortunes of this nature the most terrible is to fire on our countrymen there is no shrinking from duty, and mine shall be done at all hazards: but accursed be they who cause or begin civil war.

"I expect to have very few soldiers and many enemies: hence, if we deal with pikemen my intent is to put cavalry on their flanks, making my infantry retire as the pikemen advance. If they halt to face the cavalry, the infantry shall resume fire, for if cavalry charge pikemen in order the cavalry will be defeated; the pike must be opposed by the musquet and bayonet, in which the soldiers must be taught to have confidence: it is the master weapon. I am inclined to use buckshot, which would seldom kill or wound dangerously; yet with mobs it would hurt so many that fright would cause dispersion. The great point is to defeat without killing. With a foreign foe, who recovers to fight you again, we must kill; but insurgents we should seek to save,

not destroy, because the chances are that the rebellion will be over before the wounded can re-assemble: having no hospitals they will fly to their homes. A general brings up his recovered men; an insurgent chief does not even know where they are, and they will not come back of their own accord: a brave enthusiastic man, here and there, may rejoin, but generally wounds will be an acquittance of further fight which men will profit from.

"March 27. A summons from Lord John Russell.

"29th. In London, twenty-fours after receiving the summons! Well done steam! Smoke thou art wonderful, and a reformer! The government seem to me alarmed, and yet not vigorous. My hope is, if civil war begins, to moderate that monstrous spirit of inhumanity which history, and my own experience, teaches me to have prevailed on such dreadful occasions.

"30th. Saw Lord John, a mild person in manner. Poor man, he is in affliction which makes it hard to judge, but he seems unaffected and thoughtful. He spoke with good sense, and without violence against the Chartists, which pleased me. Saw Mr. Phillipps also, a sensible man: he rather exhibited his own knowledge than tried to measure mine, which I was glad of as he seems to take a just view of affairs. Lord Fitzroy Somerset seems to me an abler man than either, and with the right feeling of abhorrence for civil war: his dread of bloodshed is strong. Sir John McDonald did not speak of affairs. —— was in the room, and McDonald seemed to avoid speaking before him; but Sir John is a good fellow with right views. —— and I are old acquaintances. He is in my opinion narrow-minded and time-serving: perhaps I do him wrong for our acquaintance has not been intimate, but he appears to me one who would soon make civil war ruthless and sanguinary, being full of small spite like a wasp, which he resembles.

"As to myself light begins: matters may perhaps be kept

quiet, but if not we have force to overthrow the Chartists. They have, seemingly, no organization, no leaders, and a strong tendency to turn rebellion into money, for pikes costing a shilling are sold for three and sixpence. So I hear at the Home Office, and if true it betokens the leaders' objects; we cannot expect more honesty in their followers and an outbreak will be for plunder. They shall not have much time for pillage, but my object shall be to calm things down, and instil just feelings of pity into the soldiers' minds. The people suffer greatly, and the right system is to shew them their folly, without exercising violence against their leaders, who they believe to be patriots and in that belief give their confidence. To separate them from those leaders will be useless until you destroy their confidence by proper dealing; but that done they will abandon the leaders on whom you can fall with just severity. Even then great caution will be requisite for there is no advantage in harshness, and insurrections are produced by bad government, not by the ostensible leaders. Lord John Russell and the Tories are far more to blame than O'Connor in my opinion, though I believe Lord John to be an able and a good man and O'Connor not so: the Whigs and Tories are the real authors of these troubles, by their national debt, corn laws, and new poor law.

"Colonel W. Napier. Long conferences with Lord John, Mr. Phillipps, Lord Fitzroy, and Charles Rowan. They seem very ignorant of what is going on, and by their account the magistrates must be a poor set, on whom no reliance can be placed. Rowan seems to take the best view, but all agree that there are no leaders and no money, and that O'Connor makes profit of his politics: the having no leaders I doubt, though possibly they are very bad, which is for me to find out.

"Journal. Sir Richard Jackson my predecessor writes to Lord Fitzroy, that in half an hour he can tell me all he knows; and for all the light got from the Home Office I am as blind as a new-born puppy: if insurrection

is going to break out government is strangely ill informed. However, nearly four thousand men are under me and if May is to produce a rising they shall be gradually drawn together, lest the insurgents should begin by picking off small detachments, a danger that does not seem to have been considered here. These pikes are but six feet long, which shews their military advisers are not much up to their work.

"April 3rd. Saw Jackson, an honest man, and speaks his mind freely.

"Nottingham, April 4th. Here I am, like a bull turned out for a fight after being kept in a dark stall. No danger of an immediate rising, but magistrates are alarmed because their houses and families are exposed. Very natural this, but troops cannot guard single houses, which it would come to if these good people had their way.

"8th. Saw Colonel Wildman and like him; he is not afraid, and speaks out. He swears there is no fear and is perhaps right; but as it is said the people have abundance of arms we must not be too secure. The small detachments make me uneasy. I have a good view of the troops on paper, but wanting to see them actually I asked leave, and have been refused because of the expence!

"Colonel W. Napier, April 9th. I have drawn a plan of the district containing only the towns where detachments are, and marking the number of troops in each; thus if suddenly turned out of bed by the Chartists, my hand can be laid on the soldiers without fumbling for half an hour through a brigade-major's returns, smothered in the details of his craft. The troops are in twenty-six detachments, spread over half England, some two hundred miles from me! The magistrates are divided into Whigs, Tories, and personal enmities; and every mother's son of them ready to go any length for his sect and creed. The town magistrates are liberal from fear of the populace; the country bucks are too old, and too far gone Tories to have hopes of

gaining popularity now by being Radical; so they labour to get troops near their own houses. *Funk* is the order of the day, and there is some excuse, for the people seem ferocious enough. But this fear has produced a foolish dispersion of the troops, these magistrates being powerful fellows. Jackson could not manage them, and probably I shall be also obliged to give way, seeing that in their ranks are the Dukes of Newcastle, Portland, and so forth. Nevertheless my efforts shall be to get my people together. Detachments of one hundred, well-lodged, do not alarm me; but having only thirty-six dragoons amongst the ill-disposed populace of Halifax, with a man in billet here and his horse there—that does. My intent is to talk to these magistrates thus. If there is danger, as some of you insist upon, instead of finding safety from soldiers you will only get them killed like sheep. If there is no danger a great expence is incurred, and discipline injured without reason. This and insisting on quarters, which will make the troops very cosey and be very troublesome to the magistrates, may produce a rational view of the subject, for no doubt there are many gentlemen and sensible men among them.

"The state of the country is bad enough, but in the distress of the people is the great danger; they make pikes, but it is doubtful if they could turn out ten thousand armed men, and not a thousand in any one place. There appears less fear of a rising than of the growth of a base, murderous, servile character, for these qualities were distinct in the mob here when they burned the Duke of Newcastle's house. Remember however that this is my first *coup d'œil* and may be a very erroneous one; I would not give it to Lord Fitzroy, or Lord John, as that might commit me to views which may be reasonably changed.

"Journal, April 10. Colonel Rolleston, a sensible man, is more afraid than Wildman, so I must go by him now; but if a row begins Wildman for me: a capital fellow and an old soldier. Rolleston tells me the Chartists preach assassina-

tion: this gives food for reflection. What has made Englishmen turn assassins? The new poor law. Their resources have been dried up by indirect taxes for the debt, and the poor law throws them on a phantom, which it calls their resources—robbery follows, and a robber soon becomes a murderer.

"14th. Same state of uncertainty and want of information. The Duke of Portland called on me. He seems totally ignorant of the state of the country, and indeed told me so. A duke and ignorant of the state of the country in which he holds such large possessions!! He gets his information from a poor man, who tells him about the Chartists and has completely alarmed him. This informer is unknown to me, and whether he milks the duke of certain monies, or not, God knows, but his information has neither led to anything positive, nor been of use: on the contrary, it has done mischief by frightening the poor old man, that is as much as a Bentinck can be frightened, for they are a plucky race.

"Colonel W. Napier, April 15. There is no great fear of an outbreak on a large scale, but assassination seems to be the Chartists' creed. At a private meeting of thirty * * * is said to have asked if they had heard of Lord Norbury and how he was put out of the way. Yes! Then do you get rid of obnoxious men in the same way. Colonel Rolleston told me he had this from one of the thirty; adding—a fellow who is a spy is never wholly to be believed, but he swore over and over again that this was said. I have informed Lord John Russell, yet warned him that it would be unfair to condemn * * * on such vile evidence. Worse than that has come to my ears, not to be trusted in a letter, but confirming my opinion that the aristocracy have with their new poor law demoralized the working classes. There are men here who take bullets from their pockets, and say—do you want a Norbury pill? This is a common joke indicating the progress of bad feeling.

"When the mob burned the Duke of Newcastle's house they proceeded to that of Mr. Musters; he was in London and is an obnoxious man; not from politics, but that he refused the public leave to fish near his house because every idle blackguard used to go there and annoy his family. His wife—Byron's Miss Chaworth, was very ill in bed, her children and servants threw themselves on their knees, entreating the rioters to take everything but not to go into their mother's room as the fright would kill her. They drove the children into the woods on a dark night, locked up the servants, went into the sick woman's room and set fire to her bed! A few, no one knows whether one two or three, rushed into the room, rolled her in a blanket and got her out through a window! Now what can be expected from such chaps if they break out! I am anxious to diminish the number and increase the strength of my detachments; all the magistrates are against this except Wildman, but he again is too reckless and holds the whole thing too cheap. The government seems to take no step whatever to find out what is going on; and—this from high authority here,—*discourage the gentry taking any measures of self-preservation:* meantime the arming certainly goes on more or less.

"Journal. Just heard that eleven men met and cast lots for assassinating the Duke of Portland, because of his support to the new poor law. The magistrates who told me this say they know the man and he is watched; but they will not tell the duke. I do not feel easy, though not believing the fact, for they cannot guard against it if the villain be resolute. The duke is now at Newmarket and therefore out of harm's way, but he shall not return to Welbeck in ignorance of the danger.

"17th. Seen much of Sir Richard Jackson: he is a very good and very clever man.

"18th. On the 12th sent a circular to all officers commanding detachments, calling on them to consider what

they would do if attacked; and to tell me, from time to time, what was going on in their neighbourhood, and the opinions of the labourers. Their reports are just come, all well written and with a degree of military sagacity beyond my expectations. This has effected two things. 1°. I got acquainted with the strength of each post, and with my officers, and have set them a-thinking. 2°. It gives me a sort of military *surveillance* all over the north of England, independent of the information furnished by the magistrates; and much more impartial, as the latter are all under personal fear and political prejudice. This military information will also be a test for that obtained by the magistrates, and it embraces the pensioners: men half military, half civilians, who have all a hankering after the army. Very likely half are Chartists, but that signifies nothing; they know the troops cannot be easily beaten, and will advise waiting until more resources are at hand, which will not happen. This will tend to quiet, and these men cannot hold their tongues. They will drink and talk with the young soldiers, and from love or vanity or heat of argument tell them what is going on; and if anything serious is brewing their superior sagacity will give them the lead: thus I make spies of them despite of themselves.

"23rd. The Duke of Portland called on his way from Newmarket. I had begged of him to do so, not being able to reconcile my conscience with letting him return ignorant of the conspiracy: the old cock shewed no fear, he has all the Bentinck courage. My wish is that he should go to London; for though not believing the villain courageous enough to attempt the deed, if he should it would make a devil of a stir in the country.

"22nd. Went to a meeting here, but did not like to mix in the crowd, fearing to draw attention, perhaps insult. There were nearly three thousand people, most of them spectators taking no interest in the proceedings; no cheer followed the orator's expressions, it was like a religious meeting.

Was this deep attention or not? In my mind not, for numbers came and went the whole time, and plenty of a Chartist description walked about wholly inattentive to the speakers. Fergus O'Connor and Bronterre O'Brien were advertised to be the orators but did not come. The estimate of numbers by the mayor was amusing. How many? Oh! not above three or four hundred. More Mr. Mayor. Upon which he called a youth, said to be in the habit of estimating numbers; he got up to a thousand, the Nottingham Journal gave six hundred. There were full three thousand: civilians don't estimate numbers well.

"Yesterday a piece of a letter was found in the park and sent to Sir C. O'Donnel, my brigade-major, by post. What does it mean? The words were written in pencil, and the fragment run thus, '—y, for wit monday, that all of you must bring yure pistels . . . . . day as their will be important . . . . . Is there no foot sogers tho' he sa . . . mee was coming so that the wat is . . . . . acks . . . . . not got over carts and such things, as I saw how the done it at paris . . . . . ist get old . . . . also that we'—the dotted parts were torn. This indicates business.

"April 23rd. A letter from Wemyss. The folks at Ashton-under-Lyne growing patriotic, being disturbed by the itinerant orators, who, like Colonel C——y in the house, talk loud long and foolishly. Matters are going on badly. These poor people are inclined to rise, and if they do what horrid bloodshed! This is dreadful work, would to God I had gone to Australia: however it is now a struggle for existence, a servile war. At this moment the best hand-loom weaver can only earn five shillings a week, the price of food being such that this will not give him bread, without firing clothes or lodging: hence a good workman in full wages must starve! And with this fact our rulers are called statesmen! These people threaten to take arms. If they do they will be crushed by force and will then resort to the means which slaves must employ. Mammon has supplanted

God: our rulers have worshipped the evil one, and evil are the results. Yet life is transitory, our troubles soon pass. Death is bitter, but only to the body of the man who believes in the promises of Christ, and in the aspirations of his own mind. When men mount the scaffold; when on their death-beds; in fine when their minutes are numbered these are their thoughts: why not cherish them then in life and health, and so act that when death comes we can meet him with intrepid and undoubting hearts?"

The Wemyss alluded to above, was one of two colonels of subordinate command; the other was Sir Hew Ross of the Artillery: the first acted at Manchester, the second at Carlisle. It has been said that Charles Napier was a man of stern authority, and it is true, he was so to all who neglected duty; but with officers of zeal and character his intercourse was marked by urbanity frankness and confidence.

"Colonel Wemyss, April 22nd. As to your writing freely, why that is what I wish beyond all things: I am not such a vain fool as to think a general has more brains than his neighbour because his head is under the dreadful plume they have stuck in his hat! No! I want both you and Ross to write to me just as you think; and heartily I rejoice at having two men so well known to me, and for whom I have such regard: but this will be of little use unless you write like old comrades, freely and at your ease. I do not promise to be always guided by either, because we may differ in our views and I must pay the piper if anything goes wrong; but I think we all three hold nearly the same views, and if we differed I should feel great mistrust of myself, being just come, and as yet ignorant.

"With regard to detachments, my mind is made up to have as few as possible. You seem most anxious to give support to the well disposed, and to brow-beat the disaffected: I am more anxious that no mishap should befall the troops. Still we come nearly to the same point, your anxiety for the troops, mine for the civil authorities, being

both very great. But I lay down as an axiom, and our first, greatest principle, that the queen's troops must not be overthrown anywhere, because the effect in the three kingdoms would be fearful. If only a corporal's guard was cut off it would be "a total defeat of the troops" ere it reached London Edinburgh and Dublin; and before the contradiction arrived the disaffected, in the moral exaltation of supposed victory, would be in arms. This is more especially to be apprehended in Ireland, where rivers of blood would flow.

"Now let us look at the other side. Suppose from want of soldiers a rising takes place in some town; suppose the worst, and nothing can exceed what happened at Bristol; suppose a second Bristol affair, an exaggerated supposition, because you, or I, or Ross, would be on the spot before such a conflagration could be effected, but suppose it nevertheless. What did Bristol amount to? Only individual loss. The troops were victorious the instant they were put in motion and all the world knew it was a riot; it produced no national evil; it had no public results, though one of the largest towns in the empire was nearly laid in ashes.

"These are my convictions, arising from general principles, and a large view of the subject, the one which the nation will take. We must not let our eyes be diverted by the small interests and personal fears of magistrates, which, though meriting attention, are all local and must only be cared for so far as they can be without danger for the more important matter. There is however one more point:—the soldier's life. He is not to be spared if the service of the nation requires the sacrifice; but he is not to be endangered for the security of private men, who, if they only have the courage, may arm and defend their own carcases. What endangers two-thirds of them? The answer is, so far as I have yet learned from the Home Office and Sir Richard Jackson, indeed all with whom I have conversed, their own inordinate avarice, which will not let them fairly pay

their workmen. To my knowledge this is not the case in all instances, but with the majority I am told it is so. Suppose it not so in any case: then let these men arm like men, and not shrink and quail before the Chartists, imploring for soldiers. Let each hang up his pike as well as the Chartists; they are rich, they have servants, let them bestir themselves; they know the troops are on the alert and will, in a few hours, come to their assistance.

"The soldiers must be kept together: the consequence of a military mishap would be a national misfortune; of a civil defeat only a trifling private loss. By dispersing the troops the greater evil becomes very possible, even probable. By concentrating the troops the smaller evil may happen; but the danger will give such a stimulus to private courage as will call forth more manly and effectual exertions from the middle classes, who are now supine and trust wholly to soldiers. This apathy I wish to rouse them from. I want to withdraw the detachments from Todmorden and Halifax and give them to Leeds and Sheffield, but Lord John Russell opposes me, being talked over by the magistrates. I have told Lord John, that if an outbreak takes place it is to be feared it will shew itself by a well-planned night attack on Derby, Rochdale, Halifax or Todmorden. I have also told him, that the magistrates should find quarters. Forty-two men are in twenty-one billets! Fifty resolute men would disarm them in ten minutes!

"Sir Hew Ross. Extracts. Write to me at all times as a comrade, or I shall think you take me for a vapouring idiot, whose head is turned by that bunch of cock's feathers in my hat, from which it is hard to say which suffers most, the unhappy general or his purse! Tell me always what you want done, and I will do it if possible: if not will tell you why, for I hate mystery, which is a wonderful creeper into head-quarters. We shall have a rough time, all my reports point to the middle of May as the time when a rising will be attempted. I hate a well-fed

traitor, but in Lancashire the hand-loom weavers are in terrible distress, and I pity them from my heart. Poor fellows, they know not the wild work that O'Connor and O'Brien, and Oastler—said to be a madman—are leading them to do. Reckless massacre and plunder would be the order of the day if once they were successful.

"Under-Secretary Phillipps, April 23rd. The paper fragment I had the honour to send to Lord John Russell shews that the disaffected are prepared to use barricades; and I have information that their plan to cut off soldiers lodged in billets has been discussed in the public-houses at Halifax: cheap copies of Maceroni's book on pikes are also in circulation.

"To the magistrates of the West Riding, Yorkshire, April 24th. Sirs. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant. To be frank with you, I dislike small detachments because from experience I have learned the danger to which they are exposed in civil commotion; but this danger depends much upon the manner in which they are lodged. The cavalry at Halifax are quartered in the very worst and most dangerous manner. Forty-two troopers in twenty-one distant billets! Fifty resolute Chartists might disarm and destroy the whole in ten minutes; and believe me gentlemen, that a mob which has gained such a momentary triumph is of all mobs the most ferocious and most dangerous to the inhabitants.

"You will admit I speak truth in stating the danger of the queen's troops at Halifax; but you naturally wish to have the protection which the presence of soldiers affords. I am equally anxious to give you that protection, but demand of you a building in which the soldiers can be safely lodged; for be assured gentlemen that my most anxious wish, as well as duty, is to afford the best protection in my power to the civil authorities. But I repeat and feel assured your candour will admit, that to expose a detachment to a midnight massacre would not be to protect but to

expose you all to the greatest peril. I have too high an opinion of you gentlemen to think you require any apology for this frank exposition of my views, and beg of you to communicate with me in the same strain.

"Journal, April 24th. The magistrates are always trying to get soldiers, and never caring for their safety: they shall not have detachments unless they provide for their security, which they try to avoid as costly without regard for the soldiers' lives. I have written them a strong letter, and sent a copy to the secretary of state, whom they had enlisted on their side. He has had the good sense to see I am right, and takes my side of the question.

"25th. All quiet. Read a report made by Colonel Shaw Kennedy to the police commissioners on the subject of rioters. He was long at Manchester and this report is a most masterly affair; I have felt more at home since reading it, but my task is harder than his, for a greater power is against me. He had only to deal with workmen fighting against their masters; I have to deal with a large mass of the population avowedly arming to overthrow the constitution. However this able man lays down a few general principles and gives a few facts which are of great value to me. His report came to me from Rowan. My belief is the secretary of state never saw it, nor the Horse Guards either: it is worth their reading though!"—This Colonel Shaw Kennedy, now a general, was the organizer of the Irish constabulary; was one of Sir J. Moore's men, and distinguished alike in peace and war by cool intrepidity, administrative talent, and commanding decision of character.

"Mr. Phillipps, April 25th. Colonel Rowan lent me Shaw Kennedy's letter to the commissioners, dated 22nd November 1838: and from it I learn the following facts.

"That the men with whom we have to deal, did in 1830-31, get up a powerful organized force, the arrangements for which were made long before in beer shops and at numerous small meetings: the people were stimulated by various

pamphlets and finally made 'a turn-out.' That the able-bodied men in that turn-out were eight thousand, of which many were armed, and they had acquired military discipline; they formed good columns, taking up their ground in perfect order, and throwing out their picquets with all the systematic proceedings of a military force. They kept the field four months, and finally yielded from want of funds. In one instance they marched up to a barrack-gate and fearlessly challenged a captain's detachment to fight: had that detachment of soldiers been in billets it would have been forced to fight, and one hundred against eight thousand would have been too great a risk.

"We have now the same men to encounter, but their object is to overthrow the throne. Their number, though not ascertained, is probably greater than before; the arms possessed then they still possess, with the addition of a great number of pikes, so we may fairly suppose every man has a weapon. We have also those indications of commotion described by Colonel Kennedy as the precursors of an outbreak, namely, the beer-house meetings, the small assemblies, rumours, threats, agitators, and exciting pamphlets. So far the analogy is complete: but we have more, for we know that printed extracts from Maceroni's book on pike exercise are also in circulation; and we have information, though vague, that drilling without arms goes on nightly. We are also informed, and of this our information is tolerably certain, that the purchase of fire-arms and the manufacture of pikes goes on in some places with more vigour, in some with less, but still goes on.

"We have also the fragment of a letter shewing that barricades are contemplated and understood, the example of Paris being held out. Finally, the conversation among the poorest classes who meet in public houses is, that one hundred Chartists may destroy fifty soldiers in billets and small detachments; and that the first thing is to cut the railroad and all communications between towns: these are

all sound military operations, and taken as a whole afford some ground for apprehending that an outbreak will take place sooner or later. Of its being speedily put down there can be no doubt, because funds, leaders, and that discipline which is required to move large bodies, are all wanting; there are leaders for a midnight massacre but not for a mid-day battle: moreover, the avowed objects of the Chartists is said to be plunder and assassination. Such we hear is their language in the public houses, and that alone would destroy them even if a resolute and loyal army were not at hand to crush insurrection. The state of the unhappy hand-loom weavers is distressing in the greatest degree; an industrious man in full work and on the highest rate of wages starves: this is very dreadful, and in such parts the Chartists are most numerous and most resolute. If this state of distress can be ameliorated one great source of Chartism will soon be tarried.

"With the foregoing general view of the subject I have constantly asked myself, what is to be done by me as a military man? The answer is—Secure your detachments from surprize as far as practicable, seek for information and abide events. But if the agitation now going on should produce an outbreak my plan of operations would be as follows. Divide the troops into three portions. The first to be composed of those at Carlisle, Newcastle, Tynemouth, and Sunderland—in all about nine hundred under Sir Hew Ross. The second composed of the troops at Manchester, Stockport, Bolton, Blackburn, Burnley, Todmorden, Rochdale, Wigan, Haydock, Liverpool and Chester—two thousand eight hundred men under Colonel Wemyss. The third composed of troops at Hull, York, Leeds, Sheffield, Derby, Nottingham, and Halifax — about one thousand under myself.

"If the outbreak appeared partial in the northern part of the district, Sir H. Ross would collect his troops for suppression, according to orders previously given to him;

and I should detach five hundred men to his assistance. If it appeared confined to the western part Colonel Wemyss would act in a similar way, and be reinforced by me. If the rising was in the eastern part I could draw on Ross or Wemyss for aid. Should it be general, Ross and Wemyss shall assemble, each his own division, at such places as appeared to them most suitable, and I should do the same. When it was ascertained where a great head of insurgents was formed I would march direct upon it, combining my movement with Ross and Wemyss, either for uniting or acting separately according to circumstances.

"As to positions for occupation they must depend on the enemy's operations, holding always as a general principle the maintaining of my communications with Ross or Wemyss, or both, rather than with London; and if requisite calling for aid from Ireland, which I am authorized to do. My reason for abandoning the communication with London is, that the force which could be drawn round the capital would be large enough to hold its ground, and if the insurgents moved in that direction the forces under my command would press their rear and flanks, and protect the country from being widely ravaged.

"If the rebels confined their operations to pressing the troops in the northern district a force detached from London could harass their rear, or unite with my troops; but it is most probable, that after the first week the struggle, if continued, would be carried on by an armed yeomanry, and small columns of regulars would rapidly push forth to their aid from central stations when the insurgents were too powerful. I propose therefore that the yeomanry be put on permanent duty in such parts of the district as appear most dangerous. The law now permits men to arm with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the constitution; it is advisable therefore also to arm those who are to be attacked, and whose numbers are

so great that their array in arms would probably secure the loyalty of the doubtful and timid, crush the hopes of the disloyal and recall them to a just sense of their folly.

His brother William. "Lord John Russell at first took part with the magistrates in their demand for detachments of cavalry, to be placed in billets; he has now avowed that I am right and decided in my favour; but as they are powerful fellows he may not be able to resist them, and I feel rather surprized at my success than confident in its continuance. Lord John asked me, if it was necessary to draw troops from Ireland? My answer was, if his question referred to an encounter in the field we had enough; but if to prevent a rising by a display of troops the sooner the men came from Ireland the better. Had my answer been Yes, without qualification, and no row took place, I should be held up as an alarmist and this cry raised, Why is the country to be at the cost of shifting troops from kingdom to kingdom because General Napier is frightened? If I said there are troops enough and an insurrection did break out, the accusation would be—he tempted it by his supineness!

"Shaw Kennedy's paper is admirable as far as it goes, and taught me more than anything else the nature of their goings on here. No one knew anything about it but Rowan; he had *lost* it, but afterwards found and sent it to me when my report was written. This delayed me, for a comparison was very necessary, and obliged me to recast the report, which has caused them to draw two regiments from Ireland; but even thus I shall have fewer troops than Shaw and Bouverie had, and more enemies. Numbers of workmen are said to have come from London on purpose for the row. Oastler's pike was shewn to me, it is a half pike with a long springy blade, altogether the worst possible; so are their knives, with which they could not stab because the blade is curved at the point. I am here without a soldier and yet overwhelmed with military business. A

general officer's time is dreadfully cut up with fiddle-faddle work; everything is tried by their absurd district court-martials, which must be read and approved of. Four or five a day come, and some are very difficult. This is earning bread dearly, because unnecessary: it is doing badly what a regimental commanding officer would do well, and is with my extensive command oppressive and not to be rightly done.

"Journal, April 27th. A letter from Lord John's secretary wholly entering into my view of the danger of small detachments. My system of *surveillance militaire* is now also established; the Horse Guards and the secretary of state are convinced, and I hope the magistrates: nothing remains therefore but to carry gradually into execution the plan of rendering the detachments secure. Against this the magistrates and the government will set themselves tooth and nail, for it cannot be done without expence; and, moreover, circumstances render it difficult. The truth is that barracks should be *built* and that they will not do. However, we cannot have everything as we wish in this world, or the next either, or hell would be empty and earth become hell!

"My men should be in three masses, one around Manchester to watch the manufacturers; one around Newcastle-on-Tyne to watch the colliers; one around Leeds and Hull to watch the other two: but such an arrangement of my force cannot be effected in time; it would take a month ere the secretary of state would understand it, and then he would have a host of magistrates on his back! He behaves however very well and stands by me against the magistrates, so that I have my own way in some degree: were it allowed me in all things the country should soon be quieted. Poor fellows, they only want fair play and would then be quiet enough; but they are harassed by taxes till they can bear it no longer. Between five and six thousand men and eighteen guns are under me; we could manage a large force of Chartists, but I trust in God nothing so horrible will

happen. Would that I had gone to Australia and thus been saved this work, produced by Tory injustice and Whig imbecility. The doctrine of slowly reforming when men are starving is of all silly things the most silly: famishing men cannot wait. And that the people of England have been, and are, ill-treated and ill-governed is my fixed opinion. The worship of Mammon renders the minds of men base, their bodies feeble, and their morals bad: manufactures debase man woman and child.

"May 1st. My command is better in hand now. At first all was darkness: I groped about like a mole. Will there be a civil war? My opinion is that it will only be a row at Manchester and its vicinity, which will be put down; but that will not put down the sufferings of the people, nor their hatred of the rich, and winter is to be feared more than now, for they will then suffer more. Wemyss writes that he is very uneasy, the pot seems to boil near him. With some dragoons and infantry this neighbourhood can be kept in check, but both arms are necessary; dragoons alarm, and slash without killing, and if they are too roughly handled the infantry will soon end the business; rockets also are good bullets and do not kill: but my hope is, if a fight takes place, to have no murderous work as in Ireland, no refusing of quarter, no *spite*. Fight, if fight we must, like men, sparing those who ask for mercy: it surely must be possible to keep down the malignant spirit which seems at all times to have animated those engaged in civil wars!

"May 2nd. Wemyss asks for more troops. He says, a company, marching out for exercise towards Leigh, was told by the Chartists, *We shall be out next week, and if your soldiers interfere we will destroy you all.* There are two words to every question, and as the threatened 6th of May approaches we shall soon see what pluck they have: in my opinion it will pass quietly. Whit-Monday is really I believe their day.

"May 3rd. Reports come in stronger, that a rising will

take place the 6th. *Voyons!* I have forbid the soldiers to be marched out of barracks for fear of encountering a body of Chartists and having a collision, which must be carefully avoided. I dread bloodshed. If once it begins no man can say where it will stop. It shall not begin if I can hinder it. Lord John has issued a proclamation against training and unlawful meetings; this is good, and I hope timely: he has also given me authority to draw out the yeomanry at need. Reports come from many officers that the Chartists openly threaten the soldiers and trust to a simultaneous attack to beat us in detail: this I expected but cannot draw in the weak detachments, the magistrates are too strong for me, and too much alarmed for their own safety.

"May 4th. Sent Captain Grant, 9th Lancers, to Mansfield to report on a building eligible for securing a troop; he has made a good report, and is a clever officer: we have multitudes of such men, there are no officers in the world like English gentlemen.

"May 5th. News from Manchester, things look black enough. They seem alarmed in London, and the secretary of state now wishes me to be at Manchester. I shall not however go until after to-morrow, for to-morrow is the threatened day and my place should be here or there, not on the road. If they will have a fight God defend the right! One good thrashing will cool their courage: even the Devizes affair was a damper and if they deal with me it will be far worse, for the blow must be as decisive as musquet and bayonet can make it; yet always having a feeling for deluded men, who when vanquished must be spared. Meanwhile Heaven defend my family! If it pleases God that I come not back to them, I must wait until they come to me!

"May 6th. All quiet in Nottingham, and no reports of risings. There is a doubt, if a rising takes place, whether William"—his nephew and aide-de-camp—"and myself can get to Manchester; I have therefore sent instructions to Ross to meet that event. Within thirty-six hours a horrid slaughter

may perhaps be the precursor of a bloody insurrection! The probability of the troops being defeated is not in my contemplation if, as my belief is, they are loyal; but a terrible slaughter of the unhappy Chartists, so sadly deluded, is a dreadful prospect, even though in their ranks are many ruffians who will do much mischief before they are quelled. What can be done to prevent a collision? Is it likely men can be prevented fighting, whose minds have been making up for it these many months? I fear not, but will try. How full of events next week may be! God assist me to act justly."

TWELFTH EPOCH.

SECOND PERIOD.

THE terrible responsibility of kindling civil war by error, or suppressing it by force, of spilling blood or avoiding it, now rested on Charles Napier, but with a firm heart and clear head he sustained the burthen.

"Journal, May 7th, Manchester. Reached this place last night. The country from Nottingham undulating, from Derby hilly, towards Matlock Alpine; the pass of Holstandwell Bridge is strong: the country is a fortress.

"8th. All quiet for the moment, but all information speaks of a rising on Whit-Monday. Like me, Wemyss hates this work: how can it be otherwise?

"9th. I have over and over again stated the danger of having billets; why will they not let me hire barracks! The country cannot be protected by detachments. Let the gentlemen and yeomanry defend themselves, local defence should meet local attacks: I cannot, I will not give troops. Yet I have not called in any detachment, because if that were now done the people would rise and the blame be cast on me: moreover, with so little knowledge of this district it would be too decided a step; all that can be done is to put some infantry in buildings where the cavalry are in billets. I have by letter endeavoured to animate magistrates and colonels of yeomanry; but all are apathetic, all wanting soldiers, and doing nothing for themselves. A disarming bill is a sad measure but should be passed. These magistrates are very provoking: I ordered night patrols, and Wemyss tells me, the civil force has been less vigilant in consequence! Well, one must have patience.—Lo! the ministers are out! A

pretty kettle of fish! Who is to be in the Home Department? Lord John has acted towards me with great fairness: I hope his successor will do the same, for otherwise my position will be ticklish.

"Colonel W. Napier, May 15th. I have already done all that you advise, except taking up strong posts for securing the communications of my detachments with the country: there is bother enough to get any barracks at all for them. It was only two days ago that leave came from the Home Office to hire temporary barracks; meanwhile the Horse Guards were growling at me for keeping the men in billet, as if I could swallow them! A man in this command should have power to do what is to be done on his own responsibility: these people think the necessary precautions can be taken without expence or by magic. I have however hired two barracks, one here and one at Nottingham, both commanding the entrances to the towns, and with free egress to the country. The Chartists hardly know what they are at. The people want food and think O'Connor will get it for them; and O'Connor wants to keep the agitation alive because he sells weekly 60,000 copies of the *Northern Whig*. While this lasts he will try to prevent an outbreak. No premeditated outbreak will occur I think while our imposing force furnishes an excuse for delay: and delay will injure their cause, because the deputies are paid and the people are growing weary of the physical-force men.

"At Stone, in Staffordshire, there was a row: they attacked the yeomen who killed and wounded several, and it has startled the Chartists much to be so easily overthrown by yeomen without loss, while some twenty of their people were knocked down. I had sent two companies there and had they been up in time a severe loss to the Chartists would have happened; very glad they were not, my wish being to keep the soldiers as long from blood as possible: the Chartists had barricades. We are in a strange state, but the coming week will open some clear view. Government should

give me money for spies, our state is too dangerous to be without them. God send me through the work as a gentleman ought to go through it.

"Miss Napier. Lord de Grey's letter to me is excellent. Would that there were a dozen such yeomanry colonels. The magistrates and country gentlemen appear apathetic; they do not see the dreadful state of the country, or they are afraid. William is all that can be wished, but is too hard-worked; neither of us get any exercise—pen! pen! pen! Tell me any criticisms on my doings that you may hear, for I have queer folks to deal with.

"Colonel W. Napier, May 23rd. The day after to-morrow is to be the great meeting, for which my arrangements were made, when Wemyss gave me Shaw Kennedy's plan for the protection of the town. Liking my own best it shall not be changed, and you have both on the enclosed card. The crosses shew the direction of the disaffected towns from which all mobs approach. All the N.E. of Manchester is riotous, the south quiet: Salford, i. e. all the right bank of the river, is always quiet. Which of the seven positions indicated should be occupied would depend on the place where the mob assembled; but in each my left is protected by the river, my right by the canal; and they are shorter than they look, as only the openings of streets need be guarded and a few windows occupied. The bridges could be easily barricaded and defended by the armed citizens; and from any one position men could be detached against the rioters if needed, or an advance made with my whole force: in each position there are one or more strong buildings.

"Shaw's plan certainly holds a greater portion of the town, but his flank to the north is exposed; he could be attacked in front and rear simultaneously, and if obliged to give ground would find it difficult to cross the canal or the river to reach the barracks: at least this is my view. Wemyss leans to Shaw's plan, but thinks every plan bad, and that we should act on the spur of the moment: yet the

best way to act on the spur most readily is to have a plan matured. We have, as every one says, one hundred thousand men to deal with, and such a mass cannot be treated as an ordinary riotous mob. The disposition which the people are called on to shew may be understood from the following hand-bill.

"'Dear brothers! Now are the times to try men's souls! Are your arms ready? Have you plenty of powder and shot? Have you screwed up your courage to the sticking place? Do you intend to be freemen or slaves? Are you inclined to hope for a fair day's wages for a fair day's work? Ask yourselves these questions, and remember that your safety depends on the strength of your own right arms. How long are you going to allow your mothers, your wives, your children and your sweethearts, to be ever toiling for other people's benefit? Nothing can convince tyrants of their folly but gunpowder and steel, *so put your trust in God my boys and keep your powder dry.* Be patient a day or two, but be ready at a minute's warning; no man knows to-day what to-morrow may bring forth: be ready then to nourish the tree of liberty,

WITH THE BLOOD OF TYRANTS.

"'You can get nothing by cowardice, or petitioning. France is in arms; Poland groans beneath the bloody Russian yoke; and Irishmen pant to enjoy the sweets of liberty. Aye dear brethren, the whole world depends on you for support; if you fail the working man's sun is set for ever! The operatives of Paris have again took possession of the city. Can you remain passive when all the world is in arms? No my friends! Up with the cap of liberty, down with all oppression and enjoy the benefit of your toil. Now or never is your time: be sure you do not neglect your arms, and when you strike do not let it be with sticks or stones, but *let the blood of all you suspect* moisten the soil of your native land, that you may for

ever destroy even the remembrance of your poverty and shame.

"'Let England's sons then prime her guns
And save each good man's daughter,
In tyrants' blood baptize your sons
And every villain slaughter.
By pike and sword, your freedom strive to gain,
Or make one bloody Moscow of old England's plain.'

"This is a nice piece of advice! Well, I have just had out three regiments and two guns, and they do not look as if they would be easily beaten!

"Lord de Grey, May 8th. Should it be necessary to call out the York Hussars I shall write as you desire. I am a strong advocate for calling out the yeomanry; it shews the disaffected that the loyal are both able and willing to put them down if they resort to physical force. The present apathy and total dependence on the regular troops is bad; it argues a want of self-reliance in society: force should be met by force on the spot. I say this to your lordship, because Lord Wharncliffe and yourself are the only two commanders of yeomanry that, as far as I am aware, have shewn any great readiness to come forward with proper public spirit: indeed one told me, that if I attempted to keep his corps on duty beyond their usual time half of them would resign! If there be occasion I shall give them the opportunity of making their public spirit manifest.

"I have this day written to Lord John Russell on the subject, as I do not consider myself as having authority to call out any corps, unless in case of actual riot. Now my object is to give a high tone to public feeling, and to daunt the republican portion of the community by one of those decided public expressions of loyalty which tells the world that, whatever diversity of opinion there may be as to what is good for the country, whenever the safety of the throne is endangered all unite to crush the disloyal. It is in this view only that I wish to have the yeomanry under arms; for

as to the Chartists and their pikes, I have men enough within musquet shot when they please to try their strength. Whether your lordship's views coincide with mine, or not, I should like to know: you know the feelings of your people, and your rank gives you power to judge how far my wishes are likely to be met by yeomanry corps in general.

"Mr. Phillipps, May 9th. I have deeply reflected upon the power which Lord John has placed in my hands. I mean as to calling out the yeomanry. It is an operation of great expence; but when I consider the extent of the present bad spirit, and of the armings, I cannot but hold the opinion that it is absolutely necessary to concentrate the greatest possible force to overcome the people of this district. The primary object is to save the country from devastation, expence must therefore be a secondary consideration. The Chartists affirm that they have 250,000 men armed in Lancashire alone: this is probably a lie, but if they can assemble 50,000 the most dreadful ravages would be committed by the march of such a body: hence, any inconvenience it may cause to gentlemen of the yeomanry to put them on permanent duty, will be trivial to what they would suffer if the Chartists get under arms. Therefore, in whatever light the project is viewed, whether as means of prevention or of combat, it is my decided opinion the yeomanry ought to be placed upon permanent duty, and that the disposable regiments should be called from Ireland without delay.

"I shall, with Lord John's approbation, call out the Yorkshire Hussars and order them to Leeds; and I have written to Sir Hew Ross to call upon the Westmoreland Yeomanry in case of an armed meeting taking place near Carlisle, which he expects. The calling out of these corps may possibly give to the country gentlemen a reliance on their own strength, in which feeling they seem to me, erroneously perhaps, greatly deficient, especially the magistrates. They ought to be assured that this is not a time for either disunion among themselves or apathy. These gentlemen trust more to the

protection received from the regular soldiers than is either becoming or safe; for there is a widely-spread spirit of mischief, and it must be opposed by a widely-spread spirit of loyalty and self-defence. The regular forces cannot be everywhere; if that were tried they would soon be nowhere, and already attempts to tamper with their loyalty are being made: this is a natural result from billets, and having troops from Ireland my wish is for Irish rather than Scotch, and Scotch rather than English. I am indeed very anxious for hiring barracks at any cost from what I hear of the attempts to seduce the soldiers; yet without reason for thinking evil has yet been effected, though that is hard to determine. The resignation of ministers is fearful.

"Lord Fitzroy, May 10th. There may be and there may not be a general insurrection; but the people menace the use of the pike and fire in all directions, which is perfectly practicable: therefore I distinctly assert that the general here should have power to go from town to town without check as to expence; and to hire buildings calculated for the safety of each post. To do this cheaply he should have an active engineer officer with him, and where detachments are demanded by the magistrates the town should pay the cost; but if it be a post chosen by government the public should be at the charge. If this is not done the detachments must be largely reinforced, without much security gained, for the more numerous the billets the greater the chances of the soldiers being seduced.

"The Under-Secretary, May 11th. Extracts. I am sorry Lord John doubts the expediency of calling out the yeomanry. There are no doubts on my mind; it is the best way to meet either a local or general rising; and as cavalry need drilling it will be good to get them rapidly under arms. This will oppose a front to the disaffected, man for man and better armed. This morning I hear the Chartists have told off thirty men to fall on each soldier. But I have also heard of a society amongst the labourers for assisting

each other when out of work, where a fine is inflicted on any man who speaks about Chartism. Great good has been done by the proclamation: everything is good that strengthens the faint and weak-hearted, which calling out the yeomanry will do.

"Lord Fitzroy, May 12th. With respect to artillery my opinion is formed on the only ground available now, public rumour. The Chartists assert that more than a million will assemble to march on London and demand the charter. All are to be armed but to do no injury unless attacked; yet, if attacked, they will devastate so many square miles of country in revenge. Such a wild project would render a collision with the troops inevitable, and to meet it my idea is that at Nottingham, which so far as I can judge is free from Chartism, it would be good to assemble cavalry, artillery, and infantry, to enable the general to move at once on Sheffield or Buxton, to keep the communication open with Wemyss, ready to march to his aid or to draw him up, and so act on the flank and rear of the multitude. Now with fifty dragoons nothing could be done against such a mass, but with added infantry and artillery much could be done; especially in Derbyshire, which is full of strong positions where with artillery, large bodies might be arrested. Through Derbyshire the chief part of the Chartists would move, and their convention call their numbers two hundred and fifty thousand: a fourth of the number would destroy the country.

"The same, 13th. Just returned from a meeting of magistrates, assembled at my request, to arrange acting as much as possible in concert. After three hours' consultation the impression on my mind is, that those gentlemen do not expect an outbreak, yet they think it can only be prevented by the exhibition of military force at the different points of danger. Some were for withdrawing the civil power altogether as inefficient; this I strongly opposed, but have consented to furnish troops for Leigh, Bury and Ashton, if good barracks are provided.

"Under-Secretary, May 14th. Met twenty magistrates. Mr. Forster was in the chair and managed the meeting with great tact: he seems a very able man, and brought them to an *intended* consistency of action, but that is not much to be depended on. The impression on my mind is that there will be a great assembly next week, but not with hostile intentions: however, so many fiery spirits and bad men will be there that it is impossible to say what will take place. If not interfered with the anger will probably evaporate in harangues and seditious language; for O'Connor and others gain such sums by the present state of things that they must wish it to continue and will seek to put off an outbreak, which would kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Moreover the people are tired of the physical-force party, and if magistrates and armed associations would but give them courage they would reject the violent Chartists: numbers now only join because a refusal would make them marked men.

"Lord de Grey, May 15th. I have to thank your lordship for your obliging and excellent letter of the 6th inst. relative to the yeomanry. It is of the greatest use to me, as giving a clear general view of the nature feelings and duties of yeomanry, which will serve to correct my own conduct should the more rigid military habits of the old soldier incline me to draw too largely on the exertions of the local force: an error easily fallen into. As yet however, I have only called for the services of two corps, one but for a day, the other to be in a great measure determined by the magistrates. In the late slight contest at the potteries the yeomanry were of the greatest service, and I am sure they will always prove so. Had the Chartists not been met by the yeomanry their attack would have been on the soldiers, and a deadly fire would probably have been the consequence. I am endeavouring to spirit the civil power here to more activity, for I find a lamentable desire to bring the soldiers and people at once in contact, as if no civil power existed!

"Lord Fitzroy Somerset, May 17th. This morning a letter from the commanding officer at Rochdale tells me, he has been informed by a respectable inhabitant, that at Burnley a gallery has been run out from a coal-pit to the officers' barrack; that great quantities of gunpowder have been introduced into Burnley, and it is intended to blow up the barrack. I dispatched Colonel Wemyss to examine the informer and take such steps as may be necessary. This morning also Colonel Wemyss got an anonymous letter, apparently from a soldier, worded in terms rather respectful, considering that its contents were to say he and his comrades were resolved to make common cause with the people; that they are the first to suffer by the new poor law when discharged, and that they will not fire on their countrymen. There is some reason to suspect it came from the 20th Regiment, as Colonel Wemyss tells me they have among them many men recruited from Manchester and its vicinity. Yesterday a deputation of Chartists came to the town-hall when Wemyss happened to be there, and their leader told him the quarter of the town which he represented, though considered by Wemyss and the magistrates as quiet and well disposed, is extensively armed and the people confident in their power to beat the troops. He said that his wish, and that of the other Chartist leaders, was to avoid violence in every way, but they would assemble half a million of people next week. These things do not alter my opinion that we shall have a quiet week.

"Sir C. O'Donnell, May 19th. Extract. Tell Sir Thomas White how confident I feel in his yeomanry: it would be impertinent to thank him or them, as their conduct springs from motives of patriotism, but I may be permitted to express my approbation of their soldier-like conduct. I hope they will not be too ardent, but keep cool and patient, recollecting that the people are misled, not bad, I mean the mass.

"Under-Secretary, May 19th. Applications have poured

in from Bradford, Dewsbury, Barnsley, Huddersfield, Ashton-under-Lyne, Bury, Preston and Congleton, all praying for troops, and troops I cannot give. At Bury it is possible that they will find a good barrack at the expence of the magistrates, and if so they can have a strong detachment. Lord Wharncliffe was here last night: he is gone to Barnsley and tells me he will answer for all that district with his yeomen.

"The state of the magistracy of this town is I conclude known to Lord John better than it is to me; but it appears totally unfit to deal with a meeting like that advertised for Saturday. The boroughreeve and mayor are more hostile to each other than can be described, between them there is no concert: nothing is apparently prepared, and, if I am rightly informed, they would not unite though Manchester were in flames. As a stranger I am no authority for this; but if half of what I hear from no ordinary authority be true, the state of this town is very unfortunate and very dangerous. I intend to attempt reconciling them, if but for one day.

"I have *full instructions* from the mayor how to proceed in celebrating her Majesty's birthday, but none how to serve her when 300,000 men are, next day, to assemble with the cap of liberty for their standard! I do not fear the intentions of the leading Chartists at this meeting, because my belief is they wish to make it respect the laws though met for their eventual subversion; but I do fear the dissensions of the magistrates, and the accidents which may happen in so large a meeting: we are not prepared. All that can be done by zeal and ability will be done by Messrs. Foster and Meade, but the occasion demands the whole force of the magistrates united, which I will endeavour to obtain, though without hope of success. Having had secret information since last writing I am still of opinion next week will pass without collision; but my informant positively asserts that the moment the Chartist petition is rejected fires will begin.

I understand six hundred men are to attend the Nottingham meeting, all well armed.

"To Lord Fitzroy Somerset. I believe these great meetings do not intend to break the peace. What we have most to fear in Manchester is the city war, which is going on fiercely. The boroughreeve and constables are against the mayor and corporation; nothing can reconcile them, and they will not make any preparation for the great meeting to be held on Saturday. All this puts the safety of this enormous town in jeopardy; neither side will act, so that if a breach of the peace occurs, instead of two thousand constables able to seize offenders, or if that be not enough four thousand, they will have none! They must do their work their own way. I have told them I cannot let the soldiers come in contact with such enormous masses of men, thousands of whom will be armed, unless some great danger be apparent and the safety of the town at stake. The races alone attract full fifty thousand, and we shall have races and Chartists together.

"Under-Secretary. No chance of bringing the mayor and boroughreeve together, but the last has prepared five hundred constables which, though not enough, is something: the meeting will no doubt pass off quietly. The assembly at Preston was rather a failure, but orderly. At Sutton-in-Ashfield, near Nottingham, they have prepared a quantity of caltrops or crowsfeet to lame the cavalry, and the meeting there has been named for to-morrow; it will probably pass like the rest. They all seem to consider the Manchester one on Kersall Moor to be the great affair. I am not uneasy, but there seems no doubt that the meeting will be immense, and I have entreated the boroughreeve not to interfere with flags. The plan for blowing up the barrack at Burnley is certainly going on, but we have not yet been able to trace the gallery to its full extent. The necessary steps are taken to prevent mischief and yet conceal from the miners that their diabolical project is discovered, so as to let

them commit themselves.——10 o'clock. I met the mayor with several other magistrates. We shall have a quiet meeting, and they are about to issue a proclamation to caution the people. An infamous proclamation by the Oldham agitators, quite worthy of the reign of terror, will probably be sent to you by Mr. Foster.

"The Master-General of Ordnance. I should be glad to have Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell 98th Regiment to command at Newcastle, but on the first change of regiments he would go, and a new man command, possibly at a ticklish moment, as has actually happened. If you could send me an old lieutenant-colonel of artillery not likely to be superseded he would be the man; I do not mean an old woman, but even that would be better than change. I am easy about insurrection now. For a fortnight it looked bad, but the move of troops, the arrival of regiments from Ireland, the guns rockets and rifles, appearing at Nottingham altogether gave so strong an idea of preparation, that the Chartist leaders begun evidently to *funk*. They saw they would be obliged to lead their pikemen in the field, and knowing Demosthenes did not like fighting, they, as orators, think it not derogatory to follow his example. They now preach to their poor followers not to come armed, a curious doctrine from those who a month ago preached only physical force. But though they have wisely given up this, and though I am sure, if we get over our great meeting here on Saturday, we shall have no open fight, still, believe me, *we shall not be quiet*. There is a deep feeling of discontent and great distress in the country, unaltered by the fears of those who exhorted them to arms.

"Lord Fitzroy. Major Rivers found at Burnley such a multitude of galleries and so low and dark he could make nothing of them; but he and the commanding officer and the barrack master have taken measures for a close observation of who goes into the mine, and what they are at. Major Rivers ascertained that no powder had been taken into the

mine, nor had any gallery reached the barracks; and my informant says it is quite safe as yet. The barrack master's house would be in the midst of it, and he is they say a sharp fellow who knows all the people about; he can see the mouth of the pit from his windows, and is, with the commanding officer, so much interested that I feel safe in their hands: when they cry danger, a deep trench will be cut outside and the gallery discovered.

"Under-Secretary, May 25th. I am just about to mount for Kersall Moor to have a look at the meeting and see their temper. One wing of the 10th came by a morning train yesterday; the other by an evening train, which made everybody suppose two regiments had arrived. We made also a great show on the 23rd, and it is generally thought we had then 3,000 men under arms: we had not 1,000! The civil force here is quite inadequate. What are five hundred constables and specials in a town which would turn out fifty thousand people to see a dog-fight? Manchester should have a well-organized police of at least a thousand men.

"Sir Hew Ross. I attended the meeting yesterday in coloured clothes, and will wager, that if thirty thousand were hanged none would have been left alive! Certainly twenty-five thousand very innocent people, and ten thousand women and children, would have been murdered! The remainder might have been Chartists, expressing orderly, legal political opinions, pretty much — don't tell this! very like my own! If there were five hundred regular rascals wanting bloodshed and pillage it would be the outside; fifty dragoons would have routed all that came to fight. Yet I know there were armed men among them, who would quickly have got up a row if the imposing force in the barracks had not spread an alarm more powerful than their exhortations. Many a man will join a row that will not begin one; and many a man would begin one when he sees no force arrayed against him, who would never attempt it if he sees there must be a fight. The government should

be prepared to consider the charter in parliament and cultivate the good-will of the people, or take measures for disarming them: there is no wisdom in letting complaints be rejected and pikes made.

"Under-Secretary, May 28. The Sutton-in-Ashfield meetings passed quietly. Mr. Irvin dispersed them in the first instance, but they immediately assembled elsewhere in double numbers: was this gentleman's conduct prudent? I am not aware that any other magistrate acted in a similar manner, but I suppose he had some strong motive. Lord John Russell could not feel more satisfaction than I did at the meeting here passing over so quietly: a bird escaped from a cage must have the sort of feeling I have now."

Neither his letters nor his journal take notice of two secret measures to bring the Chartist leaders to reason on this occasion; but the omission has been supplied by Mr. Bingham—a gentleman whose efforts to serve the public and prevent bloodshed were most laudable. He procured a secret introduction to a conclave of Chartist leaders, and thus relates the result. "When introduced he addressed them in these words, 'I understand you are to have a great meeting on Kersall Moor, with a view to laying your grievances before parliament: you are quite right to do so and I will take care that neither soldier nor policeman shall be within sight to disturb you. But meet peaceably, for if there is the least disturbance I shall be amongst you and at the sacrifice of my life, if necessary, do my duty. Now go and do yours!' This firmness and decision prevented any disturbance."

The other measure was more subtle. Having ascertained that the great body of the Chartists had an absurd confidence in five brass cannon which they had concealed, he secretly invited an influential leader, of whose good sense he had formed a favourable opinion, to come to the barrack at a given time when the royal gunners were prepared to handle their pieces as in action, taking the carriages to pieces, and

remounting &c. This proof of the superiority with which the royal guns would be worked in a fight convinced the Chartist witness, and his report had a powerful effect. But having now shewn how the general dealt with the authorities, his private letters and journals shall exhibit the honesty of his character.

" Col. W. Napier, June 3rd. Our great meeting passed off quietly. There was a very general feeling amongst the *respectables* that we should come to blows; and a fervent hope that the soldiers would *make an example.* Wemyss justly said there was as sanguinary a disposition as could well be among the civilians. I adopted several tests to ascertain numbers, and certainly, including women and children, they were under thirty thousand; this is worth recording as a testimony against the Chartist assertion that there were half a million. Mr. Bingham told me to-day that the presence of troops had prevented a row; that Doctor Taylor came from Glasgow expressly to lead them; that they consulted and decided we were too strong: moreover that they had and still have five pieces of brass cannon concealed. How far his information is good I cannot say; but the 10th Regiment having been suddenly brought up by railroad from Liverpool certainly upset their calculations of our strength. I also puzzled them by the march of a strong troop of dragoons from an out village the morning of the meeting: they thought it might be the advanced guard of a larger force.

" Journal, 8th June. Too busy to keep my journal for a month. From the 10th of May my time has been constantly employed, and the various reports which came in from all quarters, to the effect that the intended meeting would decide the fate of the country, were harassing. All the best informed of the rich people and the magistrates asserted that this district could easily turn out three hundred thousand people on Kersall Moor; and the Chartist newspapers asserted that they would turn out five hundred

thousand. I did not believe this, but secretly thought one hundred thousand might be assembled:—quite enough to render my position very dangerous. My two thousand men and four guns were indeed enough, if well handled, but not enough to afford mistakes. I had been long out of practice myself, my troops had been but lately brought together, were all young soldiers, and not a dozen of the officers had ever seen a shot fired: all this was awkward. But allowing that no error occurred, what a slaughter! Good God what work! to send grape-shot from four guns into a helpless mass of fellow-citizens; sweeping the streets with fire and charging with cavalry, destroying poor people whose only crime is that they have been ill governed and reduced to such straits that they seek redress by arms, ignorant that of all ways that is the most certain to increase the evils they complain of.

"On one side we have an ill-used people suffering want, and thinking, justly, that if they had their rights the want would be relieved. But how are those rights to be gained? By changing our government into a republic say the vagabonds who want power, and do not want to see their countrymen fed; who like Daniel O'Connell delight in seeing them poor and miserable, as a means of continuing their own popularity and power: keep the people aggrieved and we will keep power by declaiming against those grievances. On the other hand, what do the Whigs and Tories do? Madly refuse the people's rights, thereby convincing them the democrats speak truly, and that aristocracy will yield nothing; that the people are lost if they trust to any things but arms. Madness on both sides. One seeking right in a wrong way, the other wrong in a wrong way. Hence not only slaughter might have occurred, but the example of one rising might be followed throughout England; for the agitation is so general no one can tell the effect of a single shot: all depended upon avoiding collision. I met the magistrates every week and impressed

on them to the utmost of my power the necessity of not attacking the people, of letting them meet, and speak also, as they have a perfect right to do. That if any orator excited them to overt acts of treason, burning, murder, he should be arrested after the crowd dispersed; that if any went armed we could seize them as being armed. Otherwise to let the people alone. In all this Mr. Foster agreed with me and this line we pursued.

"The redoubted 25th of May came and not three hundred thousand but thirty thousand assembled. At this meeting Wemyss addressed a few of the people in high Tory oratory, and argued with a drunken old pensioner, fiercely Radical and devilish sharp; in ten minutes an eighth of the whole crowd collected round Wemyss and cheered him! These certainly were not Chartists. Some days before this I had a meeting with a gentleman, intimate with the Chartist leaders if not one himself, and begged him to shew them how impossible it would be to feed and move three hundred thousand men; that armed, starving and interspersed with villains, they must commit horrid excesses; that I would never allow them to charge me with their pikes, or even march ten miles without mauling them with cannon and musquetry, and charging them with cavalry when they dispersed to seek food: finally that the country would rise on them and they would be destroyed in three days!

"He said peace had put us out of practice, and we could not use our artillery; but he was soon convinced that was nonsense, and reported my observations to the leaders. I offered him no abuse, said many Chartists who acted on principle were to be honoured, others to be pitied as acting from ignorance, and certain to bitterly repent when they saw the terrible mischief that would ensue. This I believe had a good effect, and saying only what in my conviction was true it is probable I spoke well, for he seemed struck with the evils pointed out as inevitably attending even a disciplined army. At all events my meaning was good, urged

by my dread of the havoc impending, for every one believed that three hundred thousand men would assemble. Such a force in one mass had never met my eyes, and I was resolved not to let them come near me, but to fight with my guns, keeping cavalry on their flanks to prevent small parties foraging.

"How small accidents affect men's minds and decide events. The 1st Dragoons and 10th Foot came from Ireland with the 79th, but the last being in kilts terrified the Chartists more than a brigade of other troops. Again. Not being sure if the first outbreak would not be at Birmingham, where the *mulcibers* are bolder than the weavers, the 10th were kept at Liverpool as a reserve. Birmingham was quiet and the 10th came to Manchester by wings, one with the band, the other marching with drums and fifes: so I had ordered. The Chartists thought two regiments had joined, and Mr. B —— says this supposed increase of force decided them not to attack: thus the kilt, which was no force at all; and the division of the 10th, which was weakness, contributed largely to our security.

"Under-Secretary, June. By the accompanying letters you will perceive that the Wakefield magistrates, besides calling out the troops, which they have a right to do, appear to have detained those troops when no riot existed, but apparently for the purpose of using them as constables to arrest persons guilty of disorderly conduct. They also assumed a right to give such directions as to the stationing of soldiers as *may appear necessary*. Am I correct in supposing that exceeds their just authority? If so, I hope Lord John Russell will explan this to them. If not, I am relieved from the great responsibility which circumstances may in future give rise to: it will attach to the magistrates. A quarrel amongst railroad labourers was not an occasion for demanding the aid of troops. It is surely not good to call out troops on every trifling occasion, and thus throw the constable's staff into the shade, as if martial law existed. At

Bury and Hyde the call for troops was fully justified, and promptly responded to; it was also promptly responded to at Wakefield; but I am inclined to believe Lord John will concur in my opinion, that neither the demand for nor the detention of the troops at Wakefield was *necessary:*

"Sir Hew Ross, June. I cannot conceive how our accounts of barrack accommodation differ. But this, and other difficulties and irregularities, proceed from the monstrous absurdity of giving the army half a dozen heads instead of one. The Ordnance alter your barracks, yet I know nothing of it, because we belong to *separate armies:*—one commanded by the Master-General of the Ordnance, the other by the Master-General of the Infantry and Cavalry. Then comes a third:—the Master-General of Finance. Last, not least, the Master-General of the Home Office, more potent than all. Besides these, you and I have our little master-generals called magistrates. *God help the poor English army among so many cooks. Were it broth, it would have been spoiled long ago.*"

The Crimean miseries arise like spectres to confirm this prophecy!

TWELFTH EPOCH.

THIRD PERIOD.

WHEN these troubles were rendered innocuous by the dexterous management recorded in the preceding pages, the government, Ministers, Horse Guards and magistracy alike, became scornful of what had passed, treating the discontent as a momentary ebullition of a contemptible class: to them cessation of danger seemed the natural course, and they gave no credit to the man who had stopped the mischief. But had an officer of less talent and activity been in command; one less resolute to check the pernicious system of spreading the military in small detachments; or one of more violence and less humanity, a dreadful outbreak would probably have occurred, it might be a successful one: certainly it would have been devastating and sanguinary, and its repression would have rent Englishmen's affections from representative government in favour of republicanism.

Sir Charles Napier, seeing very clearly that the discontent would again gather head, strived to impress that truth on the authorities, yet in vain, until fresh commotion drew forth the same course of error, to be remedied by the same vigilance. Yet so little was he, or the crisis, understood, that we shall find his cautious perceptions of danger and judicious preparation, treated as conscious inability for command, and the gross insult offered of proposing advisers, and employing supervisors to prop up his weakness! Now, having averted evil at Manchester, he returned to Nottingham, and from thence watched all points with great solicitude, while he executed the ordinary military duties, involving an oppressive correspondence and frequent inspection journeys, one of which is thus noted.

Journal, June 19th. Having visited the quarters of the different regiments, I found those of Rochdale, Todmorden, Blackburne, Bolton-le-Moor and Wigan infamous. Is it not strange that now, when all depends upon the troops, government makes them uncomfortable and discontented both as to quarters and food, for they complain of having too little to eat; and this in the middle of disaffection and when every effort is being made to corrupt them. Their barracks are absolutely disgusting: moreover they are in the highest degree dangerous; for the Chartists may place marksmen at windows commanding egress from the barracks, and setting fire to the last shoot the soldiers as they attempt to form. It is in vain to remonstrate, the officials are so touchy and jealous as to be quite childish, and when children are so powerful it is best to let them alone. Nevertheless, cautiously it must be attempted for the soldiers' sake. Lord Hill wishes this, but he is so beset by the civil offices that he cannot act freely; and he is too noble a fellow for me to encrease his difficulties by want of patience; Lord Fitzroy is the same: they cannot do as they wish or the soldiers would be well lodged.

"Lancaster delighted me, so far as a flying visit enabled me to judge. Westmoreland and its lakes were delightful. The beauty of all that scenery is great. Those gems of bright waters in their rude mountain setting, bursting on one's sight in fresh changing forms with all their lights and shadows, their mists and showers, exhilarate the spirits and give a calmness and happiness to the aching mind which seems like the peace of Heaven, still lingering on earth though driven from the usual haunts of man. My mind wants peace and quiet. I could live on the banks of one of those lakes and feel happy. I always am so when calm scenery and calm people are around me; but my lot is cast in trouble, or rather it has been so chosen. Nothing happens to man that is irksome but what he has himself chosen; all may be traced to his own folly: and yet, who

made us foolish! Let that pass, suffice it that we are so, unless we take the only course that is left for wisdom: take things as they are and make the best of them; there is no real wisdom but that.

"Saw merry Carlisle. The old castle has been spoiled by foolish people, but that is no great matter. Naworth is the fortress of belted Will Howard, and a snug berth he had. His bed, his books and reading desk, are all there, nearly as he left them when he was called to be judged as he had judged. Perhaps with more mercy, as with more wisdom, though probably he only hanged fellows who were much better hanged than unhanged: at least their neighbours were better for their hanging. The belted man had however only to deal with wild border hordes: Hew Ross who is as good a soldier as he, has to guard against men whose object is to gain their just rights, and are only wrong because they cast away their real strength—that of reason.

"From Carlisle by Newcastle and Sunderland to York, far-famed York and its cathedral. How many hypocrites have entered there to preach and blaspheme and oppress the poor; it almost makes me wish the burning had been complete: but it is so pretty! What a magnificent pile! I would like to live near it, to go in and pray and be calm if but for an hour. Yet it is not God's palace! The border of the lake, the top of the mountain:—there! there is calmness, there is God's temple! There He may be worshipped, there one can live in peace and die fearlessly, the soul unruffled! My command is great. No, not command: responsibility, great and irksome, but no power. I see wrong and dare not put it right, and that is called command, There is nothing to flatter ambition, absolutely nothing; it is indeed better than a miserable lodging in Bath or Dublin, but it is not so good as the healthy and more noble one of a country life.

"Under-Secretary, Nottingham, June 29th. O'Connor was here yesterday. His audience amounted to about two thou-

sand sufficiently enthusiastic but most of them dispersed when he had done speaking, disregarding other orators. Everything was orderly and quiet. I find there are meetings held on Bulwell Common every Sunday, three times a day. At these meetings Stevens' political sermons are read: the demand for subscriptions has made many hang back, but has not changed their opinions.

"Lord Fitzroy, July 2nd. I find a soldier of the Rifles attends all the meetings here; he is said to be a man of ability, is a chosen man, and remarkable for having no comrade and keeping aloof from the other men. I think the best way to deal with a man of this kind is to reason with him and advise him shewing the impropriety of a soldier going to such meetings, with which he may be placed in collision at any moment. I think such a man may be made a good soldier of by fair words and reasoning. A mill was burned near Manchester, but the people here have changed their tone: instead of pikes and physical-force lectures they make it a religious question and have political sermons."

The Mitchel of the next letter, a colonel and author, thought Napoleon no general, and was intent to prove that musquets and bayonets were inferior to swords for war. Charles Napier adduced in opposition a letter from General Wolfe describing the inferiority of the sword at Culloden, but the colonel treated this authority with as much contempt as he did Napoleon's military genius.

"Colonel W. Napier, June 29th. I got your letter about Mitchel just when setting off to be invested with the red ribbon, for which they gave me twenty-four hours' leave; and ill could that time even be spared from the half-yearly inspections, for the piles of reports returns and books of all kinds now required are endless. It is impossible for a general to do all that is required, and I conclude most of them do very little. If Napoleon Alexander and Cæsar were one man he could not fill up one inspection return honestly, examining everything he signs, and I have eleven.

Do not speak of this for they are absurdly touchy; but never did you see anything so exceedingly ridiculous as the printed questions of these half-yearly inspection returns. *Is the surgeon fully qualified to fulfil his medical duties?* Upon the answer the man's character is to hang! *Are the beards of the officers non-commissioned officers and privates, cut according to regulation? Does the parson preach a good sermon?* &c. Was there ever such silliness?

"No time to answer Mitchel. He takes Home's and other accounts of the relative numbers at Culloden and rejects Wolfe's; he assumes that Home is better authority because he served in the rebel ranks; Wolfe who was a captain on the other side is no authority! With time to reply I will, meanwhile, to use your words, Let him gnaw the Wolfe's bone.

"Every one, including Lord Hill, Lord John and Lord Fitzroy, thinks the political storm has blown over, they will in time find it is not. The poverty is great, the discontent great, the hope from changes great; the present quiet results from the summer work, the demand made by the convention for money, and the fear caused by the assembly of troops at the points where the leaders designed to begin their operations. The government is diminishing the troops and summer will pass quietly; yet in winter the troops must be again collected, and again we may slip quietly through: but is this governing a country? You and I know the remedy, but were we to tell them, the only question in their minds would be whether Bedlam or Newgate was the place for me. I have however nothing to complain of, because, thanks to chance, things have gone smoothly; because the hour of trial has not arrived, and they mistake expedients and palliatives for remedies. At times I am tempted to give up, not from ill-temper for nothing can exceed the flattering kindness with which I am treated, but because the real state of the country is known to me without the power of doing real good.

" I hate the poor law, but it is not a cause of the mischief in itself, it is only a train to fire the mine: the evils produced by the manufacturing system and the debt are attributed by the people to the new poor law, which aggravates instead of assuaging their feelings as the old poor law did. Well, if we are resolved to sacrifice everything to the *cotton lords* and establish the principle of turning an agricultural into a dense population of men women and children without morals or health; a population starving one week, earning forty shillings the next, of which, from the corruption in which they are bred and in which they breed, they do not save a penny; if, when these dense masses starve by the rise of a farthing per pound in cotton we still go on as hitherto, let us prepare for keeping the operatives down by force, building barracks like fortresses, holding military possession of the country, establishing a paid magistracy and increasing the force with more troops, or a rural police. We neither remove real evils nor prepare for their effects. What does our present distress arise from in Lancashire? The cotton lords work as little raw cotton as possible, because they want to compel the Yankees to lower its price; they know Jonathan wants money and must sell: it is a trial of strength between English and Yankee cotton lords to make the Yankee come down a halfpenny, and the former starve thousands of wretches whose health and morals they have ruined, or rather never allowed them to have.

" Journal, July 1st. In June I ran up to town to be invested. The showy brilliancy of the court has something very childish and trifling. In the midst of embroidery, gold lace, stars, orders, titles, and a crowd of soldiers, I met many an old comrade of the Peninsular war:—worn, meagre, greyheaded, stooping old men, sinking fast! I too have one leg in the grave. When we had last been together we were young, active, full of high spirits, dark or auburn locks! Now all are changed, all are parents, all full of cares. Well, the world is chained

hand to hand, for there were also young soldiers there, just fledged, meet companions for their young Queen: they too will grow old, but will they have the memory of battles when like us they hurry towards the grave?

"There was our pretty young Queen receiving our homage, and our old shrivelled bodies and grey heads were bowed before her throne, intimating our resolution to stand by it as we had stood when it was less amiably filled: I wonder what she thought of us old soldiers! We must have appeared to her like wild beasts, and I dare say she looked at us as she looks at the animals in the Zoological Garden. Lord Hill is old and has lost his teeth; poor Sir John Jones looked like a ghost, and Sir Alexander Dickson is evidently breaking. Thinking how these men had directed the British thunders of war I saw that death was the master, the brilliance of the court vanished and the grim spectre stared me in the face: his empire is creeping over all! Yes! we are in the larder for worms and apparently very indifferent venison.

"Under-Secretary, July 10th. There was a consultation among the Chartists in this neighbourhood when the Birmingham riots begun, and it was proposed to march at once to their assistance; but after discussion it was voted that the troops would interrupt the march and the enterprize was abandoned: one hundred pistols are said to have been distributed. The causes of Chartism remain, and be assured the present apparent decline of it is not sound, the spirit is abroad and vigorous.

"Lord Fitzroy, July 15th. Ross has sent troops to Durham, the colliery districts being disturbed. At Newcastle they are not quiet, neither are they at Carlisle; and from the latter place he had been obliged to send a detachment to Cockermouth. From Bolton-le-Moors I hear, that the manufacture of pikes has increased, and Wemyss hears that three hundred stand of arms were introduced into Stockport during the last week. In short

the agitation is strong everywhere, and at Sutton-in-Ashfield meetings are held nightly.

"Under-Secretary, July 15th. I hear the plan of the malcontents is to rise in different parts where troops are not quartered, so as to divide and harass them, and into this trap I fear the magistrates will readily fall. I said to you, and am sure of it, that the spirit of revolution is strong and increasing, but, as before, it wants leaders money and concert: yet the latter is evidently on the increase.

"Colonel W. Napier, July. I really hardly know what to think about writing to Lord Fitzroy as you advise, though I have several times thought of doing so; for of all those who seem to treat the people's feelings lightest he is the man. He seems to think it only a passing discontent, and he is so clever a fellow, and so good a fellow, that to own the truth he almost staggered me. He would have done so, had not my opinion, formed long since, been confirmed by all I see here. The Birmingham work has shewn pretty clearly how we are ruled"—a great tumult had been caused there by the violence of the authorities. "I only know what the papers tell, for the troops there and at Weedon are not in my district; my hope was to have been sent there, not as liking it but to have stopped the mischief by interfering with the magistrates.

"At Manchester I found the magistrates reasonable, yet several were for stopping the meeting by force, and would have done so with any encouragement; but I swore, if they attempted it not a soldier should quit the barracks till both constables' and magistrates' heads were broken. This was bravado, for I dare not refuse to obey their orders, but the two stipendiary magistrates were with me.

"The London police should not have been sent down to Birmingham. Such a town should be able to hold its own if the magistrates are the right sort of fellows, and one thing strikes me as curious—if the people were armed, how came the police to escape? The leaders cry vengeance for the

assault made on them. Well, they were assaulted and those leaders were there in numbers, yet a handful of police attacked them and escaped with three or four men wounded. My opinion also is, that the rural police, which Lord John said he is forming, will do no good in the long run; it is good for me though, by placing a strong body between the soldiers and the crowd; a body which, by what we have seen at Birmingham, will nine times out of ten beat the mob: the police were anything but cowed, and with a few more comrades would not have required any soldiers. However one cannot hear truth and the whole thing ought to be inquired into. The magistrates of my district are demanding troops. At Carlisle, at Newcastle, at York, here, there, everywhere, the steam is again on, and in this neighbourhood and Manchester pretty strongly too. Will not this convince them in London that the thing is not over? My reports from Manchester say pike-making is redoubled, yet they will not believe! Of what use is it to write? They trust to the soldiers! but when a rising is put down in blood, what then?

"There are many Chartists among the Rifles; one in particular is an able fellow but I have information of all he does and he is not a bad man. I told the Horse Guards this, and also that my notion was to speak to him rationally as man to man, and seek to convince him that a handful of people had no right to force their opinions upon a nation &c. The answer from Lord Fitzroy was that he had spoken to Lord Hill and Lord John Russell, and Lord John thought it better not for fear of its getting into the papers: that it would be better to make one of my staff speak to the man! Now you may easily conceive young William being floored in argument by an expert Chartist; or O'Donnell either; he indeed would be more easily confuted, as he never studies the subject and piques himself on never entering into politics. My whole success, or hopes of it, rested on my being known to hold the man's own opinions, and only differing as

to the means taken to give them effect: upon the general himself reasoning with him; on my being an old rifleman. Thus I might stop the taint, but if I do as Lord John advises the man will gain a victory and be confirmed in his views. Interrupted by applications for troops from Cockermouth, Durham, and other places. One letter tells me the Chartists are advised not to collect in great bodies, but to harass the soldiers by rising where there are no troops. The stir is general, and certainly magistrates will be my bane; I begin to know the look of one now as readily as one does an officer in plain clothes: they have a regular *asking-for-troops* face! This is a new adjective, a magistrate's adjective, which is as hateful to me as ever was a French verb.

"Dr. Hutchinson, nephew of the 52nd surgeon, attended us here. I described your illness to him. He said it was the ball pressing upon some large nerve, or upon the backbone, which being cased with some nervous membrane throws the skin into agonies that no one can have an idea of without feeling them. He has published several cases of this attack upon the nervous system of the skin, arising from rheumatic affections falling upon the membrane, or whatever it is. The same effect would he says inevitably be produced by the bullet pressing so as to create inflammation, and he has no doubt of the ball causing your ill-health.

"I fear to write to Lord Fitzroy. A few days ago I merely said that—I saw no way to meet the evil but, to make concessions on one hand, and on the other to organize a strong constabulary, to stand between the troops and the people. His answer was. 'Lord Hill desires me to point out your observation, and to suggest that you avoid all remarks having allusion to political questions; and I am to say, without entering into the merits of the question, that it is clear to Lord Hill, that neither he as commander in chief, nor you as the major-general commanding the northern district, can have anything to do with the matter; it is therefore better that you should confine yourselves to what is

strictly your provinces as military men. The position of officers is so peculiar in responsible situations, and at the same time so difficult, that it is highly desirable we should not add to our embarrassments by travelling out of the strict line of duty, either in line or in action.'

"After this I have no more to say. I gave no advice as to what they ought to do, but merely said as a fact that discontent was so general I saw no other means to meet it with effect: and that in a confidential letter! You see how fearful they are of looking facts in the face, or of involving themselves in difficulty. Perhaps they are right: governed as the country is, if Lord Hill acted otherwise he would be at daggers with the ministry in a week. I have however all along kept up a strong expression of my views, both to the Home Office and the Horse Guards. Eight detachments were recently ordered in five days, whereupon I wrote to the Home Office that I could not be answerable for accidents arising, either from attacks on small posts or the debauching of the troops, or for discipline of regiments if this division of my force took place. The attempts to seduce the troops are incessant, in my belief unsuccessfully, but the nicest management is necessary and is not used.

"As to the police question, we must fight our battle with the people as we can, not deal with them as we ought; but if this state of things continues the army will be debauched. I agree with Lord John, that a local civil force may be more constitutional, but it will be inferior to an organized body from London. 1°. Because it will be ill managed. 2°. Because it will act with less impartiality. Soon will it be found that instead of advising me not to allude to political questions it would be better to take my advice. At Hull the soldiers and mob joined to thrash the police."

His prognostication of renewed violence from discontent was quickly realized.

"Journal, July 20th. The work of this district is too much for one man. I ought to be at Manchester, but unless under

positive orders who can resolve to run up a chimney? Some duties are not to be done voluntarily, and to live in a chimney is one. Manchester is the chimney of the world. Rich rascals, poor rogues, drunken ragamuffins and prostitutes, form the moral; soot made into paste by rain the physique, and the only view is a long chimney: what a place! The entrance to hell realized! The alarm is now general again. I wrote to my brother William that it would be so when all was quiet in June: he wanted me to tell the high authorities all my views at once, but I did not; they would take huff, they are so timid.

"Under-Secretary. The spirit of democracy is strong, and increasing, and of a sanguinary collision there is great danger finally, though not now, the present excitement will subside: but for how long? It may be presumptuous to give an opinion, but my belief is that concession must be made to the people's feelings, or the establishment of a strong rural police hurried on. I would do both, thinking them absolutely necessary: if the police force be not quickly increased we shall require troops from Ireland.

"Lord Fitzroy, July. The magistrates of this town—Notts—behave with great propriety and good sense. Along the eastern coast up to Newcastle all appears quiet, but it is said to be in a dangerous state, and at Carlisle Ross says the people are ready to break out—the magistrates tell him so. In the demand for troops at Wigton, the Chartists are said to parade the streets with drum and fife, and fire guns: from thence down through Lancashire we have reports of meetings and agitations, no acts of violence, but arming goes on vigorously. With all this my opinion is that the Chartist leaders wish to avoid a collision with the military.

"Colonel Wemyss, July 25th. That the Chartists make such a quantity of cartridges is a stiff fact; but our not daring to seize them is a stiffer! If the magistrates can prove seditious exhortations to the people by any speaker

they ought to arrest him, but not in the midst of an assembly highly excited by his oratory; they should follow him to his quarters and there arrest him: that is the right way to go to work.

"Under-Secretary. Condensed. July 24th. All detachments should be composed of infantry and cavalry, none ought to be of less than two companies and a troop; none should be in barracks situated amidst houses in the centre of a town, because fire applied to the houses would burn out the troops, who would probably be massacred while escaping the flames: the cavalry horses would inevitably be destroyed. Shut up among houses, even if not fired, soldiers could not profit from discipline, and attempts to issue forth would generally be destruction, as the enemy, being prepared to prevent escape, would oppose barricades and have marksmen in the opposite houses. If a detachment remained shut up it would be useless as a protecting force, and its own danger great. Officers with small detachments are generally separated from their men, and in a night-attack would be killed while seeking to rejoin their soldiers. Small detachments are easily shut up and may be forced to surrender from hunger and thirst before they can be succoured, especially as their sixty rounds of ammunition would be quickly exhausted.

"A strong detachment quartered on the outskirts of a town is free. It can make head against an enemy, keeping him at gun-shot distance; it can get out if necessary, and attack; it can receive other detachments which strive to unite from the country. In case of arson the soldiers can issue and take possession of other buildings, or keep to the country. It can send a part to aid the inhabitants, or retreat if necessary to some other post: in short a strong detachment lodged in the outskirts of a town commands that town, whereas, posted in the middle of a town it is commanded. These are matters to be attended to always, and

shall never be lost sight of by me because timid magistrates choose to take alarm. Durham, and every other town, can surely supply a house in their suburbs.

"It is true that there is no great fear of the troops, but let an accident occur and the whole aspect of affairs will change. The Chartists are numerous, and should one detachment be destroyed the soldiers would lose confidence; they would be shaken while the rebels would be exalted beyond measure. Their defeat finally would be certain, but much blood would be shed which need not be shed. Some soldiers have quarrelled with the police at Hull; such accidents are unlucky; the police are odious to the people and quarrels of this nature put the soldiers and the people in tacit confederation against the police, which may produce mischief. The Chartist leaders are not such fools as to let this advantage escape them, they will turn it to account in their tamperings with the loyalty of the troops.

"All these things induce me to press earnestly on Lord John the keeping of the soldiers in masses, the *prestige* of mastery is with them, and their high discipline and loyalty will enable them to maintain their superiority. No man can measure the limits of the present danger, it is not possible to do so; but the troops form a strong barrier around the throne; one which, with proper management, can be implicitly relied on: but if cut up into detachments a taint may begin. Much better will it be to throw out the advanced posts of a constabulary force, and thus keep the enemy off: treason cannot easily enter the ranks if the army be kept in masses. The rifleman has done no harm here because his comrades are in barracks; but were the men in billets he would ere this have made half of them Chartists.

"Major Creagh. What you tell me in *strict confidence* must go to Lord Hill; there can be nothing hidden from him that is important to know. The safety of the public is far too valuable to be risked by over delicacy; it is our first, our greatest duty—*speaking humanly* as the new-light

people say, and very correctly. I hold this quarrel with the police to be a very serious affair. You were quite right to let me know your private opinion, and it is equally necessary that Lord Hill should see it. I can give you but one rule. Smooth things, reason with all parties, condemn what is wrong in either, but not with acrimony; speak kindly and explain the mischief and wrong there is in these quarrels between men serving the Queen. Speak with the leader of the police also: explain to him the danger of his men being over-officious, if such be the case, in this interference with your men; request of him to speak to them if he is a sensible man, if not ask him to let you do so. In that case do not tell them they are wrong but explain, that as soldiers are under rigid military law which brings them up for all offences it is better not to be too sharp upon them for offending against police law, if they do so, unless in violent cases, but rather to help them out of a scrape than into one. In short, throw all the good humour you can into the matter for at present we want more oil in our salad than vinegar.

"The police force is going to be much increased; it will save the soldiers a world of unpleasant duty and we must work well with them. They have a very difficult part to play. We face rioters in bodies well armed; a policeman, nine times out of ten is alone with a stick, and surrounded by all sorts of rascals. If your soldiers recollect this they will see how ungenerous it would be, as well as wrong, to add to the troubles of the police, who, on their part, should not interfere with the soldiers unless they are doing mischief. Explain these things to both parties: and read what I say to the chief of police, if he is a sensible man. Always enforce on the soldiers that being out after hours renders them culprits, and therefore they draw any bad treatment on themselves.

"'Under-Secretary, July 29. If Lord John sends for troops from Ireland, which I earnestly hope he will do, it is desirable that regiments which yet have the greatest number of

Irishmen should be selected: the difference of religion and country offers additional guards for the soldier's fidelity. The quarrel between the soldiers and police must be managed with great caution. I did not move the 81st from Hull, because the quarrel would then be taken up by the next regiment and the mischief would spread.

"July 31st. The Chartists of this town and neighbourhood mean to go to church in procession, heading the troops: there is no reason to apprehend improper intentions, but it becomes awkward because of their numbers. I have decided to make no change in the church parade. If there be room for the troops they will enter the church; if not, those for whom there is no room must remain outside. Nothing in the conduct of the troops shall give pretext for a riot; but were I not to let the troops go to church it would be to presuppose, what I do not believe is intended, an insult to the military, and so presupposing to submit to the imaginary affront. Were I to hasten our parade and forestall places it would be entering into an undignified struggle unbecoming the character of her Majesty's troops: if we cannot find room it is a natural occurrence and there an end.

"I shall be present and will take care no insult is offered to the sacredness of the place, either by soldiers or Chartists; and shall see that the church authorities are free to exercise their functions: in this view the clergymen and magistrates shall be consulted and requested to caution their people against undue zeal, which the presence of soldiers might otherwise induce them to exhibit. But while I take these steps to preserve the peace and decorum becoming a congregation assembled to worship the Almighty, I shall have a strong picquet in barrack under arms, in case intemperate people should resolve on violence and insult. There is much alarm in the town about this matter, but it is among a certain class and in my belief without foundation. There was a meeting last Wednesday in Nottingham Park: it took

place at night, about a thousand men, no women or children.

"Lord Fitzroy, July 31st. I lose no opportunity of telling Lord John Russell the great danger the magistrates will draw on us by insisting on detachments—danger to discipline, danger of defeat, danger to loyalty which is the worst: the drunken rascal of the 81st at Hull exclaimed *Damn your eyes we are all Chartists.* Then the hand-bill given to the soldiers at Manchester; the letter to the corporal of the 34th; the rifleman here! These things, occurring far from each other, being put together, the inference is that the troops should be kept in masses; such taints could then be detected: with small detachments fear is always an agent of corruption, but cannot operate on masses.

"Colonel Wemyss, July 31st. At Wigton the magistrates picked out their confidential people to be special constables: when assembled to be sworn they said, Oh! never mind we will keep the town quiet. What! are you armed? Yes! every man his musquet, and we will soon settle your forty soldiers if they are saucy. So much for the *élite* of Wigton."

He was now, as he had feared, entirely overborne by the indirect power of the magistracy, or rather of particular magistrates who forced the foolish weakness of the Home Office; and that blood did not flow was chiefly owing to his extreme vigilance and wide knowledge of the Chartists' secret designs; to the influence he obtained over the wisest leaders by his firmness and gentleness towards the people, combined with his known opposition to the violence of some civil authorities who were eager to bring the soldiers into action. Meanwhile his remonstrances against the errors of government were as freely urged as his rebukes to the Chartists, but did not meet with such a reasonable response. Conjoined with his previous resistance of personal wrong from Lord Ripon, and his avowed politics at Bath, they raised a secret but implacable feeling of dislike which pursued him to his latest hour. His genius was indeed too

great to please or to be stifled, but his spirit was too strong to be overborne, and once placed in a prominent position his course was that of a meteor for the nation: for the government however he was only a man to be thwarted and rejected, unworthy of notice save in enmity.

"Journal, July 25th. The Chartists say they will keep the *sacred month*. Egregious folly! they will do no such thing; the poor cannot do it, they must plunder and then they will be hanged by hundreds: they will split upon it, but if mad enough to attempt it they are lost.

"July 26th. The pot boils every way. Rumours of war from Carlisle—merry no longer! from Newcastle, from all parts of Lancashire. Demands for troops will soon multiply. The country magistrates are a miserable set generally; they insult the people, are hated, and on every alarm grow frightened. The magistrates of towns have a little more pluck, but the country magistrates bully them, finally inoculate them with their own fears, and then pour in calls for troops. If the soldiers are spread as the magistrates want, the men will soon lose discipline, grow insolent to their officers, and when punished will turn Chartists: I shall be defeated by the magistrates they are so powerful, but the safety of the country is at stake and I will do my utmost.

"As matters stand I am for a strong police, but the people should have *universal suffrage*—it is their right. The *ballot*—it is their security and their will, and therefore their right also; and the new poor law should be reformed: but while doing these things, I would have a strong police to stand between the soldiers and the people. My reasons for this are as follows. Good government consists in having good laws well obeyed. England has abundance of bad laws, but is every man to arm against every law he thinks bad? No! Bad laws must be reformed by the concentrated reason of the nation gradually acting on the legislature, not by the pikes of individuals acting on the bodies of the executive. The law, good or bad, is to be obeyed, and

the magistrate is to enforce obedience. How? By his constables. But there are now so many people who think the law ought not to be obeyed, who have armed themselves for disobedience, and are moreover so well instructed in the quibbles of law, by which it may be safely broken under cover of its own protection, that the magistrate is frightened, morally and physically. Moreover in cases where his courage is equal to the work he has no force with which to act: he may be a bold and clever man but he is still a cypher.

"I will not take an obnoxious Mr. U—— for my magistrate, but Colonel Wildman. He has ability, courage, activity, generosity, and all the influence of property. Yet Colonel Wildman shall not be taken at Newstead Abbey. He shall be transplanted to the dense, demoralized population of Burnley or Ashton-under-Lyne, or Manchester, where his virtues would not be understood, or valued if they were; opposed to men with whom he is only known as the magistrate, and as such looked upon as a foe. How is he to be obeyed? Where are his constables? Two or three, perhaps two or three dozen, shopkeepers quailing under fears of all kinds, natural fears, fear of exclusive dealing, of private vengeance. Men as helpless as their magistrate are thus opposed to a rough set who are perfectly aware that these constables are helpless, and are themselves therefore, every man a hero in the crowd, ready to commit any crime his heart may devise. What is the result? Outrage! Call in the troops! But to that there are two objections.

"First you must have an immense force, with its expences, to give every magistrate a guard: all the troops in the northern district would not furnish a single county, and then the second objection arises—dispersion of troops, which destroys discipline. In a few years they would become amalgamated in opinion with the people, you would have a Chartist army not a royal one, and one you had armed and drilled! What then would become of the throne and constitution?

Lost! There would be no 'kicking against the pricks' the bayonet would be master. My principle is not to risk such danger. Correct bad laws and do the people justice: this is indispensable if we would have peace. But I am talking of supporting the laws as they are. To avoid danger to the throne you must keep the army clear of the people, and fortify it in principle against treason. How then are you to support the magistrates? By an effective police force constituted either on the principle of concentration or that of local election; or, if you please, a compound of both.

"Manufactures have formed an artificial state of society: a dense polluted population dependent for food on accidental variations of trade, one day in full work and high wages, the next neither work nor wages, and all willing to break the laws. To meet this you must have a strong police, and if it become contaminated with the democratic spirit you have your military force in reserve and the throne is safe. Whereas if the military are contaminated you have no reserve, the throne would be first degraded and then overturned. For these reasons we should in our present state of bad government, public debt, manufacturing and general discontent, have stipendiary magistrates and an armed police.

"Let us suppose the whole people wanted and could force a republic. What would result? A desperate struggle between the manufacturing and landed interests, ending in a civil war, to be decided finally by a military chief who would not be fool enough to wear a hat when a crown was in his hand. Nor such a rogue either: for what patriotic man would let his country be governed by dozens of squabbling republican fools, when his own good sense and single will could rule and guide her aright? This is foreign to the subject, but speaking of the means to oppose attempts to make England a republic, I cannot help a glance at what our state would be if they were successful.

"They have asked my opinion about having more troops from Ireland. Surely they are wanted when all the north

threatens and every post brings demands for soldiers from Carlisle and Newcastle-upon-Tyne down to Newcastle-under-Line; when all Lancashire is armed and in a ferment; when I cannot say at what moment a general rising may take place—if one is to be, and truly there are signs. I have indeed nineteen regiments, but also half England to garrison and defend.

"And then such magistrates! three from Loughborough sent for troops to *save life and property*—their messenger came at a gallop and a troop was in a few minutes in full trot for the rescue, my utmost hope being that it might help to extinguish flames and bury the heroic 'petty sessions' with military honours in the smoking ruins of Loughborough!! The troop arrived, the town was in alarm, but not in flames; the magistrates were alive, but had removed, the nearest to six miles' distance! Captain King, unable to act, sent to seek the runaways, and at 10 o'clock at night by threatening to leave magistrates and Chartists together got one of the former in presence. I reported all this and Lord John gave them—*a gentle reproof!* Saying, if evil happened it would be on their shoulders.

"July 28th. Great anxiety about the collieries in the north. I have sent Campbell 98th—now Sir Colin—there from Hull. The colliers had better be quiet, they will have a hardy soldier to deal with; yet he will be gentle and just, or he should not be there, for I want not bullies to join the civilians' cry for murdering the people, to *make an example*. One may be required, so much the worse, but let not soldiers seek occasion for it, as almost all the civil gentlemen seem to me to do: let us avoid that as we would sin and death!

"July 30. Alarm! Trumpets! Magistrates in a fuss. Troops! Troops! Troops! North, South, East, West. I *screech* at these applications like a gate swinging on rusty hinges, and swear! Lord, how they make me swear! The people are not ready for a fight though: there may be bloodshed and burnings, but no fighting.

TWELFTH EPOCH.

FOURTH PERIOD.

HITHERTO no indication of bodily suffering has marked Sir C. Napier's correspondence; yet the following extract from his journal shows that he was all this time in dread of the most terrible and heart-breaking of personal afflictions:—blindness!

"Journal. The Home Office and the Horse Guards write that they think little of the quarrel between the soldiers and police: this is to be seen:—but shall I see then at all? I fear not. Blindness! My God what an awful thought! it makes my blood run cold. Perhaps I may die first and be spared that suffering. My poor mother! How I think of her suffering, and sometimes reproach myself for not remaining for ever at her side: but I did all things as she wished. My own hour of darkness now comes apace, I must bid adieu to reality for ever! Nor face, nor form, nor aught will be seen more by me; all must be imagination, except pain, until blessed, welcomed death, comes to send me to those who are gone! Yet God tempers trials and will temper mine so as to be bearable, and with courage we can bear much. And after all death is not a distant event for a man of fifty-seven, especially when smashed as my body has been. All in God's good time. We can neither hurry nor retard the hour of fate: all that a brave man has to do is to look his trials in the face without flinching, and thank heaven they are no worse. Yet, if that stuffed feeling in the nose from my wound should come on also, what would become of me! Oh! God! I will repine not even at the

loss of sight, at anything if spared that horror of horrors! I will not think of it."

Here let it be remembered with what fortitude and even gaiety he bore, when in Lisbon, the dreadful suffering alluded to above; how his letters sported with torture to save his mother and sisters mental distress: but never did bodily suffering impede his course of action, never indeed, until this outburst, did he even let it be known that he suffered. The intrepid spirit that sustained without complaint, the pain of broken limbs when a boy, the horrors and sufferings of Coruña when a youth, sufficed during manhood and old age to suppress all evidence of agony, until the approach of the most terrible of ills forced from him this one and only groan of his life for himself.

The sacred month of the Chartists, in which all were to cease working as an evidence of the power of labour over all other interests, was now at hand.

"Journal, August 2nd. Sacred month! Do they imagine they can make the people of England stop work for a month? How are they to feed? Rob. What! All England turn thieves in a day. Why the thieves, were they two millions, would be floored instantly by the ten millions who were not thieves! It is a farce, but the attempt may produce a tragedy and to prevent that is in some degree my affair. I can however only do my own work and with such magistrates God knows what may happen.

"Lord John Russell, August 2nd. The accompanying sketch will convey the clearest answer to your enquiries, and the detachments in danger, chiefly from fire and position, are marked on it. Should a rising take place all communication between those places would be intercepted. The organization of lodges is a powerful one if well executed, which it probably is; at the same time it is more theoretical than practical for the field: it will prepare them well for an outbreak, but will be very dangerous when they get under arms, for all will talk and order, no man will obey. But this does

not render attacks on weak detachments less dangerous, because the Chartists can prepare beforehand and it would be only a work of a few hours.

"Journal. The Home Office has resolved to make Durham find barracks if they will have soldiers. All right, drive on coachy. But how the wheels roll and the coach sways from side to side, and the spokes rattle and the axles crack! Oh, the old state carriage, how it shakes and jolts in the deep ruts of folly and quagmires of knavery! We shall upset it at last and God help the passengers.

"August 5th. Meetings every night in the market-place, and good sense talked by the speakers: some a little outrageous, but nothing to demand notice. My advice to the magistrates is not to interfere unless the peace be broken: why should they? If the mob break the peace I will break their heads; we will have no burnings, no disgraceful proceedings, which the honest part of the Chartists deprecate: but when men assemble to express their political opinions it is unjust as well as foolish to disperse them.

"August 6th. The plot thickens. Meetings increase and are so violent, and arms so abound, I know not what to think. The Duke of Portland tells me there is no doubt of an intended general rising. Poor people! They will suffer. They have set all England against them and their physical force:—fools! We have the physical force, not they. They talk of their hundred thousands of men. Who is to move them when I am dancing round them with cavalry, and pelting them with cannon-shot? What would their 100,000 men do with my 100 rockets wriggling their fiery tails among them, roaring, scorching, tearing, smashing all they came near? And when in desperation and despair they broke to fly, how would they bear five regiments of cavalry careering through them? Poor men! Poor men! How little they know of physical force!

"August 7th. My brother Richard's birth-day. God send him happy days! I wish he had a pursuit, there is no

happiness but in a pursuit; a house, a garden even is a pursuit, flowers, animals, all around furnish pursuits; we live and die as they do, they are God's creatures as we are, and they pass more quickly through life and warn us. I could live in a garden and a *wee* farm, have a cow and graze a horse, and try little experiments and breathe pure air, and then lie down and die! When my sight fails I shall not see the world, and 'tis but a step further not to hear it. Oh these eyes! But it is folly to fret, it may be some years yet ere light vanishes. My poor Richard, I fear his eyes are in more danger even than mine, and he has no child's voice to hear! Strange are these dispensations! But he is all honour and goodness, and for him also there is the chance that life may pass away before sight leaves him; if not, God tempers the wind!

"August 8th. All in a ferment, meetings everywhere.

"9th. No time for journals. Write, write, write all day: the plot is as thick as batter pudding.

"10th. My birth-day. What recollections! At my age no man of sense can value life, or anything in it except quiet. Oh! quiet, blessed quiet! to be so is to be as happy as we can be in this life. All my thoughts are now to get easiest out of life and with least pain to my wife. With my girls sorrow will soon be over; youth can bear the shock. I loved my father as they love me, yet a few months made all bright: after that there was and is, and ever will be, a holy reverence for his goodness and talent and character, attended by the feeling that we shall soon meet again. Thus will my children feel when I am gone and their enjoyment of life will not be spoiled. God has ordained that youth should enjoy life, and if my girls read this they will know I wish them to do so. I know not why this train of thinking has come, but in age a birthday brings such thoughts.

"The Secretary of State says, If you wish it Lord Strafford will visit any part of your district to give assistance and advice. Non credo! That Byng is a good

fellow said a soldier of the guards in my hearing in 1803. He is said another, what's of him, but the most part is boots and cocked hat—he was very young and the dress then was preposterous. Now I have more cocked hat than I want, thanks to the stupid regulations; and as to boots his won't fit me. I want neither John Byng's advice, nor Johnny Russell's, and will offer mine to both, feeling quite equal to my own work. Are they getting frightened as the sacred month approaches? I verily believe so, and they think Lord Strafford a better man in the hour of need! Perhaps he is so, I won't dispute that; but he shall not be my dry nurse, better or worse. If they want him let them give him the district, I am quite ready to give it up, yet while here no privy councillor over me: that's as flat as a pancake.

"August 11th. Troops ordered to Bradford if I 'approve.' I don't approve, but if they give a good barrack the men shall go. Meanwhile all on tiptoe! Every one expects a row: not yet, the pear is not ripe. If these foolish men keep their sacred month they ruin themselves; how can those who live by labour live without labour? Robbery must be the result, and the English people will not support a cause by such means; the Chartists will not do so. I deny that Chartism is a general feeling, and there are plenty of good men among the Chartists who would turn on robbers acting in their name. The silly magistrates of Mansfield are in labour and a troop of dragoons has gone off to deliver them of their fears: the old Duke of Portland is played off by a spy.

"August 12th. The magistrates here want to act rightly, but have been bullied by the county magistrates into a proclamation against meetings which have been held every day in the market-place and race-course: this is unwise. —— Just as I wrote came a call for troops to disperse a mob in the country. I rode out, ordering dragoons to follow me. Mr. N—— and I found the mob, which would not notice

us and marched on. Old N—— put on his spectacles, pulled out the riot act, and read it in an audible voice—to who? Myself and about a dozen old women, looking out at their doors to see what we were at! We came back, found another mob, and ordered it to disperse. No. N—— told me to disperse it. I laughed, the dragoons laughed, the young women of the mob laughed, and then old N—— laughed and so the second act of folly passed. Hardly home however when a second call came; then a third; a fourth; each time we were paraded in order of battle and each time were laughed at: so the day passed in great excitement.

"August 13th. Magistrates again read the riot act on the race-course. We scolded, laughed again, and this second farce ended; but three or four times was I obliged to mount, and indeed remained on horseback until long after dark. The mob was abusive but very timid, the approach of a dragoon made them fly like sheep. The soldiers were keen for a fight. The mayor and corporation issued foolish proclamations and then let the people jeer them; it was not wise to prohibit meetings and processions and then let them take place in defiance of their handbills. The town magistrates however endeavoured to do their duty with a conscientious regard for justice; all seemed to act with a strong sense of honour, and good feeling: the only fault was threatening injudiciously and then allowing the Chartists to threaten them.

"August 14th. Mayor and town magistrates this morning asked my advice: they were evidently alarmed. The country magistrates were exhorting them to prevent meetings, and the Chartists were bullying them. My advice was given in writing, they took it and since then all is quiet and will probably remain so: the poor people when left alone, have no desire for disturbance.

"August 15th. Napoleon's birthday! All quiet. The magistrates wanted me to call out the yeomanry. No said

I, no yeomen. If the Chartists want a fight, they can be indulged without yeomen, who are over-zealous for cutting and slashing. Matters must go hard ere I call them out, it shall not be done until the troops are fairly in the field. Then all must arm. The difficulty is, that where there are no soldiers the magistrates must have yeomanry; for they have no means of their own, and neither judgment nor courage for the occasion, as far as I can judge. There are exceptions, many, but also too many who having been oppressors of the poor are now surrounded by dangers too great for their courage: having debased the people, whom want has roused into action, these tyrants quail, and unhappily good men must unite with the oppressors.

"August 17th.—Reports from the outposts that all is quiet throughout Lancashire, Yorkshire, Durham, Cheshire, Westmoreland, &c. Bolton is the only place where shot has been fired, but only three there, and those from the eagerness of the magistrates. In one instance the officer refused to fire, and everywhere the soldiers hung back from bloodshedding, the civilians crying out *slaughter!* Yet the soldiers are all staunch to the Queen: no disloyal feeling, no hesitation with them, all resolute and ready, nay, even eager for fight, but averse to fire on unarmed people. The troops are all that their country could wish; humane, obedient, bold: the eight thousand men under my command would meet ten thousand, yea, more, of any nation on earth, for officers and men are full of intelligence, physical power and discipline. I have seen much of our cavalry now, they are superb, and if properly led will go through anything." Balaclava!

"August 19th.—Everywhere a sudden calm has succeeded the storm; it is unnatural, for the causes of discontent still exist. The fact is that the Chartist leaders' calculations are quite at fault; they have found the difficulty of uniting their people in simultaneous efforts. Many of the chief men have been seized, there has been no resistance, and

in this Lord John Russell has deserved well of the country. His failure has been in not making concessions, and not diminishing taxation: he cannot take a great view of affairs.

"August 20th.—The Home Office and the Horse Guards again think Chartism is at a discount; they are wrong, it increases. The middle classes were frightened at pikes, the Chartist leaders saw this and we hear no more of pikes: but they are all there, none have been given up or destroyed. The shopkeepers are no longer alarmed, they have no love for the aristocracy and think commerce will flourish as well under a republic: they see also what great preparations the Chartists are making for exclusive dealing, which alarms them. The mayor and corporation of Bolton are said to be Chartists; the same at Carlisle and Newcastle-upon-Tyne; the constables everywhere are, more or less, and all avow that the people are oppressed.

"August 23rd.—I was mad not to go out as governor of Australia. I could have founded a great kingdom, and by this time my whole plan would have been in full operation and the colony nearly ready to declare internal independence as a people:—with a systematic education, universal suffrage, vote by ballot, annual parliaments, and the abolition of the law of primogeniture as regards land: for if a man produces children, he is bound to provide them with the means of living, as far as he can. I would have so ruled Australia that the land should never have been thus collected. I would also have done my best to prevent the introduction of great manufactories, by promoting discussion on this simple question. How can they tend to the strength, the freedom, the happiness of a nation? They produce corrupt morals, bad health, uncertain wages, and dependence on a foreign market, instead of on a strong and virtuous labouring class. They stimulate speculation by offering means for accumulating great fortunes in a few years, which is the worship of mammon, the ruin of virtue, overthrowing all moral principles.

"Men are restless and discontented with poverty in manufacturing places; they have all its sufferings and have not the principal pleasures which make men content under it; that is health, enjoyment of country scenes, country air, and interest in the seasons and various productions of nature. The exhausted unhealthy manufacturer has no such enjoyment; he has no resources but gin, cards, and all kinds of debauchery. The countryman worships God; the manufacturer worships gold:—that gold which alone can relieve him and his sickly family from the misery they endure: thus the practice of sin, united to mammon-worship, makes a ruffian. Yet such is the system which your political œconomist calls the prosperity of England! Hell may be paved with good intentions, but is assuredly hung with Manchester cottons.

"How can good and otherwise sensible men imagine that the wealth of a nation, and its prosperity, can depend upon the vast riches of a few persons, accumulated by the toil, privation and destruction of the health and morals of millions? This one fact should teach that it must be wrong. Our prosperity, as the wise Lord Ripon called our misery:—our prosperity has not a foundation on sense or honesty: and so these deceived good men would think if they extricated their minds from a labyrinth of details entered upon, under the illusion that money riches are strength and happiness and virtue. Riches are good, yet the riches of a country do not altogether consist of money, but in just government, in a happy people, content with the poverty which attends labour.

"A healthy labouring class, where a man's toil gives sufficient clothes, food and lodging, for himself and his family, with a cabin and garden to interest him, will not envy rich men, or seek to rise above an humble lot, except by time, frugality and honesty. They feel they have enjoyments, some, nay most, beyond the power of riches to give; and many which riches take away. All poor men who have

good sense see this; those who are foolish are either guided by cleverer men, or are too contemptible to destroy the harmony of social order: if they make the attempt the world scorns them and they perish, because their country is happy and beyond their power of disturbance. But for such a state there must be no debt, few taxes, and those laid on equitably, and that was my plan for Australia. I could and would have executed it, and by this time it would have been a rich and powerful colony; a little state rather, able and resolved not to allow England to send more convicts to Sydney: that infernal population would thus have gradually died away, and a better one have arisen to unite with us in due time. The difficulties were not great, I feared but one, the want of money to begin. This difficulty has not yet taken place, though it is doubtful whether they are yet out of the wood, lustily as they halloo:—that is the speculators, and that knave —— holloa! nevertheless my belief and hope is they have passed the danger: it would vex me to find them fail after all their troubles.

"Colonel W. Napier, September 8th.—We were foolish the first two of the three sacred days. On the third the mayor and magistrates asked and followed my advice, instead of calling out troops and reading the riot act as they had done the other two days: the result was that the third, which was to have been the last of Nottingham, passed quietly and all is peace. I am tired of folly above and below. A letter from the Home Office said, 'Lord Strafford, if you wish it, will visit any part of your district to give assistance and advice.' I want neither, and have heard no more of that. The next impertinence was the sending Colonel Angelo upon a mission through my district. He came at night, told me he was on a mission, was very mysterious and incomprehensible, and went off, leaving me ignorant of why he came. Some time after Lord John sends *Colonel Angelo's Memoir* for my opinion! It settled that infantry were placed where cavalry ought to be, and the contrary.

Had I done as he recommended, the cavalry would have been dispersed in billets at Halifax, the infantry at Bradford, both towns wickedly Chartist, whereas by my arrangement both are in barracks and strongly posted: the folly of Angelo's memoir is now felt. Other things happen that I don't like. It pleases me that you have had the correspondence you mention with the Duke of Wellington;"—a short but remarkable one in which that great man stated that his political object was to heal the dissensions of the time, which he thought were leading to ruin, and therefore he overlooked the bad conduct of the Whigs.

"There are strong symptoms of different corporations leaning to Chartism and democracy, and the £70,000 voted for the Queen's stables did the government mischief even with its own friends. Wildman disputes with me about the police, which he strongly opposes. I say the laws must be obeyed; if bad alter them, but without a strong police manufacturers are unmanageable. Power warps judgment, perhaps it has done so with mine here, though God knows I have little enough of power! Masses of men in manufactories must be held in check, especially when morals are so very low as they are here. The devil understands his work when he makes death so disagreeable or he would find it hard to keep us here.

"Journal, September 24th.—This month has been of unvarying quietude; there was however a meeting at Sheffield which just shewed that all is yet alive: indeed the haggard faces of the poor suffice to tell this to any observant man. There is among the manufacturing poor a stern look of discontent, of hatred to all who are rich, a total absence of merry faces: a sallow tinge and dirty skins tell of suffering and brooding over change. Yet often have I talked with scowling-visaged fellows till the ruffian went from their faces, making them smile and at ease: this tells me their looks of sad and deep thought are not natural. Poor fellows!"

Selections from his public correspondence shall now enlarge the record of England's internal condition at this perilous time. It gives a lesson: for the discontent was not a temporary ebullition, it will again revive. Ameliorations, some accidental, some extorted, some conceded from policy, have since then averted violence, but the labouring mass still requires the right of self-government through direct representation, and will again demand that protection against power. A population which furnishes such heroic soldiers as those of Inkerman and Balaclava will not always submit to be treated as unworthy of rights enjoyed by men not so good as themselves.

"Major Bayly, August 10th.—I attach little credit to the threatened attack on Chester Castle, yet be prepared. You must urge the town magistrates to swear in special constables and arm the pensioners; the gentlemen of the city may arm themselves also. Be most careful of the castle and cautious how you weaken your garrison in case of danger. Colonel Wemyss has orders if armed insurgents move from Hyde towards Chester to have them pursued by as strong a body of cavalry as he can spare.

"Colonel Wemyss.—Lord John told the Loughborough magistrates he had forty applications for detachments which my remonstrances had caused him to refuse: however, they got a troop and I fear many others will also succeed. Chester Castle must be Bayly's first care, and the townspeople left to their own valour. They do not like to arm against their fellow-citizens! Well, let their fellow-citizens cut their throats. If they will not stand by the soldiers why should soldiers stand by them? We dislike fighting our fellow-citizens as much as they do.

"The same, 11th August.—Anxious to hear how matters go on to-morrow though certain there will be no general rising. If the government mean to hang the condemned men it should be done to-morrow: it would make others pause before they begun mischief.

"Under-Secretary, 12th.—I have just come from accompanying a county magistrate to Barford, where he read the riot act to about 100 people, who were said to have been moving about from mill to mill, forbidding the workmen to continue labour: this mob dispersed with sufficient good-humour, and there was not the least occasion for the troops to act.

"Sir H. Ross.—From my experience of the magistrates I warn you, that unless you get the necessary preparations for the soldiers' barrack done before the soldiers arrive the magistrates will do nothing after. They generally try to get off promises, so tell them no cavalry shall march until a barrack is ready for them. You will find this a capital pair of spurs!

"Under-Secretary, August 15th.—A report from Barnsley states that the riot act was read there on the 12th and the military called out, but nothing important occurred. At Sheffield the same thing occurred on the 13th instant. The Chartists assembled, it was supposed to rescue two of their leaders, but dispersed quietly on the appearance of the troops.

"Colonel Wemyss, 16th.—Really the conduct of magistrates who go grouse-shooting at such a crisis is too bad, and proves, if anything is proof in the world, that we shall never do without stipendiary magistrates: if the present ones would do their duty nine detachments out of twelve would not be required. I think we have got matters tolerably quiet here; however they certainly bullied our magistrates wickedly. They met in defiance of their proclamation on a hill near the town, and away we went to disperse them, but when we got there away were they on another hill, still cheering and defying the magistrates constables and dragoons! Darkness luckily came on, and we returned with the fame of having dispersed them, but having done no such thing: however, they were afraid to try the game again next day. I suspect their reason was, that I said in the hearing

of many, I would, if the magistrates pleased, send a rocket after them which would kill fifty or sixty. This was partly in joke, partly to make them believe they owed their security to the forbearance of the magistrates rather than to our not being able to catch them.

"Under-Secretary, August 16th.—I send Colonel Custance's letter, stating his reasons for refusing a detachment to Cole; they appear very sufficient. I would not trouble you were it not to shew the strange fact, that at a moment so critical there was no magistrate at home! I believe there is none now, and I this day got a letter from Colonel Wemyss with the following passage. 'Major Cheape had great difficulty in impressing on the magistrates the necessity of remaining in the town of Leigh while the troops were rendering aid to the civil power.' I have no doubt Lord John Russell will disapprove of this conduct in the magistrates of Leigh and Colne.

"August 17th.—A report from Bolton gives details of the riot there, which I enclose. From Carlisle Sir H. Ross reports having called out the Cumberland and Westmoreland yeomanry cavalry. The town was in a ferment on the 13th, but the 15th all was quiet in consequence, Sir Hew believes, of the promptness of measures and the imposing force arrayed. He speaks in the highest terms of Colonel Hasell and the yeomanry under his orders. The troop at Barnsley was called out on the 15th and some people were arrested, but no disturbance took place: all was quiet yesterday. There is however much ferment in the country.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Cairncross.—Accept my approbation of your own and your officers' conduct during the three days' rioting at Bolton-le-Moors. I have especially remarked the humane and cool conduct of Captain Bush in not firing on the people:—an extreme measure which the result proved to be uncalled for. Inform that officer that I feel it due to him and to Captain Anderson, to report their excellent conduct to the commander in chief.

"Under-Secretary, August. — Excellent news from all parts. The campaign is over."

Notwithstanding this apparent calm the general was too keen-sighted not to perceive that all the causes of mischief still remained, and he did not fail to warn the authorities that it was so, but they snatched, as before, with a childish confidence at every lull, calling it the end of all troubles; and as a matter of course he had now a renewed struggle with the magistrates and higher powers about detachments and lodgings for the troops.

"Lord Fitzroy, August 25th.—Everything seems quiet, but I confess I don't feel much confidence in its continuance beyond a couple of months. There are many mischievous persons at work, who I fear only wait for dark nights. However the cowardice of the popular assemblies has been conspicuous.

"Sir H. Ross, August.—I wish to have a statement of defaulters at Wigton and Cockermouth compared with those of equal force at head-quarters: it will shew the mischief of billets. Two companies are at Halifax in barracks, and two in billets at Newcastle-under-Lyne. The first have seventeen defaulters and none tried; the second, in an equal space of time, have had sixty-two defaulters and seven courts-martial! Hence if the magistrates of Wigton and Cockermouth will have soldiers they shall fit up barracks.

"Under-Secretary, August 28th.—The Carlisle magistrates are not acting well. I always suspected there would be some difficulty, but not that the magistrates would make us a bow altogether after their promises had led to so many arrangements. If Lord John approves, I propose to write to the lord-lieutenant of Cumberland, stating the difficulties I am thrown into by the magistrates not fulfilling their promises, and requesting him to represent to them that arrangements for quartering the cavalry had been made on the faith of their application and promise of barracks. Should this fail to move them—they being relieved from the pressure

without—will his lordship sanction my hiring and fitting up the place now preparing? if he does, he may depend on me to make a stiff fight first with the magistrates.

"Sir H. Ross, August 28th.—'The devil was sick the devil a monk would be,' &c., &c. Just so with the magistrates all over the north. When the Chartists put them in a funk, Oh, barracks! yes as many as you please. When they get soldiers and the Chartists are quiet, Really we can't afford barracks, they are too costly. This is the case everywhere, but your chaps have put me to most inconvenience. I do not understand how gentlemen, having due regard for promises, can retrograde in this fashion! Shew them this letter, except the first passage, and that too if you like.

"At Mansfield and Loughborough they have performed their promises like gentlemen; but your cocks of the north are moss troopers, and want *Belted Will* among them again: with the power I would find the *Will.* I joke, but am vexed at this matter, and trust you will press the magistrates with all the ill-nature and bitterness you can muster. Of one thing the magistrates may be assured. I will not be made a dupe of by false promises a second time: their conduct is provoking and unfair.

"September 1st.—Withdraw the Cockermouth detachment at once, and also that at Wigton. Order them to march without giving time for the magistrates to write humbugging letters to Lord John. Let them have the trouble of writing to you in the first instance; I find the more trouble one gives them the more easily they are dealt with in the end. However I trust a good deal to the Chartist steam, which will be up again in two months or more, when dark nights begin and work slacks.

"Duke of Portland, September 3rd.—There seems reason to suspect the honesty of your grace's informant. A man who pretends that such a general movement of the working classes as we have lately witnessed can depend upon the freedom or imprisonment of Mr. O'Connor must be actuated

by some sinister motive, or have very little perception of what is going forward. The Chartist spirit is not broken: a few miserable violent fools and some resolute knaves have been put down, or rather checked by the array of force exhibited against their mad acts; but the Chartist spirit is not broken, it has only been made cautious and therefore perhaps stronger."

TWELFTH EPOCH.

FIFTH PERIOD.

THE northern district now became a less anxious but scarcely a less toilsome command. There was still to transact, besides the civil affairs, the military business of twenty regiments, spread abroad as if scattered from a pepper-box, and he was not allowed even the usual staff.

"Adjutant-general.—I cannot go on without a brigade-major. You have I conclude your own list, and a subaltern I believe cannot hold the post, or I would recommend to your notice that very fine young man, and thorough soldier, Crawley, adjutant of the 20th Regiment. Poor fellow, without money or interest he is working up a long avenue, but be assured he has the making of a first-rate staff officer.

"Journal, September.—I am asked to meet the Bishop of Lincoln at the *ordinaries*. What does it mean? I will go if it be not a political demonstration, but it is an old saying, that where a priest and a woman are together the devil makes a third: this is doubtless true, for whatever a priest says a woman believes. I would disbelieve the sun if a priest told me it was a fine day, were it not that God speaks to me through the sun.

"26th.—Our dinner was a *black* affair. I would not have gone, if I had not first ascertained from Lord Rancliffe that Lord Scarborough, the Whig lord-lieutenant of the county, was to go, and so concluded that it could not be a party dinner: yet it was so. The first toast, *Church and State*, made it clear we were a Tory party, for the acclamations were immense. I looked to Lord Scarborough for a sign of disapprobation, but he was immovable. He sat on

the right of the chairman, Lord Lincoln on his right, and I on Lord Lincoln's right. The next toast was *the Queen*. Glasses were filled, but not a sound of applause followed. Her Majesty's health was drunk in significant silence. 'No man cried God bless her,' except myself. Then came the *Queen dowager, and the rest of the royal family:* instantly the room shook with shouts of applause.

"The lord-lieutenant and magistrates of the county! This was a puzzler, because the magistrates are Tories and the lord-lieutenant a Whig: there was a faint attempt to applaud, so weak as to be worse than none. The bishop's health was given before the lord-lieutenant's, which was incorrect, the latter being the representative of majesty. He made a well-turned speech, the meaning being that the people's pockets had been successfully picked for a church just built; and that this must be continued for more churches. However, being voluntary, this is no great harm; and I quite agree with Bishop Kaye, who seems to be a very clever and a very good man, that unless we pray education is a very idle affair: but bishop, we must be fed before we are content. You and I are content because we are well fed; but the poor will tell you that when God ordained rich and poor He did not ordain a national debt, incurred for foolish and unjust wars; and that He gave the poor brains to understand their own case. Your eloquence then is vain to produce content without food: you cannot put God in the wrong. You are a clever and good man, and you ought to know that when a press is in full activity bamboozling must die a natural death. Truth is in march, sadly shackled indeed still by ancient follies, but the press will set her free, and the next hundred years will produce more change in the condition of man than the last thousand.

"Why does a nation have its own law and language and habits? Because it is small, and by some accident has been morally and physically separated from its neighbours; but what separation will there be when we travel fifty miles

an hour? Will not a thousand motives produce union of interest between countries now divided by distance, though soon to be within a few hours' travelling? Is not nationality wearing away by commercial intercourse? Has not provincialism almost ceased? Communication and the press have beaten down the old barriers, and men no longer cling to old habits and faults and inconveniences, because they are provincial or national. The bishops must talk more wisely if they expect the present generation to listen to them: for if they preach forbearance and patience under heavy taxation they will only concoct hatred and scorn of themselves.

"Lord Scarborough got up, said nothing and no man cheered: he sat down without giving them a dressing, so I could do nothing. But then the county members with loud shouts and long, and Lord Lincoln returned thanks: he was exceedingly nervous, and nearly broke down. Just before this toast, when the Queen dowager was given he said to me laughing. You and my left-hand neighbour, Lord Scarborough, are in the wrong box. So I see said I, and the *reigning Queen also*. The next toast was myself, with long flattering speeches; and in reply I laid strong emphasis on the devotion of the army to the Queen, which was understood."

His half-yearly military inspection now recommenced.

"Nantwich, October 11th.—A very old town, full of houses built with *brick noggen*. These old names remind me of ancient days, and make me say to myself how happy England was when you were built Nantwich: when there were no cotton manufactories with their long chimnies; when men worked in the fields, and were robust and fit for war and happy in peace; when they thought of nature as they laboured and breathed pure air amidst her works. Now they breathe smoke, wheeze cotton *fuz*, and only think of quaffing gin at the *palace* when their day's labour is done. Well, God help us for the devil's grip is on us now.

"Chester.—A fine old town. Saw a capital house if we

can get it, Baitche Hall. I feel light at heart with the idea of quitting the baker's shop in Wheelersgate Street Notts, though Charles the First did lodge there:—loaves lodge there now.

"This day my father died in 1804 at Clifton. How small others appear when I think of him! He cared little for those things which ordinary men seek so eagerly; he was too great, too majestic for small cOmmand:—but what signifies all this? Death!

"Lancaster.—A fine old town, with John of Gaunt's Castle. Here I met Assistant-Surgeon Ore, who told me he was in the ship when my old Blanco died. Mr. Ore constantly fed him with biscuit, but the long voyage killed him. My weakness was the cause of his sufferings. Twice I went to shoot him in London, but my heart failed and I took him to Cephalonia, where I thought to pass many happy days with my old horse! How I did love him! Well, I and all I love must go the same way. Mr. Ore told me he grew so fond of Blanco that he wanted to say prayers for him, to the great horror of the ship captain; yet I am sure he has a soul as good as most masters of merchant ships. Noble excellent animal! you were good, and brave, and faithful as ever charger was; and as you so often escaped being shot would you had died in your stable: your picture and your memory is dear to me, with your playful ways. Heigho! this is a weary world, and I will go to sleep, which is like death. Yet we love sleep and fear death! Strange! If they be alike death must be indeed a blessing.

"Carlisle, October 21st.—Major ——'s depôt here is in good order. He is a time-server and behaved ill to me in Cephalonia; he thought my defence against Adam would ruin me: and so it would had one of Adam's stamp been commander in chief; but we had Lord Hill, and Lord Fitzroy, and John McDonald. This —— has however overshot his mark; he finds himself a major under my

command, and instead of a ruined colonel on half-pay sees me a major-general, K.C.B., commanding the largest force in England. Justice however must be done. —— is a good officer, and my confidential report shall back up his own efforts to get a lieutenant-colonelcy, for he is clever hard-working and zealous. I bear him no ill-will, and as he has, night and day, the *best policy* at heart, he is an honest fellow. Moreover he is good-natured, so far as consists with a regard for what is what, when is when, and who is who, and all that who wishes: he is good-nature in a cuirass without a crevice. A devilish good soldier though.

"Tynemouth, 22nd.—The 98th Regiment is the best drilled and disciplined regiment of the district. Campbell, excellent himself, has made his officers so: Majors Gregory and Eyre are very superior young men. We went down a coal-pit here, being lowered in a basket 950 feet in two minutes. We went through various galleries, and were told amongst other things of a current of air maintained by fire. We heard also that when a horse becomes furious it is terrible, for he runs off with a dray through narrow galleries, killing or maiming all before him! The nags seemed all very good-humoured, so I suppose they like their position poor things; at all events they are well treated though living by candlelight: fear keeps their drivers in order, and it is pleasant to have horses so much the master of man as to prevent brutality.

"November 1st.—Returned to Nottingham. My wife nearly knocked up. Women are not made to bear fatigue: their spirit indeed carries them on but their bodies fail, and they want food oftener than men do.

"Duke of Portland, September 9th.—Your grace has misunderstood me. I did not say O'Connor's imprisonment would have *no effect;* but that it could not arrest the general movement, as your grace's informant seems to think: so far from that arrest stopping violent proceedings

I have no doubt it would encrease them. Mr. O'Connor is one of many leaders, and amongst the more moderate. Dr. Taylor is the most violent, and wishes, nothing more, to see O'Connor out of his way, they are enemies. Dr. Taylor frequently exhorts the multitude to the use of arms. Your grace's barometer is however a very correct one; while the Chartists keep their arms we may suppose they intend to use them—they do keep their arms.

" Under-Secretary, September 29th.—Last night came a report from Colonel Wemyss relative to disturbances amongst the colliers at Poynton. He tells me the magistrates are anxious to retain the troops until to-morrow; and I have, in consequence, directed him to enquire as to the origin of the dispute; because, if the troops are called upon to interfere in disputes which are wholly of a private nature it is right the government should know how far either party may be in the wrong. These sorts of disturbances are of a kind in which the magistrates, at whose disposal the troops may be placed, have a direct personal interest, or may have.

" The same, October 2nd.—The disturbance in the collieries is unpleasant because it breaks the tranquillity, and may at any moment be turned to mischief by agitators. I know it is a difficult matter to mediate between master and workman, but if some one unconnected with these colliers were to speak to them they would listen to reason, which at present does not seem the case. They seem not only unreasonable but somewhat ferocious. Perhaps Lord Normanby would approve of my going to that part of the district, and, with the aid of Lord Vernon's agent, endeavouring to restore peace. Reason and justice have generally their due weight with bodies of men whose interest it is to listen to them; especially when the speaker has a magistrate, and the law, and, not least, plenty of dragoons at his back! Every barrack in the northern district is full, the dragoons Lord Normanby wishes to withdraw from Carlisle, must

therefore go to Leeds, and the innkeepers there will then be as much incommoded as those of Carlisle are now. His lordship is no doubt aware that the squadron was sent to Carlisle at the request of the magistrates, with a positive promise to find a barrack; they hired a building and set workmen on because I had refused troops until satisfied they were in earnest; yet the moment the troops arrived the workmen were struck off and the barracks refused!"

Grave events were now to vindicate his prescience in opposition to that of the higher authorities, who thought the violence employed at Birmingham, and the savage prosecutions and sentences afterwards, had entirely crushed Chartism. Once more the spirit broke forth, and according to his prediction, with more dangerous commotion as winter approached.

"Journal, November 5th.—An outbreak at Newport in Wales says rumour; if true it is only what I had expected. It is said the soldiers were defeated and numbers killed; that is nonsense, there may be some killed, but a mob cannot beat troops unless under some extraordinary circumstances.

"6th.—The outbreak is true. There was a headlong attack, and thirty men of the 45th defeated 15,000 assailants: this last is an exaggeration, but it would take a handful to beat thirty soldiers.

"9th.—The Chartists swear they will not let the ball drop; I believe them, but they must shew more pluck to make anything of it: they seem to have shewn none at Newport, and nine or ten have been killed.

"November 15th.—The steam is getting up here again and the mayor has asked for nightly piquets: rumours from the outposts also are rife.

"16th.—If government means to defend the throne it must make preparation by giving the people their rights, being ready also to resist outrage and defend social order by having a strong police in every large town, and a stiff body of soldiers in this district.

" 20th.—The town of Bradford is getting unquiet, that is the poor fellows are hungry, and the magistrates being in a funk have written to Lord Normanby for more troops; they shall have no more. I have given all my commanding officers written instructions, as in such a large district I must command by the pen, which is difficult, because orders are not obeyed unless looked to personally. The cavalry are excellent as to non-commissioned officers and privates, their defaulters are but nine to eleven of the infantry; but their officers really know little beyond fox-hunting, dancing and shooting; they are however a very fine set of young men, extremely clever, and zealous also when put to their work perforce. Caring nothing for their profession and thinking it a bore they know nothing of it. They are nevertheless the makings of the finest cavalry in the world, being full of spirit and talent, with good looks, courage and honour; in fine they are ready for anything but the dull routine of duty. Few of them mean to stay in the army and they will not study. I could indeed make anything of them in a camp, but it is in vain to try in a district embracing nearly the half of England. Two things are certain:—they will do their work with spirit when brought to the mark; and the devil can't make them read."

The next letter has reference to a political dinner at which a Mr. Proby used opprobrious language about the Queen, in the presence of Colonel Thomas and some officers of the 20th Regiment.

" November 22nd.—M'Donald's letter is very good, and I shall read the gentlemen the lecture on their political effervescence. Men at the head of troops are not to exhibit their party politics: nor are they to allow their Sovereign to be reviled in their presence. What! Officers sitting quietly to hear a young Queen abused! Fye! What could she have done to merit this? It was not right.

" Manchester, November 24th.—Read the reprimand to Colonel Thomas and the other officers concerned. The

truth is that, Colonel Thomas excepted, none of the poor fellows went with any political feeling at all, but out of curiosity to hear Sir Francis Burdett speak, he being expected. They all swear they heard no abuse of the Queen, yet Colonel Thomas must have been near Mr. Proby. However, they had no business at a political dinner.

"November 27th.—Bradford discontented, and everywhere agitation. Alas! with good cause. Want and misery, all that man can suffer they suffer.

"Lieut. Huband 8th Hussars, Nov.—The magistrates are more alarmed than there is occasion for. The meetings you mention go on in every other town prominent in Chartism, but are not likely to break out just now. The correspondence with Newport is not peculiar to Bradford; it was the same with Birmingham, Bolton, Carlisle &c., and the magistrates in each settled that their town was head-quarters for Chartism, which was not true. Manchester is the place, and there Feargus O'Connor arrived the night before the Newport affair. I tell you this in confidence, to show the necessity of seeking other information than that of magistrates, who are naturally influenced by local circumstances affecting their personal safety. Your old soldier of the Guards is just the man from whom to gain much information, and if his going often to you might expose him to danger he can write to me under a feigned name. Such men are invaluable, as their information is honest and loyal.

"Under-Secretary, November 28th.—There has been a disturbance at Sheffield, but so imperfect a report has been sent I really cannot tell you more until I hear again; the troops were called out, and almost immediately returned as the mob dispersed of itself, so nothing serious can have happened, but it marks a readiness for mischief that requires watching.

"December 1st.—I enclose a paper—a Chartist plan of attack on Notts barracks, that came by post last night. I

attach no importance to it. The hiring of empty houses can be easily watched, so can the crossing the river in a boat; and the *instruction*, said to be carried on in the meadows over the river, can also be discovered if it goes on, which I disbelieve in toto. No patriotism could stand drill in low wet meadows, on a winter's night. If Mr. Frost was sentenced to be drill sergeant under such circumstances he would forswear Chartism in a week! But while I hold this paper to be a trick to make us fidgetty, I am very sure the Chartists are everywhere at work, and the terrible state of distress in this town is both pitiable and dangerous, for there are certainly two thousand people starving. I am going to meet the mayor in hopes of doing something to relieve these poor persons, it is quite horrible to see them, and to know that many who are not seen to beg are in still greater want. I hope the people here will in prudence if not from compassion, do something to relieve the sufferers, for when men beg in bodies they will soon do worse.

" Journal, December 1st.—An anonymous letter come, with a Chartist plan. Poor creatures, their threats of attack are miserable. With half a cartridge, and half a pike, with no money, no discipline, no skilful leaders, they would attack men with leaders money and discipline, well armed, and having sixty rounds a man. Poor men! A republic! What good did a republic ever do? What good will it ever do?

" 2nd.—The streets of this town are horrible. The poor starving people go about by twenties and forties, begging, but without the least insolence; and yet some rich villains, and some foolish women, choose to say *they try to extort charity*. It is a lie, an infernal lie, neither more nor less: —nothing can exceed the good behaviour of these poor people, except it be their cruel sufferings.

" 3rd.—Spoke to the mayor about a subscription:—the excellent mayor, Mr. Roworth. He joins me in all my opinions as to the thrice-accursed new poor law, its bastiles,

and its guardians. Lying title! They guard nothing, not even their own carcases, for they so outrage misery that if a civil war comes they will be immediately sacrificed.

"4th.—I have spent the whole morning with the town magistrates, many of whom seem to think the distress quite light, others the contrary. The day after my letter describing the misery, the statement of which I had chiefly from the mayor, the guardians of the poor-house issued a notice that they would supply those in distress out of the poor-house: on the 30th November I saw their list of 1200 people who were destitute, and that number rapidly increased. It is clear therefore that the mayor was right in what he told me and I repeated to you; for if, as some magistrates assert, there is very little distress, why did the board of guardians put forth their notice of out-door relief? And why is there a meeting called to relieve the poor?

"Sir Hew Ross, December 7th.—In answer to your question I think a mixed force is the best, because, if the Chartists take proper means of fighting in a town we know cavalry can do little better than get out of it with all possible speed. Horsemen cannot charge people in garrets, and they cannot sit in their saddles while chests of drawers, bedsteads, stones, tiles &c., to say nothing of musquetry, are poured from the said garrets. Therefore cavalry are only useful to bully a mob, and save the lives of those who compose it, by chopping them a little instead of destroying them by fire-arms. A hundred fellows may get ugly-looking gashes that would frighten a thousand of their companions into the vigorous use of their legs. But ninety of the chopped hundred men would be as well as ever in a week, and so proud of their wounds, as to resolve to live all their lives on their past glory, and never again look a dragoon in the face. My own opinion is, that had a troop of horse alone been at Newport the men would have been destroyed, or defeated; and a pretty *flare up*, would have run like wild fire to Carlisle. I have been long preaching to the government to unite

both arms, but they will not though they give me no refusal. I am shackled by, *will be fully considered*—there is not such a pair of manacles in all Newgate as that sentence. I only hope that the full consideration may not be given in shape of a *crowner's quest* over the bodies of thirty dragoons in billets: there are things which will not bear the future tense, and this is one.

"I am for joining horse and foot together on all excursions; if hard pressed the dragoons could take the infantry behind them for ten miles, which would enable the latter to make thirty miles a day without any great fatigue. It would be well to practise them at this. I will do so here and tell you how we get on: but though I have given you my opinion let it not bind you, we are too far asunder for any interference should we be turned out.

"Colonel Thom, December 9th.—I ought, when at Birmingham, to have gone out to your house, but meeting Mr. Collis at his warehouse I found him so agreeable and well informed, and so obliging withal, that he enabled me to see what I much wished, the manufacture of fire-arms. Secret information from Sir H. Ross says there is decidedly a correspondence going on between the Chartists in England and those of France; his informant is, he tells me, worthy of trust and confidence: the details have been sent to the secretary of state. It is necessary you should know all I know; but let it go no further, unless you think it would give any clue to your police chief for watching stray Frenchmen. Depend upon it, if your chaps turn out, I will send every man that can be spared to you; but my force has been so dispersed by the secretary of state, that if a row begins to save Frost I doubt whether there will be a man to spare. The word with the Chartists here is *We will die ere he dies*, alluding to Frost: there is much humbug and vapouring in all this.

"Duke of Portland, December 8th.—I have to thank your grace for the information you have been pleased to give

me. Whatever discrepancy there may be in the details, which come from various sources, the cream of the whole seems to be, that the Chartists are endeavouring to make a push to save Frost and carry forward their own plans: I do not believe they can do either if we are circumspect.

"A letter from Merthyr Tydvil yesterday, states that Colonel Considine says, he came to Newport with contempt for the Chartists, but he now thinks, if they attack they will be too much for the troops there, numerous as they are. I do not believe Colonel Considine either said, or thinks this"—he never said so, he was too good a soldier.—"We all know how words are put into men's mouths; but I tell your grace this, to shew that the opinion in that neighbourhood is that the Chartists are strong; and if they get the advantage there, it will run north like wild fire, but will I think be put down and punished as rapidly.

"O'Connor must be wrong in saying Frost was forced into an outbreak; it seems plain he expected to succeed against thirty men and the success was to be a signal. As to private assassination, it is very possible and very practicable, but will have no useful effect for their cause: for example, if they shoot me from behind a hedge the magistrates have in reserve one hundred and sixty-four other major-generals, all anxious to be employed: Bobadil himself could hardly slay us all! And if they did, it would only be a godsend to the colonels.

"Lord Fitzroy Somerset, December 10.—Mr. Phillipps has from me information received from Sir H. Ross. It contains an account, given by Dr. Taylor to a Chartist meeting, of an intercourse carried on between the Chartists in London and the disaffected in Paris, and exhorting the Chartists to be ready with their arms. Ross seems to place much faith in his secret informant, but much cannot be placed in Dr. Taylor, and supposing the doctor's statement correct it signifies very little. I imagine neither English nor French party can be of any use to each other; for by

Dr. Taylor's account the French are plotting against their own king and consequently can have no funds but what they want themselves: it is not now as when a French king supplied English malcontents. Dr. Taylor says the correspondence is carried on by Frenchmen on both sides of the water.

"Lord Normanby, December 10th.—Mr. U—— has the character of being a great alarmist, and by all I hear he has reason, for he is extremely odious to the people. I believe he has the confidence of the Duke of Portland, and their sources of information are the same. Taking the cream of the many informations received from various parts it is possible some ill-arranged commotion may take place in Frost's favour; but nowhere is there evidence of an organized plan, the only thing of the kind was contained in the paper sent to Mr. Phillipps on the 1st instant. It says men drill in the meadows over the river, but unless thousands do this there is no danger; and if there were but hundreds they would be discovered: so, whether begun or to begin that matter is nonsense. The whole affair is folly. They are, it is said, to cross and recross in a boat to avoid being observed passing the bridge: it would take the whole night to pass a thousand men and the constables could not fail to observe it. Then drilling in a marsh in winter! It would require more hardy men to do that than the poor weaving devils here, half clothed and starving: they are much more up to setting fire to houses than such cold work.

"Again, we are told they are to hire empty houses just before the outbreak and filling them with combustibles fire the town in many places: this is more probable than the drilling and pleasanter. I have begged the mayor to get a list of empty houses, and we shall watch those who hire rooms; for no information is to be despised, it would be dreadful to be taken unawares. I also informed the magistrates in the neighbourhood of Sheapshead about the pikes

and drilling, and this morning received their answers: they only speak of *rumours of drilling*. On the other hand, great distress, great fervour amongst Frost's friends, great party excitement, and great numbers being armed and eager to do mischief, are all facts which may lead to unorganized risings in different places without system, or means of being sustained, and which will neither be simultaneous nor difficult to suppress. That Frost's trial may bring all to a head is very probable, but the troops are staunch and everywhere on the alert. I always speak however of safety in the district with regard to the present moment, being far from thinking we are safe in a general point of view. There is no diminution of Chartist principles; they have only assumed a more cautious and religious garb, adjourning from the market-place to the church; and that is the only very clear indication of a directing power working systematically, which I have been able to trace.

"December 12th.—Dr. Taylor told the meeting to be ready with their arms; that he had seen two revolutions, one in Greece one in France, and hoped soon to see one in England. This was received with loud cheers and cries of *we are ready*. He said he did not wish them to injure others, but their neighbours were rolling in plenty and he supposed those he addressed were too fond of their wives and children to let them starve, and that they would *dust their oppressors' coats well*. This is the upshot as to what they were to do; but he added that six Frenchmen were employed carrying on a correspondence with the disaffected in France—two in Paris, two in London, two as couriers. *The palace of Louis Philippe was to be lighted without gas*, but whether that was to be the general signal or not I forget. Taylor had another meeting on Sunday, and told them, in his *sermon*, that he would repeat his caution to be ready as they would be wanted before three weeks. Sir H. Ross writes that the borough magistrates take no cognizance of what passes out of their jurisdiction, and the only county one, residing in

the immediate neighbourhood of Dalston, prefers hunting in a distant part of the country to looking after his neighbours: so Dr. Taylor and his followers have full scope to follow their own inventions.

"December 14th.—The sound judgment displayed in the excellent note received from the Rev. J. H. Hamilton of Sheapshead, which I enclose, will put Lord Normanby at ease, so far as regards the part of the country from which it comes: it seems a just course between the effervescence of an alarmist and the stagnation of those who will see no danger.

"Report to the Home Office, December 22nd.—I have been to Bradford, where the magistrates are in much apprehension of popular violence, resulting from the accidental union of three causes, viz. Chartism distress and Frost's trial. Whether the magistrates over or under rate the danger I will not say, being afraid of ignorantly jumping to a conclusion; but I imagine, that while there is some danger in Bradford from the above causes, there is not that organization or concert with the Newport people which the magistrates apprehend. With regard to the civil force, 1800 special constables have been sworn, who are to assemble on the ringing of the largest and smallest bells of the parish church; the alarm posts for these men are various, and have been pointed out. These special constables, though perhaps not very valiant, would serve to guard the court-house, and secure those whom the magistrates ordered the military to arrest. There are thirty-two watchmen under a chief, who would be useful as a body-guard to the magistrates, among whom there is one that would not easily be bullied by a mob: I mean Mr. Thompson. Not that I would insinuate the want of spirit in the other magistrates, but Mr. Thompson has, apparently, such a decided cast of character and clearness of expression, that acting with Lieutenant Huband of the 8th Hussars, who is full of intelligence and energy, nothing would be left undone that the civil and military force could effect.

"Such are the arrangements made for the present, and I hope Lord Hill and Lord Normanby may consider them sufficient, even supposing the utmost fears of the magistrates should be realized. I must say also that those gentlemen seem both vigilant and resolute, qualities which will, in my opinion be sufficient to prevent mischief. But in great manufacturing towns, such as Bradford, an efficient police under a single commissioner is absolutely necessary to give the law its proper tone and energy, and to prevent the necessity of demanding the aid of troops on minor occasions: the distress in Bradford is however very great. The magistrates told me the guardians under the new poor law have a great latitude given to them for relieving all that are in real want. I hope they use this power freely, for parsimonious conduct would at this moment produce very great danger.

"Duke of Portland, December 24.—I have the honour to acknowledge your grace's letter. I have also a letter from your informant, and two letters have reached me from Carlisle and from a Northumberland magistrate, both giving as near as possible the same information. I am not the least afraid of the pensioners failing in duty under authority: but they *must* be Chartists. Situated as they are, dispersed and single, common sense tells us that these poor fellows would be the first to whom the Chartists would apply for military instruction; and how could the poor pensioner, alone in his hamlet, refuse? Would it not be to sign his death-warrant? But take him out of his village, place him under a chief, and the scene changes; he has then an excuse to be loyal and death awaits treason.

"Under-Secretary, December 29th.—Dr. Taylor says the two Frenchmen carrying on the Chartist correspondence with France lived in the same house with himself; perhaps it might be useful to find out if Frenchmen really live in that house, which no doubt is known to the police. For my part I think this supposed correspondence, if it exists, must be

a mere trial between the leaders which can cheat the other, and it will die when they discover that neither have cash. I hear that Mr. Frost's lawyer has written a circular to the Chartists, requesting them not to rise in his favour or commit any violence till after the trial, as any disturbance would be a serious injury to his client. The Duke of Portland's secret informant says something is to happen here to-night. I don't believe!

"Journal, December.—I have certain information that fire balls and caltrops, are being prepared here and at Sheffield for an outbreak:—pretty Christmas gambols! I am rather uneasy about Bradford; and everywhere the magistrates are in great alarm. Bradford is the only weak point, but the hussars there have been reinforced by infantry from Hull. If attacked each post must fight for itself, lustily, while I collect a reserve to march as events may dictate. I have certain intelligence that many sales of gunpowder have been made to countrymen this week, exceeding what has ever been known before. Was it to poachers? No, to the poorer people and to strangers. This looks as if Johnny Bull was getting restive. Poor fellow! No wonder! But the whole quantity sold would not furnish more than 8000 cartridges! Poor wretches, they surely will not provoke war with such a miserable provision."

Thus closed the first year of his command, and the story of it may be fitly terminated with the following reflections extracted from his secret journal.

"There are queer fellows in this world. Every day I hear the same stupid opinions expressed, and the same demand for what are called *vigorous measures:*—that is to say hanging a dozen men called agitators: that is to say men who differ in opinion from the men who demand their death. A pretty mode of governing! The people are discontented because they want food: a few men cleverer or bolder than the crowd, either from evil design,

for their own gain, or from honest indignation, or from wisdom, or some other cause speak aloud what they think will relieve the people and are believed. These speakers are called demagogues, and your vigorous people would hang them. Well, they are hanged! Are the people fed by that? No! They become more angry, more vindictive, and the peril of the country is greater. Such is the result of vigorous measures, so called but which are really *idiot measures.* What then is to be done? says John Donkey the member, the legislator, the statesman! Why feed the people Johnny, and give them votes, short parliaments, ballot: give them their rights. Here we are on the eve of an outbreak. What good will victory do? the people, beaten in the field will resort to assassination and fire, and thus become entirely demoralized by bad government.

"Radical cure being rejected by our government, let us consider expedients. I am now ordered to keep permanent detachments at Newcastle-under-Lyne; detachments at Durham; detachments at Cockermouth: my force will soon be frittered down to a corporal's guard. This is playing the Chartists' game, and the greatest danger may be apprehended:—danger of being tainted if we are not careful, and of being cut off if we come to blows. I dread a small war of posts, we could not carry on such a struggle. We must keep together in barracks, and have paid magistrates and a well-organized police in all the manufacturing towns: thus the troops would not be called upon until it comes to a civil war. Moreover it is not decent to have the law of the land upheld by soldiers at every turn: if it is necessary what sort of law must it be! The principle upon which government should act, is conciliation on one side and a strong hand to repress outrage on the other. Speaking only as a general officer, I say that government must have a strong police with paid magistrates, to uphold the law without calling for troops on every occasion: the soldier forms the reserve and should not be the advanced guard.

"There is a regular correspondence between the French and English Chartists, the object of both being to get money from each other. Formerly the French paid the Sydneys and Russells &c. to keep England in trouble. Matters are different now. The French Republicans are beggarly cut-throats, and neither will nor can help our knaves; their object is pillage: the very essence of republicanism is pillage. The moment a clever or industrious man gets more than his neighbours they desire to pull him down. This is their creed in France. Our Chartists will get no money from the French *Liberals*. Their friendship will soon cease; for it may be taken as an axiom, that when individuals, or bodies, lay taxes on each other all union soon dissolves: a friend who borrows and does not pay becomes an enemy!"

TWELFTH EPOCH.

SIXTH PERIOD.

CHARTIST commotion was not ended, but, previous to resuming that story, some purely military correspondence shall illustrate the general's care for discipline even when unsupported by those in authority; for to oppose mismanagement in high places was the struggle of his life.

"Major ——, December.—Let me give you advice: never put into a list of real grievances things which are imaginary; they do away with the effect. The barracks are dangerous, filthy, all you say; but when you add that there are no means of keeping the soldiers within bounds you make me laugh. What would you do if they were in billets? Yet I should expect you to be in excellent order in billets: it is discipline, not stone walls that keeps soldiers in bounds. Then, one-half of your accommodation is stone-floored. My dear sir, I have been for nine months in a lodging with stone floors, and my wife and daughters bear them very well: soldiers must not be so delicate; my own room is just seven feet by ten, and stone-floored!

"Major Gregory.—I know of no reason why the soldier should get worse rations in the Isle of Man than he does at Newcastle. A man is not forced to be a contractor, and there is no pretence for cheating the soldier out of his food: I am therefore at a loss to understand Lieutenant D——'s allowing the rations in the Isle of Man to be inferior to what are issued in England. I laid the misconduct of the contractor before Lord Hill and the master-general of the ordnance; they have taken it up, and given Lieutenant D——full power to protect the soldiers from the cheating vagabond: yet the

lieutenant is so weak as to let him have his own way, and still give rations that he the lieutenant does not consider equal to what are issued in England. He thus establishes a precedent for giving in the Isle of Man worse rations than in England. It is not less cheating, but no cheating of the soldier at all that I want.

"Major Wilson, December.—I have ordered a court-martial on the man who made a frivolous complaint of Ensign B——, but you must order Captain Egerton to explain to his subaltern, that I consider him nearly as much to blame as the private. Had he formerly done his own duty at Newcastle, as a good officer, this man would have had too much respect for him to dare a frivolous charge: but seeing that in a moment of hardship his officer took more care of himself than of his men he lost that respect which ought to exist.

"Captain Egerton must explain to this young officer what carelessness in duty leads to, namely, commission of crime, and infliction of punishment on soldiers by those very officers whose conduct set them a bad example: officers should never forget that they are judges as well as officers. Captain Egerton is I hear a soldier, who will do what I want, and as I want, viz. instruct his subalterns, and not reprovingly but kindly. There is no better lesson in command than to let captains teach their officers and privates. It imposes responsibility, obliges them to reflect on their own duties, and gives a facility for explaining themselves to others: for this reason I like to see officers always attached to the same company as far as is practicable. My wish is to have every officer under my command know that I watch his conduct. Daily I have to confirm courts-martial, and it is my duty to ascertain the general conduct of those who bring men to trial; but also I lose no opportunity of bringing to Lord Hill's notice all officers' and privates' names that in any way distinguish themselves: to do otherwise would be unjust.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Coutance.—I have approved and

confirmed the sentence on Sweeney, but think it very severe; two months with hard labour would be sufficient: however, it is left to you to remit if you like. The disturbance in the room was very serious, so was striking the corporal; but we know youngsters will get drunk, and two months would be a sharp lesson. You have however a difficult task with so many detachments, and I do not like to add to your work by injudicious lenity: do as you please, but I have before me a lighter sentence on a rascal of the 7th Dragoon Guards, for desertion, with three former convictions for desertion, insolence to his captain and theft! I wish you to tell the court that, although to avoid the bad effect of revision the sentence is confirmed, it makes me sorry to see such severe sentences: they do no good. Had this man been sentenced only to two months it would have had more effect.

"The same.—I agree with you in not remitting punishments; it very rarely does good, and need seldom be demanded in a regiment where a colonel and his officers are all together, because they come to a certain degree of understanding as to the quantity of punishment to apply to each crime, and in all cases revision is easy, the court being in the next room. But very different is the situation of a general officer. A revision by him is a tedious affair. Suppose sixteen courts-martial come to me by a single post, as once happened, then the expence of postage and the detention of the man all combine to make revisal bad. To revise courts-martial adds much to my labours, for I read a court-martial twice over, in some cases three times, and again when it comes back!

"Look also at the extraordinary sentences passed. Not a fortnight ago a man of bad character deserted and was a few days away before being caught: the court sentenced him to two years' imprisonment with hard labour, and alternate months of solitary confinement! A lance corporal was at the same time sentenced to one month solitary confinement for being drunk when commanding a picquet—drunk on duty

at such a time as this! And now Sweeney's sentence of four months! where, as you justly observe, there was none of the knocking-down system; for if there had been the sentence of four months would be just. The corporal's crime was far greater than Sweeney's, especially in these times; yet I think the corporal's sentence sufficient and that it will have more effect than a heavier one. Heavy sentences compel me to remit: when sentences are light I have no scruple about one man getting a little more than another for the same offence; but when one man has weeks and another months for the same fault I am necessarily obliged to remit a portion of the latter. Everything confirms my opinion that a corps of judge advocates should be formed, one of whom should attend every court to establish a uniform system. I mean to propose this to Lord Hill when there is more time.

"Journal, January 1st 1840.—Last night a dragoon was fired at while passing through the street: three constables heard and two saw the shot fired, yet they did not catch the man.

"2nd.—A sentry at Haydock Lodge fired upon.

"4th.—Sale of gunpowder goes on briskly in Nottingham, and I have seen some of the fire-balls; they are mischievous for undefended houses and frightening peaceable citizens, but ridiculous as weapons of battle. Lord Normanby has desired me to offer £200 for discovering the man who fired at the dragoon, but I will not do so; the thing has made no talk, and £1000 would not find the man; it is only shewing our teeth without biting: let us shut our mouths and the thing will be unnoticed.

"Under-Secretary, January 1st.—I enclose some information received last night from Mr. Roworth, mayor of Nottingham, a gentleman of whom it would be difficult to speak too highly. The informations come from only a few of those who sell gunpowder; the rest are supposed to be Chartists who would not speak the truth. I cannot say too

much of the mayor. His active benevolence and watchfulness are most praiseworthy; and the good feeling of the people under very severe suffering is admirable. Meanwhile taking the powder sold these three months past at 300 lbs. it will make 7200 cartridges: to be on a level with soldiers sixty rounds are required for each man, and this gives cartridges for only 120 men! Allow twelve times the quantity to be sold, it provides 1440 men for Nottingham and its vicinity; and of their fire-locks one thousand would not go off and forty would be cast away on the first shot: about four hundred undisciplined men would remain to deal with, and a wet day would put the four hundred on a level with the rest.

"The same, January 5th.—All we can learn about the gunpowder, is that there are 60 or 80 people who sell it in this town. I send a letter from the mayor, who says, if he called his colleagues together about paying any one as referred to in this letter, there would be discussion for two days, the whole town would know it and it would be finally refused. As to the watch committee, he might as well consult the Chartists, for they would know all that passed in ten minutes after the council had fixed any point. As to the reward for discovering the man who fired at the dragoon, before doing so it is right to state, that the firing has made no talk, and, strange to say, has not got into the local paper: a reward would perhaps do what this vagabond has failed to do, viz. create alarm.

"Lord Normanby, January 6th.—The mayor gives me the following information from excellent authority.

"The Chartists have what they call rockets, which they believe will, if thrust into a window, blow the roof off a house. Their arms are chiefly pistols, and they have cast a vast quantity of balls. Their plan is to attack the middle classes and reduce them to the same state of poverty with themselves. They have no fear of the soldiers, because they mean to go about in small parties of fives and sixes accord-

ing to their classes and sections, with their arms hidden and so as not to attract attention by their numbers. These small parties are suddenly to attack houses with their rockets, yet do not purpose to kill any one—how avoid it? The moment any Chartist is convicted, whether it be Frost or any other, this warfare is to begin and all labour instantly to cease. The mayor has a strong belief in his informant, who is a Chartist but opposed to physical force.

"Journal, January 5th.—Great abuse of me in a Manchester paper for my district order. I issued it to prevent bloodshed, and believe it did so: I would again issue it under the circumstances. Had I not issued it some attempt would have been made on the troops and the blood of some poor people spilled.

"10th.—Colonel Martin writes from Sheffield that he has positive information as to an attack on him to-morrow.

"11th.—Met all the magistrates.

"12th.—Patroled all last night. Saw the Chartist sentinels in the streets; we knew they were armed with pistols but I advised the magistrates not to meddle with them. Seizing these men could do no good; it would not stop Chartism if they were all hanged; and as they offered no violence why starve their wretched families, and worry them with a long imprisonment? I repeat it, Chartism cannot be stopped, God forbid that it should: what we want is to stop the letting loose a large body of armed cut-throats upon the public. My wish is to prevent an outbreak, not to provoke one. The magistrates, happily, agreed with me, and my excellent friend William Roworth the mayor was worth a host.

"Colonel Wemyss, January 11th.—The Duke of Portland writes, that he has positive information of a general rising to take place to-morrow, Sunday: I do not believe it.

"Lord Fitzroy.—I am aware of the Duke of Portland's alarm. How far his informant may be credited I cannot say, but doubt much that any outbreak will happen until

an order for the execution of a Chartist arrives at Monmouth, when outrage may happen.

"Under-Secretary, January 12th.—Last night Colonel Marten's report came from Sheffield. It coincides with the intelligence sent by the Duke of Portland, that a rising is to take place this night. Another report from Lieutenant Huband at Bradford contains nearly the same statement, but he says, the report was, that the outbreak was for the 10th. Lieutenant Huband's report was on rumour, Colonel Marten's on depositions sworn before magistrates. These things made me consult the mayor, who called the magistrates together and we agreed that nothing more is necessary than to be on the alert. We could not I think be so quiet if desperate work was close at hand; men's nerves would shew excitement and give warning. Colonel Marten tells me there is not a single magistrate in Sheffield!

"Lord Fitzroy, January 13th.—Last week I drew out the garrison, posting a chain of picquets, which would, on an inroad by the Chartists of Sutton and Arnold, bar entry into Nottingham. Three days ago, a rifleman drinking in a public-house was asked by a countryman—Why did your general take out the soldiers? The rifleman not wishing to say what he thought answered, Our general is a doctor as well as a general, and as the weather was fine he thought a little exercise would be good for the men's health. *Don't gammon me with your doctor*, said the man and took from his breast a plan with the position of each picquet marked, having riflemen and dragoons written over each, and the exact number of men. *None of your doctor gammon, no one could get into the town to help his friend without the general's leave!* The plan was drawn with pen and ink, and the soldier tried to get it, but the other would not let him touch it.

"Journal, 14th January.—An attack has taken place at Sheffield, feeble, badly arranged and base. Marten's dragoons frightened the rioters, no lives were lost, but one poor

dissenting preacher was badly wounded: many prisoners taken. The insurgents shot the poor preacher wantonly for there was no firing, it was the deed of some ruffian. This is a danger which must be a consequence of an armed multitude rising: ruffians will murder, burn and plunder, devastating where there are not troops to quell them.

"15th.—The sale of gunpowder continues, all is however quiet, but only in consequence of the troops being on the alert.

"January 16th.—Anniversary of the battle of Coruña! Oh that I should have outlived that day to be at war with my own countrymen! better be dead than live to see a civil war.

"17th.—An attempt to fire the barracks at Barnsley on the 15th, but Lieutenant Yates of the 1st Dragoons behaved with a good sense and presence of mind that baffled the attempt.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Marten, January 17th.—The papers have not treated you fairly, your promptness in advancing against the incendiaries was certainly what saved the town from being fired. However the government is aware of the fact, for I sent your report to Lord Normanby: from that, though you give little more than a statement of facts, it is quite plain that your arrangements did the job.

"Colonel W. Napier, January 19th.—Misery is running riot through the greatest part of this district, that is to say through the manufacturing parts; the agricultural parts suffer less perhaps, at all events, being less condensed it is less perceptible. At Nottingham the gentry are really very good-natured: the mayor and one or two more got up a meeting, and in a few days near £4000 was subscribed, *despite of the exertions of the poor law people*, who said we were encouraging idleness. The poor here have resolved to die rather than go into the union houses, and I have not the least doubt that numbers would have starved sooner than go there; certainly they would have resisted hunger

until the feebler bodies of their children perished, or been so reduced as never to recover their health. Many who were willing were refused admittance. I know of an old man who being starving was told—Oh, you can't have anything to-day, come again on Thursday. But I have gone two days without food and shall be dead before Thursday. Oh, we can't help that, you must weather the storm as others do. And he would have died if the mayor had not fed him.

"Now for what I saw, and which is not *quite without foundation!* as the poor law folks tell you all stories of suffering are. Being at the police on Christmas night, the rain falling heavily, the mayor said to me, General you shall see a case. A pretty young woman came in, she could hardly move, being on the point of child-birth: she had been refused entrance at the union, and had one child in her arms and another at her breast. She had entered the town that morning, seeking her husband, who was a hod-man going about for work: she had no acquaintance, no shelter, was wet, half dead with cold and about to be delivered in the streets. She was willing to go into the poor-house and was refused! They abused her for being what she owned she was, but said very quietly Tell me what I am to do, either good or bad? The mayor said, What does her goodness or badness signify? It is not a case of morality but of destitution, and her children are not bad. Devil a bit would the poor-house folks take her in. The mayor then asked the other magistrate to join with him in signing an order to force the poor-house keeper, but was refused. And this excellent mayor is abused because in giving help with the subscription money he relieves men of Chartist principles.

"There is one family here that would save a city from God's wrath. Wrights the bankers. Mr. Smith Wright is one of the firm and a better fellow never rolled in riches, as I believe he does. However the misery is so horrid, the poor law rules are necessarily broken and put aside, and relief out of doors is given perforce. We have 800 men

paid by the private subscription and, horror of horrors! 200 of them rank Chartists, employed by the mayor's order, at which some people here cannot sleep in their beds: they would ere this have slept less if they had a *vigorous mayor*, for the town would have been burned. My firm belief is that it has been saved by the good heart and good sense of Roworth the mayor, more than by anything else:—if we are saved, for the Chartists have prepared a quantity of combustibles and are exceedingly ferocious. There are quite enough of rascals amongst them to fire the town; and also many good fellows so enraged at villainy, such as I have described, as to be ready for any violence, though they would regret it when they saw what would happen.

"Both these classes are very dangerous, but the cowardice shewn is absolutely ridiculous. One night, when out with 12 dragoons, a mob of 2000 followed and assailed us with abuse so violent as to make me fear they would end with stones, a large heap being at hand. Thinking they would have some respect for me, I told the magistrate and the dragoons to ride on while I spoke to the mob, and I rode back alone. To my surprize all fled, pushing each other down in their haste. At Sheffield not a man faced the dragoons; fire and assassination are their weapons, and now their nature, because they are driven to that course, the poor law being the goad to keep them going. That law is however, in a great measure, only new in name, for they give out-door relief everywhere in the manufacturing districts; but they still separate parents and children, which the people will not bear, and they are right. The hatred to this law is not confined to Chartists, nor to the poor, it creates Chartists, it makes them sanguinary: they mean to spare no one that has a good coat if they once get to work: in short it is all hell, or likely to be so in England.

"Peter Bussy, the great Chartist leader at Bradford, has fled; he refused to join in the physical-force work and they were going to murder him. They now want to burn towns,

with all the sick, and infants, and aged! All this has been provoked, but sane men cannot join in such bloody work. My district order got into the papers God knows how! certainly not with my consent or knowledge. The fact was, that I had positive information of an intended general attempt to fire all our barrack. Our officers were either worn out by constant threats, or over-anxious, and were harassing their men, who, on the other hand were, though I believe perfectly loyal, making long strides in liberal opinions: I however never *say* this, because you can have no idea of the touchiness I have to deal with in some quarters.

"The same, February 5th.—We go on from bad to worse here; the people are starving, and the guardians of the poor are, as you justly called them, *guardians of their own pockets*. If a starving wretch, irritated by the overseer's domineering insolence answers him, the unfortunate may die, for the overseer will not let him get assistance out of the house, or get admitted in. If he complains, the guardians say to the overseer—Well what are we to do in this case? Oh! that's a terrible rascal, he is one of the discontented insolent villains that infest this town. *My friend we can do nothing for you.* So Mr. Overseer is absolute despot. Meanwhile we are going on, making pikes out of files and battleaxes out of old saws, and buying up gunpowder and making fire-balls: at least the police tell me so, and I believe it is so. Yet when these Chartists turn out to use these weapons, as at Sheffield and Bradford, they shew fear past description, or equal to that of the magistrates at Bradford. There, having only their rattles the constables disarmed and took prisoners all the Chartists they met, the Chartists having spears. Not a soldier was present, they were in another part of the town, where the magistrates kept them to guard their sacred persons. Not the least attempt was made at resistance by the incendiaries with their pikes and fire-balls; yet the magistrates sent an express to Leeds for a piece of cannon, and another troop of dragoons, thus alarming the whole country!

Now, if I gave them a lecture the Horse Guards would be down on me like a thunderbolt! You cannot conceive the caution forced on me. The attempt to burn a large town like Sheffield was atrocious; the rascals taken deserve to be hanged: but what good will that do? None! We are in a state which no example can better, because the halter cannot be put round the right necks!"

At this time he was severely attacked by acute rheumatism, arising from the unhealthiness of his lodgings and his frequent night excursions: and the general discomfort of his personal position was very oppressive.

"Lord Fitzroy Somerset, January.—When I was first appointed, you told me Lord Hill would allow me to choose where I would have head-quarters. I thought it best to see a little of the district before deciding, and now my wish is to go to Chester. I cannot get a house here in which to live on my income. At the request of the gentry about Nottingham, made without my knowledge, Lord Manvers offered me the house which Sir R. Jackson had; but I could not live in such a house without ruin. Having only £300 a year of my own,—which being in the American funds may now at any moment become 0!—my military income added to it and the advantage of a large family, will not let me live in a palace like *Helen-Pierpoint*. Chester, now the railway is ready, is not more than two hours from Manchester, from whence railroads push out in all directions towards the north. Hence in point of time, and reference to the greatest portion of the force Chester is a central position; and my hope is that Lord Hill will not think the change inconvenient for the service: if he does, nothing more shall be said.

"January 26th.—Very ill with rheumatism. Even Robertson will let me swear at rheumatism I hope, and I must in face of all the saints terrestrial and celestial. Robertson tries hard, but cannot make me a saint. The Chartists are bad soldiers! It appears from the depositions

of prisoners at Bradford or Sheffield, there was one desperate leader, Holberry, sent to Nottingham to lead the Chartists against me: he deposes that the troops so worried the Chartists there they were afraid to attack. So far so good, I saved blood! This is a blessed thought.

"January 30th.—This day, my great, great, great, grandfather, Charles the First was *be-nobbed!* and well he deserved it: he was a jesuitical hypocritical rascal as ever wore a crown. He died with pluck because he was in his right place, on a scaffold!—not the right place as a king, but as a man. God rest his soul, but he was a bad king, a bad soldier, and a bad man.

"Under-Secretary, February 2nd.—There is more protection for the country in having one town occupied by a troop of cavalry, than two towns, each occupied by half a troop. Besides the absence of soldiers makes magistrates more alert, and at the same time, induces them to be temperate and conciliatory. The conduct of Mr. Roworth the mayor of Nottingham, shews what great influence a zealous, temperate and active magistrate can acquire over the population. I am very far from thinking troops unnecessary, but Bradford shews what the civil power can do if resolutely used; and the putting down one riot by constables has more good effect than putting down ten by soldiers: it also gives the civil powers confidence in themselves, which is very desirable.

"Sir H. Ross, February.—Ingilby's letter to you is a very sensible one, except *his* telling *you*, how helpless a gun was without artillerymen, which possibly you had some idea of before, though the magistrates would not believe it. God forgive me, but sometimes they tempt me to wish they and their mills were all burned together. I am going to take the company from them and expect a fearful battle, in which they will probably defeat me: however Lord Normanby has been hitherto very staunch. I find it took five hours for the reinforcement to arrive! This demands

enquiry, for though neither hussars nor gun should have been sent for at all they ought to have been at Bradford in two hours and a half. There is reason to believe the soldiers were alert, and the delay caused by the magistrates' messenger taking two hours to go nine miles! I ordered Colonel K—— to take the dragoons and a gun four miles out and back, and let me know the exact time that march took. He answers by a calculation of his own and Ingilby's instead of doing what he was told. What think you is his reason? The *weather was rather wet!* Now I know as well as he does, that a gun troop of hussars can go seven miles in an hour on a pinch; but I wanted to have a practical proof on that road, and to make it evident to all they could reach Bradford in any weather, in little beyond the hour when danger required a push. You will agree with me that alertness is necessary, or may be; and that troops should consider it as a matter of course, and occasionally practise it, to be aware of all the little accidents that are sure to happen. Now, with due respect for K——, the wet day was that to be preferred, as the men have good barracks to return to, and are not made of sugar. Men afflicted with difficulties are the greatest subverters of discipline.

"Wemyss, February 13th.—The meeting at Bolton was like all others, and there was no wisdom in the mayor and magistrates refusing permission for a meeting which they could not prevent. Our mayor and magistrates acted more wisely; they gave permission but refused the town hall, and that meeting was perfectly quiet, lasted only twenty minutes, and very few attended. At Bolton and other places where permission was refused meetings took place notwithstanding, but with bad feeling towards the authorities. Here there was good feeling, and thus a proper respect for the people produced respect for the law. Those who called the meeting told the mayor, if he would send two constables, they would at the constable's bidding arrest any man pointed

out; this is much more sensible than shewing teeth without being able to bite.

"Journal, March 5th.—Ordered to inspect the barracks of the district, and report to the secretary of state, marking the positions where I would erect new barracks, in place of the miserable hovels called temporary barracks in which the troops have been so shamefully placed for twelve years. It is just however to state, that the condition of the barracks would have been unaltered for a century, had not Colonel Thomas, 20th Regiment, brought it up in the House of Commons; his motives concern not me, but such is the fact. He attacked Sir Hussey Vivian, which made the latter demand a court of inquiry to examine those of Manchester, designated by Colonel Thomas in the house, as *disgraceful to the country:* yet they were and are my best!! The master-general, piqued at the attack, made a tour himself, and saw the horrid holes of Wigan Bolton and Rochdale. He was shocked at those accursed holes in which to lodge human beings and resolved to assist in putting things right, at least not to oppose me and the troops. We then poured broadsides of complaints, until, beset on all sides, the government resolved to move in the matter, and I was summoned to London, where the various heads of departments being tolerably ignorant of the affair, from having other avocations, but not choosing to avow their ignorance formed their own plans separately. Some wanted a few large barracks, some a good many small ones; they could not agree and sent for me to decide: those who would not yield to equals would submit to an inferior. Thus it all falls on me.

"1st. Ashton-under-Lyne.—The magistrates all as haughty as you please, fear nothing and will not pay for barracks.

"12th. Burnley.—The landlady, and her three maids—such beauties! my bad eyes have been much better since I looked at them!

"Todmorden.—On high ground where the hills branch

off at Blackston edge. The pass to Todmorden is deep and strong; so is that out of it at the Rochdale side. The country very pretty and wild. Caught the train, and was nearly overthrown down a place twenty feet deep.

"Manchester again.—Millions of letters here. I feel very ill. I know not what ails me, but have a fearful depression of spirits not to be shaken off. Yet I must work, my pay from the public goes on and so must I: better die honest than live a rogue. My pay comes out of these poor men's pockets and not to work is to cheat them.

"March 4th.—Anniversary of the day George and William were wounded near Condeixa in Portugal; my head too was then still tied up from my Busaco wound. Time flies! Take 1811 from 1840 and 29 years remain! Oh Cocker! Cocker! We were three active chaps then. I was 28, George 26, William 25. And now! *Och hone!* 57, 55, 54!!! I command half England, George rules the Cape, and we are both knights commanders of the Bath. William is a companion of the order and finishes his History this month. This is not bad, but what good is it? A few years and we are gone, forgotten! Yet! is it pain to go to those who went before?

"14th.—Ill all day, but worked hard.

"16th, Halifax.—Very unwell, but must get on with my work. Late to bed, having had much to do, all done though, thank God for that! Now for a dose of opium, called by doctors morphine, but opium is opium. John Chinaman is right!

"18th, Dewsbury.—A curious place. Cavalry should not be here. The town is in a hollow, bounded on one side by the river Calder: it has three entrances, each through a pass, and no messenger could get out of the town save through them, so that cavalry might be blocked up. They are there now by order of the secretary of state, at the repeated demands of the magistrates. I have however got

them a strong stone barrack capable of a long defence; and ordered them in case of agitation to communicate daily with Leeds, where the officer has orders to march in strength on Dewsbury, if the communication ceases: the cavalry are thus secured from being cut off. There should be infantry at Thornhillbriggs. They would support all the cavalry detachments, and protect all the neighbouring towns. This will not be done: we irritate the people and do nothing to guard the country. But the curse of mammon is upon us and we perish: the poor starve, that 5 per cent esquire, may become 10 per cent esquire, and keep four horses instead of two. God does not allow these things to go unpunished: all unholy pleasures carry their pains with them.

"Now to my treadmill, to that labour which bears no fruit, that preparation for civil war! Fool that I was not to go to Australia! there peace, health, natural life, invited me; but I would not have been Sir Charles, or a general! Both are to me worthless: a farm in Australia would be more happiness than the Garter.

"Leeds, 19th.—Arranged with Bradford magistrates, who are in a proper fright: the people are everywhere starving in the manufacturing districts, and of course everywhere to be pitied and feared.

"York, 20th.—Barracks good for cavalry. The cavalry officers are fine fellows, but entirely engrossed with hunting, shooting, and horse-dealing: this never did, and never will make soldiers, and with the finest men in the world, and the finest horses in the world, and the best appointed, our cavalry will never have much success.

"March 21st.—The anniversary of my father's birthday. It is also that on which Marshal Ney set me free at Coruña. Oh time! time! Thou shark which swalloweth all! How many were alive then who we can meet no more on earth! But can men think that so we part, that all we love are but figures in a hurried dream? Nonsense! we must meet again, or how could the brain bear the weight of memory,

if the hope of futurity did not come to its relief? There is a mystery and death unravels it.

"23rd.—Went to Hull, passed down the Ouse and Humber; thought of Tostig and the Danes, and Harold, and of the Hothams. The citadel of Hull ought to be strong and is weak.

"March 25th, Nottingham.—Arrived here after a three weeks' tour, ill the whole time, and having the comfort of knowing that a poor and extravagant government will do none of the things I have proposed for the soldier: my report will be thrown away. Yet an army is no joke and the soldiers well know that the game is in their hands. A private of the 81st put a letter in the Bradford paper plainly saying so, yet professing the greatest loyalty, which I am convinced the soldiers will; but it will not do for the Crown of England to be held on a common title like that of the East India Directors. There is one thing that ought to be a standing army, viz. the will of a steady moderate loyal nation! let that be removed and [illegible] may use his power well or ill, but

[illegible] work! Letters and courts-martial. [illegible] incessant briefs and no pay. Who [illegible] talking of a man being a general, that [illegible] up reading courts-martial—four, [illegible] a soldier but an attorney's clerk. [illegible] delegates are to assemble here at Nottingham April the 6th.—Oh ho! the Chartists are [illegible]

[illegible] year my command of the northern district begun. My time has been one of labour and anxiety without reward, for nothing can be shewn! I have ten times the penwork that Cephalonia gave me and nothing to shew. There I protected the poor, regulated justice, and executed really great works. Forty miles of road hewn out of the living rock, and many fine buildings, and horses with carts introduced into a country previously without them, were things

to make a man feel he had lived for some good. Here my time is lost in drivelling correspondence and reading courts-martial, with much additional gribble grabble. I command ten thousand men but never see them together. Well! patience, duty must be done. What have I to do with ambition?"

It is painful to note these internal throes of power and energy in a mind conscious of ability to serve the country greatly, yet condemned to the drudgery of a monotonous and pernicious official system, which plastered, as it were with bird lime the wings of a noble ambition—but his time was coming.

"Journal, April 6th.—Walked out with my two merry little affectionate girls; I fear they are idols but cannot help it. the godly tell us we must have no idols. Perhaps right, but for all that, father and mother will [illegible] and I have no idea of being [illegible] that respect.

"April 7th.—We are all alive again. The delegates for the national conv[illegible] have met, though no one knows who they are or a[illegible] about them, except that reporting they met in t[illegible]

"8th.—This [illegible] sensation, the [illegible] sent: they star[illegible] had zeal, good will and [illegible] ment, in unio[illegible] saries of life to a rebellion!

"11th.—I have been treated by the gentlemen of this neighbourhood with much kindness, which I could but slightly return, being in a miserable lodging, a baker's shop. Wishing to shew these kind people that I had at least a sense of their good nature, I have asked all who have invited me to a dinner at the George the 4th. Ten were pre-engaged, but we sat down twenty-two. It was an agreeable dinner to me because they were good enough to be pleased; and so far as feeding went with reason, for old Mrs. Ward gave us a

splendid feed. Splendid is the correct cant word I believe: everything now is *splendid* or *interesting*, and *carried out*, not executed or effected. Well Mrs. Ward carried *in* her splendid dinner, which then became most interesting: that is, there were two *lovely salmons*, one at each end, and in the middle a most *interesting turbot:* every one ate in the most *correct* way, the champagne was also *splendid*, and then the dinner was *carried out!*

"I like Nottingham; the poor people are good, and were they fairly treated they would be perfectly quiet. Thank God we have had no row, and not a drop of blood has been spilled. The gentlemen here are so good as to give me credit for this, which I am not sure of deserving, save from my great desire to prevent mischief. They are here generous to the poor, and do much; but it will not do, the rich manufacturers are too hard a set. There are two men of these parts for whom I shall always feel the greatest regard. Mr. Smith Wright of Rempston, and the mayor, Mr. Roworth, they are among the 'noblest works of God.' Kind-hearted, generous, benevolent: these two men would have sufficed to save the scriptural city.

"12th.—Not well, having been forced to drink at my dinner more than usual, which does not agree with me. I never was drunk in my whole life, and I doubt whether another soldier in the army can say that.

"April 14th.—Lord Fitzroy asks me to let them take away two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry. Certainly if things remain quiet, but who shall guarantee that? Now if I say yes and an insurrection breaks out, all England will cry out upon me and the Whigs would give me up; at least I should be a fool to trust them. No! there will be an outcry that I am an alarmist, and my very keeping of the country quiet be used as the proof. Now I do not like being in a cleft stick any more than Caliban did; so I composed the following letter, but on second thoughts sent another to the same purpose safer for myself and therefore

better. Lord Fitzroy and Lord Hill are very cautious; they do not like the least political opinion being expressed and I will not expose myself to a second hint. But how an officer holding my high situation can do his duty without forming opinions, and decided ones, on the state of the country is not easy to say.

"First letter. In my late tour I made much enquiry as to the state of the country and found it quiet; but in the manufacturing districts great distress prevails, which is not the case in the agricultural parts. While this distress exists the physical-force people have materials to work upon, and therefore I delayed writing about the reduction of the forces in hopes commerce would revive. It has not yet done so and the district continues tranquil, which leaves me little to say against the diminution of the troops. But government has seen how suddenly disturbances arise, how suddenly subside. One day we have been under arms throughout the district; the next, apparently without necessity for a single soldier; yet, but for the soldiers the country would have been plundered. This state, peculiar to a discontented and partially-armed population, makes me always feel unwarranted to recommend any diminution of the force here.

"If you ask my opinion as to the state of the country, it is the same I entertained when in town. The idea of gaining the Charter by present employment of force is dying away, men of that stamp could not now produce disturbance; nor do they believe they could themselves, or think of doing so: but of Chartism as a principle, my belief is it becomes more general. I may be wrong and my abilities are too small to give weight to my opinion, nor do I ever talk politics: but while listening to others I see, or think I see, three things, namely, great distress, great party violence, and a want of confidence in the present government even amongst its own party. Hence arises a very general idea that a great change is at hand: some fear it, some wish it, as they are influenced by imagined personal interest.

"I do not think my view prejudiced, because having for a year abandoned politics and never mixing myself with any party, or reading any newspaper, I am ignorant, even of the parliamentary discussions and confine myself wholly to my work as an officer: I think of nothing else, and if I speak of what passes around me to you, it is that you may better judge the value of my opinion as to the force required."

His second letter, precise and guarded, placed the decision in the hands of the commander in chief with little explanation. It is thus men of contracted minds cut off the sources of knowledge by which the machinery of government can be moved with just effect. Yet this remark applies here more to the ministers than the military authorities, who were themselves only partially of power: slaves of the lamp and the ring they dared not hang up the roc's egg.

He now obtained leave to fix his quarters at Chester, and his journal continues to shew his sense of the official fetters which clogged the free action of his powerful intellect.

"April 16th.—The Chartists are stirring again at Newcastle-on-Tyne. *Chartism is at a discount.* Ho! ho! Will there be an insurrection? My position will be personally very awkward. I am not afraid of myself, but a great deal of my masters. A general acting from his own brains, if he has any, may command his troops with effect; but when he has to act under others at a distance, cramped here, cramped there—do this! do that! God help him, for he cannot help himself. Montrose would have saved Charles the First but majesty floored him; even the genius of Cromwell was meshed by his canting masters until he wisely got rid of them; Leslie at Dunbar was not beaten by Oliver but by the priests! Well I care not, and will as an honourable man do what seems right, just, and humane, to all, in hope that what is good for the people of England may follow. And so far as falls within my limited sphere all shall be done to assist the poor, for they are ill-used and suffering. I must however give my approval of government for

having avoided bloodshed by executions: it is cruelty to do so, and useless for changing men's opinions. We have no right to take life for opinions: in battle it is unavoidable, by law horrible. It is not law or justice but barbarity to slay men for political opinions, in which thousands of good and honourable men agree with the condemned person! It is not justice, it is the vengeance of a dominant party.

TWELFTH EPOCH.

SEVENTH PERIOD.

In a country-house near Chester the overworked general hoped to recover health, but was debarred of that relief by the indecision of the Horse Guards, which forced him into a filthy unventilated lodging within the walls of that ancient and insalubrious city. This was a great vexation, but as usual treated jocosely. "We arrived here yesterday. Our house is as old as Babylon and apparently rotten, but seems pleasant for a town: we are like mites in cheese." His labours did not diminish. The Chartist commotions were not over and some military mortifications disturbed him, because they sprung from an improper bending to political persons, and while detrimental to discipline were also injurious to professional dignity. His first letter is however a noble tribute of praise to a noble soldier.

"Sir H. Ross.—I am exceedingly sorry to have so hopeless an account of Sir Alexander Dickson, who among the soldiers of his day shone with marked brilliance: and in what age did war produce men more hardy or more brave? England had before beaten France, but when was France what she was when Wellington overthrew her armies? If there is aught to boast of in military renown it belongs to the army of Wellington; and surely the leader of that terrible artillery which thundered through those great battles cannot die and be forgotten like an ordinary man. I hope England will not let him pass away unnoticed: his funeral ought to be a public one, and on his tomb should be inscribed—*He led the artillery of Wellington.* A greater epitaph could scarcely be written except for the chief him-

self. The men who fought in Spain drop fast; the youngest of them must now begin to think of folding his cloak around him and falling decently. The immortality of fame which Wellington has cast over us like a mantle of light will endure; but our bodies are separate things, and more is the pity, for of all things being old is the most disagreeable: at least I find it so. I hope you may succeed your friend, I know of no man more worthy.

"His Sister.—I go into lodgings at Chester. I had a nice house, but Lord Fitzroy said, if Chester was found unsuitable I must change again; thus my house was lost, as it could not be taken for three years with a doubt. Why should Chester not suit? I have been ill, very ill, but on my tour was obliged to defy it, though I felt as if I could not get back to Nottingham.

"Journal, April 27th.—'Chartism is now over, the people see their folly, we shall have no more of that nonsense: how quiet the country is!' Thus am I told. Nevertheless on the 25th the Chartists at Colne thrashed the new police, and troops, horse and foot, were obliged to march from Burnley to their assistance.

"29th.—The Colne affair so far over that the troops have marched back, but the people told them they would not have the police. I always foresaw this, and said to my brother William—that the people would first oppose the establishing of the police, and would fail; but the ill-will would remain and the people would hold the law as an oppression, not a protection as was once the case. Now if England gets into such a state what is to be done? Some will answer *justice*. Bah! When was a government ever just? a government always resorts to force. We shall appeal to soldiers, and then grande confusion as in the French chamber of deputies, when the knaves were disputing about free constitutions while Blucher's Prussians were plundering the town, and finally put a stop to their grande confusion with two field pieces.

"May 2nd.—This is a fine old town. 'The Rows' are very curious and antiquarians have exhausted conjecture on the subject; none of them seem to think they were built to keep people from wet, but have accidentally taken this form: they are very convenient.

"May 4th.—All the world and his wife racing. The scene is beautiful, the old walls overlook the course and are crowded, while below are booths, punch and judy, swings, men and women, drunk, and sober; and the old river Dee glides on his course, his waters and those wild rioters on his banks running alike to the ocean of futurity, to be lost and heard of no more, going, going, gone! All the rogues, and fools and drunkards in the country seem collected, and the Row balconies are filled all day with idlers and well-dressed girls, young and old, looking into the streets from daybreak till dark. Such idleness I never witnessed as at Chester. My life has been long, it has but *twelve years* to run, and yet I never, in any country, witnessed such stupid idleness as in Chester. Those who go to the course have some fun, but those who hang over the Row-balconies all day like old clothes, see nothing, hear nothing, do nothing."

He lived just twelve years longer!

"May 5th.—This is the anniversary of Fuentes Onoro! What is glory, why do we love it, why love those who fought by our side in those dread contests in Spain? Aye! love even those who fought against us. What a fond bond of union is throat-cutting. Yea! verily we love it and devilish queer animals we are therefore. The fact is, men in the field are generally healthy, strong and full of spirits, life is enjoyed and dangers past are bonds of union: we admire those whose courage and generous daring made them conspicuous. It is impossible to love or admire a coward; his nature is base, his motives of action selfish; he does right only from fear or forecast.

"9th.—Rode out. *Reiza* pretended to be lame because

he wanted to go home! What nice animals horses are, one loves them in one's heart. I long to live in their company like an Arab. I am an Arab. I hate a home and wish to go about with my women and my horses and tent.

"Colonel W. Napier. May 11th.—Your sixth volume come, but my eyes are bad and my reading slow. The critic who complains of the length of your work and compares it with Gibbon drivels: he might as well find fault with the ordnance map of England for being as big as a carpet, when Wyld's map of the world is only the size of this paper! Chartism goes on silently, but we shall have a quiet summer, for trade is reviving a little and the people are patient beyond conception; they are a fine race and it is a sin to govern them so ill. Some great convulsion is approaching in the world, for bad governments clearly only hang now together from habit, as you said of your house: the first strong shake will produce a new order of things.

"Journal, May 13th.—I cannot get my romance from Colburn, but got his £50 for *Notes on Light and Shades*. My notes are full of errors for he would not let me correct the press, but his notes are good.

"15th.—Last night called up by a magistrate for troops to quell a row with the colliers at Flint. Labouring at my barrack report. I require £160,000 and they have not the money; but they must expend £40,000, or discipline will go and the soldiers will desert.

"20th.—My Elizabeth's birth-day. What is this world, and what are we? Memory! Oh thou racker of the heart, thou tearer up of times past, thou picturer of things never more to be seen, of faces no more to greet, voices no more to be heard! Yet but for their remembrance how terrible would be death! This makes man fearless.

"22nd.—Finished barrack report, and for ever, for I'll swear Lord Normanby will not be such an ass as to read it. He knows the treasurers have no money; but neither he nor

they know that they are weaning the soldier from his loyalty by bad barracks.

"26th.—Inspected the 96th and 79th, two fine regiments, and got another lesson on the necessity of fresh air: the 79th are all pallid, their chests are affected and they have many men in hospital. The 96th all healthy. The latter are in well-ventilated barracks, the former in a cursed Manchester mill; large rooms full of men and only ventilated by single panes of glass: this is one of the ways in which poor factory children are destroyed. What mad œconomy to have bad barracks for troops: health, spirits, discipline, everything suffers, even their loyalty; yet government will not lay out a penny while they give £70,000 for royal stables, and £2000 a year to Lord Monteagle!

"30th, Windermere.—The mountains hanging over the still water and the wild look of the place are enchanting to one who, like me, loves to dwell away from towns and people, and see nature in her wildness, and there live.

"June 1st.—Saw the 98th. Campbell is first-rate, what a nuisance that such a fellow should be kept back, while such as Colonel —— get on. But fairness is fairness —— is not a bad man; he is only one with a hundred-horse power of temper, his judgment and ability being that of an old maid's tea-kettle. If we have a war Campbell will be a first-rate leader of a brigade.

"June 9th.—Saw the Chesnut troop of Horse Artillery: beautiful as ever. How celebrated it was in the Peninsula under Sir Hew Ross. I recollect at the Coa how they fought a French battery across the river; they beat Johnny Crapaud out of the field. There also I saw a poor horse's leg knocked to pieces, yet the noble animal pulled on as if not hurt!. he walked a few minutes unobserved, for the shot raised a dust and the officers were attending to some men who were hurt. I never look at this troop without vivid recollections.

"11th.—Came back to Chester yesterday. Henry"—his brother, then a widower—"has been a great pleasure to me.

I am sorry he has given up his profession; he would either have improved it or made himself known in some other way, for his abilities are great and his mind active; but he is losing the last from living alone: contact with the world only can keep up self-confidence. He forms ideal pictures of perfection, and because he does not fill the frame-work holds himself cheap. Were he to work in the world he would find his own level, which is far above most men: he would thus be taught his real powers. Man ought to live an active life: Christ and Socrates lived amongst men, a recluse is useless.

"17th.—Colonel Thomas made a long report to the quarter-master general, saying, that there never was anything so disgraceful as the way his regiment was embarked; and that the military authorities, from Lord Hill to the unhappy Colonel Falconar, on whom he especially falls, ought to be d——d one and all; that the navy are even worse than the army and his men on board were like pigs! I stepped into the Liverpool coach, for having previously taken all precautions to have the embarcation regular I was resolved to blow up the offenders as high as the tallest steeple in Liverpool. Colonel Thomas's charge was entirely unfounded: he is just fit to be a member of Parliament. The Vesuvius war steamer is immense; she can carry four hundred men and fifty tons of baggage, and had but three hundred on board. Colonel Thomas was not there, but there is a key to the affair. A 'friend,' referred to in his report as the authority, was agent at Lloyds and wished to be made a surveyor of steamers: he avowed to me that he had not seen the regiment embark, but thought it a good opportunity to shew how much evil *might* occur, unless a surveyor of steamers was appointed! The officers of the regiment say they were treated like princes, not pigs, on board the Vesuvius.

"Colonel W. Napier, June 23rd.—Class meetings of physical-force men are going on secretly with great precautions: this is on certain information, yet I am continually told how

tranquil the country is, though in addition 4000 men at Stockport have maintained a *turn-out* for two months. I ought to have the power of going about more, but cannot afford it, the barrack report cost me £50: it may not perhaps be worth that to the public, but certainly it is not worth that to my girls who have paid for it. Hotels are oppressive. I am known everywhere, must travel with post-horses, and the nature of innkeepers is not to be overcome: travelling with a carriage entails certain rooms and charges—one must *dine in the Apollo!*

"My barrack report approved by Lord Hill, but not a word yet from Lord Normanby: it is a puzzler. Officers and soldiers are very sulky; the first most so, with least cause, yet cause enough for both. Like all needy people our rulers are parsimonious without being œconomical; and here they are in a cleft stick: for if they take away the troops up start the magistracy like bees from an overturned bee-hive; and if they leave the troops barracks must be built, for when Chartists are quiet the magistrates refuse temporary barracks. This dilemma made them demand my report, which Lord Hill approves, and it calls for £160,000. They are up to the knees in mud, having the magistrates on one side and poverty on the other; or rather abominable extravagance, for the royal stables and Lord Monteagle's pension would have lodged the troops well.

"Mr. Macaulay, Secretary at War.—I have to request that the charge in my contingent account for travelling expences on ordinary military duties may be allowed. This district is more extensive and contains more troops than any other; there is consequently more frequent occasions for the general officer to visit parts of it, and he is thus put to more expence than any other general commanding a district. Every regimental officer, non-commissioned officer and private soldier is allowed marching money to cover his increased expences on the road: this is an admission of the principle. Now in making his half-yearly inspections, and executing other duties,

the general may slur them over, or he may execute them thoroughly, but it will be under the very heavy tax of £2 a day, and the question forced upon him is this:—not how long those duties require his presence, but how long he can afford to maintain himself, his aide-de-camp and his servant at an expensive hotel? I say expensive, because the general officer is known everywhere, and really the innkeepers think he is as rich as my neighbour Lord Westminster.

"Now you, sir, must know as well as I do, that it is impossible to resist the tyranny of innkeepers: it does not always take the shape of pounds, but it does that of sixpences, and a man cannot travel over half England—my district amounts to that—fighting about sixpences! The expence of my half-yearly inspections, and other duties, deduct one-sixth of my staff pay. I think you will say this is not just. I have nothing but what comes from my military income: but that is not the question. Were I a man of independent fortune I should still say this deduction is unjust, and it is greater in the northern district than any other."

Notwithstanding the palpable injustice of this affair, enhanced by the fact, that the barrack journeys were not any part of the general's regular duty, Mr. Macaulay not only refused reimbursement but took pains to prove that the general's allowances amply covered all such expenditure:—making however the small mistake of setting down about £300 a year more than the reality: in short giving one of those official refusals which combine the utmost injustice with complete ignorance even of the official facts of his department. Mr. Macaulay, who thus unjustly deprived a hard-working officer of honestly-earned pay, had just come from India, where he had been for years complacently enjoying £10,000 yearly for doing nothing, his appointment having been a gross Whig job.

"Journal, July 4th.—Fires in most houses! If Noah had lived here after the flood the climate would have kept him in

constant fear of another voyage: by the way did he swim in fresh water or salt?

" 13th.—We are all quiet, but combined with so much distress, and so much injustice, as to leave me little confidence: 'tis not the quiet of content, and the quiet which force acting on wretchedness produces is a hell to me. Against a Chartist, pike in hand and bent to fight, I can stand with bold front; but against pale faces and humble conduct there is no fighting! However the Whigs have not shewn any ferocity this past year; it is but just to say they have been patient and merciful. Half the land has been openly in arms and not a drop of blood spilt on the scaffold!

" July 24th.—Anniversary of the Coa. This is the world! If we could see before us a few years how brave men would be: how fearless of death! My greatest objects in life then, were my mother, Susan Frost, and my young sister Caroline; it was indeed a hopeless feel about the last, for the blow had been struck; but I hoped to live with the others and to have them was enough of happiness. They are all gone and I never lived long with any of them! Always we were separated, and for what? Pursuit of a profession:—fame! gold! How civilization has destroyed happiness. In the wilds of Australia I should have procured food with them, working hard, having good health, and all around me happy: even trees and animals would have been my friends, with whom to live and die. Now all have passed away except my brothers and two sisters, and we live asunder, not sundered in affection but apart: the home of our childhood is in the hands of a stranger, the body of our father is where we are not; the body of our mother where we are not; on their graves we cannot sit to moralize on the coming hour; even *their* bones are separately laid to rest. We set an imaginary and erroneous value upon life! yet it is best to bide our term and patiently await the end of the queer journey. We cannot controul events, but can bear

them with patience if we resolve to do so: it is not what happens but how we bear it that contributes happiness. Patience however is not easy when mental or bodily pain presses.

"This day thirty years I slept sound and happy on a rock, with my feet to a fire, on a Portuguese mountain. Having come away from the bridge about twelve at night with General Craufurd, Rowan and others, I reached the 52nd bivouac about one in the morning, wet to the skin, rain having fallen in torrents. George and his company were on an immense plate rock, the rain was over, they had a good fire and a supper of beefsteaks with tea. I had not eaten that day, except a bit of bread George gave me during the fight, and was fairly *done up* as the fancy say, being tired, starved, anxious about William's wound, and depressed at our having fought so uselessly, throwing away lives so recklessly. I stripped and the soldiers who were then dry and had supped took—one my shirt, another my coat, and so on, to dry them. I sat meanwhile naked like a wild Indian on the warm rock—it was very pleasant, drinking warm tea, and eating steaks half raw, taken off the poor beast which had drawn our baggage all day:—one cannot be sentimental about bullocks on such occasions. We regretted the poor fellows who were slain, there were a great many, but the excitement of battle does away with much regret, there is no time: it is idleness that makes people grieve long, or rather bitterly. For my charming, my beautiful, my gentle sister Caroline I still grieve; yet at Busaco, a few hours after hearing of her death, a shot went through my head, and my thoughts were no more of her loss: my anxiety was to know if George or William was slain, both being still in battle, as the firing told me. Yet for my equally, not more dear sister Cecilia, my wretchedness was intense. They were two charming girls: the recollection is painful. Adieu battle of the Coa!

"August 2nd.—Agitation in all directions: police thrashed

at Lancaster, and the Charter is again the cry: my warnings to the government were sound.

"3rd.—More agitation. Colonel Wemyss thinks the remedy is hanging. Wemyss is a clever man and a kind-hearted man, how can he think thus! God send that our rulers may not take up his idea.

"Colonel W. Napier, August.—You are right about our Indian empire. I had an argument in Dublin with an East Indian general, Briggs, a clever fellow he was too; but when I said Circassia and the Caspian appeared the places to meet Russia and cut her line with India, he did not seem to coincide, yet gave no sufficient reason. As you say, if Russia sends an army to Bokhara it will be difficult for us to make war there. I wish you would fill up the outline which your letter to me sketches, like the great triangles of an extensive survey.

"The people of Lancashire are in a dreadful state of starvation. I told Mr. Phillipps ten days ago, that without entering into politics, or pretending to treat the question of the corn laws, I well knew the people were starving; and when told by able men that to abolish those laws would immediately feed them they will make it a rallying cry; attributing to those laws evils not belonging to them, and to their abolition virtues which it will not possess. This cry will enlist numbers of a class that Charter and pikes frighten away. To this I have received no answer. What they mean to do Heaven knows, but the starving goes on. The people propose to have starving processions, which in a town like Manchester is no joke: they also say they will take bread where they see it. Then come the soldiers on the stage and the convulsions of famine are quieted by the bayonet.

"Journal, August 10th.—This day fifty-eight years old, and a wayward life of adventure has been mine! A good romance it would make, full of accidents by flood and field, stories of love and war and shipwreck, and escapes of all

kinds. I dare swear few men have had more adventures than myself: and yet, eventful as my life has been, my present high position and the threatening state of the country render it probable that the short portion which is left for me of life *may be the most eventful of the whole!*" A strange anticipation, fulfilled to the letter!

"August 11th.—Again a row at Colne: they threaten to destroy the police. I have asked Lord Normanby's leave to go there to smooth matters.

"12th.—Lord Normanby wishes me to go. The Colne chaps have killed a constable and thrashed the police: several are wounded: the police have resolved to resign unless they get arms.

"14th.—Colne. There is perfect cordiality with the soldiers, the riot has not been political. The police must be armed; if they are to be protected by soldiers they are of no use!

"August 15th.—Made arrangements to protect Mr. Bolton of Colne against those who want to kill him. The police are fine men and have good pluck. Mr. Benbow advised the Colne Chartists to *hang Mr. Bolton, and then consider what to do.* Pity Mr. Bolton was not smitten instead of the poor constable Halsted. This Bolton treated the soldiers like dogs until I put that to rights.

"Lord Fitzroy.—On the 8th there was polling for church-rates at Rochdale, which produced excitement. Mr. Boyd the magistrate thought there was cause to call out the troops. Captain Smyth 79th thought there was no cause. Mr. Boyd ordered the troops to load and they did so: Captain Smyth saw no cause to load; his men were 200 yards from the mob, he frequently went in amongst the last and nothing could be more quiet. When the polling ended the crowd dispersed quietly. There was no dispute between Captain Smyth and the magistrate.

Journal, September 1st.—Untoward day for partridges. Were Mr. Secretary Macaulay one I would turn sportsman.

Is it not too bad that men who like me have been working hard all their lives for the country should be exposed to this man, who returns from a lucrative post in India to be made secretary of war without any knowledge of his work?

"September 2.—Saw young Horsford, son of my old friend Mrs. Horsford. She and Mrs. Byng and Mrs. Butler made the Bermuda times very pleasant. Mrs. Byng's beauty was radiant: she was then twenty, she is now forty-eight and still resplendent. Mrs. Butler was pretty, but so gentle, so winning, so delightful, that I have rarely met her equal. Mrs. Horsford was very good-looking, as clever as the others and very agreeable; but not so grand as Bradamante and Marphisa, so I called the other two: they were not easily to be matched even in England.

"8th.—War threatened. What is to happen? Black Charles Napier has some strong ships in the Levant. Would that another Charles Napier was there also with a strong brigade, we might give the name another shove. Perhaps with a strong brigade I might yet do something for my bread. I do indeed a great deal for it here but it is only kneading work.

"12th.—War appears imminent. I may yet command an army! that would please me, yet without a wish for war, it is the worst thing that could happen to England.

"13th.—More sounds of war. Charles Napier will probably open the ball, he is taking decided steps apparently, and no doubt by order of government: no man more likely to win. He has at least checked the horrors which that ruffian Ibrahim Pacha was perpetrating.

"15th.—The plot thickens, our rulers are playing the game of Russia and smoothing her path to India.

"16th.—The discontent at home increases, yet every body tells me my district is so quiet! So may a thundercloud for a time, but it looks black.

"24th.—Got back to Chester. Riot in the Isle of Man, troops called out. Caused by the introduction of English

money, twelve pence to the shilling. The Manx shilling was 14*d.* and the poor thus lost 2*d.* directly and more indirectly, for every article which before sold for a Manx penny now costs an English penny; the poor customer therefore pays a sixth more, which is equivalent to one-sixth reduction of wages. Hardly could a poor man live on the six shillings he earned before, and now he is reduced to five! And when he is angry at this wrong soldiers are called out to quiet him! It is horrid to govern people in this way.

"25th.—No mischief yet at Man. If blood is shed there it will be murder. Lord Westminster has sent me a haunch of venison: I wish he would ask me to eat one with him, I would tell him about the poor Manx men, he might perhaps do something. No! lords do not generally understand these things; he would probably tell me that twelve English pennies were intrinsically worth the Manx pennies. Lords do not know about the necessaries of life; they do not know that a poor man getting fourteen penny loaves for his shilling's worth of Manx money will only get twelve now, and the shopkeeper will not add a sixth to the weight of his loaf for the English penny. If the Manx farthings remain the evil will be less, but the shopkeepers will soon make them vanish.

"September 27th.—Anniversary of Busaco, in which I was shot through the stem and George through the stern: that was burning the family candle at both ends. I was on horseback and the shot stunned me; black shadows came across my eyes, my sight went, I reeled in the saddle and fell: my cousin Charles picked me up and then the blood gushed from where the ball had entered: it was supposed to have lodged in my brain and that I was a slain man. I could not see or speak, but heard—*Poor Napier, after all his wounds he is gone at last.* I felt obliged by this regret, but hoped they would not bury me, being still all alive and bent upon living. The observation made me uneasy though, for when a fellow shews no life they are sometimes on a field

of battle over quick in burying him: so with a slight twist I intimated, alive but not merry.

"Four soldiers of the guards carried me in a blanket to the convent of Busaco by Wellington's orders: he was close to me when I was hit, but rode away at the moment and was returning as they bore me off. Who is that he said? to answer was not possible, but my hat was pulled off and waved to him and he ordered them to take me to his quarters. Going there we met a clever surgeon, Kirkpatrick of the artillery, and General Alava. Setting me on the grass, he and another surgeon worked, and very disagreeable work it was; for the ball was embedded in the bone and pull as they would it could not be extracted, though they cut open my cheek for three inches. At last one put his thumb in my mouth and pushed while the other plucked, and away it came tearing innumerable splinters of bone with it: I did not call out, but it was very painful. Poor Alava could not look on and turned his back. There are I believe few Spaniards so troubled with feelings of a kind nature as that brave and noble Spaniard; he is above his nation in all things, and must feel bitterly the devilry going on in his country: so much for Busaco. I still suffer enough from that wound now, thirty years after!

"30th.—In Man the magistrates, as usual, want troops to do everything and the civil power to do nothing, except insult and provoke the people: they do not bestir themselves anywhere—north, east, west or south; all are alike inert and nowhere endeavour to find out why and where the poor suffer. Nor do they work with government to relieve them; nor shew sympathy; they are listless, or fox-hunting, or grouse-shooting; they see no crime but poaching, and for that small fault, if fault it be, they are merciless! Wife, children, health, may all go down together: if a poacher is caught they will not spare him.

"October 5th.—A report that the ships have destroyed Beyrout. Sad work! it is great cruelty beating down a town

full of women and children and bedridden old people and sick: it is very dreadful to fire on any but troops.

"Durham, October 20th.—Work! as the lightning said when it split the steeple. Colonel Chatterton studies his profession, and will, with opportunity, make a figure.

"November 2nd.—Captain Williams, prison inspector, was here last night. He told me he found a man sent to prison for a year with hard labour, without a trial! He was accused of poaching and the magistrate's clerk sent him to gaol with an illegal committal for a year, stating that he had been *tried and sentenced!* The gaoler knew no better, the man remonstrated in vain, and had been in prison six months when Williams found him, and told the case to Lord Normanby. No wonder we have Chartists.

"5th.—My wife suffering from pain in her face, caught at church. Pity the devil can't keep women from church!

"7th.—Black Charles is doing his work in Syria like a good fellow, and trying to prevent horrors. Her Majesty would not be the worse for a dozen such black gentlemen as he.

29th.—Glorious news of the taking of Acre. What will not boldness do? A strong fortress which has stood siege after siege taken in three hours by ships!! The poor Egyptian slaves have been slaughtered by thousands from the obstinacy of that rascal Mehemet Ali. Poor fellows, their fate is hard, to fall for a tyrant they detest! What a life mine is! drivelled away in reading courts-martial!

"December 4th.—Wrote again to the Secretary of War to request some allowance for travelling expences. Eighteen months in this district, travelling 4250 miles in that time, and all posting, besides being from eighty to one hundred days at hotels, for which they allow me nothing: this is very unjust.

"5th.—Dined with the bishop. He seems a fair man in conversation; but oh! the riches of the church! He, who has lived a life of ease has £8,000 or £10,000 a year and a

palace: I who have lived a life of hardship, wounds and banishments, have one thousand.

"7th.—Napoleon's remains have reached the Seine and are honoured as the hero deserves to be honoured. The stain inflicted on England by the murderers of Napoleon can never be washed away: of all the base cowardly actions committed by a nation, or rather the rulers of a nation, the sending of Napoleon to Saint Helena is the most disgusting and the most impolitic: he should have been preserved in England to keep the French rulers submissive to English policy. What harm if he had got back to France? He would have had no longer means or provocation for conquest: his old conquests indeed had been only the results of successful defence, but he could not again have roused France to the same exertions—Napoleon was not a god! He never gave marks of folly though, and to attempt to be a conqueror again would have been folly. All he could have done was to lead the spirit of the age, to train and guide liberty in its growth, restraining exuberance.

"11th.—At last government has authorized an expenditure of £52,000 in the way pointed out in my barrack report. What will follow? The Ordnance will order estimates upon estimates, and a year will thus pass without anything being done. Against that humbugging department my force must be tried now: with able engineers at its disposal it does nothing but mischief. We shall quarrel, and I being in the right will of course be overset: we cannot overcome power except by sneaking, and that is not for me. However it is a great thing to have got so much money out of the Whigs for the public good, and without a job! It has been my doing, but Lord Hill has backed me well.

"16th.—It is said the sultan insists on Mehemet Ali being destroyed: if so it is a Russian trick and she will then take the Porte under her protection. Napoleon is to be buried to-day. Glorious man! The whole world now acknowledges your greatness!

"Christmas day.—My family all well. God be praised! Does the Deity enter into these matters? Who knows! The Bishop of Chester of course! I wish he would tell me, but I suppose he won't unless in church and in an orthodox manner. It is too cold a day for that, and there is no assurance that my belief would follow. Such things require undivided attention and I should be thinking of his ten thousand a year. Oh! the priests, the priests, they are worse than Sir Harry Vane. Heigho! it is hard to be happy. Susan wants to be merry, so do most people, but it is not so easy to be merry as children think: they are merry however and of them is heaven composed! Innocence is with them alone: so we are told and so it is. Old people are full of evil passions, which are indulged knowing them to be evil and therefore we are miserable: our own folly is the cause of our misery and we should bear the results of folly patiently, looking forward not back. So ends my Christmas sermon without the bishop! Sufficient to the day is the evil thereof. I can die.

"27th.—Macaulay will not allow my travelling expences, though I have now posted 5250 miles in this district, and lived above 100 days in hotels with my aide-de-camp and servant. I will memorialize the Lords of the Treasury against this Macaulay being allowed to make a bagman of me; bagmen are paid their expenses though. *Voilà une grande différence. Sacristie!*

"December 31st.—The people are starving and the government do nothing! Confound these men who call themselves statesmen because they are in place, they have no other title to the name. What will the coming year produce? Fate settles these matters, luckily, for if God left them to us what wild work we should make!

"January 2nd 1841.—Hard and fearful winter for the poor. What a state we are in! What pleasure, what comfort is there in riches when all around us suffer? I never did and never can enjoy alone. This is not from principle, for there

is no sense in it unless enjoyment is at others' cost, but there is something so painful in others' sufferings as to destroy all pleasure. My punishment of Sir F. Adam was the most ill-natured thing I ever did with deliberation: but it was right to chastise a tyrant. Vindictive feelings were however there also, scorn and anger which ought not to have been indulged; they were soon over but should have ceased before my book was written: yet if oppression be not rebuked, all government had better end and slavery be accepted at once.

"January 3rd. Black Charles and Stopford at loggerheads. So it always will be when government gives power to mediocrity and age, with an active vigorous man known to be all enterprize as second in command; but the Admiralty never yet acted with sense or judgment, or common justice; what board ever did? The First Lord and Board of Admiralty are as bad, as, as, what? I know not faith! unless it be the Master General and Board of Ordnance.

"6th.—Took my quarterly oath that I am Charles Napier and no other man. Oh! wise secretary Macaulay! You are almost as wise as if a board was tacked to your tail; however nature has done her work to make you neglect yours as much as if you were a board of ordnance.

"7th.—We seem to go on well in China, but John Chinaman is a cunning knave; and it cannot be believed that 300 millions of the most self-sufficient proud people of the world will take a kick from Admiral Elliot and be brought to their bearings by the capture of a little island like Chusan. I asked Lord Fitzroy to send me out there, but was refused.

"14th.—A fearful day, the cold is terrible. God help the poor people in their dreadful suffering: well may they exclaim, *we want justice not charity*. The secretary at war still refuses my expences: this is just:—the more my duty, the worse my pay. Lord Hill says he will take it in hand." He did so but could not move Macaulay to justice—his Indian profits had dulled his perception of the virtue.

"February 12th.—What is to be done about McLeod? Surely the Yankees dare not hang a man who only obeyed his orders. If our government bear this our pride and honour go for ever: men will feel ashamed of being English. To resent it will cost me all I possess, my money being in American funds, but better to lose it than see England so dishonoured.

"14th.—A letter from Sir Hussey Vivian: he can neither understand his own business nor mine. Why should not plans of barracks be kept prepared? Estimates are different things, I never supposed they could be kept prepared; at least never said so: but plans may be, and ought to be. Sir Hussey is not wise, and because he is not the soldier will be kept in bad barracks for some years longer.

"27th.—Sir C. Shaw, police commissioner at Manchester, tells me the government police established there is to be turned over to the town: this is bad, it will become a means for oppression in the hands of faction. A large town like that requires a police, but ought to be ruled and paid by a responsible chief unconnected with town or manufactories. He ought to keep in order not only the gentlemen who regard all things that can be got at as meums, and all that can't as tuums; but also, a more difficult task, keep the rich manufacturers from grinding the poor to powder when raw cotton is falling in price: such people naturally desire a police paid and governed by themselves.

March 14th.—Mr. Davenport has offered me his house of Calvelly and, though expensive, it shall be taken for the sake of my girls' health. Lord Hill has also consented to headquarters being at Calvelly Park: this is pleasant after two years' misery in lodgings, too small and without a room to write in undisturbed!

21st.—Write, write, write. 22nd. ditto, ditto, ditto. Confound all geese but those that have wings, and those too for lending their quills.

27th.—I shall have my way about barracks yet, if I have

patience. I do not care for a clever fellow kicking me, but the worry of fools takes all the patience out of my body.

"April 1st.—Two years of command over! so life passes. Command! No! it is not command, it is slavery under noodles; but Lord Hill has not his own way and he is no noodle, he is a glorious soldier, but a little too good for the Whigs and Tories he has to deal with.

"Colonel W. Napier.—Fear of publicity is great at the Horse Guards. Lord Fitzroy in alarm lest my barrack report should get into the hands of the public. What harm if it did? It is very disagreeable to be thus daubed with government slime, and at times it inclines me to *cut the painter*. Yet how give up my profession! I am reading the life of Hoche as you advised. His only weak point was his admiration of a republic, under which his genius was, by his own account, constantly upset. One sees nothing of this in Napoleon. Hating republics and republicans, he waited for better times and made them. Hoche had one great advantage in the civil war of Vendée:—the people did not fight for food but for a Bourbon, and against the mass of their countrymen. How different would a civil war be with us! The rich have driven the poor mad by oppression, and think to regain lost respect by greater oppression!

"April.—You tell me I am popular in Chester. I did not know that, nor do I now know why? However, as you observe, unbought praise from such a source is agreeable" —it came from poor men. "It is surprising to me that you have not heard from Lord Fitzroy, but one of the best points of the Horse Guards is that they do more than they promise. As to the Canada matter I conclude, on general principles, that McLeod is a Canadian rap; that the Yankees who are trying him are rather worse; that Fox will do what is right, Lord Palmerston will do what is wrong, and a fair prospect of war will arise out of the medley."

It is well known to persons acquainted with the secret affairs of that time that Mr. H. Fox then British Minister

at Washington prevented a war by his great talent and prudence.

"The duke is abused for his speech, *Illiberal speech*, about the navy. I at first thought it a wise and useful one, but am now convinced he was wrong; our fleets can always take strong fortresses and it was Old *Douro's* stupidity which caused the failure at Burgos: he ought to have *had up* the squadron from St. Ander. Don't trouble your head about the flying sap, a *flying squadron* is the thing for business in John Bull's opinion, and with John's effervescences not even the duke can interfere with impunity! Mr. Wilbraham told me that Lord Normanby said to him—Chartism is dying away, for the Northern Liberator had gone out for want of readers. My answer was, that I could not account for that fact, but could not believe it was from a cessation of Chartism. Writing then to Campbell at Newcastle, he says, 'the merchants wanted an advertizing paper, and the *Liberator* did not circulate among purchasing and selling people; another paper was consequently set up with a large capital, and the Liberator was bought for a very liberal sum.' This simple fact, the real cause not sought for, has tranquillized the ministers as to the state of the country! Campbell tells me Chartism is spreading more than ever about Newcastle-on-Tyne; but a minister thinks all safe and tranquil because a miserable newspaper has sold its types! Robberies and murder go a-head here, two burglaries within a week at Chester. A thin weak lady has however defeated three robbers with blackened faces, one of whom put a pistol to her head; she knocked it out of his hand and cast him headlong down stairs! Well done poor law! and well done old lady!

"April.—Australian affairs seem to be carried on expensively: it is said £24,000 has been paid for a palace! My design was to model the government upon the system of Frederick the Great. Five hard-working secretaries, viz. one common, the others for justice, agriculture, police, public

works and schools: they should have done without clerks who could have been added as the colonists increased; thus the frame-work would have expanded. Three hundred a year at first for the secretaries, and my own pay £1000; I told them £800 was enough, but say £1000. Allow £500 for lodging *all*, and a government would have been established for £3000 a year. A poll-tax of one pound where wages were from 7 to 16 shillings a day would not have been felt, and would have given £3000 above the expence of government for contingencies; this would have increased in the lump as the colonists increased, but would have diminished to the individual.

"My intent was also to carefully lay out such portions of the hundred thousand pounds—which I had demanded from government only as a loan to be repaid—as might be necessary for the security and advantage of the colonists individually. This in colonizing is everything: for though in England one man is only the twenty-millionth part of the public, he would be on landing a three-thousandth part of the colony, and therefore a much more important being to the commonweal! In this view the immediate interest and comfort of each individual is of the first importance, the expansion of the democratic principle being the only means of preserving the aristocratic principle, by making it respected. That the population would be immoral and bad I know, but the greatest rascals would have been satisfied to see Kennedy, Light and myself, and other good fellows, working hard to forward those very rascals' own wishes and success as colonists. The soldiers also would be ready in case of need, and to them I would have given high rewards for ten years' good service, keeping tight discipline. Fifty soldiers would have done as to force, but very small bodies are not easy to keep in discipline; two hundred would have been better, and enabled me to hold courts-martial and shoot a mutineer: but power to send

home in disgrace, with loss of home and land held on military tenure, would have sufficed.

"My plan for schools was all arranged, and from the chief school after twenty years all public functionaries were to be chosen; no other obligation was to be imposed on people to educate their children; and the schools should have been open for persons of all ages. The code Napoleon should have been taken for our jurisprudence generally; I expected opposition to this, but found none, so far as I ventured to sound. Chinese artizans should have been introduced; and camels for exploring, as the chief difficulty in my eyes was finding places with water for halting. Camels would carry enough for searching, which tired men and beasts half dead with thirst cannot do. At watering places, when found, Martello towers and a family of missionaries should have been established. These fellows have enterprize and industry, and would soon form good *taps* for exploring parties, to halt at and provision. I designed also to drill all the boys at school, to prepare for dealing with the 60,000 convicts at Sydney."

THIRTEENTH EPOCH.

FIRST PERIOD.

On the 5th of April 1841 he took possession of Calvelly Hall.

"Journal.—This place belonged to the famous Sir John Calvelly, or Calverley as Froissart has it, a friend of the Black Prince. If he was such a monster as his royal crony they have now probably a warm berth, and are not, like me, troubled with rheumatism. This is a beautiful spot, but too grand for a poor soldier of fortune without fortune, like me: but it is a delight to see my girls running about in this fine air.

"April 21st.—My scheme of passing some years here is already ended! Lord Fitzroy Somerset has called to offer me, from Lord Hill, a place on the Indian staff; but he gives me leave to decline the offer, which is very honorable treatment: it must be considered, but my wish is to go."

On this offer he consulted his brother William, whose advice was, *to go if he felt a call for such a service; if not to remain at home.* The reply was—"The appointment is accepted. My hope is to get there safe, but to move my family is fearful! I go overland and shall insure my life for two years. If there is war in the Punjaub, which seems likely, a good command may fall to me: it will be sorrowful to leave you all for it is late in life and I am much worn."

Worn he was, anxious and ill, yet his labours increased rather than diminished as his command drew to a close.

"Colonel W. Napier, June 18th.—Poor Considine, and his

successor Barlow, on my staff, are both dead—and all their work falls on me while preparing for India. The '*Aigle Catchers*' have been making a row at Newcastle. In my opinion Irish regiments should not be commanded by Irishmen, they go on better with others. Major —— won't let a soldier speak to him unless brought up by a non-commissioned officer! And now when some of his men behave ill he is absolutely encouraging them in outrage.

"June 26th.—Been to Newcastle. My spirits were very low until my mind was fixed for India, then they rose; but my work is so hard it gives no time for thought. There is fear of a row at Manchester, where Shaw has sent 200 constables to meet a body of furious, justly furious, Irishmen.

"July 19th.—No exercise for a month, not even a walk, except my journey to Newcastle. The Horse Guards would not let me settle the 87th matter as could easily have been done, but insisted on a report, desiring me to give no opinion publicly. The parties have consequently sent in twelve pacquets, each as thick as one of your volumes, out of which my report is to be concocted while suffering agony with rheumatism in my arm, which is nearly paralysed; the spasms only seize me in a certain position, but then come like the wrenching of a bad strain: am I on your road of pain? If so I am done."

In this manner he worked for the public to the last moment of his stay in England; but only his private story need now be traced, until he is found again in arms augmenting even the glory of England by his courage and genius, for his head was made for war though his heart always yearned for peace.

"Colonel W. Napier.—My rheumatism not better and is very painful, with little sleep. Alexander Johnston tells me I am to have 10,000 men on the Indus: I care little where, being a fatalist, as most people are in my belief. I can't get my life insured, my wounds have given me too great a shake; and my conviction that the objection is sound is

just why I wish to insure. Meanwhile gladly shall I get away from this district, for how to deal with violence produced by starvation, by folly, by villainy, and even by a wish to do right, is a hard matter: hard I mean to deal with it conscientiously, for act as you will it must be with some injustice: honest men on both sides furnish rascals with pretexts, and then blindly follow those rascals as leaders. A man is easily reconciled to act against misled people if he has an honest plan of his own; but if he is only a servant of greater knaves than those he opposes, and feels he is giving strength to injustice, he loses the right stimulus to action. In 1839 the government certainly let me take my own course; but if the Tories come in, violent measures or, what they call *vigorous measures* will probably be taken: that I could not bear, and rejoice to have escaped the trial. However, I may wrong the Tories: Peel is a clever man, and as he gave way in one instance he may in another. But this alone will not do, the people are starving, and if not fed the less violent the government the more violent will they be.

"Every element of a ferocious civil war is boiling in this district, and if asked what class of men appear most just and most anxious to avoid it, I should say the officers; but of all classes the worst are the magistrates. The Tory magistrates are bold, violent, irritating and uncompromising; the Whig magistrates sneaking and base, always ready to call for troops, and yet truckling to the mob: at least this is the tinge on my mind in my intercourse with them, though I cannot bring any body of facts to bear me out. As to the Chartist leaders they are not trustworthy; they are demagogues for evil, not for good; they would all fall under the mischief they have provoked, and are now, provoking. Last year I told the secretary of state, that without pretending to have an opinion on the merits of the corn-law question, it was very clear that question would ere long form a rallying point, on which Chartists Republicans and shopkeepers would unite and form a league not easy to

deal with. This I am inclined to believe is now coming to pass, because the dissenting ministers are taking a violent part, which of course they do to please those who pay them. This ere long will produce a powerful body, and possessing such weight that it will not be very manageable in the manufacturing districts. It will have leaders of great riches and influence, and as they can only hold place as leaders by the general suffrage of their followers, the mass of whom will be Chartists, the latter will make great progress, although hated by those very leaders. This is the last dose of northern politics I shall give you. The duke will do no good I fear. First because he won't try; next because he would be overwhelmed with reproaches, and because his ancient feelings are so strong. He is like a gnarled oak, there is not a bit of bend in him; and his twists cannot be cut into knee timbers because they are twists the wrong way."

Thus terminated his long and arduous command in the north of England, during which he certainly saved the country from insurrection and bloodshed: nor were his predictions of after mischief unsound. After his departure starvation and misery did their work. Strikes riots and frequent conflicts with the police proclaimed the people's feelings; the military were recklessly brought into action and blood was shed: yet Chartism became more vehement. And then the corn-law agitation, taking exactly the course predicted by him, grew too powerful for the government, and its success, combined with disunion amongst the Chartist leaders, abated the spirit of Republicanism. True Chartism however abated not, until the memorable 10th of April 1848. Nor then through the prosecutions, harsh and vindictive as they were, but from the fact, established by the immense display of special constables, that the Chartists were not the majority: this went home to the people's understandings. Chartism is however not dead, it only sleeps, to awake with an improved judgment.

Charles Napier shall now be followed to India, but it is

worthy of notice that on his departure the staff of the northern district was increased to four general officers to do the work he performed singly, and for which Macaulay refused him the extra expences.

"Marseilles, October 25th.—No occasion to describe a journey through France, it is known that the post-boys wear jack-boots, they are the chief things to be observed because ever before you, and there is no scenery to draw off attention. There are however paved things which our agreeable neighbours call roads, laid without the least regard to that scientific course which they taught in the Simplon, but have abominably neglected even there and on the Mt. Cenis. However Englishmen have no right to crow, they are satisfied if the surface be smooth, and hard enough to founder their horses. *John Crapaud* is now curing his roads of the stone by giving them the gravel, without attempting scientific slopes. Science and common sense are nearly synonymous, and both outraged by these road-makers.

"28th.—Reached Malta. Passed through the Straits of Messina, with the phantom-looking head of Etna looming in the clouds and the plain of Maida on the left! the glory of brave men perishing with their bodies, the eternal mountain bidding time defiance.

"31st.—Among the isles of Greece. What is to happen? They are now free and roguish, living on their character of past times, cultivating their literature and proud of what they were, yet giving no indication of again becoming great. They seem inclined to throw Otho overboard; to tie his hands with a constitution would be more sensible, killing kings is a bad habit which unsettles all government. But the Greeks, still sick with slavery, are incapable of great achievements; and Otho seems to think injustice and cruelty is the way to enlighten a clever high-spirited people, after ages of misery and darkness. The Greeks are a proud people, and Otho by treating them well would save his adopted country and himself from much suffering.

"November 4th.—Egypt! The land of wonders!

"6th.—Left Alexandria by the Mahmoudie Canal, sixty miles long, ninety feet wide, eighteen deep: a great monument of the villainy and stupidity of that barbarian Mehemet Ali. It is said he had it executed in one year by one hundred and fifty thousand men, who had no tools but dug it out with their hands! They had no pay and 29,000 died of starvation! I quarrel not with him for making them dig with their hands, that might be good or bad for them; but the starving the poor people was unqualified evil. Working with their nails might be a remedy for starvation; not a very wise one in the present state of the world though, nor very creditable to Ali's boasted '*talents and enlightened views*,' so extolled by vulgar English mercantile adventurers and travellers. But when we find nails digging canals, and teeth having sinecures, the great pacha must be left to those who have more time and talent than myself to describe the rascal in proper colours.

"Having made his nail canal one would imagine it was for general traffic. Woe betide the boat and boatmen he finds on his canal! His own boats only are allowed to ply, except the tract boat for English travellers—permitted because the communication with Suez is profitable to him. None but European merchants have any property in Egypt; the land and its produce is the pacha's private property and his tax is the full produce, out of which he returns a miserable dole, partly grain partly money, at pleasure. This is the 'great man' of adventurers, who have by frauds reached to fortunes, and to whom the pacha, for they are sharp sharks enough, has made grants. Every £100 they get from him adds to the cry *How great is the ability of Mehemet Ali!* He has however much diminished the population of Egypt since the reign of the Mamelukes, whom he murdered at a feast. One leaped his horse from the walls, about 40 feet, it is called 60, without injury to the man, or the horse which bore him off to Syria.

"November 7th, Cairo.—This city of caliphs and genii and Arabian Nights is very pretty and very stinking. It is however a curious old town worth seeing, but my anxieties and my age go ill together with sights, and my spirits are wretched. The whole of Egypt is a marvel, and 'tis a sin that it is not well governed. Why did we give it up when we were in possession by right of conquest over conquerors? and when it was won also by the lives of Abercrombie, and thousands of others! Had it been kept, Alexandria would now be a Liverpool; Cairo would be clean and beautiful, with a full traffic from the interior of Africa, and civilized Abyssinia would be pouring down her produce by the Nile to Cairo. Then the word of God spreading through the *darkness* of Africa! a point so dear to Tories. Think of that bishops! Think of a bishop of Alexandria! another of Grand Cairo! a third of Thebes! Deacons of the Delta also! Prebends of the Pyramids! Think of Mahomet floored alongside of Sesostris, and the Pope gibbeted on Pompey's Pillar! Alas! it is no joke to fight battles for nothing when the happiness of a whole country might be created by profiting from the bloody work!

"November 15th.—In the desert.

"16th.—Still in the desert. Vultures, gazelles, camels, and as much pebbles and sand as could be wished.

"Suez.—A very curious but disagreeable place; bugs abound; water does not and what there is salt and horrible, Seidlitz powders are preferable as a beverage but too scarce here. Mr. Waghorne is a very active gentleman, but his arrangements are by no means completed; ten pounds expended at this place would make the run a hundred pounds better: he must also have horses better trained to draw his carts or necks will be broken in the desert, and people don't want to be picked by vultures like the camels. Travellers find the greatest civility at the hotels, and though we were delayed by ill-broken, or rather wild horses, in the desert, the driver, Mr. Williams, was most attentive and careful. How-

ever, no one can altogether enjoy being pulled along by four wild Arabian steeds attached to a tax-cart, kicking, rearing, plunging and gibbing.

"Bombay.—Arrived here 12th of December, and on the 13th first set foot on Indian ground. I had visited Aden on my way, a strong place easily defended: it will be large. Beyond our lines, which are stronger than Gibraltar as being flanked by an island, a rich plain seems to extend far into Arabia; if well-governed and well-founded as a colony Aden will be most valuable: but no government cares about such things, all with them is from hand to mouth work, without reflection or plan.

"Poonah, December 28th.—Assumed command here this day, having resigned the northern district of England in October! Pretty quick! We are very uncomfortable, no house holds us: a soldier should not have wife or daughters, his hat should cover his family."

No event of Charles Napier's life exemplified the daring and firmness of his temper more than this journey, which he thus spoke of in after years. "When I look back to the desperation which made me come to India at 60 years of age, and on the dreadful journey to Marseilles with so many women, I feel how strong is my love for my girls: had I then died not a farthing was left for them. My passage to Suez was paid beforehand perforce, and my pockets were empty; all I possessed was expended on the journey, and the illness of one of us would have forfeited the whole by keeping us behind the steamer at Marseilles! It was one of those bold adventures which amount to rashness, but my resolution was to risk all for my girls. At Bombay the purser received my last money, a bill for £500 in payment of the voyage from Suez, and returned two pounds! Happy was I to end that long, long journey of danger to me."

He was now quick to master his own position and the state of public affairs, but ere he speaks himself a slight preliminary sketch is necessary.

Sir W. McNaughten, mover and director of Lord Auckland's unhappy Affghan invasion, had been killed at a conference with Acbar Khan; General Sale was besieged in Jellalabad; General Elphinstone's army had been utterly destroyed in retreating from Cabool, himself remaining with a few officers and the wives of officers prisoners. This catastrophe had produced consternation throughout India, all sense and energy seemed to vanish; the government which had rushed with such ostentation of power and boasting to an unjust war sunk under the calamity, and the public partook of its weakness.

On the upper frontier, the Khybur pass, of which all persons, civil and military, seemed to have an exaggerated terror, was between Peshawur and General Sale, and when two feeble attempts to succour that officer failed hope of his safety died away. On the lower frontier Colonel Palmer was shut up with a thousand men in Ghusnee. General Nott was in Candahar, having a considerable army but menaced by the main body of the Affghans. Brigadier England was at Quettah, in support of Nott; but the Bolan pass was between him and Sukkur on the Indus, where a small British force held the northern parts of Scinde. In this state of affairs, after two unsuccessful attempts had been made to force the Khybur pass, a force under General Pollock reached Peshawur, destined to succour Sale; but he had no carriage, his sepoys were disheartened, and a numerous body of Sikhs, though professedly friendly and their Prince Dyan Singh was so, had assembled near Peshawur evidently meaning mischief: fortunately, at that moment Lord Ellenborough took the reins of government.

"Journal, January 22nd.—I have seen the Poonah brigade. Very good tools to work with if need be; and need may be, for the Affghans have rebelled against Shah Soojah, Lord Auckland's king, have murdered Sir A. Burnes and shut up the garrison of Cabool without provisions; the roads are snowed up and the troops will be done up. Sir W.

McNaughten the great mover of this silly policy of conquest remains in Cabool. Rumours of fights, victories, defeats have filled my morning visitors' mouths for the last month, but all communication is cut off and we only know the danger the unhappy Cabool garrison is in; no provisions for any length of time, no ammunition, and hordes of foes without to prevent escape. What is to be done? I would put myself at the head of the best force to be collected and win my way to Cabool. While writing the above, a letter from Sir T. McMahon says, Scinde is growing troublesome, and he has recommended the Governor-General to send me there. This will probably happen, and I like to go, but do not like to leave my wife and girls. However war admits of no hesitation, the sea is troubled but my little boat must be pushed into the waters! What is to become of this? God knows! His all-powerful hand rules and as He wills we must move, be it to destruction or disgrace, to good or ill, to life or death. My wish is to be left quiet a little while in each day, to obtain an insight of Indian wars history and country; for knowledge and thought only can enable us to act wisely in such positions. This the world will not believe, and idle talk is thought more important than reason and reflection. If my morning hours only were secure from worry it would content me; but only by snatches can needful knowledge be obtained.

"January 23rd.—McNaughten has been assassinated at a conference with the insurgents; falsely called rebels, for what right had Lord Auckland to depose Dhost Mohamed? It was a scheme of money-seeking merchants that caused the war, and we have caught a tartar! More war with these wild tribes must now be, and it is clear that I shall go to Scinde; nearly as clear that I shall have the whole command of those countries and be 1500 miles from my family. This demands nerve, but it will not be for long, the expence will prevent a long war and it will not be my taste to eke it out. This is speaking indeed as if already appointed, but

who is there? My hope is to act satisfactorily for the public and I am not likely to spare myself, yet I am too sensible of increasing weakness from age to hope much: hurrying fast towards the end it will be fortunate to reach it in the hour of victory: who would be buried by a sexton in a churchyard rather than by an army on the field of battle? But this is not for us to settle; perhaps the best end is that longest delayed, certainly the best is that which fate ordains. May mine be honourable, come how or when it may, this life has many trials and 'tis well to leave it. I am now past fifty-nine and for this command should be thirty-nine!

"24th.—My feelings grow strong. A post may keep me at Poonah, or send me fifteen hundred miles off to head 20,000 men in a difficult war, against natives defending one of the most difficult countries in the world: add to this, the worst part of the affair, a bad cause! I am not acquainted with the troops to be commanded, or the people against whom we war; yet the eyes of the world will be upon me, for the whole world sees and talks of our Affghan failure, which it will be for me to repair. To try my hand with an army is a longing not to be described; yet it is mixed with shame for the vanity which gives me such confidence: it will come and I cannot help it as to my mind; but as to my body it is not so. Oh! for forty, as at Cephalonia, where I laughed at eighteen hours' hard work on foot under a burning sun: now, at sixty, how far will my carcass carry me? No great distance! Well, to try is glorious!

"February 3rd.—All sorts of reports about the poor people at Cabool, the worst is to be expected. The Scindians are said to be growing more hostile, if so I shall certainly be sent. I am ready.

"March 4th.—Received the following from Lord Ellenborough. 'Madras. I have the honour to transmit a letter given to me by your brother Sir George Napier at the Cape. I shall feel greatly indebted to you if you will have the kindness to send to me, at Calcutta, a statement of your views

with respect to the manner in which the honour of our arms may be most effectually re-established in Affghanistan. I have just heard of the disasters of Cabool. I arrived here at noon to-day and sail this evening.' Now it happened that when I heard of the Cabool massacre, having a presentiment of Lord E.'s difficulties on first arriving, and knowing that those who had produced misfortune were not the men to furnish a remedy, I drew up a plan of campaign. But never having seen Lord Ellenborough I was fearful of sending it to him, and thought rather to send it to Sir Thomas McMahon or Lord Auckland, being mad to see so many lives thrown away by foolish men; but my wife so earnestly opposed its being sent to Lord Auckland, as useless, that it remained in my desk. It will reach Lord Ellenborough the 16th with the following letter.

"Poonah, March 4th.—I have been but two months in India, yet in that time our misfortunes have naturally drawn my thoughts to the war on the north-west frontier. The result has been the crude memoir herewith transmitted.

"The details of our misfortunes seem as yet involved in mystery; the only point clearly ascertained is the slaughter of a large body of our troops, whose courage has not been impeached. That great faults have been committed may be assumed, because the force destroyed, though possibly not equal to the defence of Cabool, was fully equal to secure its own honour and safety. This Sir Robert Sale has proved by his noble defence of Jellalabad against the same enemy, and with less than half the force massacred without resistance at Cabool.

"The first operations should be an endeavour to relieve the garrison of Jellalabad. If the newspapers speak truly General Sale has only provisions to last till 1st of April, when these fail he must surrender or be destroyed. He is differently situated from General Elphinstone. The latter had no right to expect reinforcements, he well knew they could not reach him because of the snow and the enemy:

he had a strong force and knew he had but a limited quantity of provisions. Thus daily becoming weaker, physically and morally, I know not why in such circumstances he did not at once give battle, and he had no right to negotiate with rebels. General Sale's position is essentially different. He has a right to expect reinforcements, and to abandon his post would be to give the enemy a second victory. General Sale has gloriously fulfilled his duty of defence. Had General Elphinstone made a vigorous attack he would probably have now worn well-earned laurels instead of chains!

"General Sale may be relieved by treaty, or by force. In the first case, surrounded by barbarian nations and lately-conquered tribes within the frontier, a treaty made under the pressure of recent defeat would be a dangerous experiment. As to force, all history tells us of the difficulties of warring in a mountainous country occupied by a hostile population; yet difficulties must be encountered with fortitude and can generally be overcome. The country between Peshawur and Jellalabad is spoken of as very strong, but if men can get to the top of hills which command a pass, other men can generally get there also without going headlong into the pass: when troops have been destroyed in passes they have commonly fallen victims to want of conduct in their leader.

"Ignorant of the country I really am afraid to say much, but cannot help thinking a large force ought long since to have been assembled at Peshawur, and ere now have forced the Khybur pass: this should be attempted by pushing one strong column along the left bank of the Cabool River, and a second to turn the pass if possible by the south. These flanking columns should be commanded by resolute officers, expressly selected, and with picked men—the general commanding the whole using whatever stratagems the resources of his mind and the local circumstances offered. The judicious application of money to gain intelligence, and even allies, amongst the Khyburees, might be most effectual: not

that I would purchase a passage, as that might entail purchasing one back again :—it should be forced.

"Destitute of local information I dare not criticise what has been done, it would be presumption; but in the confidence with which your lordship has honoured me, I will ask, why this tremendous pass has been attacked by small detachments? To force the most dangerous pass of a country, where whole armies have been before destroyed, ought only to be attempted with many thousands, yet it appears to have been attempted with hundreds. Had the brave men who are said to have reached Ali Musjid, and were then obliged to fight their way back again from want of provisions, reached Jellalabad, would they have been of use to General Sale? No! they would have added to his distress by diminishing his provisions. Either the papers give a lying account of this matter or it was an operation of exceeding folly: the stories may be false, but they are believed and show what a want of confidence exists in the public mind.

"What force has been collected at Peshawur is not known to me, but I hope its operations are vigorous; assuredly there is no time to lose; for if the intrepid defenders of Jellalabad fall without some desperate effort being made to save them, great will be the disgrace and melancholy the catastrophe! In all cases, and whether Sale has been relieved or not, the first military operations now ought to be, if the numbers means of transport and military chest admit, to move upon Cabool from Peshawur, and from Candahar by Ghuznee. The strength of these columns should have no limit but the want of means; the greater the force the more certain the success, and after our defeat we must be very cautious against another reverse. The force from Peshawur should be about thirty thousand; that from Candahar not less than ten thousand: such appears to me the force required; but these plans ought to have been all prepared a month ago!

"The above movement, if well executed, would liberate Shah Soojah, who is said still to make a desperate defence in Cabool, and we ought not to abandon him. The column moving from Candahar would distract the enemy's attention, oblige him to divide his forces and remove our disgrace; and when our colours were once more unfurled at Cabool your lordship would be able more freely to adopt any line of policy you chose. Perhaps, if a noble, generous, not a vindictive warfare, be pursued by our troops, as I sincerely hope, it might be very practicable to retire immediately with honour from Affghanistan, leaving a friendly people behind us. The Affghans are a noble race, and although their mode of warfare is abhorrent to civilization, a sanguinary inroad would be disgraceful to us and would not give them more humane ideas! Once re-established in Cabool a very small entrenched force would hold that place, if supported as described in the memoir which accompanies this letter.

"Such my lord are the views which have presented themselves to my mind; but I must repeat, that my want of information as to the disposition of the troops, the means of provisioning them and of the power of the treasury to meet the expenditure, makes me ashamed to offer my views, and my hope is it may not lead your lordship to place more confidence in my opinions than they deserve. This is a sadly-hurried letter, but I am aware that if it is to be of service it must not be delayed. I feel also that your lordship may, before it reaches you, have information to render it inapplicable: indeed while writing, there is a report that Scinde shews signs of hostility. Our Indian empire has had some great trials, but as far as my judgment goes no former governor-general was ever placed in so trying a position as your lordship. This war in Affghanistan is too far away to be carried on without a frightful expenditure, and yet, if not carried on with vigour it had better be given up: languid wars amount to defeat and end in defeat!"

To this communication and the memoir Lord Ellenbo-

rough answered, that the want of transport and supplies for the indicated force would bar the execution, nor had he so many men disposable. Nevertheless, a few months later the expedition against Cabool was undertaken in strict conformity with the suggestions in the memoir. Fewer numbers were indeed employed and with success; but the armies advanced from Candahar and from Peshawur, and the defiles of the Khybur were won by turning them and seizing the summits of the hills on each side. The war was however not conducted with the magnanimity and compassion hoped for in his letter. A revengeful spirit was evinced on more than one occasion, and with savage fierceness: the destruction of the bazaar of Cabool, in itself a vindictive Vandalism, was accompanied with very terrible excesses.

"Journal, March 29th.—Not feeling sure that Lord Ellenborough was aware of the evils that will probably arise if we fail to relieve Sale, I wrote the following reply to his second letter, and now await events.

"Poonah, March 28th.—Extract. I am sorry the force proposed for attacking the Khybur pass cannot be assembled; but perhaps I am mistaken in thinking so large a force necessary, those on the spot ought to be the best judges. My hope is that they may find that collected at Peshawur equal to the adventure, and that they may without great loss of life succeed; for it is peculiar to these enterprizes that the bravest and best fall first, and the honour of arms devolves on the care of those who have flinched. This may happen without personal stain, yet it rarely occurs without a loss of moral superiority, which is very mischievous to troops. Your lordship's words indeed express exactly what is required at this moment. '*The thing I am most anxious about is the recovery of our military reputation in Affghanistan by some decisive success.*' That is the one thing necessary, and it was this view of the state of the war that induced me to recommend the concentration of the largest possible force at

Peshawur, because the peculiar state of this war makes a decided success imperative.

"The first operation is to relieve Sir Robert Sale: if we fail to do this our arms will suffer, not only the misfortune of a second defeat following on that of Cabool, but such a defeat as entails a third, by the consequent destruction of those heroic soldiers who have attracted general attention and admiration. Their fall at Jellalabad would have a greater moral effect, to the prejudice of our name and the courage of our troops, than the loss of ten times their numbers on the field of battle. But this is not all the evil that would arise from failure in the Khybur pass, it might produce great difficulty in withdrawing the garrisons of Ghusnee and Candahar. It is said that between those towns there are no very difficult passes, but between the latter and the Indus are many—some stupendous. It is necessary to embrace all these things in estimating the importance of success at the Khybur, and the means to render the operation decisive should be if possible proportionate. For if Sir R. Sale be relieved, I imagine your lordship will not find much difficulty in honorably concluding this contemptible, but sufficiently irksome and expensive war—a war in which I am sure, from your experience in Indian affairs, you would never have involved the country.

"Journal.—My design was to put Lord Ellenborough on his guard, fearing the *many* generals he has in the north-east would destroy poor Sale, and that if he lost confidence in them he might call upon me too late to recover the campaign. To undertake impossibilities is not my ambition. I could save Sale now, but not after another failure; certainly not with the means which would then be left disposable; for it is said the sepoys don't like the work, and the thrashing will not *encourager les autres:* our own blunders would be enough without other people's.

"April 7th.—This day last year I took possession of Calvelly Hall, settled as I thought for several years in that

beautiful place, and then commanding the northern district of England. On the 8th of October I quitted it, and on the 12th of December following am commanding a district in India! What would an ancient general say to such travelling? Putting aside chronology, I might have engaged Cæsar in England, got thrashed, and bolted to have a slap at Alexander in aid of Porus in less than two months! If either of those *two chaps*, as my little Emily calls them, could come back, how they would stare. Yet this is tedious travelling to what is coming! A hundred years will see railroads to the Persian Gulph! A great change is coming on the world. No man can deny the connection between the moral and physical world; mind and body mutually affect each other, and printing and steam are changing the bearings of matter. This change will change all connected with it, mind amongst the rest.

"April 12th.—Pollock was to attack the Khybur the 28th ultimo. To get through a long and difficult pass is a dangerous operation: it is to attack a position which has all things in its favour; it is to go into a hole with an enemy spitting on your head; art is with your foe as well as nature, and you must trust to your genius for making the enemy blunder.

"13th.—The Bombay and Poonah world give me credit for writing the letters of *Lucius Junius* on this war. I am not the author, and would not deny it were it so, for they are capital.

"23rd.—General Pollock has forced the Khybur pass, so far as Musjid Ali, in face of 10,000 Khyburees: the war now ought to go on well, for if Sale be rescued all is safe. Musjid is about one-third of the pass, and experienced Indian officers think the rest presents no difficulties. This is good, but General England, having marched from Quettah with a convoy for Candahar, was met at Hykulzie by 1000 Affghans, who defeated him, and he got back to Quettah with difficulty and loss of life"—it afterwards appeared that he

lost but one hundred in action and had no difficulty in retreating, not being pursued. "Ghusnee has also fallen. Colonel Palmer capitulated with a thousand men, and when he began his march we hear the whole was massacred: this last is only report.

"From these reverses we may draw these military lessons. 1°. Never to occupy towns in a hostile country without giving your garrison all necessary means of defence until succour can arrive. 2°. Never attack, nor risk being attacked, when only half your force is in the field if you can have the whole in hand: General England might have doubled his force by waiting for Colonel Simmonds. Sometimes an inferior force must attack, because it is in the enemy's power and it is better to fly at him tooth and nail than run away to be caught: in the first case you may be victorious; in the second defeat is certain.

"General England, knowing he was to be encountered, quitted a fortified town when nothing called on him to do so, and when a part of his force was defeated did not bring the whole into action. Now if a man makes up his mind to attack he should follow it up; had England done so he would have won. He marched out with half his force, he attacked with half of that half force, and did not bring up the remainder in support: this was terrible work. Pollock and Sale will I hope put all right so far as the honour of our arms is concerned; but they cannot bring back to life Apthorpe and May, and the gallant men who fell with them at Hykulzie! England's misconduct is however only hearsay, we must have his own story ere we judge. My fear is that they will send me to Scinde, where there is now no honour to be gained. Had they sent me there at first, as the Bombay government wanted, this disaster would have been spared—perhaps not though! Well, a soldier must go where ordered, and no grumbling.

"April 30th.—That noble fellow Sale has given Acbar Khan a thrashing at Jellalabad; it is one of the most bril-

liant things ever read of: with fourteen hundred men he attacked the 6,000 besieging him and totally defeated them. No more news of Pollock: he complains in his despatch that his men are totally knocked up for want of due numbers, yet he has fifteen thousand men! I told Lord Ellenborough thirty thousand would be required, and if fifteen thousand are exhausted with fatigue ere one-third of the pass is won, and no serious fighting, my estimate was not far wrong! Had the Khyburees resisted, as everybody said they would, Pollock must have stopped progress until reinforced. I hold therefore by my first opinion. The Bombay government has made a second application to have me in command of Upper and Lower Scinde—from Kurrachee to Candahar. This is not agreeable. At this season to move in Scinde is death to the soldiers; consequently I shall be shut up in that miserable fishing village Kurrachee for five months, and can do nothing until the very end of October. Meanwhile General Nott is shut up in Candahar, with his ammunition, his food, his moral force, daily decreasing: why does he not fight with his seven thousand good soldiers and twenty-four field pieces? If Sale has beaten Acbar Khan's six thousand with fourteen hundred, Nott might defeat more than are opposed to him. He ought to beat them in every way and on every side: it is madness to lose the ascendant over semi-barbarous enemies.

"May 3rd.—Left Poonah to visit my family at Mahabuleshwar—eighty-four miles. The scenery is magnificent, three, perhaps four thousand feet above the sea. The woods are luxuriant, but tygers, cheetas, bears, hyenas, snakes, scorpions, centipedes, and such like pleasant chaps abound, and are apt to accompany you in an evening walk. There is a report of cholera at Kirkee, if it spreads I shall return to Poonah at once. Strange disease! One hundred and thirty soldiers have already perished, and not one officer! This horrid loss was without necessity, for no one knows why the troops were moved in April and March, which

always produce cholera. Here then, besides loss of life, if the calculation that every soldier costs £100 be correct, and to me it appears low, this freak of government has cost 256,000 rupees! and at a moment when it is perpetrating every dirty trick against the soldiers! I say nothing of misery. To talk to the Company of humanity would be too ridiculous.

"May 20th.—Pollock has sickness, his communications are difficult, and he has been obliged to send back a detachment to help Bolton's brigade up from Peshawur. He seems to be in a ticklish position, but courage and good sense may free him. The papers say Nott has ordered England to meet him at the Kújuck pass. From this we may augur that his state is bad, and that no road turns that pass or he would not order a beaten general to meet in a pass, a foe who had beaten him in the plain. England marched the 28th of April with two thousand five hundred men, leaving three hundred and fifty in Quettah. Nott sallied with five thousand men, on 7th and 8th of March, to fight ten thousand cavalry, who enticed him two days' march from Candahar while their infantry slipt round his flank and nearly overpowered the garrison; but though entirely composed of sepoys it bravely repulsed the attack. Colonel Wymer also, being sent to forage, was attacked, and the fight gallantly maintained on both sides but we were victors. A Captain Chamberlaine was distinguished. He cut down three Affghan horsemen, broke his sword on a fourth and finally freed himself. Many of the enemy fell on our bayonets, charging home into the square. Nott is said to have marched seven miles in line, and begun his cannonade at fifteen hundred yards!

"Sir Jasper Nicolls seems to be an old woman, if one may say so of a commander in chief! This is hard on Lord Ellenborough; for not being a soldier himself he ought to have one with him. Why don't they send Lord Seaton?

"May 21st.—Better news. Bolton has joined Colonel

Monteith, and is said to have cleared the Khybur. We shall see if Pollock can move on; provisions have reached his camp, carriage is now the only difficulty.

"May 23rd.—General England has again fought on his former ground, taking due precautions he won the heights with only eight men wounded: a clear proof of former negligence.

"Partabgur.—The scene of Sevagee's honest conduct!! He and his *Waynuck*: it is their *way!* Sevagee the founder of the Marhatta power, met Ayool Khan Aurengzebe's general at an arranged conference; pretending to embrace him and having previously armed his own hands with steel claws, the *Waynuck*, he tore him open!

"May 28th, Sattara.—A miserable town governed by a beast, with a Don Pomposo Resident who acts as dry nurse. Why does not the Company get rid of all these pensioners and stipendiaries? This Rajah, the Peishwa, and some dozen of others, who have no claims, cost great sums of money. The old Peishwa was a traitor, a murderer; he tried to assassinate Mr. Elphinstone our Resident, thus forcing us to depose him, which was done after a hard battle or two and then we pensioned him! We are a strange people.

"Jejewry, 31st.—A magnificent pagoda here: my family encamped under it among the grandest tamarind and mango trees, several of which measured 18 and 20 feet round at the height of my shoulder: the tank is superb, four good acres of water. The trees were full of monkeys who came continually to eat out of our hands: one entered our tent at night when I was lying at the door: he walked over me and awoke me; I followed him and could see nothing, but next morning my wife's apron was found outside. The monkey had taken it, pulled out her money, wrapped it up in a bit of paper and put it back, but carried off a biscuit she had been feeding him with in the evening: he left the apron, gloves and money! Honest fellow!

"Sapoor, June 1st.—The road is not bad, but the Rajah the Resident and government of Bombay are not only grossly ignorant of road-making but cannot muster money to build tunnels where the nullahs cross the road, and after a few showers of rain the roads are closed until October! Can it be credited that a government is so stupid? I dare say it has not found out that the traffic thus cut off would repay the expence of arches being turned over the nullahs. The Rajah is building two bridges when two hundred are wanted; little things indeed, not deserving the name of bridges but absolutely necessary, for the deep nullahs though only a few yards wide stop all carriages, and the Ganges can do no more!

"Poonah, June 14th.—General England has joined Nott, and the latter has moved on by Kelat-i-Ghiljie towards Ghusnee with three thousand men. Pollock remains idle at Jellalabad. He will have a cumbrous army when he moves, the passes will be closed behind him, and he will I fear come back to Peshawur like Tam O'Shanter's mare with the loss of his tail." This happened exactly when he did come back, that is, after reaching Cabool and destroying the bazaar there.

"23rd.—Another mortal case of cholera. I hope it is not returning. We have lost great numbers, the village behind my house is nearly depopulated, but when the hour comes the grass must be cut! Yet my wish is not to be made hay of yet, no time suits one to die.

"July 2nd.—An army of reserve is being formed at Kurnaul, apparently to impose on surrounding nations: perhaps the Sikhs of the Punjaub are shewing disaffection—if so Pollock will have a job.

"July 24th.—This day, thirty-two years ago, we fought the battle of the Coa! Middle-aged men now were then unborn. Well this is again an eventful hour with me! I am ordered to take command of Upper and Lower Scinde, and must be separated from all I love in this world of cares

and wretchedness. And for how long? Well, my mind must be bent on its work, not on its miseries. Lord Ellenborough says that all the *politicals* are to be placed under my orders: I shall work well with these people but was resolved not to be under them. I never quarrel with such people if they behave well, and I think them useful in their place; but that place is not as councillors to a general officer, he should have none but his pillow and his courage.

"August 10th.—This day 60 years old. Well, patriotism is no chimera: it is the resolution to be honest, carried into effect where our country requires us to act contrary to our wishes comforts and happiness. Perhaps few trials are more severe than sending a man at sixty away from his family to a distant country and a bad climate. Well, Lord Collingwood did not flinch, nor will I, if I know myself.

"24th.—My command is to extend from the Kojuck pass to the Indus at Bukkur, and down to the sea: what to do is not said, but all information is to be sought for relative to the road from Bukkur to Mooltan by Bhawalpoor. What does this mean? A war in the Punjaub? What else can it mean, and that my division is to move northward? They had better take care with these wide-spread *combined movements;* they are anything but combined. Why does not Sir Jasper Nicolls come forth to direct these matters? My design and hope is to find excuses for acting on my own responsibility, and going right before there is time to set me wrong! Assuredly if there be war I will not wait for orders as Pollock and Nott have done, letting the enemy gather moral and physical strength while both run from us in streams. Twenty-six thousand men have been idly wasting strength and money from March to September, the finest part of the year in those regions for making war. How is this to be answered for? Time will tell, but until then it must be set down as a blunder. Perhaps I may do no better; it is yet to be proved how I can command a large force, or rather a

small one in face of an enemy. Have a care Sir Charles! forget not, that caution and zeal and daring must all be employed to insure success, and if any one of them has too much vigour you will spoil the salad!

"Here the fifth volume of my journal since taking command of the northern district shall close: four years eventful to me are therein noted; what awaits me to record in the sixth volume God only knows, but it will probably be the most eventful time of my life!"

What Sir C. Napier designated above as a blunder was the result of Lord Auckland's previous policy, or rather want of policy: the delay was unavoidable. Mr. Kaye, in his cumbered compilation of the Affghan war, has with little knowledge and no judgment cast the whole blame on Lord Ellenborough, characterizing his letter to General Nott, 4th July, 1842, which finally set the armies in motion, as evincing "*Jesuitical cunning, or discreditable feebleness of will:*" and he describes General Nott and Pollock as eager to advance. Lord Ellenborough knew however, that, flourishingly as those generals might talk of advancing, to enter a hostile and desart country without ample supplies and carriage would, when the communications were abandoned, be destruction; and it was only on the 3rd of July that a private letter from a "*Political,*" placed on the line of communication, told him that General Nott had supplies and carriage. Not so with Pollock. His force was destitute at first, for Lord Auckland had merely sent him to withdraw Sale's garrison, and hence numbers of the animals taken to Jellalabad were hired for that point only, and were by him sent back when he decided to remain there. He thus reduced himself to helplessness and could neither advance nor retreat until Lord Ellenborough, by great efforts, in twelve weeks forwarded twenty-three thousand hired or purchased animals; but on the 3rd of July they were still on the road, and Affghanistan was such a word of panic that many drivers deserted with their animals: when Pollock

did move, in September following, his force was even then not fully equipped.

In this state of affairs Lord Ellenborough's letter of the 4th of July was written, and it could not reach Candahar under nineteen days; it might be intercepted; and the same time and risk were required for an answer. Absolute orders would then have been a folly, a wide discretion was necessary and was given, with a frank exposition of the difficulties and advantages of two operations presented for choice: that is, a safe but obscure retreat by the direct line on Scinde; or a dangerous but glorious circuit by Cabool. This choice was a fine compliment to a brave man, and the acceptance of the danger a guarantee for the necessary energy in the general. Lord Ellenborough did not order this dangerous movement, but his wish was so strong for it that he pointed to the recovery of the Somnaut gates and the taking of Mahomed Ghusnee's mace, as an additional stimulus to the soldierly feelings of Nott: and those feelings were so strongly counted on, that all the subsequent government measures were taken on the assumption that he would advance; the time being so well calculated also, that the two armies reached Cabool within a day of each other!

The army of reserve was another part of this combination, and was a wise exhibition of force to awe the intervening nations, and give what was really a retreat the appearance of menace, of victory and honour. Mr. Kaye and others, equally ignorant of facts and of the great principles of war, have strongly condemned and ridiculed that measure: the Duke of Wellington on hearing what had been done, and the reasons, thus wrote to Lord Ellenborough.—"You might have done less, you could not have done more, and I think your generals ought to be able to execute your plans."

Sir Charles Napier's journal up to this period touched only on the general state of the war then existing, and his command at Poonah is not noticed: but some public letters and extracts from private correspondence will supply the

want. The first was to Sir T. McMahon on a mutiny which arose soon after Sir Charles' first arrival.

"Poonah.—I send you copies of letters received from Colonel Hughes, but am much too ignorant of Indian affairs to offer any remark. Brigadier —— will doubtless do what is right. Anywhere but in India I should at once proceed to the spot and punish the mutineers; but here, being ignorant of Indian affairs, I dare not take upon me to act, and it would be unwise to hamper Brigadier —— by my presence at Mulligaum.

"January 14th, Brigadier * * *.—On the 9th instant I wrote thus to you. 'Be so good as to let me hear from you daily 'till all is quiet.' I have not received from you a single line, and were it not for Colonel Hughes I should, up to this moment, have remained perfectly ignorant of what is going on at Mulligaum! You must excuse me for expressing at this great surprize and regret. This morning came from Colonel Hughes a copy of your letter to him, dated 9th instant, in which you say—'I have this day ordered a wing of the 52nd Regiment to furnish a detachment of one hundred men for the Mehyjee Fair, to march on the 12th instant. If they obey my orders I shall be satisfied that no mischief is immediately intended.' These words astonish me. Have not the mutineers imprisoned your artillery, loaded their own arms without orders, chased an officer of your staff to shoot him? and you talk of waiting to see if the mutineers will obey a prospective order totally unconnected with these outrages—but if they choose to obey an order about a fair you will be satisfied!

"Sir I shall not be so satisfied; nor will the commander in chief be satisfied; nor will military discipline be so satisfied. What does your satisfaction amount to? Why, that no mischief is immediately intended. You really do astonish me. Would you leave mutineers to brew and concoct their dangerous schemes 'till it suited them to break out into open war against authority? I can draw no other con-

clusions from your expressions to Colonel Hughes. I expected long since to have heard from you that you had seized the ringleaders and put an end to the mutiny; and not that you wished to see whether the mutineers would add another crime to those they had already committed. Such a line of conduct is more calculated to create criminals than to repress crime.

"I am under the necessity of requesting you to forward to me by express, categorical answers to the following questions. 1°. Have you liberated the Golandauz—artillerymen? 2°. Have you imprisoned the ringleaders of the mutiny? 3°. If you have been opposed in those necessary steps have you disarmed the wing of the 52nd Regiment, which you have sufficient force to do? If you have not done these things you will be pleased to do them forthwith; for I assure you sir, that I have no idea of remaining five days longer with a portion of my division in a state of mutiny, and the officer in command giving me no information of what goes forward. You have nearly 1000 men and four pieces of artillery at your command, and I expect to hear by express that you have put down the mutiny, either by fair means or by force, within two hours after the receipt of this letter. If your answer tells me you feel unable to do this I will myself proceed to the spot, to learn whether the 52nd Regiment or the East India Company is to be master at Mulligaum.

"Sir Thomas McMahon, January 30th.—When I demanded on parade of the 24th N. I. if the men had any complaints to make, they came forward in great numbers to state their grievances as set forth in the accompanying papers, while some hundreds of soldiers belonging to other regiments thronged around eagerly listening to what passed. I feel well assured that the claimants will receive justice at the hands of Y^r. E^y. and the government, if their claims be well founded; indeed a longer delay in settling them would prove injurious to the service, and it would be very painful

to me as a general officer to appear again on the inspection parade of soldiers who had in the most respectful and authorized manner urged, and will again urge, their right to money, which, on active service, they had confidingly placed in the hands of government! I would sooner pay their demands myself than go through such an ordeal.

"I do not say whether these men's demands are just or unjust, but they have a right to expect a decision one way or the other. The native soldier is, I understand, gentle and patient; but the patience of these men has been exhausted by receiving no answer to their remonstrances. These poor men are not factious fellows cavilling for an allowance to which they may or may not have a claim; they are men who ask for their own money, saved when on active service and placed with confidence in the hands of government for transmission to their families. Such complaints cannot be passed over, they are too serious. In forty-eight years' service I have never witnessed so hard a case as this, and have no doubt that your excellency and the governor will cause those concerned to give immediate attention to it, for any further delay would be very prejudicial to the service, especially so at this time.

"Journal.—The good people of Bombay seem to think old soldiers are pieces of iron that may be kicked about at pleasure: the treatment the men receive is revolting to one's feelings."

A man who thus rebuked the negligence of authorities, and defended soldiers' rights so vigorously, could not fail to be obnoxious to corrupt and unjust power, and he was so marked at Bombay, where justice seemed to be only known as having existence by the clamours of oppressed persons demanding it. But nearly a month after this remonstrance he is again found complaining in the strongest terms that the government had not taken the slightest notice of the soldiers' just claims. Meanwhile he freely expressed his opinions on other points, and amongst them on an occur-

rence of the Affghan war which had made much noise, viz. the cold-blooded murder of thirty-six prisoners of war by Shah Soujah, when under British protection.

"The adjutant-general. Extract. — The question is, were they put to death as assassins, or soldiers taken in battle? If the first it was a just execution, if the last a massacre; a breach of all law, divine and human. Sir W. McNaughten asserted that they were assassins but does not offer a single proof in support; and if he believed his own assertion why did he endeavour to save a man of them? Lord Keane was more decided and consistent; he thought they were assassins and said, execute them. I think him wrong, because their guilt does not appear to have been established. That murders were committed I dare say, but that did not constitute the prisoners murderers!

"Another point remains untouched by Sir William. What brought him there? He seems fond of Vattel, but never to have studied chapter xi. '*of sovereigns making an unjust war.*' As to Napoleon's putting the people to death at Jaffa it was an entirely different case, being a matter of necessity authorized by the rules of warfare. Besides Napoleon had no voice in the matter, his army did the job in despite of him, he could not have saved them if he would; and there was no reason why those men were to be spared *twice*, but every reason why they should not! War cannot be made with rose water any more than revolutions, and the great question is to be right, and justified by circumstances. He who enters into wars without just cause has, to use Vattel's words—'a dreadful account to render to the King of kings, the common father of men!!' To that tribunal poor Sir William has been called.

"I have read '*Lucius Junius.*' His letter is admirable, who is he? Every word is true, and every word proves him to be a thorough soldier: were I Lord Ellenborough I would find him out and send him with a high command to the north-west. The letter just before it is very inferior,

and the attack on Mr. Erskine and Lady McNaughten perfectly unjustifiable: at least that on the lady. What had she to do with it? 'God knows her misfortunes are heavy enough, and a man is a cowardly rascal who under a feigned name attacks a woman, especially a woman in distress. Were I related to Lady McNaughten I would lose no time in finding out the writer and sending an ounce of lead among his brains, unless he was quick enough to forestall the compliment in my favour! He is clever enough to know that such an attack was neither sensible nor gentlemanlike, nor humane, nor religious, nor honourable: if Lady McNaughten has offended him let him tell her so, taking a proper time. Anonymous assassins are to me odious, from '*Junius of infamous memory down to the lowest scribbling coward in John Bull.*' The author of Lucius Junius is a gentleman; he only pays off Sir William McNaughten, because to do so was necessary for the defence of the army. The whole story must come out when General Elphinstone is tried. Lucius Junius makes me strongly suspect that Elphinstone is an ill-used man; and I have other and stronger reasons for thinking so, if that man can be called ill-used who bears it, which I never did and never will do. I suspect he was crushed by illness.

General W. Napier. — The general framework of this army is bad. The officers appear better staff officers than ours, but as regimental officers worse. There is nothing I can remedy as a major-general; plenty that should be quickly arranged were I commander in chief. People here are full of the superiority of Europeans, which as regards the soldiers is perhaps true. I have not seen the others fight. But the mistake is this. The former European officer was the enterprizing hard-headed daring fellow who taught and formed the sepoy:—the Clives, Laurences, Bussys, &c. The present European is a youngster who makes curry, drinks champagne and avoids the sun; in ten or twelve years, if he has brains and health, he acquires some

knowledge and is put on the staff: thus the regiments are constantly commanded by lieutenants. At this moment a troop of horse artillery here is commanded by a cadet of fifteen, who came out with me and whom I puzzled by asking him what the dispart of a gun was!

"While this deterioration of the European goes on the native officer seems to acquire a higher grade in general estimation, because from want of European officers the young and ignorant command nominally, while the natives, ever at their posts, are the real officers and very good ones too! There is a great cry for more regimental officers, because the few there are have more work than they like; but no one seems to foresee that your young inexperienced wild cadet will some day find the Indian army taken out of his hands by the *Soubadars*, who are men of high caste and very daring:—many have got orders of merit for noble actions. Very lately the bearers of a wounded officer, being pressed by the Affghans, set him down and run; the Affghans made a rush to murder him, but a Sepoy serjeant shot the first, slew the second with his bayonet, and defended the officer until help came:—yet at that moment they were retreating, and hotly pursued! Now, when knowledge is added to such intrepidity our European ascendancy can only be maintained by keeping the regimental officers complete, especially those of the higher ranks. The Soubadars are steady, respectful, thoughtful stern-looking men, very zealous and very military, the sole instructors of all our soldiers. If our rulers think this a trifle, and none appear to think it worth consideration, they will some day be surprized; and to this they are adding a dirty parsimonious defrauding of the Sepoys, which has within two months produced a mutiny in six or seven regiments in different parts of India, one under my command.

"Lord Ellenborough has from me a general plan of campaign, the leading points being to save Sale and then to abandon Affghanistan and occupy the left bank of the Indus,

and put back Dhost Mohamed on his throne. The details are too long to give you, but I have also told him that the chief causes of our disasters was fancying that when a smart lad could speak Hindostanee and Persian he was a statesman and a general, and was therefore made a political agent. As to holding Affghanistan, it would be folly equalling that of the attempt to conquer it; but our flag should fly at Cabool again before we quit the country, or the men of Nepaul and the Burmese will, so it is said, be upon us. Many princes within our bounds would also rise, and meanwhile the treasury is empty. Lord Auckland has left a pretty mess and we shall have trouble, but it is delightful to me not to have poor starving manufacturers to deal with; if we have war it will be with tyrants whom it will be good to upset: John Company's is bad but better than a native prince."

This opinion of John Company he had after reason to modify. He knew not then of the wholesale confiscations of property, the licence of torture to collect exorbitant revenues, the nepotism, the rapacity, the universal injustice of the Company's rule where not controlled by the English judges' courts in India: he knew not then of the overbearing money-seeking tyranny of the Indian government, and the hideous system of supporting the iniquity by falsehoods in Parliament.

"Journal, May 15th.—Poor Lord Munster is dead: I knew him from his boyhood. He was with us on the Coruña campaign, and afterwards in Spain. I once heard him tell the duke, that he had been an aide-de-camp but left his general because he charged him too much for dinner: the duke was exceedingly amused. At Fuentes Onoro he was thrown in a charge but escaped by his youthful looks: he told a French officer he was wounded and the good-hearted fellow immediately said *Ah! pauvre garçon, vous êtes bien joli, allez, cherchez vôtre maman.* I met him the instant after and he told me how he had escaped.

"May 20th.—Pollock forced the Khybur pass on the 4th or

5th of April: he had about twelve thousand men and reached Jellalabad. Every one thought there would have been a desperate fight, but scarcely any resistance was made: meanwhile a report of his defeat had reached Sale who instantly made a daring sally and defeated the enemy. On the other side of the country General England has lost the confidence of his troops, and private letters say Nott does not stand high with his army.

"June 16th.—Every one feels eager to know the policy of Lord Ellenborough. He seems to me a man of decision and ability, and one to make the best of the bad bargain Lord Auckland sold him, viz.:—half a dozen garrisons cut off by the enemy! These northern people however do not seem to be so brave as we are told: French or Americans would not have let us get through the Khybur. More men have been lost by one hour's skirmishing in Spain than Pollock lost by his whole operation; indeed he lost so few as to create a suspicion that they mean to await his coming back; but he seems to have a good head for arrangement and will beat them. His long halt at Jellalabad puzzles me: a halt was perhaps necessary to prepare for an advance; but halting for a month is not easily comprehended, as all difficulties must have been foreseen and learned from Sale: in a short time probably we shall have good reasons given.

"June 28th.—I have not given a dinner yet, having no knives, forks, spoons or dishes: we were miserable without baggage, and delighted to hear of its being on the road after a seven months' voyage, when suddenly, within twenty miles of Poonah, it was robbed. We have lost about £400 worth, and the inconvenience is more distressing: Sir Thomas McMahon has very kindly lent us some things to go on with."—He afterwards discovered that the robbery was committed at the Bombay custom-house, and the perpetrator was well known, but no redress could be got.

"June 20th.—The season for gormandizing here is the monsoon, and such magnificence! A colonel gave a ball

last week at a cost of only two hundred guineas! My intent is to give eatable dinners of twenty, feeding all who ought to be fed; my cook is the best of Bombay and there shall be lots of claret champagne and hock, and if that don't satisfy the society without two hundred guinea balls it may go to a hotter place than this. The female talk here runs thus:—Will you marry Mr. A.? Well, I don't see that better can be done, dead or alive he is worth three hundred a year—that is the youngest civil servant's pay, his widow's pension being the same.

"The worries of command here are great, it is a bore to be thwarted by fools who will stand up against what is good and useful: one shakes indeed finally into ease, but a horse just taken from grass don't like harness and a fool for coachman. All the stuff in the U. S. Gazette about myself and my drill is pure nonsense; they are very few and more to get my own hand in than anything else, for it requires habit to move large bodies: there are two awkward things to think of in a field, viz. *what to do*, and *how to do*. These three arms had never been worked together, and the infantry only in the same dull formal round on the same smooth piece of ground, which tired them to death. Now they go out altogether and over the hills, which they like: my belief is no one before did this, so it makes a talk. The Sepoys are capital soldiers.

"Our dear friends of the Punjaub have sent a force to help Pollock in eating his provisions; they were unasked, won't go away, possess the Khybur pass in reality, and have forty thousand well-drilled troops in rear of the pass under Avitabili, a clever Neapolitan. If this be true, it may not be, it is high time to have an army of reserve. Pollock would look blank with Acbar Khan and forty thousand Affghans in front, and Avitabili with forty thousand Sikhs on the top of the Khybur. I hear the duke has sent Lord Ellenborough a plan, but any plan must fail if the generals lose time. Pollock, we hear, says he has not means to move; why then did he go without means?

"July 16th.—You ask about the muskets. I found everybody running mad about the superior range and accuracy of the matchlock, and it seemed a settled point that the musket had no chance. To put an end to such a silly and dangerous opinion I bet five guineas with a great stickler for the matchlock, that I would with a common musket beat the best Marhatta matchlock 'man' he could produce. I got some officers and privates to practice with me every day until the best shot was ascertained. He and myself then contended. He put in eleven out of twenty rounds at one hundred and fifty yards, my hits were only eight, but the whole camp thus got interested and at the end of two months Captain St. John owned that no matchlock man would have a chance, and paid his bet. He could not count upon firing above five or six shots in half an hour as the matchlock takes so long to load and prepare; we reckoned on sixty shots in that time and at least twenty in the target. So the matchlock is now laughed at in the camp and the musket has its place again.

"I cannot describe how entirely it was settled before that the musket had no chance; the soldiers were persuaded they would be shot before they could get within range of their own arms. I could not have credited this feeling from hearsay, and officers and men were alike. I explained that the error arose from having fought matchlock men ensconced on high mountains where a shot downward reached and hit the uncovered climbing man, while his musket could neither reach nor hit when fired almost perpendicularly upwards at men well covered: the strength of the position was thus taken as the measure of the weapon. It was my firing myself with the soldiers that did the job: preaching till doomsday would have been useless. Our musket is however too heavy for the Sepoys, it should be made lighter without reducing the bore or length of barrel. I am going to try the range of wall pieces, they might be useful in Affghanistan where the people have no cannon; on certain posts they would

undoubtedly be good, and could go with the troops where from want of forage cannon cannot be taken. With these and mountain guns on camels I think some long marches might be made unhampered with horses and bullocks, except for provisions. They are all for horse artillery here. My opinion is different. It is not an arm for mountain warfare where no guns oppose us.

" Various reports come as to our force in Affghanistan. 1st. It is to retreat when it can. 2nd. To advance when it can, and lay waste the country with fire and sword. 3rd. It is to remain where it is, which it must do until animals are collected in India to move in autumn. Meanwhile we know some strange facts. Sale with one thousand men defeated Acbar Khan, and his guns were scarcely cooled when Pollock joined him with twelve or fourteen thousand fresh troops; yet Acbar laid siege to Cabool and took it immediately, within eighty miles of the victorious army! There may be good reason for this inactivity, and no one can condemn Pollock without a full knowledge of the details. He cannot stir from Jellalabad, all the letters say so, without eleven thousand more camels; he will thrash any force in battle, but the Affghans won't give him that chance. This war is a harlequinade, and we must hope like Moore in Spain, '*that all which may happen won't happen.*' Lord Ellenborough's anxiety must be great: if he steers through all these rocks he will deserve well of India and of England. Much would I give to see the duke's opinion and plan. I wish he was here, or that those who command armies would read his letters."—The duke had not given a plan, he only approved that of Lord Ellenborough, who did steer through the difficulties and was rewarded with recall and insult by the directors!

" Journal, August 26th.—This day public orders give me command of the troops in Beloochistan and in Upper and Lower Scinde.

" Bombay.—I am bothered with little worries, and the

pest of providing creature comforts which should be left to Macpherson my aide-de-camp, but he would do too much and smother me with baggage. Being determined to cut down the baggage of the Indian army I must begin with myself; it will be *a job* but shall be done if I live: a trencher more or less in my train seems a trifle, but the source of the Indus is but a stream melting from a handful of snow! Unless a man be right himself his house is not built on a rock and cannot stand: the words of Christ are true even in our unrighteous calling.

"September 2nd.—What a government, what a system! I go to command in Scinde with no orders! no instructions! no precise line of policy given! How many men are in Scinde? How many soldiers to command? No one knows! I am, if sharp enough, to find that out when there. Sir George Arthur seems to have a good head, so has Willoughby, but the first has only just arrived, the last is not chief and cannot change a bad system"—the nature of Mr. Willoughby's *head*, and *heart* will be shewn hereafter. "They tell me I must form and model the staff of the army altogether! This is easy to do: but is it in 1842 that the Indian staff should be modelled? our empire being nearly one hundred years old and existing by military force! That I must act for myself is clear, or rather by my own lights in their interest, for they know nothing. Feeling myself but an apprentice in Indian matters I yet look in vain for a master!

"September 2nd.—Visited the arsenal and found some rockets. Captain Watson where did those rockets come from? England, general. When? A few months ago, overland and secretly. Ho! are they hidden to continue the secrecy? I don't know. Pack up half and put them on board the Zenobia in which I am going to Scinde. This is singular: we send for rockets from England at an enormous expence, and at the risk of a quarrel with European cabinets should it be discovered that we secretly convey

arms and ammunition of war through Egypt; and when they are in the Bombay arsenal we lay them aside to rot! I had asked for rockets and my belief is these are the rockets sent out: so we make war in India! And all our cavalry are, I find, in the mountains of Affghanistan, none in the sandy plains of Scinde! Diable! Am I going to make war with such bottle holders!

"September 3rd.—Off in three hours, and this is old Oliver's day, the day he won Dunbar and Worcester, and the day he died; and a very good day to die on, as good as the second or the fourth! '*A crowning victory.*' Strange! Why are we superstitious? Why is there a devil? It puzzles man and so he is superstitious. Charles! Charles Napier! take heed of your ambition for military glory; you had scotched that snake, but this high command will, unless you are careful, give it all its vigour again. Get thee behind me Satan!"

Such was his Poonah command, but he has not noticed in his journal a remarkable instance of mental power overcoming nervous sensibility exhibited by him at a public festival, where a sword-player offered to cut an orange in halves on a man's hand, without injury to the member. The general offered his right hand for the trial, but the swordsman after careful examination said it was unfit for the experiment; he presented the left hand and it was admitted to be properly formed; still the player was nervous and refused to display his art on a man of such rank: his trepidation was apparent yet Charles Napier sternly insisted, and then the swordsman with a deep-drawn breath cut, the orange fell in halves, and the skin below was slightly razed, but without bloodshed. It was not without design this danger was incurred, for he was no reckless seeker of evil, or of display.

THIRTEENTH EPOCH.

SECOND PERIOD.

CHARLES NAPIER'S course was now to be through terrible scenes of war, and noble scenes of government.

"Journal, Kurrachee, Scinde, September 9th.—We had scarcely quitted Bombay harbour when a man was reported sick. Expecting cholera, I went forward and found a soldier slightly attacked: the only doctor on board thought lightly of the case, but in an hour several cases happened of the worst kind of spasmodic cholera, and all night the number increased. The deck was instantly cleared for their beds and every aid given, but many died. Rain came down and the decks became scarcely bearable from heat and stench; for to clean them was not possible and as men died they were rolled up and instantly cast overboard. The darkness of the night, the pouring rain, the roaring of the waves, the noise of the engine and the wheels, the dreadful groans of the dying, all in horrid convulsions; the lamentations of men and women who were losing wives, husbands, children; the solemnity of the burial service read by the glimmer of a solitary lanthorn held up to the book, presented altogether a dreadful scene. No man knew whose turn would be next.

"Morning came and the rain abated in degree, but the fierce disease defied all skill and we cast twenty-six of our companions into the sea! The 5th, 6th, and 7th, night and day, were passed in this terrible manner; and in these four days of wretchedness we threw fifty bodies into the waters. The decks were covered with filth, the sick packed close together, no room for the living until the dead were thrown

away, the survivors nearly broken down with fatigue of nursing, the doctor, Collum, exhausted, the engineer dead! Luckily we had a spare engineer going to the steamers on the Indus, otherwise the ship would have been in peril: but worse threatened. Hitherto soldiers only had been attacked, now it menaced the sailors, who took to drinking; if this had continued, all the troops being down, the ship could not have been worked with either sails or engine and must have been lost. The moment was critical, especially as the two mates were drunk: however only two sailors fell, and on the 8th the disease took a milder character. Previously the patients had died in three or four hours; now they lingered ten or twelve and many began to recover—those that died however still turned quite blue.

"Towards evening, on the 9th, no new cases appeared and we reached Kurrachee at night: it was dark, both mates were drunk and we got out of our right channel, but the horse-boat was in tow, the natives in it knew the track and calling out saved us just as we were closing on a reef. Then we cast anchor where we should be high and dry at low water, but where the rough sea running would have beaten us to pieces. The decks were still covered with sick, most of them convulsed, all utterly helpless to the number of eighty, and again therefore we heaved anchor. Everybody was now translating what the men in the tow-boat were calling out, and the master of our steamer was distracted by various interpretations. The waves swept loud and dashing over a reef, evidently close at hand; the captain, at the prow, was calling out for soundings and the men throwing the lead sung forth their responses, which the drunken mate repeated differently to the captain! I heard the lead's-man say five fathoms, and the mate shouted to the captain seventeen!

"It was so dark, the noise so great, and the roll of the vessel so violent I could not go a-head, but sent poor Captain Sawbridge of the Grenadiers, himself a good seaman, to tell the ship's captain that his officers were drunk and deceiving

him; he came astern, and then we heard tow-boat people shouting that we were going on to the reef, and for God's sake to anchor. Everybody now interpreted and there was but one thing to do. Peremptorily commanding silence, I named two officers, Doctor Collum and Captain Hughes, to interpret and we then came to the truth. The tow-boat people were shouting Anchor! Anchor! Quick! Quick! or you are lost. We did anchor and happily in good ground.

"Next day I landed, pitched a tent on a promontory for the troops, and got all the beds we could; we had nearly thrown all ours overboard, because one would not inclose a dead body and two were used with each. Every comfort was now supplied, but ten more died on shore and amongst them my excellent friend Sawbridge; the disease seized him at dinner and at 12 o'clock that night he was a corpse!

"A very pretty woman, Mrs. Webber, was very ill, we saved her on board, but scarcely had she landed when a second attack killed her: her poor husband was distracted. He was the engineer, a fine young man and a general favorite, and had been married only a few days before he left Bombay! A sergeant, just made sergeant-major of a Company's regiment, also died, having left his wife and children behind: that bolt shot close to me. I however never felt the slightest fear; if I had it would quickly have disposed of me, being weak from not touching food for four days, prostrate and helpless from sea-sickness. This was more painful than if I could have assisted the sufferers, as that would have occupied my mind, which could only contemplate the progress of the murderous malady when my spirits were lowered by want of food, sea-sickness, and the parting from my family. Thank God, the disease was arrested by isolating those who had it, or, more properly, it ended itself on Manoora Point. So ends also the sad story of the cholera on board the Zenobia, where we lost out of 200 soldiers 54 in four days, and 64 before the eighth day! The ship

'captain, Newman, by firm and skilful seamanship saved the vessel: his conduct was admirable.

"September 13th.—Reviewed the garrison of Kurrachee, 2000 men, and resolved to try a rocket or two. No one knew exactly how to throw them; but Captain Sinclair of the Artillery, Lieutenant Munbee of the Engineers and myself undertook the job in front of the lines; my wish being to give the soldiers confidence in the weapon though having little myself. Our first behaved pretty well, bending only a little to the wind; the second played a trick. Sinclair touched him with the port-fire; he did not go off and we both approached, one on each side, and Sinclair looked up into the rocket to ascertain if it had ignited. I said, don't look up, he is a-light, I see it:—just then it blew up, we were both covered with flames and smoke and the spectators gave us up for lost. Sinclair's trowsers were speckled with powder but he escaped unhurt; Munbee was struck on the arm and slightly bruised; I felt a severe blow on my leg yet did not fall, and looking down saw that a splinter had torn my trowsers to pieces and the calf of my leg also! The wound was horizontal, three inches deep and four long or rather more; it cut clean through the calf and was ugly to look at. The surgeons sewed up the wound and ordered quiet in one position for three days, at the end of which one half was healed by the first intention; the other was not, being jagged; yet here I am on the 24th able to limp with a stick. Dr. Collum gave me leave to travel on the 19th, coming with me, and, as he foretold, I improve and am steaming up the Indus in the *Comet*."

Notwithstanding the severity of this wound, such was his activity of mind that he obtained sufficient information to frame a report on the wants and future prospects of Kurrachee, pressing on the governor-general and the government of Bombay, projects for a boat-bridge over the creek, the boring for water, which was scarce and bad, the building of a lighthouse, and the forming of vegetable gardens.

At the same time he took vigorous measures for the health of the troops, then suffering not only from cholera but scurvy, which had attacked seven-eighths of one regiment: in fine a master's hand was felt in every direction. But now also the intricacies of Scindian affairs, military and political, were to be disentangled; the last having been complicated by the pompous vacillating proceedings of the political agents. The state of affairs may be thus sketched.

A series of foul negociations by Lord Auckland's government had given the British a treaty, permitting a partial occupation of Scinde and a complete control of the Ameers as a paramount power. These princes of the Talpoor race had overturned the Kallora dynasty about sixty years before, and being Beloochees had entirely subjected the Scindians proper by bringing down their mountain tribes to domineer in the plains. There were thus four races in connection, namely, the mountain Beloochees, the Beloochees of the plain, the Scindians proper and the Hindoos: the Ameers were tyrants to the third and fourth races, princes of the second, and held chieftainship over the first. The Talpoors reigned as the *Char Yar*, or brotherhood, because four brothers, dividing the country as to possessions governed in common. Their children and grandchildren did the same, but were at this time split into three families, viz.—that of Hydrabad, that of Kyrpoor, and that of Meerpoor:—the first in the south, the second in the north, the third in the east, bordering on the great desart. From the *Char Yar* system also sprung a custom of giving the brother instead of the son succession to the *Puggree* or turban of command, which carried with it a certain power, and crown property in addition to the patrimonial possessions. It was, when Charles Napier landed, worn by Nusseer Khan at Hydrabad; at Kyrpoor by Roostum Khan, an aged man who had in person assisted to dethrone the Kallora princes. The Meerpoor prince, Shere Mohamed, or the Lion Mohamed, acknowledged however a sullen half allegiance to Nusseer.

The treaty forced on these Ameers by Lord Auckland to facilitate the invasion of Affghanistan, had been signed under the guns of Sir John Keane's army: it rendered the Indus free for all the fluvial nations, and gave the British paramount authority in Scinde with possession of Kurrachee, Sukkur, Bukkur, Roree, Shikarpoor, and a chain of posts by Dadur to the Bolan pass. For more than three years it had been in force, and Lord Ellenborough's orders were express as to observance of its stipulations. This was vital for British interests; for the Ameers, fretting under the yoke, were exciting the mountain tribes to war, and preparing for it themselves, being encouraged by the Cabool disaster. In pursuance of this policy they were continually breaking the treaty; yet with barbarian cunning one or more of their number always pretended to be faithful and opposed to the policy of the others. Such was the political state of Scinde when General Nott advanced from Candahar to join General Pollock at Cabool, having orders to retire afterwards to India by the Khyber pass, while General England fell back by the Bolan pass into Scinde with all Nott's encumbrances. While the troops were so dispersed the safety of General England and the British supremacy in Scinde evidently depended upon Sir C. Napier's vigour and judgment as a politician and commander, and with this explanation his journal shall be resumed.

"Journal, September 24th.—On the 21st I embarked at a *bunder* on the Indus, bunder being the name for any hard spot, such as a pier. This one was two miles from Tattah—the *Pattala of old.* We are now 70 miles up the river, which appears some 700 or 800 yards wide; the water is muddy, yet when cleared by standing, or with a little alum, is delicious. Thirty years ago, in Bermuda, I read Arrian last, was delighted and wished to have been with Alexander: now I command an English army on the Indus. What shall I be, what see, what feel, thirty years hence? Greater than here my hope and belief is: perhaps Alexander himself may be my companion. Meer Gholam Mohamed came down

the river to meet me as an ambassador; he is a relation of Nusseer Khan our great enemy, and has several attendants. These Ameers are tricky and do not calculate their danger, which is very great; all their childish ceremonies and civilities will not avail if they don't stick to their treaties: we break treaties, but that is not a reason for letting others do the same!

"September 25th, Hydrabad.—Every Ameer and every great man, they tell me, has sent twenty trays of sweetmeats, and above 100 have already come; the whole bank is lined with them, each being the size of a table and balanced on a man's head: strange perversion of civility! These Ameers know that neither myself nor any officer with me eat a morsel of these things, yet they pour them in and to refuse them would be a mortal offence. The Ameers have received me so far with the highest honours, but for all that they must keep their treaties. My intention is, if possible, to give them a lesson upon their revenues, though princes are not good scholars.

"September 26th.—Yesterday paid my visit to the Ameers. They received me with the greatest honours, greater even than were paid to Lord Keane, for they sent their sons to meet me outside the town. The proceedings shall be related in detail, because the Talpoor's rule seems to be on the wane, and possibly this may be the last independent reception they may give as princes to a British general! As to these high honours, this seems the reason. Lord Keane entered Scinde because Lord Auckland had broken faith as to our treaties; the Ameers were sulky, no wonder; but being then unable to resist by arms they put the best face on a bad business, and received Keane as the general of a strong army in the ordinary way: going out of the usual custom would have betrayed fear and lowered their dignity. But now we occupy two of their most important towns, a large force under General England is coming down the Bolan pass, I am come with a British regiment from Bom-

bay, and other troops are moving about in their territory. They have long felt themselves at our mercy, and our mutual friendship has been cemented by a treaty which kindly relieved them from the inconvenience of independence: they signed but do not like this treaty, have broken it in every petty way, and are much alarmed. Meer Gholam soon discovered that my power exceeded Lord Keane's, being entire over the politicals as well as military branches, and court is paid accordingly. Moreover the great force now assembling in Scinde is a puzzling affair for both the Ameers and the English; and I am as ignorant as they are, though able to guess that it is to execute my plans, now in Lord Ellenborough's hands at his own request.

"Nusseer Khan pays his court to me thus. First a great man meets me on the Indus, and on landing 40 men come with trays of sweetmeats; again, at the house of the political agent, Lieut. Mylne, 60 more trays come, with ten sheep and vegetables. I dress in full uniform with decorations. A magnificent palanquin, covered with scarlet cloth, lined with scarlet, and pillowed with cushions of green velvet, awaits me, and camels, having rich housings, are there for my retinue. My wound prevents me riding or a horse would have been sent; but fifty of the Scinde irregular horsemen, the political agent's guard, attend me, wild picturesque fellows with their brilliantly-coloured trappings, very much like stage banditti. Crowds of Scindian peasants, armed and unarmed, flock to see the *Saib*. We approach the city, the Sirdars meet us, all mounted and with mounted retainers, their horses lean and small but active and showy. Some few of the riders have spears, all have sabres, and each a shield on his back. This and the coloured trappings, the men's own dresses of variegated shawls and silks, the turbaned heads interspersed amongst the handsome Scindian caps, and the exceeding grace of all, presented a thoroughly eastern scene, very beautiful. Nor were the high castellated and ornamented ramparts of

Hydrabad, towering above the armed men and crowded with figures similar with those below, calculated to render the picture less curious.

"The walls of Hydrabad appear to be of soft brick, but are full of loop-holes curiously made, having below each a channel, cut like a trough, which slopes off to nothing: they are thirty or forty feet high and have an ancient and romantic appearance. Nor were the people less so, with their horses plunging and neighing, their own loud voices and exaggerated yet graceful gesticulations, eager as the animals they rode. The sons of the Ameers, in palanquins, met and turned back with me, and then the crowd became dense; but our strong palkee men forced rapidly onwards, while imprecations struggles and fights occupied the people on foot, all resolved to see the *Feringhee General Saib.* On reaching the gates the difficulty augmented, the palkees went slow and salaams were made on all sides.

"The beauty of these people is very great, and though in the crowd it was diversified by many ugly negroes' faces, scarcely could an ugly Scindian be seen; on all sides were fine manly countenances, with eyes of fire and teeth of snow, dark skins but not black, nearly my own complexion. We worked our way through the narrow streets and armed gates to the palaces of the Ameers, who to save my leg politely held their durbar outside. They arose and helped me to rise, which my lameness rendered difficult, and seated me on the right hand of Nusseer, a large fat man, not handsome yet not ill-looking. I did not see anything bad in his face, but he '*hates the English,*' and of course is a '*damned scoundrel.*' What bad taste the villain has. He does not like to have his country subjected. Well, there he was, hating us—but too well bred to shew it to me, being indeed very civil, as they all are in their manner.

"They would all try on my spectacles, were puzzled by them, and repeatedly asked if I was very happy and very comfortable? In return my interpreter continually asked if

they were very happy and very comfortable? This was the more incumbent on me, as having just written a *billet-doux* to them which could by no means add to their comfort or happiness: it was to request they would not break treaty by levying tolls on the river, and hinted, that if they did so my next visit would be less welcome. Nusseer had not yet received it, because amidst such civility it was not right to mortify him before the multitude; he will get it to-morrow and shall stick to the treaty! Foolish man, he sees not that it will in time fill instead of injuring his treasury.

"When we had sat some time he presented me with an immense sum of money, £6,000, which was of course refused— at which, I hear, all the Ameers were much offended, because Lord * * * * * had different ideas and took their money. On him they pressed £2,000, on me £6,000. Lord * * * * * * * * * * also, I am told, accepted presents. These things were formerly permitted by the government and might be right or wrong according to circumstances: not so when they are prohibited. *Chacun à son goût:* mine is not to take. The government however knew of and sanctioned Lord * * * * *'s acceptance. Having taken leave and no cash, my next visit was to the palaces of those Ameers who are not on terms with Nusseer's party, and are favourable to the British. They received me with far more cordiality: they have no ambition, and so long as they collect their revenue care little whether we occupy their town or not. The same scene here as before, the same offer of money but not so large a sum, at least the towel holding the gold did not seem so large. This was a curious day. I was dictating like a Roman consul, and threatening the dethronement of princes if my orders were disobeyed!

"Up to Hydrabad the river is very wide—from 600 yards to six miles; the bed however eternally changes in depth and breadth, and even in course. A crocodile, the only one we have seen, took a look at us this day. There are many turtles with claws, good to eat, and one was caught, but

something was found in its stomach which made the soldiers throw it overboard: I made no inquiry, but do not mean to eat turtle in Scinde.

"September 27th.—This day thirty-two years ago I was shot through the head at Busaco, and am now, being past sixty, just lamed by the bursting of a rocket, and sailing up the Indus in command of an army! Wonderful are the vicissitudes of my life, and my escapes from danger within the last six weeks have been as great as ever! Cholera, shipwreck, and the bursting of a rocket, yet all escaped! though with a severe wound. This river Indus is a grand piece of water and will again become celebrated and enrich these countries; there is no want here but of man's making. The banks fall in fast, hundreds of tons have done so as we passed. The water-course must have changed many times since Alexander sailed down, and can only be the same between the mountains: in the flat it shifts every year, nay, every day, and the mouths must be quite different. Wherever wood appears the bank is four or five feet, sometimes twenty feet, above the water, the opposite bank being invariably low and without a shrub: yet there is deep soil everywhere. These woods are all preserves, and are principally of the Babul tree. The captain of the Comet tells me the current is from four to five knots an hour; Burnes says two and a half: the skipper is probably right.

"The banks exhibit mica in strata, the deposit does not appear to be sand, and the water is liquid mud, it requires no soap in washing. The banks above water are perpendicular, with the white mica strata shewing for the hundred miles we have gone about two feet from the surface, but spreading in patches where dips happen in the ground. Doctor Collum calls it mica, but I will get some examined, for guesses are worthless. Travellers' conjectures are convenient castles in the air for idle voyagers' repose, and fools are gulled by them. Sir Alexander Burnes, though not an idle traveller, seems to me an exaggerator; and as a surveyor makes his

protractions meet, nolens volens. He says the banks fall with a terrific crash and noise as loud as artillery. They now fall before my eyes every hour and make no noise; should the water sink even eight feet more they could make no great crash. Minute criticism on a great traveller this; but it is accurate statements and not the number of miles his horse carries him that makes a man a Humboldt, and the neglect of them makes him a Munchausen! This little fact shews Burnes' turn for hasty conclusions, formed on hasty work I know what surveying is very well and am sure his was loose and slovenly; as good as the case admitted of may be granted, but without positive assertion he gives the reader to understand that it was very accurate.

"September 28th.—My leg painful all yesterday, yet the rapidity with which it heals is wonderful. Carried on the 21st by men, I have been now three days walking about without a stick: pretty well for a wound which severed the whole calf of the leg to the bone! Shoals of crocodiles this day; very harmless it is said, but while accepting this assurance in words I would not like to trust their honour by bathing—the innocents!

"September 29th.—Passed the Luckee range. Lord Keane's army passed here along the river but the road has been since washed away. We have now neared Sehwan, and the water has narrowed to one hundred and fifty yards. On the northern Luckee range are the remains of a fort, after passing which the banks are again low. Did the river ever run between the Luckee and Halla ranges? It has washed away half of a pretty mosque, and Burnes speaks of Sehwan being two miles from the water; that marks the varying course of the river, which rolls its mass of waters like a whale floundering for pleasure.

"September 30th.—Pelicans, at whose bodies my companions continually do fire and continually do miss.

"October 1st.—What immense produce might burthen

this running sea! Civilization would soon bridle this mad river: the Dutch control the rude northern seas, and a few dams run obliquely down the stream would restrain the vagaries of the Indus. Would that Sehwan were mine: quickly it should defy the river and have quays, and agriculture for twenty miles around, while vast canals should carry the waters through the land. Science would play with the Indus, but it cannot be controlled by misery, poverty, ignorance, and a tyranny calculated to destroy the earth and man. The wild beast only thrives here and the Ameers torment even him: their diversions are destruction, their sole business to hoard gold! Their extortions impoverish their own treasury, they kill the goose for the golden eggs: but the last egg I suspect is laid. My object will be to resuscitate the goose; but while doing so the Ameers may go by the board: if so it is their own fault. Did God give a whole people to half a dozen men to torment? I will strive to teach the Ameers a better use of their power, and if they break their treaties the lesson shall be a rough one!

"October 2nd.—The banks shew more cultivation, grain is now occasionally seen. What grain! A field of *jawarrie* presented stalks full twelve feet high! and the soil is the same all along! Pelicans again. Pelican is a fine stately fellow, something between a lord and an alderman; with a dash of the philosopher, for when shot at he rises gracefuly, carries his paunch just out of reach and alights again to his dinner like Sir William Curtis. The mercury is at 90° in the shade.

"October 3rd.—I feel idle on board but am not so, having seen or read all yet known about the Indus, and finished a report upon Kurrachee, shewing government how very important a place it may become and how to make it so. They will no doubt put me down as a visionary; but had I Kennedy to aid me, and power, they should soon see the vision realized! Some camel grass has just been brought on board. The stalks are a sort of reed, some sixteen feet high, colour

a light but bright, yellow, very beautiful: its graceful waving is beyond that of feathers. Saw an enormous bird, larger than any ostrich. Its body small, with white feathers near the tips of its wings, red legs of immense length, and its neck also. To us on board it seemed six feet high if not more, for it was not quite erect. Steadfastly it watched the water from the bank, and never did so large and so handsome a bird meet my eyes. No one knew it and guns were prepared, but its hour had not arrived poor bird. We were too far off and left him in all his dignity, king of birds on the Indus!"

Being now close to Sukkur, where political events were bursting from their artful coverings, his journal once more assumes a public form, and will be best introduced by extracts from a private letter written at Kurrachee to his brother Henry.

"September 18th, 1842.—My position here is very ticklish, but danger from war none. When General England joins me from Quettah I shall have 12,000 men; yet no cavalry, which in this open country would be wanted if the Ameers attack me. My difficulty will be to act with judgment as chief political agent. I believe Lord Ellenborough's intentions are just and honourable, I know my own are; but hell is paved with good intentions, and both of us may have difficulties to encounter. Still I feel neither diffidence nor hesitation; my plan is formed; so is Lord Ellenborough's, and my belief is that they are alike. The mountain tribes threaten to attack England's column in the Bolan pass; but there is great reason for doubt, and I have sent to advise and authorize the commander in Upper Scinde to make a forward movement towards the pass, which will assist England in his retreat by menacing the rear of his enemies. He has the mass of my forces and, until he joins, there are only 4000 men in Upper Scinde. I ought to have been here two months ago, and have now to move 200 miles up the Indus through a hostile country with a guard of only fifty men."

This did not prevent his braving the Ameers in their palace and prescribing amendment.

"Journal, October 4th.—A report that England's cavalry has been cut off in the passes: it is probably a confusing of the misfortune that befell Nott's cavalry near Ghusnee and if true must be trifling as he had very few. Any evil to England's column would bother me: the best way to aid him will be to bring the 22nd and 28th Regiments up from Kurrachee, and taking 2000 men from Shikarpoor march at once into the Bolan. It would however be an awkward job; for the Brahoe Beloochees are called by Postans, who has been political agent with them, forty thousand fighting men, and amongst their own defiles they are not to be treated as children! My hope and belief is that England will come through safely, but if he is intercepted he must not be left without a strong effort to pull him through. What is to become of Nott if he meets a reverse? What of Pollock if he meets with one? Time must answer. This is a war of risks without objects. Why abandon Candahar and Quettah before Nott has effected his junction with Pollock? Everywhere we fight without a base. Should Nott's foot get thrashed, as his horse have been, he has neither Candahar nor Quettah to fall back upon: nor Ghusnee, for that he has blown up.

"October 6th.—Important letters from Lord Ellenborough. He works hard for his bread and acts well; but he seems to be more held in check from home than he ought to be: a man entrusted with an empire should have no check but public opinion, a rigid responsibility, yet free to do at once what he deems needful. All the sentiments of honour and honesty towards the weak that Lord E. expresses please me; I believe him liberal and honest in all he does and no man can do more. With God's blessing I will stand by him so far as executing his orders; and methinks that in India this is wanted as much as anywhere. Men come here to make money, it is the empire of Mammon; and they are

right to a certain extent, for man will not move without a motive, and what motive can they have but money? There is however reason in roasting of eggs, and making money should have limits. Example. The Wuzeer of the Kyrpoor Nusseer Khan, came to me lately to pay in the name of his prince the usual compliments, and offered a present of money: now my worship of Mammon is peculiarly strict and fervid, but I could not accept the ready rhino because it was beyond limits.

"My leg is swelled and painful, it ought to be well. What an unlucky devil am I! Two thousand soldiers were standing around, every man within reach of mischief and I alone was hurt! Sinclair and Munbee were close, Sinclair, a giant, rather closer than me. How did we escape being blown to atoms? Our hour was not come! The blow was like that of a bruise: it has given me a shake. They tell me I shall recover. Pooh! young men do not know what an old one feels; I did not until I was old: the recovering spring and elastic restitution after illness or accident is gone. Youth like the sea rises and sinks again; age like a river goes down! down! and there is no up. Fate! fate! Let me go to work."

His public correspondence, commencing at Kurrachee, will now disclose the progress of his command.

"Governor of Bombay, September 14th.—General England's first division marched from Quettah about the 10th; the second will march about the 18th; the third about the end of the month. Lieutenant Brown, political agent, has reports from spies, that various tribes mean to attack England's columns. Brown's impression is that no attack will be hazarded; and it seems reasonable to suppose, as they could have attacked England in a divided state and did not, that they will hardly attack him when he has picked up the garrison of Quettah, and is within reach of Dadur, Shikarpoor and Sukkur. But as the resolutions of barbarians are generally more sudden than wise, I have authorized

Colonel Wallace, commanding at Sukkur, to push 500 men one or two marches from Shikarpoor towards Dadur, if he judged it useful. This, menacing the rear of any force opposed to England, might prevent a contest with that officer, which in our present state would have a better effect than a victory. It would be a higher tone to say, We retired through the Bolan and no tribe dared attack us, than to have those tribes say, The English escaped us fighting for their lives.

"Colonel Wallace, September. — The moving of your column to aid England is suggested because the march of a corporal's guard will be by barbarians exaggerated to that of a brigade before it reaches ten miles! I venture to say my arrival here with two companies of the 28th Regiment has been already reported at Hydrabad as that of a thousand men, and coupled with an advance from Shikarpoor it will flutter the Volscians: that is, bother the mountain tribes!

"Lord Ellenborough, September 15th.—From what I collect, Kurrachee is healthy and congenial to European constitutions. No illness has been caused by the insalubrity of the air. Cholera was imported from Bombay, scurvy has arisen from the issue of salt provisions and want of vegetables. I have prohibited the first, arranged for a better supply of the second, curtailed the issue of ardent spirits, and caused lime juice to be served out. I have also advised Sir George Arthur that money can be got here on government bills with a gain of one or two per cent. This saving may be small, but such transactions encourage people to place confidence in our honour, which it is desirable to inculcate towards our nation whatever course political circumstances may induce your lordship to adopt towards the Ameers.

"Governor of Bombay, September 18th.—I mean to pay my respects to the Ameers in passing Hydrabad: it is an attention due to them and to omit it would look insolent. It may also tend to make matters go smoothly, because

they will then learn that they must adhere to their treaty, a fact easy to make plain without breach of respect, or good breeding.

"Lieutenant Mylne, September.—Gholam Mohamed came and begged a passage to *honour me*. I knew well enough what he was at but did not refuse him; it would have been uncivil, and his coming could do no harm. A barbarian can never avow his real motive of action, even when aware one knows it as well as himself. He was allowed a passage also, because, unless some further information changes my present determination, my design is to put a stop to the quarrels of the Ameers at Kyrpoor. I do not mean to let armed bodies keep dancing about our cantonments.

"H. Maddocks, government secretary.—The Ameers do not appear to be acting loyally, and I desired Lieut. Mylne to give them the letter of which a copy is enclosed. It appeared to me improper to allow the wording of one article to neutralize the whole spirit of a treaty which it must have been the intention of every article to enforce! The Ameers attempt to prevent supplies coming to our camp at Kurrachee, and our remonstrances are treated by them as an infringement of article 5th. The wording of this article may admit of cavil, and as the Ameers seemed disposed to take advantage I saw but one mode of getting rid of their subterfuge, namely, to reject their statement, that we had violated the treaty in listening to the complaints made against them by their own subjects. I insisted that the complaint was made by us on our own account—and this is the truth. The protection to their subjects against the oppression of the Ameers may be a consequence of the treaty, but offers no excuse for breach of treaty! The Ameers levy tolls on the river: that is a direct breach of treaty.—Article xi. They have also ordered toll to be levied on the boats of the merchants of Bhawalpoor, as well as on their own boats.

"To my remonstrances the Ameers of Hydrabad have given no answer. Yet the warning which that communi-

cation gave was, in my view, fair and honourable towards their highnesses. They have the right to reject my interpretation of the treaty; but then let them give their own for the decision of the governor-general, and on that take their ground as independent princes.

"I hope the governor-general will approve of my having, by my letter, placed Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad in such a position that he must either avow his hostility openly, or conform to the treaty. He will probably do the last so far as words go, yet continue to play the same underhand game that he now does: but after that distinct warning the case against him will become stronger. It is only since my arrival here that I have heard of Nusseer Khan's having levied tolls on and fired into the Bhawalpoor boats, navigating the Indus under the supposed protection of the treaty. This appeared to me so important that I have directed Lieutenant Brown to obtain the proofs necessary to establish the fact, which we hope to have in about ten days when they shall be forwarded.

"Lieutenant Mylne has been directed to ask for a copy of the order, or *purwannah*, which he told me the Ameers had given to Narmull many months ago to sell goods in the British cantonments free of duty; also copy of the order from Nusseer Khan to arrest that man. I do not understand why any permission was required or received from the Ameers. The 12th and 13th articles of treaty forbid the Ameers to levy duty on goods sold in the British cantonments; therefore no permission was necessary, and should not have been accepted by any British subject or servant, as it casts a reflection on the integrity of the treaty.

"Major Outram, October 8th.—The Ameers are like all barbarians, ignorant and cunning; they will get on the rocks: however the length of their tether is the treaty, and they have been given to understand that they shall not go an inch beyond it; if they do they must take the

consequences. I know what that would be were I master, and suspect what it is likely to be.

" Lieutenant Mylne.—Your answer for the Ameer Sobdar is gone; he is made a feeler for Nusseer Khan, or else is afraid and wants to keep well with both sides: they will not come to the scratch. God help them if they do:—yet they and their people would be much better for our rule. My letter has done good by bringing matters to a clearer understanding, but we must come clearer yet."

These frequent expressions of scorn for the Ameer power were used with design to reach those princes and shake their confidence.

" Sir G. Arthur.—General England's people have met with no difficulties hitherto. I have had some dealings with the Ameers and been rather rigid: they must decide now on their course. I have insisted on having written orders contradicting those given to their own authorities; four have consented, two swear they will not but have returned no official answer: they shall. They are like Macbeth's witches ' keeping the promise to the ear.'

" Lord Ellenborough, October 8th.—I send copy of my report on Kurrachee, original gone to Sir G. Arthur: a lame one for I was lame. My hope is that he will send me the boring rods, and permit me to construct the bridge of boats over the creek on General Farquharson's plan, and the light house proposed by myself. Officers shall be immediately employed to survey this place and its environs.

" Lieutenant Munbee.—It was of no use to write sooner, because I had neither time to consider the affairs of Kurrachee nor power to sanction things as I wish to do. Now there is more time to consider, and more power.

" 1°. You will proceed with all possible speed in the construction of a lighthouse and its establishment, according to your report and that of Captain Frushard; but my serious request is to make your arrangements in the most œconomical way.

" 2°. Let me hear as to the progress made in your search for water: does that which you found increase or diminish? As this is one of the most important duties, you may select an intelligent non-commissioned officer to put at the head of any number of people necessary to vigorously search for water.

" 3°. Purchase a boat of such dimensions as will float on the creek, I mean the largest: have it coppered and a rope stretched across the thwarts, made to unship so as to have all clear for holding troops. Make other arrangements to enable horses to be taken in and out with safety; for example, the bottom must be strongly planked, and two old iron guns or two anchors sunk as you propose.

" 4°. Send me an estimate of the large sheds proposed in your letter for the bundur, and for Kemaree point, and proceed without delay for the erection of the latter.

" 5°. Let me know what you are authorized to do to the bundur by the military board, and I shall probably be able to aid your more rapid progress.

" 6°. Send me a large plan of the Rham Bhag—Fort at Kurrachee, with your proposed defence in red ink or carmine. Your project cannot be judged of without the plan, one cannot fortify on mere recollections; and remember it was from a palanquin and late in the evening when I saw the Rham Bhag. The estimates may follow the plan, but let me have that at once and do not lose time in fine painting and ornament: let it be rough as you like, only be exact in all the measurements, lines and angles, and draw the lines of fire. Make no talk in the cantonment, but quietly do what I require and do it quickly: there are many reasons for this besides my aversion to see government works go on dawdling. Do not keep one estimate waiting for another but send off whatever you first prepare: this will be easiest for both, and be assured mine is not an idle time."

Thus early did he foresee and strive for the commercial

grandeur to which Kurrachee is now rising. And it must be admitted that he seized his command with extraordinary vigour when the circumstances under which he gathered the data for his report, of which the plans mentioned in these instructions were only a part, are considered. For he was but a few days at Kurrachee, suffering from the rocket wound, embarrassed by the care of the sick soldiers, perplexed by the separation of his forces and the supposed danger of General England's column, and plunging himself into all the intricacies of Scindian politics, the course of which is now to be resumed.

Observations on a convention between the British Resident at Hydrabad, and a confidential servant of the Ameer of Shadad.

"The Ameer's friend asked this question. Will the British government assist the Ameer if he declares for its interests and thereby draws down the enmity of the other Ameers?

"*Answer by Sir C. Napier.* The British government will support him with its whole force in maintaining the treaty of 14 articles: and if by adhering to that treaty his personal safety be endangered, he has only to place himself under protection of the British Resident, and any insult offered to him will be resented by the governor-general.

"*Ameer's friend.* If the other Ameers refuse to grant the purwannahs and write to that effect and you see Meer Shadad's seal to it, do not think anything of that but remember what has been communicated to you at this interview.

"*Answer.* I will not enter into any secret intrigue to assist the Ameer in deceiving their highnesses, his relations. What the Ameer signs for that he must answer for. If he adheres to the treaty the governor-general will support him, if he refuses he must take the consequences. The governor-general is alike strong to support friends and punish enemies. The Ameer is an independent prince, a party to the

treaty and his highness must judge for himself and abide results. But if his highness condescends to ask my advice, it is to adhere to the treaty and place full confidence in the protection of the governor-general: always bearing in mind that his highness is individually as well as collectively pledged to the execution of that treaty. Intrusted by the governor-general with the command in Scinde, it is my wish to preserve the friendship existing by treaty betwen the British government and their highnesses the Ameers; this treaty is the bond of union and if broken the friendship must be broken also! Therefore I am resolved to report to the governor-general the slightest infraction of the treaty, which had better not have been made than not be observed."

At this time General England had passed the defiles without loss or difficulty: but the dangers of his march had been by public opinion greatly exaggerated, and Sir C. Napier, daily assailed with strange tales of peril and obstacles almost insurmountable, had been very anxious for the safety of a column which was to compose more than half his force. His opinion of England as a general had been very low, and hence, when the troops came safely down through the passes, he with a generous emotion, thinking he had undervalued that officer's talent, addressed an encomiastic letter to him. It has since been adduced as proving the high opinion Sir C. Napier entertained of General England generally; it does not do so, as will be found in the course of this work; but with this explanation that officer is entitled to the following record.

"General England, October 6th.—Allow me to congratulate you on your successful progress in a most difficult retreat; for your convoy is like Falstaff's bill for sack, and your troops like the item for bread. I really did not expect that you could have passed the Kojuck without immense loss. Your having done so does you great honour, encumbered as you were not only with your own baggage but all the riddances of General Nott's force.

"I rejoice with all my heart at General Nott's success, but no man can deny that of the two operations that allotted to you was by far the most difficult, whether the composition of your troops or the ground to be got over is considered. His is a compact force of picked troops formed for active service, with only the baggage absolutely necessary; no sick, and having, besides cavalry, a powerful artillery and no passes to force. Yours the refuse of his force, no cavalry, few guns, the hospital of both corps and the baggage of both, with perhaps the greatest passes in the world to traverse, and the enemy the same in both cases! Lastly, assuredly not least, the one force animated by the pride of an advance, the other under the depressing influence of a retreat."

Subsequent information convinced Sir C. Napier, that the march was a mere procession and conducted without order, or skill, or danger, or difficulty.

"Lord Ellenborough, October 16th.—Although the Ameers have assembled their troops for a quarrel among themselves they seem a little inclined to use them against us if opportunity offers: at least so it would appear by the intelligence enclosed. I have often observed that barbarians become quickly reconciled when a common enemy appears, and as readily split when the danger passes away. The Ameers thought General England's force was coming with some evil design and became friends at once; they imagine now that we are going to give Shikarpoor to Prince Timour, son of Shah Soojah—and that he has come here for that very purpose.

"Sir Thomas McMahon, October 18th.—England seems to have conducted his retreat well—the terrible matchlocks that were to kill us ten miles off seem to have killed no one at ten yards! Nott and Pollock were lucky. Had five hundred of Napoleon's *Voltigeurs* been amongst the rocks they would have had sharp work. However, it has all ended delightfully in getting back these poor women: that

would repay us even had we lost five thousand men. Now then for raising the curtain which has hid the Cabool tragedy. Palmer, Shelton, come forth and tell the British army why you surrendered!

"Sir G. Arthur, October 18th.—The engineer at Kurrachee has found water in the Ghisree hills, close to Kurrachee. Good water, but whether constant he cannot say: so far however success has attended the attempt, and I hope the governor-general will allow me to negociate for Kurrachee, as all things are now favourable."—It had not been made over by treaty. "I have had hard labour in reading an immense number of documents, to gain sufficient knowledge of the position in which we stand to make out a report ordered by Lord Ellenborough. I maintain that we must hold Shikarpoor if we want to do business as merchants in Sukkur! If we abandon Shikarpoor the robber tribes will descend from the hills and occupy the great jungle between those towns; the commerce of Shikarpoor will then be ruined, for between the robbers of the Bolan pass and those of the jungle it must perish. Conducted chiefly by Hindoo Banians, will they remain between two bands of thieves? Impossible! Shikarpoor connects us with all the countries north and west, and is the seat of all their money dealings; thus it becomes a place where we can always learn what goes on in Central Asia, and from whence trade will pour into Sukkur and Bukkur.

"In a military view it is important.

"Suppose the jungle full of bands. If you attack them with infantry they retire, snipping off probably an officer and two or three men. Twenty-five miles through this jungle clears it, you bivouac and return and they follow you like your shadow; but with cavalry at Shikarpoor the robbers would be caught as in a trap. The whole district is now barren, but the soil is said to be the most fruitful in India, and if we occupy the district it will yield an immense revenue. I hope therefore to persuade Lord Ellenborough to

let me negociate for the purchase. A negociation was commenced by Lord Auckland, it is still open, and relinquishing seven or eight lacs due by those Ameers who own the district would do the job, with this accompaniment—*Pay up your debts or give us this district!*

"I am delighted that the poor women who were prisoners are at last safe! their unhappy fate sat like an incubus on my mind. The Cabool garrison left that place the 8th instant covered with glory: we don't hide our victories under a bushel; but among the nations of the East a little vaunting has a good effect. What will now be said for surrendering to a nation having so little courage that even when posted in tremendous defiles they dared not look our troops in the face:—fighting there has been none.

"Mr. Maddocks, 26th October.—I am sorry to send you so many papers, and to Lord Ellenborough so long a report; but I came here so ignorant of Scindian affairs as to have to learn while describing, and therefore have not done so in as condensed a form as I could now, though still not without a delay which passing events will not allow. Secret information, sent to Major Clibborne—head of the military intelligence—since I sealed the pacquet to Lord Ellenborough, shews that Meer Nusseer Khan has made up his mind to fight with us! he will probably unmake it again. I shall do all in my power to make him think more wisely, by being more rigid with him. If one gives way the least to these half-civilized people they think it is from fear. Poor people I should be sorry were blood to be shed from such egregious folly.

"Lord Ellenborough, October 27th.—I had just prepared a letter proposing the total abolition of the political agency when I received your Lordship's letter on that subject, and I shall select those whom Major Outram deems the most efficient of the people employed, as those who are to compose the new establishment, which I hope will be a very small one. I shall continue anxious until I hear whether

your Lordship approves of the view I have taken of Scinde affairs. The Ameers are said to threaten resistance, which I do not believe — those vagabond spies always have a story: *se faire valoir* is their motto! Meanwhile most heartily do I concur with you that 'king-making and chief-creating,' is no longer a system for so powerful a government to pursue. On first coming to India I observed how deeply the old Indians are imbued with love of this petty policy, so totally beneath the spirit required to rule this enormous empire."

A justly-grounded hatred of the British and the tottering appearance of their power was now pushing the Ameers to war, and as the troops were very much scattered and very sickly Sir C. Napier's position was hourly becoming more critical. Lord Ellenborough had proclaimed his resolution to maintain the rights acquired by treaty inviolate, and had given especial orders in that sense to the general, who was therefore bound to unravel all the Ameers' intrigues and disputes. In this view he had of necessity recourse to the political chief, Outram and his staff for information, and quickly discovered that they had been pompous and inefficient, playing fast and loose with the Ameer; at one time careless and conceding, at another bullying, at no time wise or vigorous. Costly also and ostentatious, affecting particular friendships and enmities according as the princes flattered or offended them. Nevertheless all their information, public and secret, all indications of design by word or deed, combined to show that the Ameers had systematically violated their treaty and were preparing for war. They were disturbed and alarmed by the general's prompt rebuke, being nervous and timid from intemperance and debauchery; yet their secret preparations for war went on unceasingly and finally caused their downfall. Their conqueror has been accused of driving them to hostilities and seeking bloodshed: with what injustice will now be seen.

"Journal, October 7th.—I have been dictating to the

Ameers. Four profess obedience: two others do not, but they made the treaty and shall keep to its provisions. They are tyrants, and so are we, but the poor will have fairer play under our sceptre than under theirs. The treaty expressly says, No tolls shall be levied on any boats navigating the Indus. They still levy tolls, which shall not be, or they will sing *toll de roll toll* and I shall sing small! which, with 15,000 British soldiers at my beck I am not disposed to do. What do they answer to my remonstrances? We only levy tolls on our own subjects. But good sirs the treaty says no boats shall pay toll. Yes general, but it also says, The Ameers shall be despotic rulers in their own territory and the English shall not listen to any complaints made against them by their subjects. Verily your highnesses speak truth and I will not listen to a word your subjects may say against you; but the treaty says no tolls shall be levied. It is not your subjects therefore but we who complain, and having once done so, beware! if you do it again the consequences may be my levying a toll on Hydrabad.

"Now good princes, will you have me believe you so silly as to wish to levy toll on your own subjects' boats and trade, while all others, even those of your enemies the Sikhs, pass free? Pooh! pooh! Your toll-levying is to enforce gradually your ancient scheme of destroying all commerce on the Indus; or you think our armies in Affghanistan will be cut off, and then your toll question will be good for a quarrel: that cock won't fight. First place, our armies will be successful in Affghanistan though you expect otherwise; next we have troops enough here to throw you all into the Indus. When you levied tolls on all you ruined your own subjects and every one else; there was no commerce, and your openly-avowed argument was that your subjects *were too rich*:—that the more they were taxed the more obedient they would be.

"Another question. Suppose you had a right to ruin

your own subjects, what right to ruin those of the Sikh princes?—The river is ours from Mittenkote to the sea and no Sikh boat shall pass free. Is this a doctrine to be endured? You might as well say you will dam up the Indus and drown the Punjaubees, the river being yours where you stop its flow! No. The treaty which opened that river for commerce was right, and we have reason in holding to it: it is also more useful to you and your people than to us. Our view is supported by common sense and humanity, and, what is worth more in your eyes, by 15,000 soldiers and twenty pieces of cannon." It is curious that he afterwards found the Ameers had stopped the flow of the river to destroy the country of Cutch!

"These poor foolish Ameers think, that with all those soldiers in possession of the Indus they can lay out its banks in forests for wild beasts; and with four armed steamers plying on the waters can destroy villages and all cultivation, refuse wood for those steamers, and by tolls destroy commerce and the welfare of their wretched people, who are frequently seen to pick the grains from the dung of the officers' horses to eat! *Mene! mene! tekel, upharsin!* How is all this to end? We have no right to seize Scinde, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it will be. But it seems possible so to frighten these Ameers that they would abdicate in our favour if we left them their hunting grounds and revenues, and we might do both. They have usurped their power within sixty years by the sword, but they cannot keep it by the sword, so let it go as it came.

"October 9th.—Official accounts come of Nott's victory on the 8th of September, and of his destruction of Ghuznee. Why did he destroy it? I do not like this: he seems a harsh man. Pollock's victory of the 3rd also. He has not destroyed Cabool, but hung out the British colours on the Ballar Hissar. And now Lord Ellenborough, if he gets back the prisoners, ought to put the Dhost on

the throne, or liberate him and let them alone, withdrawing our troops. Talking of troops and fighting, one smiles at the battles as the skirmishes have been called. Pollock loses some sixty or seventy men, Nott some forty! We used to lose as many for each company in Spain. They blow out a *scrimmage* wonderfully in India, but General Pollock seems to be up to his work.

"October 11th.—All the Ameers, except Nusseer Khan and Mahomed Khan, have accepted my interpretation of the treaty. I could have let them run on until they irrevocably committed themselves, but that would have been unfair. My horses have arrived: Jack Sheppard wicked as ever, he will fight every horse within reach of his heels: yet no riding for me, my legs are wasted and weak. Devil take the rocket.

"October 12th.—An intercepted letter from Nusseer Khan to the Belooch mountain tribes tells them, Now is their time to aid him to expel us from Scinde. This breaks treaty in two ways. The 8th article forbids the Ameers to negociate for any purpose without our participation: Nusseer now calls on tribes with whom we are at peace to rise, and treat us as that chief did who destroyed poor Clarke at Noofusk."

Lieutenant Clarke, in charge of a convoy, was cut off in the Cutchee hills and died, fighting terribly: his strength was equal to his spirit, both heroic.

"I have proposed to Lord Ellenborough to take advantage of the breaches of treaty, and placing a subsidiary force in Nusseer's court force him to treat his subjects with humanity—seizing Kurrachee as a punishment: that, or to take nothing but control his government. There are people who will here stickle for *vested interests*, and say with Nusseer, and the donkey driver, Things are come to a pretty pass when a man cannot wallop his own jackass. But here the donkey has vested interests also, not compatible with *walloping*. And Nusseer, besides walloping

his subjects, has called on the mountain tribes to wallop us: they are about 150,000 fighting men, and he, if they answer, could have some thirty thousand. One month ago they would have ruined General England, and may annoy him still. I thought his getting through those passes was owing to his own skill; but Major Outram tells me that *he* had before quieted all the clans except the Kakurs, and had enlisted the Brahoes, who are the most powerful, in our service: in short that the merit was his, not England's." This was not true, but it was habitual with Major Outram to assume the merit of other men's actions.

"Probably my next orders will be to march on Hydrabad; if so my point of attack will be the N.E. angle, which is very weak. But my hope and trust is not to be compelled to bombard the town, or to assault. If Nusseer is mad enough to resist, my design is to let all the women and children go out to a fort about half a mile from the town; it is a religious place, but a fort nevertheless. Nusseer will then feel so lonely, and we shall look so ugly, that methinks he will strike his colours like a wise man."—A cross note written after Hydrabad fell, touching this supposed weak point, runs thus. *So Outram told me, but that and all he said to me proved false and foolish.*

"October 13th.—Again on horseback. Saw Prince Timour. He is heir to the Cabool throne yet prefers a pension under British protection! My feelings for this poor wretch are those of contempt; he takes an ignoble pension in a land which belonged to his ancestors. The Dourance throne is his of right, is vacant, his younger brother is fighting for it aided by a strong party, and is in possession of the Ballar Hissar, and this fellow sneaks away snivelling to Loodiana! His two sons called on me: they are nice lads, very handsome and resolute-looking. The eldest, about fifteen, had been out fighting at Candahar, and I suspect will have a touch at his uncle's weazand when older: that is, if the said uncle, Futteh Jung, preserves his weazand so

long, for it seems pretty certain Acbar Khan will save the youngster the trouble whenever Pollock leaves Cabool. If these boys become full fledged they will give Acbar trouble, unless their base father ruins them at Loodiana. Poor boys! Born to empire, or at least to fight for it, which is as grand and glorious, yet now condemned by their vile parent to the purlieus of the Zenana!

"15th.—The son of the Ameer Ali Moorad came to see me, bringing from his father a quantity of money as a present. It is lucky that my temper is not avaricious, or it would be hard to be so tempted every two or three days by these bags of gold. The lad is a little fat fellow, as broad as he is long:—*the fat boy:* but such a face and head! Napoleon's! a black Napoleon! He is full of intelligence, and will give us English trouble or help. His father is superior to the other Ameers in character, and is now at war with his nephew, Nusseer Khan—of Kyrpoor not Hydrabad. They fought lately, Ali was victorious, and I have offered mediation. If not accepted my task will likely be to put both down, for having two armies close to my cantonment is dangerous: both hate us, both are trying to raise the hillmen against us, and both might strike a peace to attack me. Meanwhile they compel me to harass my men with strong guards.

"Ali Moorad sends this boy with fine speeches and gold to win me to his side, and people say he is himself a fine fellow; at least Outram says so. His fine boy is not only the *fat boy* but the *artful dodger:* when about twelve years old, he is now fourteen, being on a visit to Mr. Knyvet, a political, the latter took out a handsome watch which little Fatty resolved to have; he asked to look at it, shut his hand and held it fast the whole visit, his elder brother repeatedly whispered to give it back, but no answer, save a determined shake of the head. When they went away the youngster moved off clenching his fist on the prize, silent, and with a straightforward look as if he heard nothing. This looks

as if Fatty would have his own share of the commerce on the Indus.

"October 16th.—My mind is made up that we ought to enforce the treaty and set commerce free on the Indus. I am not an admirer of commerce, God knows, when it is to be favoured and all rascality practised towards the poor to forward its progress; and my belief is that Lord Auckland made the Affghan war for the *interests of commerce:* that is, to make rich merchants of England richer and the poor of England poorer. But here our interest and that of the Scindian people are on this point one. Wherefore I avow wanting only a just pretext for forcing the Ameers to do right for their people, and for themselves. What do they struggle for now? To levy tolls on their own boats when those of other nations go free! Oh! the goose and her golden eggs! The Ameers won't fight, my force is too strong, and this is the moment to do the job; because being strong it could be done without bloodshed, could be done with my pen! Major Outram is of my opinion and I like him much, for that reason probably, for I confess not to like those who differ in opinion with me. I may love and respect them but do not like them as companions: it is very tiresome to have everything one asserts argued, my temper won't bear it.

"October 17th.—Secret information that Nusseer Khan of Kyrpoor and Ali Moorad are reconciled, because the Ameers of Hydrabad told them, that when the English were assembling troops to take their territory it was no time to quarrel. They will certainly unite their forces, and one of them went towards Hydrabad this day. If they play any tricks they will get thrashed. England's 1st column joined me the 12th; his 2nd is at Shikarpoor; his 3rd has passed Dadur; but I shall have to send 2000 men under Wallace to Ferozepoor the first week in November, unless the Ameers are restive beforehand: my trust is that they are too much afraid. If they begin I shall be down the Indus upon them

with 5000 men before they can look about. But my mind is bent upon stopping war, and if left alone I will do so. Barbaric chiefs must be bullied or they think you are afraid; they do not understand benevolence or magnanimity. Porus did, says the scholar. True book worm! but he was confoundedly thrashed first! In such cases they are reasonable, knowing your mercy cannot be fear. I do not want to draw trigger against the Ameers, and we need not; but if we shew a wish to avoid doing so they will be at us and must be thrashed into sense. My popularity would be small if the soldiers knew my strong resolution to prevent prize money! What a wretch is man!

"October 18th.—A letter from Lord Ellenborough, very kind and flattering to me but very unjust to Major Outram. Lord E. seems an unjust man. Every one speaks highly of Outram, yet Lord E. makes war on him, and why? because he defended Lieutenant Hamersly. When General England got beaten at Hykulzie he tried to cover it by saying there were fortifications which had been worked at for two months: now the political agent, Hamersly, ought to have known it, if so. His not knowing it was no excuse for England, because he might have used his own eyes; there is a military operation called reconnoitring: but Lord Ellenborough, who is not a soldier, very naturally thought the political agent to blame and fell upon him without enquiry; he denied that there was any fortification except in General England's despatch; and I believe, when that general, a month after, defeated the same enemy with the same troops at the same place, every one was satisfied that no works had been there. The political was right, but Lord E. treated him so ill that the young man, who was sick got worse, and his doctors say he was killed by the bad treatment received: certainly when delirious he raved of the matter. Outram defended his memory, for which, *he says*, he has been the object of mean spite; so he believes, and so all he has told me goes to prove. I cannot take up the

cudgels for him, he is able to defend himself; neither does he wish it; he is much too confident in his own rectitude to want assistance, but what I *think* of him shall go to Lord Ellenborough when called to give an opinion."

The whole of Major Outram's assertions regarding himself in this matter were untrue, and Sir C. Napier's animadversions on Lord Ellenborough unfounded; but under the impression that they were just, he not only gave his opinion but obtained from Lord Ellenborough the appointment of commissioner under himself for Major Outram. It was reluctantly granted and entirely out of delicacy towards the general, who had soon ample cause to regret his successful generosity. Lord Ellenborough would not have left the chief political authority with Major Outram even had he thought well of him. To do so was inconsistent with his policy, which was not to divide power, and not to place generals under politicals: he however did not dismiss him because of Lieut. Hamersly, but for having in his public capacity made *statements to the Khan of Khelat which were inconsistent with truth.*

"Journal, October 20th.—Letters from Lord Ellenborough. Peace with China. A private letter says peace came in time, had the Chinese resisted a month longer all the army would have been in hospital. Lord E. orders a double royal salute; he makes the most of every success and is right: half the world it is said don't know what the other half suffers, and I add, that two-thirds of the world believe any nonsense the other third tells them! His lordship approves of my letter to the Ameers; and by the same post the agent at Hydrabad writes, that the said Ameers have cried *peccavi.* It is well for them, my orders being to apply force at my discretion. I am also ordered to make a fresh treaty: this is what I wanted, and my hope is Lord E. will agree to my demands on these chaps. If he does I will make a rich and happy people yet: that is, perfect freedom of commerce shall be secured on the Indus and our

Mammon-hunting merchants and manufacturers will do the rest! This poor Scindian people will then be better off; and in time Sukkur and Kurrachee will be large towns instead of miserable mud villages with a population of robbers, all filth and poverty and misery.

"October 21st.—In a rage. The poor wounded soldiers from Hykulzie, coming with England's second column, were thrown down like dogs; neither the staff officer nor their own officers took any care about them. Those gentlemen have had a bit of my mind, and not all yet. I have made those poor fellows as comfortable as their severe wounds will permit.

"22nd.—The negligence of officers about their men is intolerable, and two Queen's and one Company's officer have had my sentiments, and another shall: the set are bad, and badly will I treat them. There are however some magnificent young chaps, fit for anything.

"October 23rd.—Made acquaintance with young Chamberlayne of the irregular horse, one of the finest young men to be seen; with work to do it would be easy to pick out a gallant set of youngsters. This lad's brother is the Lieut. Chamberlayne who was with Black Charles at Acre; another brother, in the irregular horse, is coming down the pass. He is the man who dashed singly among the Affghans near Candahar, cut three down and came clear off though his sword was broken. He has lost the use of one hand from an Affghan cut, but he smote a fellow's arm so clean off that after the fight it was found with the sword still grasped! Of this fact there is no doubt. Young Chamberlayne saw the arm picked up, holding the sword, and all his men here saw it also; so did another officer, and they could hardly fabricate such a story. Chamberlayne himself says, he supposes he did as he cut a man with all his force across the arm, but four being upon him at the time he can only say he cut in all directions.

"A letter from General England says the thieves are still

close to his rear-guard: I met his second column in march, and saw how contemptible the thieves must be. With a single troop of Hussars opposed to this second column I would have destroyed or taken the whole convoy; a string of camels for miles and miles, with guards dotted here and there like moving milestones! Had England been regularly attacked nothing could have saved him: he is not an officer and can never get over Hykulzie. It is said Pollock and Nott are like cat and dog. Nott has taken Ghusnee; the fools met him outside! he had a picked force, with two fine European regiments and twenty-four well-appointed pieces of cannon; they had 12,000 men, he had 8000, and also 2000 cavalry. Beat them! yes, he could not help doing so! The Affghans are certainly cowardly, the Cabool tragedy must have been Elphinstone's own doing. McNaughten indeed! Why did he not put him in the quarter guard with a sentry over him!

"October 24th to 30th.—If I have not been worked no matter. Lord Ellenborough first sent for my views on our position in Scinde. Why! I had hardly been in Scinde! However by labour my letter of the 17th, finished on the 27th, went, and rest was really required after reading quires of written papers. Holy Paul! what hammering at things called letters! Hieroglyphics that would puzzle the priests of Isis and Osiris! Well, my letter had just gone when down comes Lord Ellenborough's order to abolish, at one slap, the whole of the political agency! one hundred and fifty people in this house alone turned off without warning or thanks! And Outram, who has worked like a horse and to whom in my belief the safety of England's corps is due, at the head of them! While Clerk"—now Sir George Clerk —"in the north, who has done no more than Outram, is made envoy at Lahore with enormous pay and the title of excellency. This is very hard on Major Outram, and makes me feel disgust when so able a man is so treated, to say nothing of all the others. Well, it is no fault of mine, but

one has no confidence in a man who acts thus: in the principle he is right, a political office is not wanted, but he might at least have thanked them for their services."

That Lord Ellenborough was right about Major Outram has been already said; and Charles Napier's opinion, when he had ascertained facts at a later period, was most emphatically expressed in the following sentence written across the above passages.—*How Outram humbugged me! But how could I believe that all he was telling me was false! utterly false!*

With the breaking up of the Lord Auckland's political band in Scinde this portion of Sir Charles Napier's life must terminate. He had now mastered his military and political position; had well judged the character of the Ameers, had fathomed their designs, and cleared the interpretation of the Auckland treaty of alliance. He had yet to expose and charge them with past violations of that treaty and with hostile schemes to subvert the British power, acting in this under the direct orders of the governor-general, which could not be disobeyed though pregnant with terrible consequences, as shall be shewn in the next Period.

THIRTEENTH EPOCH.

THIRD PERIOD.

LORD Ellenborough's instructions to Sir C. Napier, run thus.

"Should any Ameer, or chief with whom we have a treaty of alliance and friendship, have evinced hostile designs against us during the late events, which may have induced them to doubt the continuance of our power, it is the present intention of the governor-general to inflict upon the treachery of such ally and friend, so signal a punishment as shall effectually deter others from similar conduct; but the governor-general would not proceed in this course without the most complete and convincing evidence of guilt in the person accused. The governor-general relies entirely on your sense of justice, and is convinced that whatever reports you may make upon the subject, after full investigation, will be such as he may safely act upon."

Proofs of delinquency were thus thrown entirely upon the general, and after diligent investigation he transmitted a "*Return of Complaints*" against the Ameers, who were charged with the following acts of bad faith and hostility.

Roostum Khan, Rais of Kyrpore, had, contrary to treaty, held secret intercourse with foreign states; notably by letter with the Maharajah of Lahore. He had designs hostile to the British, and had maltreated British servants. He had obstructed commerce and navigation on the Indus; imprisoned British subjects, and through the agency of his vizier, Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, had aided Mohamed Shurreef, a public enemy, to escape. Against Nusseer Khan, Rais

of Hyderabad, was charged 1°. The assembling of troops to assail Mohamed of Meerpoor on a boundary dispute, which had been referred to British arbitration. 2°. Perfidy towards the political agent, and repeated wilful violation of the eleventh article of the treaty. 3°. Delaying the transfer of Shikarpoor to the British when he heard of their Affghan disasters. 4°. Secretly coining base money to defraud the British in paying tribute; exacting illegal tolls; obstructing navigation and commerce, and opposing a free supply for the bazaar at Kurrachee. 5°. Preventing his subjects from trading in the British cantonments. 6°. Neglect of tribute, and by letter exciting Beebruck, chief of the Booghtees, to attack the British troops, who he said were retreating worsted from Affghanistan. These offences had continued from early in 1841 to September 1842, and at the moment of Sir C. Napier's arrival at Sukkur, Nusseer and Roostum had contracted a secret alliance, offensive and defensive, against the English: they strove also to draw Ali Moorad to their side, collected troops and issued instructions to their feudatory chiefs to be ready for the field.

With this "*Return of Complaints*" went a report, the first of a series of state papers from Charles Napier, thus characterized by the late Sir Robert Peel. "Not I only, but all those of the government who have read his letters and despatches from Scinde are immensely struck by their masterly clearness of mind and vigour of expression; and feel with me that he is as great with his pen as he has long since proved himself with his sword. I have no hesitation in placing them in comparison with the Gurwood despatches, or with the best things of the kind which have ever been written."

"Report, October 17th.—It is not for me to note how we came to occupy Scinde, but to consider the subject as it stands. We are here by right of treaties entered into by the Ameers, and therefore stand on the same footing as themselves; for rights held under treaty are as sacred as the

right which sanctions that treaty. There does not appear any public protest registered against the treaties by the Ameers, they are therefore to be considered as free expressions of the will of the contracting parties.

"The English occupy Shikarpoor, Bukkur and Kurrachee, by treaties which, if rigidly adhered to by the Ameers, would render those princes more rich and powerful and their subjects more happy than they now are. If sticklers for abstract right maintain, as no doubt they will, that to prevent a man from doing mischief is to enslave him, it may be called hard to enforce a rigid observance of these treaties. But their evident object is to favour our Indian interests, by abolishing barbarism and ameliorating the condition of society; by obliging the Ameers to do, in compliance with those treaties, that which honourable civilized rulers would do of their own accord. It is necessary to keep this in view, because, though the desire to do good would not sanction breach of treaty it does sanction the exacting a rigid adherence to treaty from the Ameers; the more so that their infractions evince their barbarism, their total want of feeling for their subjects, and their own unfitness to govern: these things must be kept in mind or what I am about to say will appear unjust, which is not the case.

"By treaty the time for which we may occupy our present camps is unlimited; but there is such hostility to us on the part of the Ameers, such a hatred of the treaties and such resolution to break them in every way; there is alsoamong their people, Scindees and Hindoos, not Beloochees, such a growing attachment to British rule that the question arises, whether we shall abandon the interests of humanity and of the British government, which in this case are one, and at once quit Scinde, or take advantage of existing treaties to maintain our camps permanently? But if we evacuate the country future events will inevitably bring us back to the Indus. If we remain our camps will quickly grow into towns, and the people within them will carry on a transit

trade along the Indus, to the exclusion of the Ameers' people without. Among the latter misery and poverty will then sojourn, for the exactions of the Ameers will in a great measure destroy both commerce and agriculture among their people.

"This produces another question. Can such things long continue? A government hated by its subjects, despotic, hostile alike to the interests of England and of its own people; a government of low intrigue, and so constituted that it must fall to pieces in a few years by the vices of its construction—will not such a government maintain an incessant petty hostility against us? Will it not incessantly commit breaches of treaties, those treaties by which alone we have a right to remain and must therefore rigidly uphold? I conceive such political relation cannot last, the more powerful government will, at no distant period, swallow up the weaker: would it not then be better to come to that result at once? I think it would be better, *if it can be done with honesty.* Let me then consider how we might go to work on a matter so critical, and whether the facts to which I have called your attention will bear me out in what I propose.

"Several Ameers have broken treaty in the various instances stated in the accompanying *Return of Complaints.* I have maintained that we want only a fair pretext to coerce the Ameers, and I think the various acts recorded give abundant reason to take Kurrachee, Sukkur, Bukkur, Shikarpoor and Subzulcote for our own; and for obliging the Ameers to leave a track-way along both banks of the Indus, stipulating for a supply of wood: at the same time remitting all tribute and arrears of tribute in favour of those Ameers whose conduct has been correct. Finally to enter into a fresh treaty with one of those princes as chief"—each Ameer pretended to separate independence and treaties. "I cannot think such a procedure would be dishonourable or harsh: I am sure it would be humane. The refractory Ameers

break the treaty to gratify their avarice and we punish that breach. I perceive no injustice.

"If it be determined to keep Sukkur and Bukkur I think it would not be politic to give up Shikarpoor."—Here follow the military reasons given in a former letter for keeping Shikarpoor. "In a commercial view Shikarpoor is of great importance, it offers a depôt for goods from the northern and western countries with which it has long had channels of intelligence. Adverse circumstances may for a while interrupt this, but under a protecting government they would soon be re-opened. Shikarpoor goods would then be sent to Sukkur, there to be shipped on the Indus, and would also pass by land through Larkaana to Kurrachee. These have formerly been the lines of trade, they are naturally and geographically so and will therefore quickly revive. But if Shikarpoor be left to the mercy of the freebooters commerce cannot thrive; nor, without Shikarpoor be strongly guarded, can it pass through the jungle to Sukkur, towns naturally supporting each other in commerce.

"In a political view Shikarpoor has the advantage of being chiefly inhabited by a Hindoo population, tolerated for ages by the Mussulmans and consequently forming a pacific link between us and the nations north and west. Through Shikarpoor these Hindoos will gradually direct the commercial stream and be the means of social intercourse between the Mahomedans and ourselves, in time uniting those who will not suddenly amalgamate. Shikarpoor contains many rich banking houses, sure evidence of its being a central point of communication between surrounding countries, and consequently one where the British government could learn what was going on in Asia: the money market is generally the best barometer. The robber tribes have kept down this town, despite of its natural and acquired advantages; in fact the robber is everywhere the master, therefore all around is barbarous and barbarous must continue to be until civilization gradually abolishes those lawless people. Shikar-

poor is precisely one of those grand positions which ought to be seized in that view. I have therefore directed Major-General England not to evacuate that town till further instructions are received from the governor-general.

"I have drawn up this memoir entirely on my own consideration of the subject, but since Major Outram's arrival, which was just as the last paragraph was finished, he has given me every possible assistance. He concurs in all I have said, but has added to my knowledge, and in justice to the Ameers I must, with this increase of knowledge, enlarge on what has been stated. The Ameers say they did not understand Article xi. to prohibit the tolls on their own subjects. They urge in proof of this, that they resisted the treaty because of other articles less important, never objecting to xi. because they relied on Article v. This may be, and I would willingly, if possible, suppose they really did conceive the treaty gave them tolls on their own subjects: but they have attempted to levy on the boats of Bhawalpoor, which the treaty assuredly does not give a right to do; and they have fired into the boats of Bhawalpoor merchants. The treaty could not have been misconstrued on these points, and therefore I do not believe they misconstrued Article xi., but broke it purposely. The treaty has also been broken by treasonable correspondence and vexatious acts, as set forth in the Complaints.

"Now, what punishment do I propose for their misconduct? Injury to their families? No! Injury to their subjects? No! What then? The reduction of their territory by four places; two of which, Sukkur and Bukkur, are barren spots, yielding no revenue; the other two, Kurrachee and Shikarpoor, towns nearly ruined by their tyranny; and for one of which, Shikarpoor, we have negociations pending. To obtain these places in seignorage it is proposed to remit all tribute in arrears, and for the future withdraw our Resident from Hydrabad; the amelioration of the impoverished state of their subjects will thus in time add to the

power and wealth of the Ameers themselves by opening the commerce of the river. To their selfish feelings, their avarice and love of hunting, ought such great general interests to be sacrificed? I think not.

"The real interests of the Ameers demand that their puerile pursuits and blind, avaricious proceedings should be subjected to wholesome control, which their breaches of treaty and our power give us at this moment a lawful right to exercise, and the means of peaceably enforcing. If any civilized man were asked this question—Were you ruler of Scinde what would you do? his answer would be, Abolish tolls on the river, make Kurrachee a free port, protect Shikarpoor from robbers, make Sukkur a mart for trade on the Indus, make a trackway along the banks, get steamboats. Yet all this is what the Ameers dread. They have broken treaties, have given a pretext"—this word is used throughout in the sense of honest rigour—"and my full conviction is, perhaps erroneously, that what I propose is just and humane. I will go further and say, as Nusseer Khan has openly broken treaty, the governor-general may justly seize the district of Subzulcote and give it to the Khan of Bhawalpoor, as I have understood there was some intention of doing.

"The second point Major Outram has drawn my attention to is a very strong one. He tells me the tribes on the river, above that part possessed by the Ameers, do levy tolls, and that there is no treaty or public document forthcoming, in virtue of which we can call upon the Ameers, even of Upper Scinde, not to levy tolls on their own subjects. It is evident therefore, that to call upon the Ameers of Hydrabad not to levy tolls, and to allow the tribes above to do so would be unjust; that is to say it would be unjust to allow the others to levy tolls, but not unjust to prevent the Ameers. The answer to the argument that tolls are levied on the Northern Indus is this. We have with great trouble secured to your boats a free passage on the river through Scinde, we are

resolved to open commerce on that great highway of nations, and you who receive benefit thereby must join in this measure, leading to the good of all and the loss of none. Wherefore to excuse the Ameers upon the ground that others are not coerced is answered by coercing those others.

"Having thus given the best view I can take of this intricate subject I shall accompany it with various documents, among them one giving a kind of return, if it may so be called, of accusations against the Ameers, upon which I have read every paper and founded my opinion of their conduct. By referring to this return it will be seen whether I have justly estimated the complaints made against them by the political agent—documents verifying each transaction being appended. I have got meanwhile a memorandum of the state in which the negociation for the purchase of Shikarpoor remains: it has been in abeyance since last year. It appears, that, added to the advantages for Sukkur, attending the holding of Shikarpoor, the district would, with the aid of Kurrachee, cover the expense of guarding our newly-acquired towns on the Indus. Should it be deemed proper to make the proposed arrangements, so as to punish the Ameers who have broken treaty, the details can be easily made."

With this memoir went tables shewing that the tribute to be remitted overbalanced the value of the towns taken by 30,000 rupees yearly: this was given for the right of cutting wood for the steamers, the fuel to be paid for besides.

This memoir was found so forcible, that Lord Ellenborough, who had originally framed a new treaty for the Ameers on a very extended state view of the general interests of India, now sent Sir C. Napier another treaty, designed to punish the Ameers for their transgressions as charged in the "*Return of Complaints.*" But he required the most signal proof of Nusseer Khan's having invited Beebruck Bhoogtee to arm against the British; and also of Roostum Khan's letter to the Maharajah.

"Journal, November.—Ordered to frame a new treaty, and

the whole power, patronage, and reformation of the political agency is thrown into my hands, i.e. to fabricate my tools just as a job of no easy execution is to be done! Thin enough I am at present, but thinner must be with all this work. The Ameers are sure to be obstreperous on this new treaty, therefore I took out three thousand men as a hint, and trotted them over the hills to make a shew. Some Beloochee chiefs were there, and, according to my intent, will give the Ameers an exaggerated account of our force. Two thousand are to march northwards soon, but all General England's column will then have arrived, and a strong cavalry regiment is coming from Bhawalpoor: I can therefore guard all my points and meet the Ameers with 2000 men. This will do, as they cannot oppose me with more than 40,000, ill paid and ill trained, and it may be said without artillery. The odds are indeed considerable, and it will not do to be too confident, but rapid movements and boldness will do the work."—He did not then know the Beloochees, or their terrible power in fight.

"Just as I am writing there comes from spies an exact copy of a compact between the courts of Hydrabad and Kyrpoor: it is written in their Korans and exchanged, which is their most solemn mode of alliance. They say they will fight! *J'en doute.* However it must be some time first, because I shall make no move till I hear from Lord Ellenborough in reply to this news. Nevertheless I will secretly enquire about boats to float a force, and then if they fight, the Devil will be among the tailors before they expect him!

"November 5th.—The Ameers in a fright. Conscious of wrong-doing they expect punishment, and the cavalry coming down the river, with the concentration of England's forces from the passes, naturally alarms them, yet they think themselves strong enough to fight. My spies tell me their quarrels are made up, and Ali Moorad, who fought Roostum and Nusseer a month ago, is now in good fellowship with Roostum. All their women are sent far into the desert,

which looks like fighting. Clibborn thinks they will fight. Outram thinks not. However I care little for opinions; my design is to negotiate peaceably yet prepare for fighting. *Some fine fighting,* as Sultan Baber calls it. Funny fellow!

"From intelligence of what passed in the first secret dhurbar, it appears that a fellow told them my soldiers were all in hospital with cholera and dysentery; it was then I had the review and run the columns over the hills, and now my gun-boats shall be exercised on the river. If I wanted to give the Ameers a thrashing my strength should be concealed until they were in a bag, and so far as they are personally concerned there would be no objection; but if we come to knocks we shall tumble over a lot of their poor dependents, and my ambition is not for a *butcher's bill.* The fear of creating such bloody work is always in my mind: my wish is to save them and I am likely to succeed, being so bent on it, but if we come to blows they cannot be saved. If once we draw out in battle array war must have its course, and a horrid course it is, though in these countries they think it all right and natural! Poor people! The Ameers' women have been sent out of the way of danger I hear, which gladdens me; but I must have the poor class of women and children out of mischief also. These the Ameers would slaughter by dozens rather than lose a day's hunting in their new forest; our old-new forest was not near so extensive as their hunting shikargahs, which are said to cover nearly one-fourth of the whole land!

"November 6th. The Ameers are cunning. They are enclosing the whole of the wooded banks of the river as hunting grounds, meaning thus to deprive us of wood for our steamers, for these shikargahs are by treaty to be respected. In this wheel I will put a spoke that shall stop its rolling. Our wood is nearly out, and when quite out this question shall be put—which do your highnesses prefer, my burning your brushwood or burning Hydrabad? one of the two must be

done! They may answer as they please, I will do as I say, for the matter is not one to be trifled with. We have no treaty, no provision giving the right to cut wood, yet we depend on it for everything: was ever such stupid work! The Ameers having hit this blot are going to shove me to the wall, but when safety is at stake might is right.

"7th.—On the 4th we gave a dinner to Major Outram, I was in the chair and doubtless shall be censured, because he is in bad odour with Lord Ellenborough; however if Lord E. is such a bad fellow as to take umbrage, let him: but I do not think so ill of him, he is a good fellow.

"November 8th.—We have just heard that General Pollock has blown up, not the fortified *Ballar Hissar* but the beautiful *Bazaar* built by Aurengzebe! As Lord Ellenborough makes no remarks upon this in publishing the dispatch my hope is that he condemns such Vandalism.

"November 18th.—On the 12th got a letter from Lord E. with the draft of another new treaty. He says—If you are satisfied that Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad wrote the treasonable letter to Beebruck Bhooghtee, then proceed to inflict the penalty by force—or to that effect. But when human blood is to be shed it is no light matter, and so with my friend Brown's good help I have with pains got full proof of Nusseer Khan's treason: this shall go to Lord Ellenborough, for I will take nothing on myself except in cases where time is important, and it is not so here. The Ameers have indeed collected in various places about 20,000 men, who will not however stay long from their homes without money, and their masters are avaricious, like the Greeks, Ali Pacha, and all other barbarians. I am glad to procrastinate for the saving of lives and shall seek to avoid a fight, though to thrash them will be easy and to my worldly advantage: but God preserve me from seeking that at the expense of blood. Lord E. must not lay unnecessary responsibility on me: he is the proper man to decide, when proof as to the treasonable letters are sent to him; and as there are now two other gross

breaches of treaty to be added, he has the right and the power to compel the Ameers to govern as they ought. No blame to them for wishing to drive us out of Scinde but we have a right to insist on our treaty; we desire not to dethrone them, but to strengthen their thrones by enforcing just government.

"Lord E.'s answer will be here about the 1st of December, the new treaty shall then be proposed, and if refused I march to take from Roostum Khan of Kyrpoor and Nusseer of Hydrabad, certain tracts for which tribute will be remitted to the value of the land. Will they submit? I will march on the capital if they don't. I will go by land though, I will not descend the river; there are not boats enough, they would be heavily laden and often get on shore, to be helped out of their troubles by a matchlock and gingal fire from the banks. No boating therefore for me, I will cross to Roree with 5000 men, march down the river road and reach Hydrabad compact, horse foot and artillery, taking Kyrpoor in my way and perhaps some of their castles, and then lay hold of Omercote in the desert which will give me a half-way house between Hydrabad and Deesa. They will try to treat, but I will take their country and make the Indus the frontier from Mittenkote. Lord E. may settle affairs his own way *north*, but if I fire a shot I will go the whole hog to the sea-shore. Ameers be prudent, or *Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin.*

"An officer here to-day from Deera Gazee Khan. He says the tyranny is horrid! Sawan Mull of Mooltan is a villain. His troops are numerous and well drilled and pillage for their master dreadfully, while on the west the hill tribes come down to rob the people of their grain: when the poor creatures could get a word with Lieutenant Layard it was, *Oh! sir when will the sahebs come to save us?* I have sent four officers to Mooltan to spy the nakedness of the land; that is to examine roads, for I hear Sawan Mull is fortifying Mooltan and is very inimical to

the British: it may be necessary to give him cause, which he has not yet had. To upset such a chap would be good. Outram provokes me, he pities those rascals, who are such atrocious tyrants that it is virtuous to roll them over like ninepins. All I want is not to be compelled to slay their poor slaves: however the soldiers of the Ameers are all Beloochees, i.e. robbers and murderers.

"M'Naughten's attempt to catch Acbar has done much mischief. Roostum Khan wanted to meet me on the 14th. I agreed but he did not come to the garden appointed, my head-quarters being on t'other side of the Indus. He proposed another day at a place six miles down the river, but not liking this cavalier way I said No! I will not be insulted. I am told he had assembled 6,000 troops in that garden, and set his son half way to watch what troops I took to the meeting: this was sheer fright, a report being spread that my design was to seize him. I have told him he did me great injustice, that I was no traitor and moreover could, if it pleased me, pull him out of Kyrpoor in the face of day. On this message he broke up his camp and returned to his castle! I should have looked foolish had I gone alone, or with a few officers into a body of Beloochees, and though the 6000 reported were most likely only 300 they were enough. There was probably little danger here, but all this comes of M'Naughten's conduct. My position is difficult. If I thrash these chaps and take their land abuse will follow; if I let them get the better in treating, it will be abandoning the only opportunity their poor subjects have of obtaining a little relief from grinding oppression. My mind is however made up: if they fire a shot Scinde shall be annexed to India.

"To get this large cantonment into order is difficult: the military have been all at sixes and sevens and it requires vigour to pull the jokers up, but it shall be done. It is a very fine force, fine officers, fine men; but they have had no *Commander*, the camp is full of *Suggestors*, who would

make a mob of the force in a week: all this is very disagreeable, but a wild set must be held tight where there are so many. This system of suggesting infects all Indians. A letter from Mr. Maddocks to-day, about Outram, says in substance, I thought you would have *suggested* to the governor-general that his mention of Outram in public orders was insufficient. Thus everybody suggests to superiors, all proposals come from below and command seems a word not understood! Lord Auckland was dictated to by his clerks: ergo Cabool. Lord Ellenborough I see is determined to teach them '*the differ.*' What! I, a major-general, to tell the governor-general he had not sufficiently praised an officer whom I had hardly seen, whose service had not been under me, and whose merits and demerits Lord Ellenborough knew, or had a right to know better than I. Was ever such a thing heard of! My friend Outram has been spoiled in this way."

Upon these passages the following cross note was written in after times with a full knowledge of the man and the facts. —"All this praise of Outram is delightful! How I was humbugged! So has many a better man been before me, and will be after me: this it is to take a man's opinion of himself. But others did the same, and led me astray. Poor Colonel Mc—— did not. At Poonah he took me aside and said—'*General you will in Scinde meet Major Outram, let me warn you against him: he has humbugged every one but myself and Lord Keane.*'

"November 19th.—The Ameers threaten, and it was proposed in their dhurbar to cut the throats of all their wives to shew me they were in earnest! A court where such a proposition could be discussed, or made, is unfit to be left loose: if they do such acts of barbarism they must be treated with the like. I am to meet Ali Moorad, the most warlike of the Talpoor race, at daylight on his side of the river. I suppose he will play no tricks.

"November 22nd.—Five letters from Lord E. all dated the

14th, with work enough for a month in each: one a very kind private note insisting on my passing the hot season at Kurrachee as *my health is so important to him and to the public service.* Glad he thinks so, and he gives me this proof of sincerity, that he is going to ask the duke to put me on the Bengal staff in place of Sir Robert Dick, whose time will end in a year, but in a much higher command than Dick's; that is of all the north-western frontier, which Lord Ellenborough now holds himself and considers the most important in India: it is so, and Scinde is the next. He seems to think I shall put all these provinces right in eight months, and so do I, but it may require a battle first. He thinks so too, and offers me more troops, but I have enough: the question must however be settled early in December or the heat will be upon us. Then, for seven months, no European or even native soldier can shew his nose on parade without being struck down by the sun, for the mercury ranges from 107° to 130° in the shade! In the war two officers and ten men tried to reach Shikarpoor, and on the first ten miles nine men and one officer lay dead! Going to Bengal, to Agra and Delhi, will be pleasant and I may yet be the person who takes Scinde and the Punjaub, and extends the bounds of India to the Indus: it will be curious if this happens."—It would have happened had Lord Hardinge understood war better, and not forced himself to patch up a hollow truce which gave England some disgrace and Cashmere to the monster Goolab Sing.

"November 23rd.—Ali Moorad to-day. I will take no guard nor shew any mistrust, he dare not attempt violence and my wish is to teach him that Meer Roostum did me injustice. It is right to try for the restoration of confidence in our honour, and not a soldier shall go with me:—three officers only. I apprehend no danger, but if anything happens my course will have been right for the honour of England, and no Cabool stain will rest on my memory.

"Ali Moorad received me with every honour, sending his

little fat-boy son to meet me. Taking him into my boat we crossed the river, landed under a salute of fifty-one guns, and then passed through two ranks, one of cavalry one of infantry, to his tent, where he met me. We embraced, sat down in full dhurbar, and as usual he offered me money, which I have not the least doubt everybody thinks I take. In a retired apartment of his tent we had a talk. He asked me to promise him the *puggree*. My answer was, Your highness is brother of Roostum Khan, who now wears the turban, while he lives you cannot hold the chieftaincy; but you are by law his heir to the *puggree*, and as the treaty binds us to support each Ameer in his rights you shall be supported in yours. He looked delighted and said to Brown, who interpreted, 'I am glad. If the general would not help me I am quite strong enough to take it by force, but I want my friends the English to be on my side. Now, there is another thing. My brother Roostum is intriguing to set up his son as wearer of the puggree during his own life: will the general permit that?' No. Your right shall be supported against him, but remember this; the governor-general supports you because it is your right and because you have been always faithful; if you alter your conduct he will not support you: he rewards friends, he punishes enemies, therefore my promise is only conditional. He replied, 'All that is just,' and we parted as allies.

"Who gets this puggree turban is to me moonshine, because they really have no fixed rule; hitherto it has gone through the brother, and then to the eldest son's son, who does not inherit till his uncles are all out of the way: then indeed the young chaps shout 'Glory be to God!' Now, well I know that if the turban comes to Ali Moorad, as it will if Roostum dies while my command exists, he will directly ask me to guarantee it to his son, which I will not do as Roostum's son will be heir. But my strong suspicion is that Roostum will force me to deprive himself of the turban, and of his kingdom too! In that case my little fat,

black Napoleon shall have the turban: he is a determined little devil.

"Though careless of who has the turban it has been useful to enter into this case, as three good things are thereby effected, all of which came into my head while we talked, for I had gone resolved to shirk answering any questions. 1°. It has detached Ali Moorad from the league against us, and he is the most powerful Ameer; therefore less chance of bloodshed. 2°. Making him chief will in due time force others to acknowledge his supremacy and sole right to negociate, which will reduce our complicated voluminous negociations to a trifle. 3°. The other Ameers will then sink into rich noblemen instead of independent sovereigns. Sukkur, Bukkur and Roree, which last I am ordered to seize, will then quickly rise to one great city to be called *Victoria on the Indus*. It will be well governed, and so free that the turbaned Ameer will be overlaid by the commercial city. Thus the Scindian banks of the Indus will fall peaceably into our hands, unless we are idiots; but against the machinations of idiots a policy of cast-iron could not stand!

"November 24th.—Shikarpoor. Rode here on a camel; the motion is not fatiguing to me. This city is 29 miles from Sukkur and the land is all flat, not an inch rise on either side as far as the eye reaches; the soil is rich and nearly all inundated yearly by the Indus, wherefore everything planted would spring up like magic, yet all is waste: the robber rules! With God's help, ere I am six months older he shall have a wipe as a beginning for a new era in Scinde. I am gathering up my reins, my feet are in the stirrups, my hand is on my sword, and if I do not put these chaps to rights with vigour and without rigour great is my mistake. It will be Lord Ellenborough's fault, not mine; but I think he will support any blow struck by me to free these poor people: they live in a larder and yet starve! The robber is master! The ride was 30 miles and it requires 30

more to reach the bordering desert, and everywhere it is a plain of manure, with plenty of wood though and wild boars, game of all kinds, abundance of excellent water, everything but justice, none of that, but murder robbery and all sorts of gaieties instead. The Ameers rob by taxes; the hill tribes by matchlocks; the cultivators can only earn their living close around their villages, where a shout collects them all in a minute for defence, within a square mud fort with towers at the corners.

"At Lukkee, where I breakfasted, they told me that last year a poor lady and gentleman, probably an officer and his wife, were robbed and their throats cut there. The fellows around me at the time were wild-looking devils and cast sheep's eyes on my silver strings; but my guards, thirty irregular Scinde horsemen, were all adepts in throat-slicing and looked it: never were seen more picturesque figures, with their wild locks of thin matted hair, match-locks on shoulder, sabres and shields slung on their back, and their loose yellow tunics and turbans of bright scarlet. These fellows would all have died round me sooner than let me be *looted*, as they call being robbed: yet, at the holding up a finger they would have sacked the village with delight. Their morals are not beautiful; their dress, their arms, their horses, their trappings are so beyond doubt; the Albanians alone rival them, yet these men seem to exceed even the Albanians, being all mounted. Almost every man I met this day bore sword and shield, for all are inclined to rob and all have life to lose if nothing else. If I can lay the first stone of a system that will give peace and humanity to the Indus my life will not be in vain, and I think I shall do so.

"November 25th.—Sukkur. Those Ameers have again broken treaty by taking toll from a merchant's boat; they shall be paid off sharp, they shall have a leaf out of Oliver Cromwell's book. The merchant and his crew shall go to the Ameer with an order for payment of all loss. If not

paid, I will go with 5,000 men and demand his bill and my costs. These rascals must now be hit hard for my last effort has been made to serve them. I forced from them a command to their agents on the river not to levy more tolls; they have levied once since and it was by me passed over contrary to Lord Ellenborough's orders, which were to enforce the matter rapidly. Now they have got together 20,000 or 30,000 men:—it is even said 60,000: they know my camp is sickly, that 500 men are down with fever, and they say they can *sweep away the Feringhees as the Affghans have done*. We shall see. Nusseer Khan you are a fat fool, and this is all of your *hatching;* but my belief is that Roostum has *done* the job, in which case Ali Moorad will turn out on my side for battle; yet my present thought is not to let him, being able for my own work and not liking Beloochee allies: they are however all Talpoors and I can therefore make Ali Moorad get the women safe out of the forts, and so have no shedding of female blood, no violence.

"November 26th.—It is Roostum's doing after all. The Bhawalpoor merchants have been several times levied upon, but were afraid to complain: at last an old resolute chap has done so, the poor people have been with me and given proof in the receipt of Roostum's river Kardar. My aide-de-camp is gone with a stiff letter, ordering the Ameer to pay certain rupees and send his Kardar to be dealt with after my pleasure. Two hours only are given for the answer, and meanwhile 4,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 20 guns are ready to cross the Indus: we shall see what their vaunting comes to!

"November 27th.—The Ameers have struck colours or wish to gain time, it is doubtful which. They paid the money at once, and promise to send the Kardar to me: this they will not do but say, either that he has run away or is the agent of Roostum's son who pretends to be in rebellion against his father. My hope is the last, for then we can

march against the rebel and seize his territory on the left bank of the Indus, which is just what I want; and what the poor peasants want, and what my orders are to do as a punishment for his father's treason, if proof were found of that treason: and proof is now in my hands, the son must forfeit his pretended right to the land, for it is well known his rebellion is a sham.

"Roostum suspects the proof of his treason with the Sikhs is in my hands and wants to save Subzulcote and Bhoong-Bara—which Lord Ellenborough has ordered me to take from him in punishment—by letting his son take them. He knows we want them for our ally the Nawab of Bhawalpoor, and that his own right is only one of force as the Ameers took it from the Nawab in 1838. The latter was marching to retake it, but our army stopped him and gave it to Roostum as a bribe for aid in the Affghan war. All this trickery methinks I see through, and hope to confound with my beautiful camel battery: dear solemn camels with their noses up in the air, looking so philosophical and dragging nine-pounders tied to their tails as if they were feathers.

"28th.—Ali Moorad wants to see our soldiers: he shall, and if he has an eye for business will be quiet after seeing them.

"29th.—Ali came. He and little fat Napoleon: they were delighted. I like Ali Moorad.

"November 30th.—My spies tell me that Roostum in secret dhurbar said. If the Feringhees will go away from Scinde they shall have any money they ask for, even though I am obliged to sell my women's jewels; but if they remain I will collect my troops and we will drive them out. From another quarter I hear all the Beloochee chiefs are to meet the 7th of December in arms; but this day also came Lord Ellenborough's orders to enforce the new treaty. He agrees to Outram being my commissioner, but forbids me waiting for his arrival. He little knows me if he supposes me to

have the least intention of waiting for Outram; I want him only to arrange details of exchanges of tribute for land, not for the work of opening the treaty. I have already had all the papers translated into Persian, and they go to-morrow by French and Stanley to Kyrpoor and Hydrabad: to-morrow also two thousand men pass the Indus, and two thousand others are ready to do the same with three batteries and a thousand horsemen. I am to take the territory, from Roree, inclusive, up the river about a hundred miles. I will not however further divide my force by sending any troops up the Indus, but will hold them altogether at Roree and Sukkur until the Ameers act. If they bow their necks the left bank shall be cautiously occupied as far as Subzulcote, and I will then call down the Nawab of Bhawalpoor, as the territory is eventually to be his.

"If the Ameers hope to attack me when divided they will fail, for my troops at Bhoong-Bara will rapidly descend the river to Sukkur, the Nawab will pour in from the north, and when they have inundated the district I will march on Hydrabad: thus the Indus will become ours from Mittenkote to the mouth at a blow. If the Ameers resist openly, or by stratagem, they will have the wrong sow by the ear: better do as they are bid. Meanwhile my orders are to deprive them of the right to coin money; a heavy blow, and we are altogether unjust abstractedly, having no original right to be here, but humanity will gain. Another fortnight will decide whether I am to rule Scinde or be out-generalled by the Ameers! All the rich people, and the poor also who are not robbers, await with anxiety the event, that they may express their joy and flock to Kurrachee and Sukkur: this speaks volumes. They will soon know.

"December 1st.—Preparing for movement and battle, and curious to ascertain, if it comes, whether I can command; for unless real work can be done drill and so forth are nothing. I know how to command a regiment or a brigade in battle; but here is an army with every one seemingly

ignorant of war, and their work will fall on my shoulders, besides what would be my own supposing the heads of departments knew theirs. They are all so willing however, and so anxious to do right, that if things go wrong my discontent with myself will be great.

"December 2nd.—Sent Stanley with the treaty to Hydrabad, but will keep that for Kyrpoor 'till to-morrow; for, if the Ameers of Kyrpoor get the start of me they will send such lies to Hydrabad as may make the friendly Ameers there commit themselves.

"4th.—This day the treaty went to Kyrpoor, and the Ameers received it with great apparent disgust. They deny the authenticity of their treasonable letters, but that is fudge! They say a confidential vakeel will to-morrow convince me how unjustly the governor-general treats them: I will not act before hearing their statement. This argues that they will not fight, which pleases me in one sense; yet their submission makes me sorry to punish them, at least the old man Roostum: poor old fellow, he is they say the dupe of Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, who is believed to be a villain, and looks it.

"5th.—Roostum has resigned the turban to his son, a violent man and against us: this may produce war, for Ali Moorad shall succeed. Now then what is my position? These people will try to spin out the cold weather in negociations, and then we cannot put our noses out of shade: this shall not be. Their remonstrance shall go to Lord Ellenborough, but meanwhile the districts of Subzulcote and Bhoong-Bara must be occupied, unless they state some very staggering arguments to hold my hand, which cannot I believe be done.

"I almost wish they proudly defied us and fought, for they are so weak, so humble, that punishing them goes against the grain; but these feelings must not affect deeds: we are acting substantially justly and for the good of the mass, while these Talpoors are like their own crocodiles.

"6th.—Nine hundred sick, but not many deaths. Anxious about Lieut. McMurdo, who has been sent with 30 horsemen on a mission.

"7th.—The Ameers send vakeels to gain time. I listen to them with the same object, for I want to get all my stores up from Shikarpoor and my 30 horsemen back from Hydrabad; if we get to cuffs they might be cut off, and I will not lose a single soldier that can be saved.

"8th.—Ameers and I playing each our game, it will go on until the 14th when operations shall commence.

"9th.—Getting the troops into good order, and shall in a few days have 12,000 men.

"10th.—Got sites for barracks, hospital, magazine and 'serai,' and will now begin building."—This serai, or commercial depot, was part of Lord Ellenborough's great plan for improving India and connecting the different kingdoms by the bonds of trade.

"12th.—Stanley has returned by land: he made sharp work, run some risk coming back and was once or twice insulted. There seems little doubt as to fighting now, but the Ameers shall not be pushed for some days; my 30 horsemen are not come in yet, two detachments 22nd Regt. are on the river, and my stores are still at Shikarpoor. The Ameers are said to have ten thousand Beloochees at Larkaana, on the right of the Indus; and if they were to assail the small garrison of Shikarpoor, though they would be easily repulsed I should have to abandon that place, because my orders are to do so. But to abandon a town after a shot is fired goes against my grain, as looking so like being kicked out that neither friends nor enemies will doubt the fact: wherefore, no movement until disembarrassed of that town and all are assembled peaceably at Sukkur without stain on our arms.

"Roree is now in my hands, and my Bombay troops shall be thrown across the road leading from Kyrpoor to Subzulcote, making points towards the first. Wallace shall

then occupy the new district in my rear while I protect his march by preventing the Ameers following him. When he occupies Subzulcote I shall have possession of all the new treaty requires: without a shot I hope. The Ameers cannot then turn me out, and if they assail Roree I shall beat them and pursue to Kyrpoor and Hydrabad, keeping close to the river to secure my supplies.

"December 14th.—Ameers cry 'peccavi.' Yet I should not say that, for they deny guilt: they are guilty, but know well we cannot prove it. How is it to be proved? In what court? We have their treasonable letters plotting an attack; take them to the dhurbar and they will deny them. How disprove the denial? Not by handwriting, for they never write themselves, save when paying some great honour.

"It is your highnesses' seal. No.

"It is exactly the same. Very likely it is well counterfeited. Why should your signet be forged? By enemies? No! we got the seal in a way that could not be by enemies. We know nothing of that, the seals are not ours; we have ever been true to the British.

"No! you have constantly been making petty war. Our servants may have done so.

"But you never punished them. We pardoned them, they were ignorant.

"We know this writing to be that of your highnesses' confidential clerk. He denies it, and a hundred people will swear it is not his: will you believe your moonshee against a hundred people?

"Such would be the result of a judicial enquiry. But the Ameers are guilty and the governor-general is resolved to punish them. We are indeed guilty of coming into their country; but do the people wish for us or for the Ameers? For us to a man, even the poorest people. The armed Beloochee robber of course does not, and we are robbers as well as he, but we rob in a legal way; and after all an

attorney's bill, tho' very bad, is not so bad as a cut-throat: our bill also touches the rich rather than the poor. This disquisition is not good for much: my orders are to take so much territory and my business is to do so with little violence, and if possible without bloodshed. Now in two days my position at Roree will cut the Ameers off from the districts to be taken, and if they do not attack me my work will be done without blood—God be thanked for that great mercy.

"December 15th.—The Scinde horse and grenadiers are over the Indus, want of boats stops the rest; the people from Shikarpoor not yet come, from want of carriage. My wish is not to fire a shot till all retrograde movements cease, for whoever fires and retires is beaten: so at least your enemy will say, and with reason. All Lord E.'s proclamations and decorations for Pollock's and Nott's affairs will not hinder the Affghans saying they destroyed one army and kicked two others out, and history will say the same. I will not fire a shot until all my troops are in, and the march from Shikarpoor now only appears as the wind-up of England's retreat, and a peaceful proceeding."

The foregoing outline of the intricate policy on hand must now be filled up from his public correspondence, tracing a few weeks back.

"Lord Ellenborough. November 5th.—Extracts. I have read with gratification your proclamation relative to the Dhost and his family. Coupled with the late victories the moral effect will be great all over India and calm down this troubled frontier: it will be felt in Europe also. My hope is to effect all we want in Scinde without force, but Nusseer Khan is a wrong-headed man. I only await hearing from your lordship to draw out a fresh treaty and submit it to the Ameers, sparing no pains to convince them that neither injury nor injustice is meditated.

"Sir Thos. MacMahon.—As to the Cabool bazaar, the memorials of Aurengzebe do not belong to Acbar, nor to

the barbarians amongst whom we find them :—they belong to history. Lord Ellenborough's proclamation is worthy of his elevated position, and I hope he will issue none approving of the destruction of Aurengzebe's bazaar.

" Lord Ellenborough. November 17th.—I have delayed, hoping to procure a seal of Nusseer Khan. The whole now depends, as I construe your decision, upon three things. 1°. Is the letter from Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad to Beebruck Bhoogtee authentic ? 2°. Is the letter from Roostum Khan of Kyrpoor to the Maharajah Shere Sing authentic ? 3°. Did Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, the confidential agent of Roostum, assist the escape of Mohamed Shurreef ?

" As to the first, I have endeavoured to obtain, as yet without success, an authenticated seal of Nusseer to compare with that of the intercepted letter, and to submit them both for your inspection and decision, because in so grave a matter I should feel it extremely presumptuous in me to act upon my own judgment, when in a few days your lordship's can be obtained. Major Outram, Major Clibborne, Lieut. Brown and my confidential moonshee, hitherto employed in the political agency, agree that the seal is that of Nusseer Khan ; but on measuring with compasses the details of this seal and those of the Ameers which are in the office, they do not exactly coincide in size and distance between the letters. They agree in all other respects I am told by those who can read Persian, and the discrepancy is accounted for thus : it is notorious, that the Ameers have two seals, one to be used for secrecy that if discovered they may deny it and adduce their ordinary seal in proof, pointing out the want of coincidence. I have been trying to get one of these secret seals through the same people who intercepted the letter, but they have been unable to obtain one. This is very strong presumptive proof that the letter is not a forgery of theirs, because the object of a first forgery would

be secured by a second, and the instrument would be in their hands.

"With regard to Roostum's letter to Shere Sing, there are doubts on Major Outram's mind as to his being privy to this letter; but of its having his seal and being written by his minister, Futteh Ghoree, there is no doubt. Is the doctrine to be admitted, that if a prince gives his signet and power blindly to his minister such folly is to excuse him from the consequences? Your lordship will hardly admit this. However, without the original document, which is in the possession of Mr. Clerk, I can form no opinion. That Futteh Ghoree did assist the escape of the Synd Shurreef no one acquainted with the case doubts. Now, if your lordship considers the above sufficient to act upon no time shall be lost in proposing the new treaty, and I am perfectly prepared to act in a way which I imagine will bring them to reason without bloodshed.

"Lord Ellenborough, November 18th.—Extract. I have procured not only a seal similar to that of Nusseer Khan, but on the cover of the letter it is attached to is writing known to be that of Chokram, the Ameer's confidential moonshee. Nothing has been lost by the delay in looking for this seal, because one cannot be too cautious in securing firm moral ground to base the defence of whatever events may arise. The Ameers also grow weaker, delay exhausts their treasury and they cheat their soldiers, who of course leave them. This also is the season of fevers along the banks of the Indus, and if the Ameer's pride should produce hostilities I should have a large hospital on my hands in a few days, losing probably many soldiers and camp followers. An hospital would, from the nature of this country be very troublesome:—it is so in any country. If obliged to move on Hydrabad I must do so by the road along the river, or that through the desert, and to supply comforts for the sick along the last would be difficult, perhaps impossible:

that along the river would quickly double the size of my hospital!

"I am bringing up the Queen's 22nd Regiment, for I have a sickly camp, which was inevitable after England's long march from Candahar; but all these things being considered, I should have regretted if the Ameers had called us out before: now they are welcome.

"Should the Ameers take the field, my mind is made up to cross the Indus and march on Hydrabad by land. For 1°. The water is so low that boats get along with difficulty, even when not heavily laden; 2°. If filled with troops, guns, ammunition, they would not only ground but stick for days. I do not think I could float above 1000 men with guns, &c., and half might stick in the mud within reach of matchlocks. 4°. Nothing would be gained here by rapidity though all went down stream without accident, for the enemy has no positions to fortify, no works he can strengthen, no stronger place to retire to. It is therefore the same to go in three or thirteen days, and by land we march compact to beat or be beaten altogether: slow and sure is an adage suited to my position. Moreover by land I take Kyrpoor at once, and can throw myself between the northern and southern Ameers.

"Sir G. Arthur, November 19th.—I received Lord Ellenborough's draft of a new treaty on the 12th, by which our occupation of Scinde is fixed. Sukkur, Bukkur, Roree, Kurrachee with Tattah, or such places as I determine upon as we proceed in the negotiation, are the points: I am not allowed to keep Shikarpoor, which I think a mistake; whether right or wrong will be seen.

"Lord Ellenborough, November 23rd.—This is a severe climate for our constitutions, and cannot be trifled with; but for one man ill from climate ten are so from bad barracks, and the imprudence to which those barracks drive young men. The Sepoy here is still worse lodged than the European; and I am sorry to say that too often is seen an indifference about those poor blacks. '*Oh! don't mind it, those*

natives put up with anything.' Yes, they do put up because they are unable to help themselves, but they suffer very severely. As to my requiring more troops for carrying your treaty into effect, no! we have enough. These barbarians are only dangerous when a commander is careless and gets his army into a scrape; then indeed they are active, daring, and very dangerous to an entangled force.

"Sir G. Arthur, November 27th.—I had a meeting with Ali Moorad. My orders are now to abandon Shikarpoor, where there is a superb cantonment, to build which and the residency cost no small sum. The residency is really not a sample of propriety; it cost 40,000 rupees, and is on a scale suited for a governor of Bombay rather than a *subaltern* employed as an agent: the political horse was then running away headlong, he has since been brought up, perhaps rather too roughly, but certainly not before time.

"Sir T. McMahon, November 29th.—On receiving orders to reform the political department I struck off the whole establishment of officers and private gentlemen. Then I took from the list of sufferers two aides-de-camp—Lieut. Brown and Mr. Richardson a civil uncovenanted servant, and with them a certain number of clerks, peons, and others, being therein guided entirely by a sense of justice; the salaries are very high and you may conceive I should have liked to bestow some on my own numerous relations, or rather connections and friends in the East Indian service. For example, I might have made my step-son, John Alcock one of my aides-de-camp instead of Mr. Richardson, he having just as much right. Or my grand nephew"—his first wife's grand nephew—"Mr. Curling, or either of his brothers: all being heavy on my hands. To any one of these £600 a year would have been a fortune, but I thought those who had served honestly through the war, and then been dismissed, had claims before any others and I gave nothing away save to them. You see then how difficult it would be for

me to employ Captain Morse"—proposed by Sir Thomas. "I arranged the whole thing the very day his lordship's commands arrived, for the press of business was very great. He has approved of my arrangement, by which with forty-two men I do what before employed 160 or 170, and this with a saving of 168,000 rupees annually to the public.

"Lord Ellenborough, November 30th.—My conviction is that every letter was really written by the Ameers and that nothing is wanted but an opportunity to attack us: that is by Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad and Roostum Khan of Kyrpoor. Every preparation is made to act on receipt of your lordship's letter. I have calculated upon the average of the thermometer being under 80° till April, when it will rise: the mean heat last March was 71°. The average maximum only 83°. Therefore we have weather for military operations till 1st April, and even April would not be very dangerous.

"December 1st. Being confident that the troops under my hand are equal to any emergency, I feel assured there is no occasion for the Bombay troops under General Nott"—offered by Lord Ellenborough—"nor any movement of the cavalry. The Scinde horse in this cantonment, and the 9th Light Cavalry, will give me about a thousand available for action, as I shall have no convoys; for though unable to use the river for troops it is everything for supplies, and the steamers will be on the flank, under our protection."

The next letter would seem to have been written in anticipation of such war ministers as the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Panmure.

"Sir G. Arthur, December 6th.—I have been obliged to give orders for clothing the drivers of Captain Hutt's battery, they cannot bear the cold, and the accompanying letter will shew you how they have been treated. The consequence was desertion when in Affghanistan, taking their horses with them: thus to save a pair of breeches government lost a man and his horse! A Sepoy gets clothing, lodging-money, medals, twelve rupees a month, and pension. These drivers

get no clothes, no lodging-money, no rewards, no pension, and have more work than any other men, their pay being only eight rupees. It is absurd that men serving together should be so differently cared for. Now, as the men's health is in danger, you will I am confident approve of my having taken on myself the responsibility of clothing them. There are 820 men sick in my camp, nearly all with agues: warm clothing is absolutely necessary!

"——It is said the Ameers have 60,000 men. I cannot believe they have so many in one mass; but tho' it be so this division would go headlong on them with their bayonets, for my men are young and mad for service. I have secret information that if the Ameers go to war they mean to harass us night and day till we call out *Oh God what have we done that thou shouldst let loose such devils upon us.* This passed in their dhurbar, and a very good plan too. They also propose to assemble a large force at *Sehwan*, ready to march on Sukkur the moment I march on Kyrpoor: this also is sensible, but pays a poor compliment to my forecast; they may perhaps find men at Sukkur and we may perhaps fight the devils as well as pray! I suspect the most fervent prayers in camp are that we may fight, and that I am the only one who prays that we may not.

"December 7th.—Lord E. A deputation come from the Kyrpoor Ameers, professing submission yet denying any but loyal conduct. I believe this is to gain time for hearing from Hydrabad: I will not therefore take immediate possession of Roree.

"December 8th.—The Ameer of Meerpoor seems to have escaped all notice in any treaty, but he pays half a lac annually. Lieutenant Brown says he has always been our bitter enemy; but we have not any charge substantiated against him and he has no possession on the banks of the Indus: he is independent as a ruler, but his rank is below that of the Ameers at Hydrabad. My opinion is to let his tribute go on, and in the course of adjusting the treaty some-

thing may occur which will enable you to remit his tribute in exchange for land. I am unable as yet to discover why he pays tribute at all.

"December 9th.—It will be advisable to place a magistrate at Roree with a small police, and I will take the liberty to recommend as magistrate, an officer named Rathborne, a lieutenant in the 17th Regiment, N.I. With him I have scarcely any acquaintance, but he appears to me a man of great ability; far beyond those one generally meets with. I understand that many years ago he was employed on some temporary civil affair of considerable difficulty, and performed it with great credit and ability; but not having any interest returned to his regimental duty: he has a mind of no ordinary power. Lieutenant Stanley presented the treaty to the Hydrabad Ameers on the 6th instant. Nusseer denied all disloyal conduct; Sobdar appeared delighted: Stanley thinks they will not resist. They have sent three vakeels: when they arrive, if the answer be satisfactory, I can move the Bengal troops toward Subzulcote. Ali Moorad has as I expected detached himself from the adverse parties. They have discharged no troops, wherefore I do not believe a single word they say: their hostility and cunning are on a par. When I reflect on those qualities, and that the men are regularly drunk with *bhang* every day after three o'clock, it is by no means impossible that they may order a night attack on our camp at Roree, denying afterwards that they had any knowledge of such proceeding: as a precaution therefore I have sent their highnesses the enclosed letter.

"'Ameers. Your submission to the orders of the governor-general and your friendship for our nation should be beyond doubt, because you have solemnly assured me of the same. We are friends! It is right therefore to inform you of strange rumours that reach me. Your subjects, it is said, propose to attack my camp in the night time. This would of course be without your knowledge, and would also be very foolish, because my soldiers would slay those who attacked

them; and when day dawned I would march to Kyrpoor, transplant the inhabitants to Sukkur, and destroy your capital city—with exception of your highnesses' palace, which I would leave standing alone as a mark of my respect for your highnesses, and of my conviction that you have no authority over your subjects. I should also so far entrench upon your highnesses' treasury as to defray the expence of this operation; because it is just that governors should pay for the mischief their subjects inflict upon their neighbours. I therefore advertize your highnesses of the destruction which such an attempt on my camp would inevitably draw down upon Kyrpoor, in order that you may warn your people against committing any act of hostility.'

"Lord E. December 16th.—The Ameers have written the enclosed letters of submission, but my information is that they continue to collect troops. I have therefore told them that their territory shall be occupied in obedience to my orders, but their letters should be sent to you. Accordingly we are crossing the Indus as fast as we can, but have very few boats, the water is very low, and the operation rather difficult.

"December 18th.—Last night the mails were robbed near Kyrpoor by Meer Roostum's people. The poor old fool is in the hands of his family. I have sent him orders to disband his troops instantly. I suspect he has no power, and I must rule his bands for him. The Beloochees are plundering all between this and Shikarpoor: this news reached me this morning, but these things must be expected where such wild unmanageable tribes of robbers are collected to form an army.

"December 20th.—A secret message has come from Roostum, the bearer had an open letter but privately informed Lieutenant Brown that Roostum could do nothing, and would escape to my camp. I did not like this, it would have embarrassed me, but the idea struck me that he might go to Ali Moorad's, who might induce him as a family ar-

rangement to resign the turban, especially as Roostum has long wished to get rid of that charge. I therefore secretly wrote to Roostum and Ali Moorad, and this morning had an express from Ali to say his brother is safe with him in his fort of Dejee; and he requested me not to move on Kyrpoor before 12 o'clock this day, to give time to his women to get away. This I promised, and the more readily that from other circumstances I could not move before to-morrow. Ali Moorad is now virtually chief, for if Roostum does not bestow the turban on him he will at all events be guided by Ali, into whose hands he has voluntarily thrown himself. Ali Moorad was more powerful than any Talpoor even when Roostum's name and authority were against him; now he is irresistible and in alliance with us.

"I shall move forward to-morrow and disperse the bands, if the step taken by Roostum has not already done so. I will place the forts in the hands of Ali Moorad, nominally in those of Roostum. Then I think all will be quietly arranged, and placed on a firm basis for the future. The plundering tribes that might annoy our communications hereafter, without meeting us in the field, will not dare to do so against the will of Ali Moorad and he will thus be our chief of police, and at the same time always in our grasp himself. The abstract result of our proceedings in Upper Scinde is this. Ali Moorad the most powerful of the Talpoors is secured by promise of the turban. Roostum the actual chief of the Talpoors, frightened at the violence of his family and our steady operations, has thrown himself into his brother's power by my advice, otherwise I should have suspected some trick. Now having complete power over the brother we have power over all, without any chief-making, and without apparent interference, or any disturbance of the order of succession. The result is a fair prospect of a permanent and peaceful state in Scinde without maintaining a large force. Our future line of policy is therefore simple, being merely to secure the ascendancy of the chief Talpoor; and that cannot

be too great, because he can never cope with the Company. I send this by express, for though I never wish to shrink from responsibility I feel most anxious for your approbation, well knowing any error of mine will expose you to blame, and the thorough support I receive makes me deeply sensible of my responsibility. Meer Roostum, as I before stated, agreed to the draft of the treaty, but his son Mahomet Hussein is our chief opponent and the collector of troops.

"Roostum Khan, December 14th.—Ameer. The vakeels you sent to Roree are robbing you. They will tell you that they are bribing my soldiers, and extract money from your highness under that pretext. If they were really bribing my soldiers to desert I would punish them; but they do no such thing: your highness is robbed by your servants. If you are not robbed, and that they, as they pretend, were bribing my soldiers it was high time to turn them out of Roree: this I have done, and if I find them attempting to disturb the loyalty of my troops it will be worse for them.

"Ameer. I have received my orders and will obey them. I laugh at your preparations for war. I want to prevent blood being shed, listen therefore to my words. Consult with your brother, his highness Ali Moorad. Your own blood will not deceive you—your servants will. These men were four days in Roree and did not deliver your letters to me; had I not sent for them they would still have kept them from me, to gain time for robbing you.

"Eight days have now past and I have not heard that your highness has nominated a commissioner to arrange the details of the treaty. I expect to have in writing your full acceptance of the draft thereof by the return of the bearer of this. Your highness is collecting troops in all directions, I must therefore have your acceptance of the treaty immediately—*yea* or *nay*. I will not lose the cold weather. Your highness must be prompt or I shall act without consulting you: my time is measured and I cannot waste it in long negociations."

"Your highness's letter is full of discussions, but as there are two sides to your river so there are two sides to your highness's argument. Many of your highness's family have taken the same view of the case that the governor-general has; and the respect they have shown to the British government is repaid to them by the governor-general. But I cannot go into the argument, I am not governor-general, I am only one of his commanders. I will forward your letter to him if you wish me to do so, but meantime I will occupy the territories which he has commanded me to occupy. You think I am your enemy. Why should I be so? I gain nothing for myself; I take no gifts; I receive no jaghires. What is it to me whether your highness or any other person occupies the land? The governor-general has given to you his reasons, and to me his orders! they shall be obeyed."

This ended the long negociations. His army was now over the Indus, the crisis of his policy had arrived and his spirit broke out with a greatness to which his own words only can do justice.

"Journal, December 15th.—The more deeply my operations are considered the more satisfied am I of being right; but an end must be put to the extraordinary ferocity which the Affghan war has produced with us: it is disgusting. The Affghans made no fight but killed stragglers; our people retaliated and finally became worse than the Affghans: they thought, and still think it fine to slay unarmed men. This I will take out of them, it is not natural to British officers.

"December 16.—I am getting the encumbrances over the river, and Wallace's column will soon be in march up the left bank. My nephew John is ill with fever. He can never bear a soldier's life, he has no bodily stamina; but he has all the other qualities of a soldier: it is a sad pity and my anxiety about him is very painful.

"17th, Morning.—Worked to death. John worse, and ill myself, very.

"17th, Evening.—Nearly done up, and fearful John will die. Six times have I gone full gallop to see him, though my character is at stake. This labour of mind is extreme, so many people depending on me and a great political and military movement on hand when my poor boy is so ill! To help me over the stile I have, besides diarrhœa, an infernal rheumatism in my left shoulder which falls on my nerves.

"18th.—John better, but still in great danger. No sleep for me with rheumatism, sickness, appetite gone, nothing but a sense of duty and confidence in my constitution could keep me up: I must leave my poor boy, it crushes me, yet must be and God protects us all. I can neither save him nor serve him. I have set Ali Moorad to get poor old Roostum away from Kyrpoor to his fort of Dejee; then I will damp the courage of his family, but I am sorely tried. I ought to have quiet thoughts and cannot, for I am throwing myself and my troops into a desert, and must not think of John or I may involve all under me in disaster and disgrace. This is a hard trial for an old man of sixty; it shakes me to the foundation. Yet what signifies these troubles? I feel a spring in me that defies all difficulties. The time of life is short, but to spend that shortness vainly 'twere too long! This thought must urge me to resolution, and resolution is half the battle.

"December 19.—All yesterday John was in great danger, and I had much to do and could not do it, being quite knocked up with labour and illness. Patience! My dear boy is better, that is the great point.

"A secret message came from Roostum to say he was a prisoner with his family and could not control them; that he would escape to my camp if I would receive him. This would have been embarrassing, exculpating him in fact of

the crime—treasonable correspondence—for which he was being punished, and of which he is only guilty by giving his seal to Futteh Ghoree: which makes him however, by their custom, answerable for that minister's acts; so at least Outram tells me."

At first the general was averse to Ali assuming the turban, but when Roostum resigned voluntarily changed his opinion on these grounds—"Ali is the proper heir, and also the strongest of the Ameers; he is now chief, has his brother Roostum on his side, and I will take the other's forts and put them in his hands. He will then, with our alliance, be master of Scinde for life. The good of all this is, that he will be answerable for the peace of Scinde. He will be able for that, and thus instead of incessant paltry murderous wars prevailing Upper Scinde will be quiet. He can hold his own people in subjection and we could not; regular forces cannot well do so. We may then diminish our garrisons by two or three regiments; and if Lord E. will let me do my will Scinde shall be as quiet as any country in the world. The day after to-morrow we advance against their forts, progressing towards Hydrabad, but how I am to act with the Lower Scinde cocks is not yet clear: to me they seem cunning rogues, pretending meekness and obedience to spin out the cold weather. It won't do Nusseer Khan! I have a better hand than you give me credit for at this game!

"Roree, December 21st.—Ten thousand fighting men and their followers are encamped here at *Alore*, a town built by Alexander the Great. My tent overlooks this most beautiful encampment. The various sounds, the multitude of followers, the many costumes and languages, and the many religions, produce a strange scene which makes a man think. Why is all this? Why am I supreme? A little experience in the art of killing, of disobedience to Heaven's behests, is all the superiority that I their commander can boast of! How humbled thinking makes me feel!

"Still I exult when beholding this force. I have worked my way to this great command and am gratified at having it, yet despise myself for being so gratified! Yes! I despise myself. Not as feeling unworthy to lead for I am conscious of knowing how to lead, and my moral and physical courage are equal to the task: my contempt is for my worldliness. Am I not past sixty? Must I not soon be on the bed of death? And yet so weak as to care for these things! No. I do not. I pray to do what is right and just, and to have strength to say, Get thee behind me Satan! Alas! I have not that strength. Well, this comfort remains. With a secret and strong desire to guide in war I have avoided it studiously!"

THIRTEENTH EPOCH.

FOURTH PERIOD.

GREAT events were now at hand.

Roostum Khan of Kyrpoor, and Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad, had, as turbaned Ameers, accepted Lord Ellenborough's new draft treaty in words but delayed signing, and privately called on their feudatory warriors to gather for action, forming at the same time a secret hostile league in furtherance of which the younger princes of Kyrpoor were diligently enlisting military adventurers. The British right to interpose was evident, because of the delay in signing the treaty and the danger to the British cantonments from the hired bands. Lord Ellenborough's orders had been therefore peremptory for the immediate dispersion of these bands and the occupation of the districts ceded by the new treaty on the left bank of the Indus: hence the passage of that river and the camp at Roree. When these orders were made known to the Ameers they professed unbounded submission, yet with prodigious effrontery denied that any bands existed; and while continuing their preparations for war still delayed signing the treaty, hoping thus to retard the crisis until the hot season, when their warriors would be all assembled and the British unable to act. This policy the general had early detected, and was passing the Indus to execute his orders when Roostum, fearful of the headstrong violence of his sons and nephews, made the secret offer already noticed to enter the British camp, and thus opened a way for effecting the object without bloodshed; he was therefore met by the following letter.

"Highness. My belief is, that personally you have been

ever a friend to the English, but you are helpless amidst your ill-judging family. I send this by your brother, his highness Ali Moorad: listen to his advice, trust to his care, you are too old for war and if battles begin how can I protect you? If you go with your brother, you may either remain with him or I will send an escort to bring you to my camp, where you will be safe. Follow my advice, it is that of a friend: why should I be your enemy? If I was, why should I take this trouble to save you? I think you will believe me, but do as you please."

This was private, but still intent on executing his orders, the general at the same time transmitted the following public letter to the Ameer as *Rais*, designing it for a warning to his turbulent sons and nephews.

"My letters have been stopped near Kyrpoor: this has been done by your orders, or without your consent. If by your orders you are guilty; if without your consent you cannot command your people. In either case I order you to disband your armed followers instantly, and I will go to Kyrpoor to see that this order is obeyed."

This menace was backed by a proclamation, announcing that by the draft treaty the districts of Subzulcote and Bhoong-Barra were restored to the Nawab of Bhawalpoor; and the Ameers were forbidden to levy taxes in those districts after the 10th of January 1843. Meanwhile Roostum's sons and nephews occupied the forts at Kyrpoor and other places with their armed men; and as those forts belonged to the turban this was an act of hostility constituting them rebels to Roostum and enemies to the British. It also clearly indicated a design to war; for two were far in the desart, namely, Emaum Ghur and Shah Ghur, the first being from its strength and distance in the waste counted by the Beloochees impregnable. Both were well provided—the first by Roostum's rebellious son Hussein, the second by his nephew Nusseer: but Roostum's sudden move to Ali Moorad's fortress of Dejee, in pursuance of the general's

advice, broke all these younger princes' measures for fighting in Upper Scinde and they fled at once from Kyrpoor, leaving Ali Moorad master of all Upper Scinde. At this point Charles Napier resumes his own story.

"Lord Ellenborough, December 20th.—There is no chance of resistance, I cannot be deceived; at all events I am prepared and the Ameers will pay dearly as my cavalry is sufficient to make the result of a fight decisive. Information has just come that Meer Roostum's son and nephew have fled to the forts in the desert. I shall desire his highness to order them to place those forts in the hands of confidential killedars. If they refuse to obey the orders of their chief I will march against the forts with the cavalry and the camel battery: that will decide everything in the north, and be in perfect concordance with the treaty of 1838. With respect to the Ameers of Hydrabad, they have agreed to everything so far as words go but assemble troops, and I will march in that direction. The whole of Upper Scinde is now in Ali Moorad's hands, and there are no armed bands but his: all is settled here, and in that conviction I have ordered the Bengal troops to march northward. As to Lower Scinde, it is possible that the armed men disbanded here may take service there, and if they mean to fight the departure of the Bengal troops will give them courage, but my remaining force is enough.

"Journal, December 22nd.—Rode to Kyrpoor, but with an escort, as I never trust barbarians: it is free of hostile troops. Shah Newaz, the little black Napoleon, was there to receive me and had no fighting men; his father therefore feels strong enough, and has all the forts here in his hands: thus in two days all Upper Scinde has been rendered subject to him, and we have but one instead of many independent princes to deal with. Lord Ellenborough orders me to keep the Bengal troops here and offers to send me more. I want no more and wish these were not half so many." He afterwards found that Lord Ellenborough was right, but was at

this time deceived by the politicals as to the Belooch character. He was now however to arrange his operations against Lower Scinde, and hoping to obtain his object there as he had already done in the upper country by generalship rather than force, planned one of the most remarkable exploits that military history records, and thus gradually disclosed in his letters.

"December 24th.—On the 26th I will march to Kyrpoor with my host, and I may well say bag and baggage! Never did I see the like: there must be more than twenty thousand people in camp, my fighting men being but seven regiments. Well, an Indian army beats cock-fighting! I think I must go to Emaum Ghur, but am nervous about entering the desert; it is a perilous movement, requiring all the caution in the world even without fighting. Every supply must be in my camp: abandon this rule for a day and we are lost, or shall owe our safety to chance. Fearful work that, and if possible my business shall be done without this march, if not it shall be ventured. It is just in an opposite line to Alexander's march in Gedrosia; but I am not an Alexander, and the deserts are the same terrible things on both sides of the Indus. Let me be careful. Water! water! water! Stir will I never without enough of that for the day's march on my beasts, and each day explorers shall go on to find wells a day before.

"December 25th.—To-morrow at four in the morning my army moves: it is the first army I ever put in movement, and it is hard work; for there is much to think of, and there are many who ought to think yet won't, and I must for them. My hope is to do rightly, for it is an immense multitude to move on a wrong road: followers and all not less than 25,000 here, and 5,000 others went off with Wallace this morning to the north. It is good they are gone, for hardly could the Bombay and Bengal men be kept from quarrelling. This enmity between the troops of the two presidencies is incomprehensible, but exists. My

present project is this. All the malcontents have congregated under the son-in-law and nephew, he is both, of Roostum, at Emaum Ghur, which is a hundred miles in the desert. I cannot take my two twelve-pounder iron guns, nor my two 8-inch mortars, the depth of sand, the want of water and forage, are too great: but leaving those guns, the 136 camels carrying the heavy shot and shells will be available for water and forage, and the supply of my guns and 12 lb. howitzers, and these twelve good pieces shall take Emaum Ghur.

"But why take it? For this reason. It is so far in the desert the Ameers believe it invulnerable, and not to be reached: they believe they can harass us by petty warfare, and if we assemble a large force that they can fall back on Emaum Ghur and the bank of the Narra, where we cannot follow. While this feeling exists they will always think themselves independent and safe; but I think Emaum Ghur may be reached, and they be taught that they have no refuge from our power, no resource but good behaviour: Scinde will then be quiet. If I fail it will do harm, yet the attempt must be made or Scinde will never be quiet, and it is worth the risk. I know I shall do it, but the risks are very great. The last twenty-five miles will be in deep sand, a regular succession of hills, steep and without a drop of water! Well, war is full of difficulties, faint heart never won fair lady and fortune is the fairest of the fair! Will my health hold? John's illness nearly floored me: poor fellow, he has not a frame for a soldier like his strong father; *he* is a soldier and a good one, and all else that is good.

"Fort Mungree, December 27th.—Nine miles from Roree, We arrived, bag and baggage, at half-past eleven, having started at half-past six; but the rear did not quit camp until half-past eight, so difficult it is to put an Indian army in march. Oh! the baggage! the baggage! it is enough to drive one mad. We have 1500 camels with their confounded long necks, each occupying fifteen feet! Fancy these

long devils in a defile: four miles and a quarter of them! Then there are the donkeys and ponies, and led horses, and bullocks innumerable! I think our baggage would reach from this to Pekin: yet all the Indians exclaim, never saw a force with so little baggage! They say I have done wonders in reducing it so much; but I have done nothing except appealing to the good sense of the officers, and reducing my own baggage. It is said, no Indian general ever marched with less than sixteen camels for his own share, generally with several hundreds: Lord Keane had 300; Mr. Ross Bell, the political, 600. I have four camels, and one for my office papers stationary &c. which could not be carried in my small portmanteau, for I have but one and a pair of canteens, with two camp tables, a bed and a private soldier's tent; my own fine tent was left at Sukkur. This soldier's tent requires two camels, my servants' and horses' traps take one, my own things one. I cannot do with fewer animals as my tent is heavier than my servants': Europeans cannot bear the sun through a single canvas roof as the natives do, wherefore our soldiers' tents have a double roof. We got in compact, and would have been quicker but for a wet ditch which impeded the guns; camels slip in sloppy places and disjoint their hips poor animals!

"Rode on to Kyrpoor and told Ali Moorad of my resolution to take Emaum Ghur, to shew his enemies and ours that neither deserts nor hills can save them from our arms and legs. But I did not tell him all my reasons, one was to shew my friend Ali, that if he betrays us he also will have no retreat in the desert! I see clearly they all believe an English army cannot penetrate the desert, and this opinion shall be broken. If Emaum Ghur be taken they will know every place can be so; it is their fighting cock, and before three weeks pass my hope is to take off his spurs. I must halt to-day, because the camels are such poor miserable ones they cannot move after yesterday's

march, and there is abundant pasture here; the secret of their sinking is want of food, they eat slowly and do not get time enough: this must be remedied if possible.

"December 28th.—All my plans upset! These barbarians are not easily understood. It is decidedly Ali Moorad's interest to be master in Scinde, yet he has let Roostum escape! This bothers me, but it is so far good that it gives me a more decided line to follow: there need be no delicacy now. However my Emaum Ghur project is probably ended, for my information is, that all the Ameers are assembling their forces at a place called *Dhingee*. I have no good map, none exists though we have been here four years! But there is a road marked from this place to *Laloo*, and if my guns could travel on it, and water be obtained, we may from Laloo turn to our left against Emaum Ghur, or to our right against Dhingee. The operation will be simply to reach Laloo and there act according to circumstances and to my spies' tales. I cannot go that road without more information, yet cannot wait five days for information. One way remains. Ali Moorad must get me information or accompany me. Were I sure the Ameers had assembled great numbers to fight I would at once march against them down the river. Patience! patience! difficulties must be encountered in war. Two days now in camp from rain, for camels split themselves on wet ground, and there are too few already: poor animals, the rain will kill many without marching. This kind of weather is said to be unheard of in Scinde. Whatever makes people uncomfortable is always *unheard of*.

"December 30th.—Plot thickens and my position is critical. The Ameers are forming in the desert and movement is difficult for me, not having half enough carriage; and if I march upon their forces they will disperse. I must therefore march on their forts, and on Hydrabad, things which cannot escape, but their troops are not tangible by a regular force.

"December 31st.—This is the last day of a year momentous to me. I am walking before my tent, a clear starlight night, but a mist is rising and our fires give a long silvery light, not a long line but a brilliant haze: and the hum of men sounds all along while the jackals make a horrid din close around, like screams of men and women. The vast extent of the camp with lights closed in by the mist and seen through the mist is beautiful. What feelings are mine! not pleasant. I *must* retire into private life. What is ephemeral power? What is life? If I err I may witness the slaughter of all this mass of beings! Poor Elphinstone. No wonder he died broken-hearted. Thanks to Lord Ellenborough, for me there is no such trammel as McNaughten. Yet, what is my responsibility? no matter, it is welcome, and all on my own shoulders: the Lord deliver me from a colleague! I can bear ten times as much. It is details only that trouble me, they interrupt my thoughts, and at night sleep comes too quick. One night I drank coffee strong and had a capital *think* for an hour, but then coffee gave up the ghost: I got many matters decided in that hour, but will drink no more coffee late.

"My plans are fixed to march to the edge of the desert, or as far in as water can be found; then encamp, select 500 of the strongest Europeans and natives, mount them on camels, and load all my other camels with water except a few to carry half rations. My camel battery also shall go, and as many irregular horse as it will be prudent to take, and then slap upon Emaum Ghur in the heart of the desert: if it surrenders good; if not it shall have such a hammering as will make fire fly out of its eyes. While this is going on my camels shall go back for provisions, and water is abundant at Emaum Ghur. My expectation is that four shells out of the four hundred with my battery will produce a surrender, to say nothing of an escalade, for which I am prepared.

"If taken the glory of the desert will be departed, and my march shall be apparently on Hydrabad but really on

Omercote, the strong desert hold of the southern Ameers, as Emaum Ghur is of the northern Ameers: all this however depends on coming events. Afterwards my march will be on Hydrabad, the Ameers will fly over the Indus, and we shall become masters of the left bank of the river from Mittenkote to the mouth: peace with civilization will then replace war and barbarism. My conscience will be light, for I see no wrong in so regulating a set of tyrants who are themselves invaders, and have in sixty years nearly destroyed the country. The people hate them. I may be wrong, but I cannot see it and my conscience will not be troubled. I sleep well while trying to do this, and shall sleep sound when it is done. Whether God designs me for his instrument will be seen; if not to do it I shall be baffled in the desert; meanwhile all this rain will fill the wells and I hail it as a promise of success."

This private sketch must now, as before, be filled up from public correspondence.

"Lord Ellenborough, December 27th.—The Ameers put implicit faith in their deserts, and when negotiations delays and lying and intrigue fail calculate they can declare their obedience, their innocence and humility, and retire beyond our reach into those deserts: from thence they could launch their wild bands to cut off all communication and render Scinde hotter than nature has done. This it was which made me think of making our chief Ali Moorad powerful, and holding him under our power, and promising him your support as to the turban: this you have approved of. The next step was to secure to him the exercise of the turban power even during his brother's life: this also I was so fortunate as to succeed in, by persuading Meer Roostum to place himself in Ali Moorad's hands. It burst on the family like a bomb shell, they and their troops fled, and all, so far as is known, in a southerly direction, yet into the desert, chiefly to Emaum Ghur. Hence, after consideration and drawing all I could from Ali Moorad, and though war was

not proclaimed, nor is it necessary that it should be, my mind was made up to march on Emaum Ghur.

"I told Ali Moorad his killedar should be placed in Emaum Ghur; that your lordship would, as bound by treaty, support the chief; that the people who fled with armed men to Emaum Ghur, refusing to obey their chief Meer Roostum, were in fact rebels and I would follow them. He said he would take Emaum Ghur himself. I answered, that I knew he could and his readiness to save my troops trouble was praiseworthy, but I was determined to shew the Hydrabad Ameers their deserts were of no avail; that I could and would follow them everywhere, whether into the deserts of Scinde or the mountains of Beloochistan. I said this thinking it not amiss to lift the curtain and let my friend Ali Moorad look a little into futurity; it is as well for him also to feel he is wholly dependant on our power; that everything he can wish for is his as our faithful ally but should he be a traitor he has no refuge. He is a vigorous-minded, ambitious, and I suspect cunning man, but apparently generous and bold: in short as good as a barbarian can be, and better than most. His minister, Sheik Ali Hussein, is very clever, has lived in Bengal, knows our power and has I believe convinced his master that it is not to be resisted; besides, he sees that while he keeps his master friendly his own fortune thrives: he is therefore ours. He has made Futteh Mohamed Ghoree a prisoner: the latter went in disguise amongst Roostum's troops and won over 2000 of them, and of Ali Moorad's, to favour the son and nephew: Sheik Ali asked what he should do with him: my answer was, keep him prisoner but do not ill-use him. There is an evident objection to my seeing Meer Roostum. Why I know not, but I told Ali Moorad I must and will.

"I am perfectly aware of the danger of entering a desert, but it has always arisen from neglect of precautions more than other causes, and it does not make me nervous. The man first sent to gain information goes with me to shew

the water, and he knows punishment awaits him if he betrays. I have warned him not to say he does know when he don't, and he shall get no drink but what he brings to me. There is however one danger against which we cannot provide, they may poison the wells; but my hope is to overcome this by digging new wells, or by carrying water with me. It is not possible to conceal my march and I shall therefore send word to the Ameer in Emaum Ghur, that my intent is not to plunder or slay if they make no resistance: if they do they must abide results.

"The means your lordship has taken to raise the old spirit of the troops has completely succeeded, at least so far as mine are concerned: there is here but one wish, viz. to go anywhere for a fight. If you ordered me into the heart of Asia with such volunteers as my camp would turn out, my belief is not a dozen men would stay behind: so much for stars and ribbons, at which philosophers like to laugh, but their ridicule will not change human nature. The Indian army feels grateful for the protection received from your lordship. It felt degraded before your arrival. The Cabool and Ghuznee misfortunes were unjustly cast in its teeth and it was unable to hold up its head. It will now meet any army in the world, and this change is produced by justice and the distribution of rewards. I ought not to speak of these matters, but can hardly help it when seeing those Indian decorations so justly bestowed and our Queen's officers neglected by their own government. There is my aide-de-camp, Major McPherson, who has twenty hard-fought battles written on his sword, and neither has nor is likely to have a decoration, unless he gains it in India, where your lordship has made hope fresh and green for soldiers.

"December 29th.—I will not speak of my host of difficulties in collecting carriage; but the Ameers made their people drive the country and not a camel is to be had. Our contractor for 1000 camels has furnished but 250, and forfeited 30,000 rupees! He is the most influential in all

this country but his property lies in and about Shikarpoor, and though he will not say so he dares not furnish camels: his agreement was made before he knew of the Ameers' orders. And now my lord I have to tell you that Meer Roostum decamped yesterday morning. I met Ali Moorad the night before and desired him to say I would pay my respects to his highness next day: and the next day I heard of his flight. I can only account for this in one of two ways. 1°. Meer Roostum is a timid man. He has all along fancied I want to make him a prisoner, and now thought his brother and I were about to execute the conspiracy. 2°. That Ali Moorad drove his brother to this step.

"Meer Roostum had resigned the turban to Ali in the most formal manner, writing his resignation in the Koran before all the religious men collected to witness the act at Dejee: Ali sent this Koran to me, I said that their family arrangements were their own but your lordship would support the head of their family, whoever it might be, according to the spirit of the treaty; that personally I thought it better for Roostum to keep the turban and let Ali Moorad act for him, but he was free to do as he pleased; now it strikes me, that Ali Moorad may have frightened the old man into the foolish step he has taken, with the purpose of making his own possession of the turban more decided; that to do this he told him I intended to make Roostum a prisoner, Ali pretending to be his friend and only waiting for opportunity to betray us. Such are my conjectures.

"I had no sooner heard of Meer Roostum's flight than intelligence came of his son and nephew having struck a new, and closer, alliance with the Hydrabad Ameers; that Sobdar had been persuaded to join them; that their forces are assembling at Dhinjee in large numbers; that about 15,000 are north of Larkaana, and 2000 in the fort of Shah Ghur on the road to Jessulmere. Roostum's course is not yet known, but he is supposed to have joined his family at Dhingee. In this state, all changing as if by magic, I shall

lay before you my view of the matter, and the course I mean to pursue.

"In a former letter I described the position of Emaum Ghur, but did not send it as before it was folded came all this intelligence: it now goes. You will see that I am threatened from four points. The impossibility of getting camels obliged me to leave three regiments and a hundred cavalry behind at Sukkur, also four field pieces. Lieut.-Col. Roberts, an officer selected for the command there, is well able to hold his own against the Larkaana force, and against the Shah Ghur force: the 8th N.I. garrison Roree, and I have halted Col. Wallace twenty miles off; he can in one march reach Roree. My rear is therefore safe even should Ali Moorad be a traitor, which I have no reason to believe but calculate upon nevertheless. I cannot tell yet what the Ameers are at, but believe they mean to fight at Dhingee. My intention of marching direct on Emaum Ghur is therefore changed. I will march upon Laloo, about five marches, and when there my spies will have brought intelligence of the intentions of the Ameers, and their strength at Dhingee and Emaum Ghur. This intelligence will make me move to either flank, or direct upon Hydrabad. Laloo is considered to be in the desert and a march on that point will alarm them, as they expect me by the usual river road; but if I went that road they would have free communication with the desert, which by marching on Laloo shall be intercepted. No. 3—force at Dhingee—will be compelled then to fall back to Hydrabad, upon which I shall march. Or, if the Dhingee force crosses to Emaum Ghur before I reach Laloo, I will march on that fort and take it."—See map.

"I am fully aware of the danger of these marches in the desert, but they may be done; where one man goes another can, and until I prove to these Ameers that they can go nowhere without my following them they will think their desert a safe retreat, and Scinde will never be quiet. As

this new aspect of affairs, confirming all your lordship's apprehensions, seems to threaten battle I have ordered up the 19th Bengal Regiment and the troop of artillery, though feeling quite strong enough without them." — Here a cross-note runs thus. "Enough I had against the Kyrpoor Ameers, but little dreamed I of the numbers awaiting me at Meeanee. I am so cold damp and miserable as hardly to be able to bring my ideas into shape, and I must trust to your lordship's good nature towards a rheumatic man in a small tent.

"Captain Powel.—Tell Sir Thomas McMahon I am on my way to Hydrabad I suppose, but the Ameers are eels, and one might deal better with a close-shaved well-soaped pig. However they shall not make me pay ten times the value of our provisions, as they did McNaughten and Lord Keane. My men shall not rob them, nor shall they rob my men. Some of my followers begun their Affghan tricks this morning, so I gave eight of them a flogging. No troops under my command shall rob and murder, as was done in Affghanistan if report speaks true.

"Lord Ellenborough. December 30th.—The people at Dhingee are said to have moved to Emaum Ghur, where all the northern Ameers are to assemble. This, if true, will not affect my line of march, for without going into the desert there will be no managing these gentlemen. The accidental breaking of your bridge over the Sutlege, just when General Nott had crossed it, seems as if Fate indicated approbation of your policy: it was a singular circumstance."

Now resolute to penetrate the waste, he opened the year 1843 by an enterprise which, being his first essay as a general, placed him at once amongst the ablest captains. His first design was to move with three thousand men, thinking that even a small force for the task before him; but soon the explorers sent forward to seek wells reported that water could not be got for that number, and instantly he resolved to attempt it with five hundred, though to the danger of finding the wells poisoned, and that of having the

water skins cut at night by prowling emissaries, his enemies had more and better camels on which to mount their infantry, and on their infantry they prided themselves. Their horsemen also swarmed in thousands on the edge of the waste, and the fortress to be reached contained a garrison four times the strength of the expeditionary force! This resolution being taken, he issued a manifesto explanatory of the events which had led to Roostum's flight and Ali Moorad's assumption of the turban, proclaimed the latter Rais, and announced his own intended march and determination to disperse all armed bands wherever found. Then he moved.

"Journal, January 3rd.—Khanpoor. Marched this morning at 11 A.M. Some silly fellows persuaded me to start so late because our tents were wet: Jesus of Nazareth what an idiot the military man is who takes advice! These very advisers of a late march now say the camels can get no food because we are so late! I know camels now, and in future will reject suggestors: confound them, they are enough to ruin an army. How hard it is to get men to do as they are told: when I take advice again may I split like a camel. These beasts are unfit for military movements generally, they can't bear cold or rain, and on wet slippery ground dislocate their hips. They are then generally left alive for the jackals, for though we shoot them the Hindoo will not take animal life.

"Nusseer Khan has sent a letter full of deceit, professing obedience to gain time as before. Roostum also has written to deny his voluntary surrender of the turban, and intimating that I had betrayed him into Ali Moorad's hands. To Nusseer I have answered thus. 'Ameer. When a man's actions and words do not accord I am greatly distressed how to act. The government of the Ameers is one of many heads, all speaking after a different and strange manner. I cannot judge afar off. I came to Kyrpoor to see how matters stand, and mean to go to Hydrabad to do the same.

I cannot distinguish friends from enemies at two hundred miles' distance; and as you say you are the friend of the Company and of the governor-general you will be glad to see me. I hear of troops collecting in the south. Armed men shall not cross the Indus into Scinde, therefore I take troops.' To Roostum Khan, the old knave, the following epistle has gone.

"'Your highness's letter obliges me to use a language I regret, but the honour of my country and the interest of yours leaves me no alternative. The gist of your highness's letter is this. That I advised you to be guided by your brother, the Ameer Ali Moorad; and that he advised you to fly from a meeting with me as from a conspirator who wished to make you a captive.

"'Ameer, such a subterfuge is unworthy of your highness's rank: you know it is not truth. You know that you offered to come to my camp, and that I advised you to go to your brother's fortress instead of coming to my camp: you therefore well know that I had no desire to capture you, nor to interfere with your family arrangements. Yet you now pretend, that when I asked you to meet me you fled from me, not from any desire to avoid a meeting but because I advised you to be guided by your brother's advice and he advised you to fly! I will not suffer your highness to take shelter under such misrepresentations. You made submission to me as representative of the governor-general, you have solemnly resigned the turban, and you now avow that you look upon this, the most solemn and important act of your life, as a farce and a mockery!

"'Ameer. I do not understand such double conduct. I hold you to your words and deeds and no longer consider you to be the chief of the Talpoors, nor will I treat with you as such, nor with those who consider you to be Rais.'

"January 4th.—Encamped at Dejee. Went over its celebrated fort, the first European who ever did so. I have had up all the people who could, or rather would give me in-

formation about the desert: they all differ more or less, and as I cannot trust a large force to their lying my resolution is to go forward with a small force and trust to fate.

"January 5th.—March this night at twelve o'clock.

"Choonka, 6th.—Twenty-four miles in the desert. This part, which has never been before penetrated by Europeans, is sandy, with brushwood, tamarisks chiefly, and another shrub without leaves, a blighted-looking bush. Ali Moorad comes with me, and old Roostum, rogue as well as fool, has sent his son to my camp." The old Ameer, flying from Dejee, had encamped with seven thousand armed Beloochees and some guns within the desart, designing to join his son in due time: he was to his surprize and terror thus suddenly overtaken by the general.

"January 7th, Doom.—A short march, plenty of water, road heavy, country covered with jungle, but there are trees, and therefore probably a substratum of soil. The upper sand is full of sea-shells, cockles, muscles, and the spiral unicorn's horn shell. Air delightful, not a man sick.

From this place he thus wrote to Lord Ellenborough.—"At Dejee I found such prevarication and such ignorance as to the route, that I became more than ever impressed with the objections which Ali Moorad and all the other Ameers felt to our entering the desert; and also judged it unsafe to risk a large force without any positive information about water. All this confirmed me in the belief that to reach Emaum Ghur is necessary to the tranquillity of Scinde; I therefore resolved to advance with a small force and apply all my carriage to its efficiency, leaving the other troops at Dejee. On the night of the 5th we moved with 350 of the 22nd Regiment—Queen's, all mounted on camels, two soldiers on each. We have two 24 lb. howitzers with double teams of camels, and two hundred of the Scinde horse, and provisions for fifteen days: water for four. We reached Choonka, twenty-five miles from Dejee, yesterday, although the night was very dark and the tracks so slight that our

guides lost the way and the sand was deep. Plenty of good water at Choonka, but forage so scarce that I have sent back 150 of the horsemen, and much doubt if the remaining fifty can go above one march more.

"We yesterday came so close upon the traces of Meer Roostum, that he, hearing Major Outram, to whom he is personally known, was with me sent a messenger saying he was submissive. Major Outram asked my leave to go to him, we being both convinced Ali Moorad had frightened him. I told the major however that I only agreed to the Ameer's being made easy as to personal safety; that no concession or submission could reinstate him in the turban which he had resigned, and on which I consider the tranquillity of Scinde depends. The major returned with Roostum's son, to whom I explained, that his father is perfectly safe in person; that he will hold his own lands, according to your lordship's draft of the new treaty, but must lose what is attached to the turban; that I would march to Emaum Ghur and place a killedar of Ali Moorad in that fortress, but the old man might return to Kyrpoor, or live where he pleased as a simple Ameer. This son seemed satisfied with all this, and I therefore consider that Upper Scinde will be tranquil despite of the other sons, and of the Hydrabad Ameers.

"Journal, January 8th, Tujul.—The day before yesterday was more like a desert than yesterday's march, and this day we have thick jungle and large trees: this country must have water, and much of it might be cultivated, but certainly there is a great deal of sand. Yesterday's march ten miles, this day eleven: no European ever here before.

"January 9th, Luk.—A better name than Doom! This march eleven miles, the road hilly, sand deep, but we arrived safe and are in a punch bowl, or small plain, without an opening: with rain we should be quickly flooded. I dug nine wells, good water in all: had we failed there was plenty on the camels. Our march to-morrow begins with a very steep sand-hill, and very deep; so I turned out the 22nd

soldiers this evening and they run the guns up it with cheers in five minutes, though from bottom to top is not less than four hundred yards! What fellows British soldiers are! all laughing and joking, and such strength! We all thought it such a job that dinner was put off an hour, thinking there would be two of labour: the faith of the Ameers will vanish, the spell has been broken in five minutes!

"January 10th, Mitree.—A wild place, very little food for camels; one well which we exhausted quickly, but plenty on the camels: immense sand-hills like the ridges of a sea, passed with much labour, but we got the guns over.

"January 11th, Puddree.—Another wild place, one well which soon failed, but plenty of water on the camels: more sand-hills and hard labour to get along.

"January 12th, Emaum Ghur!—Desperate sand-hills, the whole march of ten miles over a sea of sand! The fortress evacuated!

"13th.—The sands we passed yesterday, indeed for the last two or three days, were very wild and deep; yesterday it was like a sea, or rather like a vast plain of round hills and grotesque-shaped ground, deeply covered with drifted sand, channelled or ribbed with little lines like sand on the sea-shore, and full of shells. It was with much labour we drew the 24 lb. howitzers over these hills by men and camels conjoined, fourteen camels and sixty men to each, and so reached Emaum Ghur.

"The Ameers deemed this place out of European reach, and in truth naturally so, for if we had been opposed the difficulties would have been great. Had we been unable to get guides; had the wells been filled up or destroyed by poison, or filth; had we been constantly peppered by swift-footed opponents with their matchlocks from every sand ridge, hiding in sand-holes, giving their shot and then flying, it would have been a job; for we had no cavalry to pursue, nor do I think cavalry could in that deep sand catch a bare-legged Scindian. Had these things happened we could

not have reached the fortress for a long time. My calculation however included all these matters. I looked indeed for a march of three weeks, because my marksmen scattered round the column could only have gone a short distance each day, and my expectation was even to have halted for supplies. In short my march has been one of great good luck or it would not have been made in so short a time and without loss; nevertheless, having foreseen and prepared for all mishaps they could only have delayed not baffled me.

"Lord Ellenborough, January 13th.—The desert presented some difficulties, but we overcame them. Our burthen camels are miserable animals worn out in Affghanistan, yet we have lost only eight or nine out of six hundred. The camel battery acquitted itself admirably, not a single camel knocked up, and the last three days have been very trying as scarcely any food could be got. The Bombay government does not allow flour for the camels of this battery, which is I am told by Captain Whitlie, necessary, and is given by all private persons to their camels. The powers of these animals have also been overrated; four are allowed to each of those heavy guns, whereas each should have eight draught and two spare camels. I ordered sixteen to be taken with each, and they were all required. The whole establishment is faulty, and its great utility renders this worthy of consideration. To my astonishment I found that none of the men except the Europeans were soldiers! I wrote to Sir G. Arthur about these poor drivers some time ago, but have not yet had an answer: they are very ill treated.

"This fortress is exceedingly strong against any force without artillery, the walls forty feet high, one tower fifty feet, and all built of burned bricks. It is a square with round towers, and surrounded by an exterior wall, fifteen feet high, lately built with the view of opposing us I believe. Within was a vast quantity of powder, distributed in various parts and built up so as to be concealed: there are some bomb-proof chambers, but against heavy guns it could not

stand. Ali Moorad has accompanied me, and though mischievous in some respects has behaved well towards us, and given every assistance. Our difficulties must have been evident to his highness, and I have some idea he accompanied us expressly to ascertain how far we could be opposed in cases of need! When I reflected on this, and that Emaum Ghur can only serve to foster confidence in the Ameers of both Scindes when discontented or rebellious, and we might sooner or later be forced to another and perhaps more perilous march, my resolve was to blow it down: it belongs to Ali Moorad, who consents.

"I shall return the day after to-morrow as far as *Tujul*, where the road branches off to Dhingee; and if my intelligence gives reason to believe that any force be still there I will march upon it with this detachment: they have no refuge now, and must either fight or cross the Indus, or disperse. I am now going to order all the Ameers, or their vakeels, to meet Major Outram at Kyrpoor, and trust the treaty will now go on smoothly. I hear that the fort of Shah Ghur refuses to receive Ali Moorad's killedar; if so I must march from *Dejee* against it, for all information got here agrees that there is no water or road from this to Shah Ghur. If necessary I would try to pass, but my force is too small to divide, and reports of gathering tribes at *Dhinjee* make it necessary to leave Shah Ghur alone at present."—Reports were constantly brought by riders on swift camels whom he had appointed for that purpose when entering the desart.

"Sir G. Arthur, January 15th.—Reports reached me at Dejee of the gathering of troops at Dhinjee. Had I marched against them first, they, confiding in Emaum Ghur as a refuge, would have fought my small force. If they did not fight they would have fled here, and I must have followed by a circuitous route; but by marching at once on Emaum Ghur and blowing it up, we cut them off from the desert, and having them now between us and the river they must fight or disperse: they might perhaps have fought with

Emaum Ghur at their back, they will not fight now. I have sent Outram to Kyrpoor, ordering all the Ameers to meet him, or send vakeels with full powers. But being sure they will try to play their usual insidious game I have told them, that if any vakeel has not full powers I will seize his master's territories in the name of the Company. I am convinced that I am right in selecting Outram to be my commissioner, but think Lord Ellenborough is not pleased. I was almost sure this would be when asking for Outram, but thought it just both by him and by the public. I fear Lord E. has been deceived about him, which I sincerely regret and will lose no opportunity of seeking to remove: it is however a very delicate affair."—Lord Ellenborough was not deceived, Charles Napier was.

"Old Roostum has again placed himself in my hands. I suppose the old dotard will not make a second *bolt*, tho' he is welcome if he pleases. I have thus I hope managed to carry through the penal treaty dictated by Lord E. and without bloodshed. My plan of action has been single from beginning to end, viz. giving the Ameers time to reflect upon everything, but telling them the consequences of non-compliance, and then doing exactly what I told them would be done. I never by hesitation gave them hope of bullying me. Had I allowed myself to be mollified by their deceitful and even base tone of submission, they would have persuaded themselves I was afraid, and we should have had a battle; for Roostum and all the others are said to be beastly drunk every day after twelve o'clock and of course liable to great excitement. My hope is that this expedition will be approved of by Lord E. and yourself, I had no time to ask for instructions, the rains had fallen, and if the desert was ever to be passed that was the moment. I anticipate more difficulties in returning, but am prepared.

"The same, January 16th.—Our eyes are full of sand, ears full of sand, noses full, mouths full, and teeth grinding sand! Enough between our clothes and skins to scour the latter

into gold-beater's leaf, one might as well wear a sand paper shirt. Our shoes are in holes from dryness and we walk as if we had supplied their place with sand-boxes; our meat is all sand, and on an average every man's teeth have been ground down the eighth of an inch, according to his appetite. It is lucky indeed we are so well scoured with sand, for there is not a clean shirt in camp! We look on our shirts with the same regret that we do on faded beauty: alas! will she ever be pretty again? Alas! will they ever be clean again? We turn them and turn them, yet all remains dark and dirty. We brought no baggage and all the dandies look at me as they would at a bad washerwoman.

"Journal, January 14th.—I will move back the day after to-morrow, and if the Dhingee folk have not dispersed I must punish them. Their troops are not, as you seem to think, poor harmless peasants taking service against an invader. They are regular robbers, each tribe under its chief, who has no power but when he leads them to mischief, and no pleasure but in mischief. Robbers rule this wild country, and like robbers! their bands, if they come across me, shall be handled roughly.

"January 15th.—Emaum Ghur is shattered to atoms with ten thousand pounds of powder! The light was grand and hellish beyond description; the volumes of smoke fire and embers flying up was a throne fit for the devil! I do not like this work of destruction, but reason tells me two things. First, it will prevent bloodshed, and it is better to destroy temples built by man than temples built by the Almighty. Second, this castle was built and used for oppression and in future its ruins will shelter the slave instead of the tyrant. McPherson dreamed all night of the explosion. I dreamed of my beloved mother, her beauteous face smiled upon me! Am I going to meet her very soon? Well, we shall all meet again, unless this dreadful work of war sends me to hell, which is not improbable."

How constantly he was disciplining his mind will be seen

in the next letter, written as if in a convent instead of a desart, and amid the toils dangers and perplexities of war: his character was certainly very original!

"January 16th 1843.—Coruña! Now at the head of an army! Such is the wheel of fortune!" Now will be seen what my talent for politics is. I had permission from the governor-general to assemble an immense force to impose his penal treaty. I told him it could be done with the troops under my hand without bloodshed; it seems to me I have done so, and proved my head sufficient for command in Scinde. This is not going far, but it is as difficult and large a command as usually falls to an English general, so my trust is not to end my long career with discredit.

"My first serious command was under Moore at Coruña, and some credit fell to me: my next on the coast of America, where no credit was lost, having been twice thanked in the public gazette. I was then for three years at the military college, and took a first certificate. Afterwards I governed Cephalonia for nine years, and I think John Kennedy and myself did there earn honest fair distinction: in two years more, but for Adam, we should have brought our work to a glorious close. My next trial of head was the northern district, and some service to the state there I did without bloodshed, as I am trying to do here. My present position is not however to my liking, we had no right to come here and are tarred with the Affghan brush.

"Such is my recapitulation of a life about to close, my hope is, with honour and a clear conscience. My brothers George and William have also done their work well. Richard and Henry, by giving up their professions for private life have obtained distinction in that, the best of all. Such are our father's sons, but none of us are his equal. I have never seen his equal; but sons are possibly not good judges. However we all resolved not to disgrace him, and were he alive he would be satisfied. With all this we have abundance of faults. We are all a hot violent crew to do us

justice. With the milk of human kindness though. We were all fond of hunting, fishing and shooting; yet all gave them up when young men because we had no pleasure in killing little animals. George and I were bold riders. Once at a drag hunt we beat the whole field, going neck and neck; my horse beat his in a lane, but could not clear a five-barred gate at the end and both rolled over headlong, breaking the top bar; George cleared gate, me, and horse, as we rolled together. He was a bolder rider than I was, and when his blood was up all the devils in hell would not stop him in a hunt or a battle.

"We however, always found it pain, not pleasure, to worry poor animals. Lately in camp a little hare got up, the greyhounds pursued and the men all shouted to aid the dogs: my sorrow was great and I rode away, yet at dinner I ate a poor fowl! It is not principle therefore on which we act, it is a painful feeling. As to cat-hunting and dog-fighting, feeling and principle unite to condemn; a domestic animal confides in you and is at your mercy; a wild animal has some fair play, a domestic one none. Cat-hunters and dog-fighters are therefore not only cruel but traitors: no polished gentleman does these things. Lord Byron said to me, 'I am serious when I say I don't believe it possible for a fisherman to be a good man,'—meaning anglers for amusement, with frogs, worms, &c. My answer was, I am sure a cat-hunter and dog-fighter cannot be so: nor a gentleman either. To this he assented. But if we Napiers are violent it is only for a moment; neither George, nor Richard, nor Henry, are the least revengeful. William and myself are, but only where resistance continues.

"January 17th, Mittree.—Still in the sandy sea with a heavy march just over, the infantry pulling the guns. Heard from Lord Ellenborough. He wants a fight with the Ameers, but the blowing up of Emaum Ghur has struck such terror they won't fight with me, advancing as I am from the heart of their desert refuge against them. Lord

E. is alarmed lest my want of troops may cause a defeat, or rather should prevent a decided victory; but a most decided one has been gained without bloodshed.

"January 18th, Luk.—A dreadfully-fatiguing march—ten very high sand-hills, and the soldiers did not pull well. Paddy is not persevering in disagreeable things, and certainly there is no pleasure in dragging two 24 lb. howitzers over steep sand-hills. This is our worst march and two more will clear the desert, when provisions and water will again abound. Letters from Lord E. approving all I have done: great abuse in some of the papers of my review at Sukkur, and of my order about riding over people."

This order exhibiting his sarcastic vein run thus.

"Gentlemen as well as beggars may, if they like, ride to the devil when they get on horseback; but neither gentlemen nor beggars have a right to send other people there, which will be the case if furious riding be allowed in camp or bazaar. The major-general calls the attention of all the camp to the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, 18th ultimo, and begs to add, that he has placed a detachment of horse at Captain Pope's orders who will arrest any offender; and Captain Pope will inflict such fine or other punishment as the bazaar regulations permit. This order is to be published through the cantonments by beat of drum, for three successive days, and Captain Pope is not empowered to let any one off punishment, because, when orders have been repeated and not obeyed it is time to enforce them: without obedience an army becomes a mob, a cantonment a bear-garden. The enforcement of obedience is like physic—not agreeable, but at times very necessary.

"Journal, January 19th, Tugul.—Day's march long but easier, the country more level and the sand harder. To-morrow clear of the desert, for my interest is to march towards the river and throw myself on the direct road to Hydrabad. The Ameers want to get us into the hot weather. My supplies will meet me at *Bankia*, and thence my

march will be to *Peer Abubekr*, a central position, from whence to fall if necessary either upon the Ameers at Hydrabad or those of Kyrpoor. If all goes smooth with Outram I shall merely halt a day or two at *Abubekr*, to keep up their alarm and rest my camels before returning to Sukkur: but if the Ameers are *bumptious* a rapid march on Hydrabad shall give them a greater fright than they have yet had: if they will fight I am resolved to attack any force they can assemble, trusting to my twelve guns.

"Bankia, January 20.—Short march, water scarce: long march to-morrow and start at night.

"Peer Abubekr, 21st.—March of 25 miles. We are now again in Scinde proper. One mile eastward we crossed a range of hills running southward from Roree: how much further south I do not know. It is low and divides the Scinde from the *Thur*, as they call the desert: all the country east is called *Regeestan*, or the land of sand; and if it be not no land has a right to the name. How we rejoiced to get out. Comfortless, entirely without clean linen or clean water and scarcely sufficient food, we are come back to abundance and baggage! I am now safe. It was altogether a very ticklish position. A *simoom* might have given us a bad berth! They had ugly looks those vast waves of loose sand, evidently rolled and rollable by wind. Internally however I felt assured of success against all apprehended difficulties.

"22nd.—Ordered Colonel Pattle—left in command of the main columns—to break up from Dejee and join me here to-morrow. Being now on one of the roads leading from Kyrpoor to Hydrabad I shall rest men and camels, and await Outram's proceedings at Kyrpoor: we have good water and provisions. It is possible these fools may fight: I do not however call them fools for fighting, but for doing it so badly; they ought to have opposed me in the desert and made all their operations turn on that. If defeated they would have had Omercote and Hydrabad to fall back on,

and could finally have gone over the Indus to the mountains. There I could not follow without opening a new war, which Lord Ellenborough would probably not like after having just got out of the Auckland war."

Thus terminated the desert expedition, related with such unpretending simplicity but thus described by the Duke of Wellington.

"Sir Charles Napier's march upon Emaum Ghur is one of the most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of in my life. He moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces; he had his guns transported under circumstances of extreme difficulty and in a manner the most extraordinary, and he cut off a retreat of the enemy which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their position."

The desart march of Marius against Jugurtha's town of *Capsa* is perhaps the only enterprize of antiquity resembling this exploit of Charles Napier; but Marius had a powerful force which no enemy could have ventured near; whereas Charles Napier defied ten times his own number in the waste; and that, not to reach a defenceless unwarned city as the great Roman did, but a prepared and expectant foe four times his own strength and in a fortress! The duke's eulogium may therefore be accepted without abatement as a solid truth.

THIRTEENTH EPOCH.

FIFTH PERIOD.

COUNTING now on the same timid policy which he had overborne in Upper Scinde, the general hoped to reduce all to quietude without fighting; but influences, before unknown, were driving all things to confusion. The Beloochees, chiefs and followers, hardy and fierce beyond all other Asiatics, were bent on war, being inflamed by religious feelings, by hatred, and by the expectation of plundering the British army, whose prowess they despised from the defeats of small detachments and the great Cabool massacre. These influences had swayed the old Roostum in all his changes, overbearing his natural dislike to commotion: and they still swayed him; for having promised to repair to the general's camp in the desart, he in the night went southwards towards his sons and nephews, then at Dhingee. And again Outram, when going to meet the Vakeels, found Roostum in his old camp apparently without followers, for the wily old man kept his warriors, 6000 with guns, hidden, and received the commissioner with assurances of entire submission. Being then also urged to go to Kyrpoor for settlement of the treaty he, as before, pleaded fatigue and sent Outram on a fool's errand, promising to follow, but in the night once more retired to Dhingee. This was not fear but policy, engendered as before said by the kindling fury of the whole Belooch race; and he secretly guided his sons and nephews, though keeping aloof personally and hovering on the edge of the desart ready to join in the war or become submissive according to events. He expected the destruction

of the Emaum Ghur expeditionary corps; but when it returned to Tujul triumphant he directed the vagrant princes to retire to Khoonhera, a large fortress of his own south-east of Dhingee, within the desart but having plenty of water: thither he followed them.

Meanwhile the Hydrabad Ameers had called all their warriors, feudatories and allies, from mountain and plain, north west and south, to assemble at the capital for war; but they wanted three weeks for the full accomplishment when the fall of Emaum Ghur struck them with terror. They would then have submitted but for the menaces of the vagrant princes, who were filled with fury and being seconded by the fierce warrior tribes were more dreaded than the British general. However, in their first terror the throned Ameers forbad the vagrant princes to cross the Lower Scinde frontier, and even sent vakeels to Kyrpoor; but not within the prescribed period, not with full powers, Sobdar excepted, for he was playing with a more subtle deceit than even Roostum. The real object with all was however to gain time for their forces to assemble and to bring in the hot season. Many of the bravest feudatories coming from the northern hills, a distance of two hundred miles, were then close to the British camp; and to mask their movement other vakeels were sent to the general, avowedly as ambassadors but really as spies, and bearing with them letters to hasten the advance of the distant tribes.

Now also Outram had his secret views. The vilest of the Bombay journals had been filled with fulsome bombast about his abilities, and sneers at Sir C. Napier's imbecility: —such was the word. Outram's appointment as commissioner, that generous error of the general in his favour, was represented as a necessity, a cunning mask for covering deficiency with another's talent. To adopt the Ameers' cause and disparage Ali Moorad was essential to support these pretensions, and accordingly Outram became loud in praise of the Ameers and louder in abuse of Ali Moorad—oblivious

that his first communications to Sir C. Napier were exactly the reverse; oblivious also of the *Return of Complaints* against the Ameers drawn up by himself and furnishing the grounds for Ellenborough's new treaty. In that document he had denounced Futteh Ghoree as the ablest and most implacable enemy of the British in Scinde: he now demanded his release; and lauding the absolute good faith of the Ameers, deprecated the employment of military force and strived as strenuously as any Ameer to create delays: indeed with such pertinacity as to render it difficult to judge whether he considered himself their servant or that of the British government.

The general was not deceived either by Outram or the Ameers, but being entirely averse to bloodshed he, at Outram's request, extended the period for a peaceable settlement at Kyrpoor from the 20th to the 25th of January, although convinced that arms must finally decide and that he was thus endangering his army. Conscious of ability to retrieve lost advantages he accepted danger rather than haste where life was involved. Amazed however at Outram's sudden change and attributing it to honest error he wrote the following condensed friendly lecture.

"Major Outram, January.—Just received your letter of yesterday which grieves me exceedingly. My whole wish and desire is to act with honour towards the Ameers, and the history of their case is this. Lord Auckland begun by a great act of injustice, political injustice, which produced the treaties. Lord Ellenborough then came and had his line of policy, viz. to abandon all beyond and maintain all on the Indian side of the Indus. He found existing treaties with Scinde to maintain, but the only part of his predecessor's policy in which he appears to agree is the maintenance of free traffic on the Indus, with possession of certain towns on its banks the seizure of which was Lord Auckland's act; to keep them has been Lord Ellenborough's, in compliance with treaties which no man of sense will say

were well drawn up. With every respect for Lord Auckland, Sir H. Pottinger, and the memory of Sir A. Burnes, I must say their fame cannot rest upon the draft of either of these treaties with the Ameers; and I attribute their deficiency to the fact that the framers did not know how to cram injustice down the throats of men whom they believed able to resist. The result was, that they left crude, indeterminate, undefined things which they called treaties, and which they either had not the ability to foresee would end in mischief; or, foreseeing, had not moral courage to be decided: thus, both they and the Ameers, shrinking from a manly explanation which they thought would lead to a rupture, left all undecided!

"In this state Lord Ellenborough found matters, with the additional inconvenience of all our troubles in Affghanistan, where we had three distinct wars:—Keane's which was successful because chance made it so; MacNaughten's, which chance made unfortunate; Pollock's, which good conduct made successful, but which, as it was necessarily followed by a retreat, being only made to patch up wounded honour and a false policy, must in history be placed on the same footing. It is said now, and will be said by history, that in the Affghan war England was defeated, for her object was to place a king on a throne and she signally failed. Now I do not agree with you in thinking the Ameers are fools. I think them cunning rascals to a man if measured by our standard of honesty; but assuredly Lord Auckland's policy was not calculated to make them form a higher estimate of us. Well, they saw our defeat and that encouraged them to break existing treaties, it gave them heart, and that they hoped to have a second Cabool affair is as clear to me as the sun now shining.

"Such is the general outline of reasoning and events which brought the Ameers and us to the state with which Lord E. had to deal; and he, seeing everything going wrong,—very dangerously wrong too if you had not saved

General England's column,*—and being himself too far off, with too many important affairs on hand, determined to send an officer with powers to deal with Scinde and the Ameers: I was selected and found all in confusion, nothing defined, nothing positive or decisive. My very first entrance shewed how matters stood. I saw Lord Auckland's injustice had made a pretty net, and that nothing but decisive measures could break through it; but I did not know whether Lord E. would take the same view of things I did. I also saw as plain as A B C, that, as always must happen and therefore always does happen, a great injustice between nations could not be wound up without minor acts of injustice.

"Now what is to be done? That which is best for the advancement of good government and well-being of the population; and we must not sacrifice all this to a minute endeavour, utterly hopeless, I may say impossible, to give to these tyrannical, drunken, debauched, cheating, intriguing, contemptible Ameers, a due portion of the plunder they have amassed from the ruined people they conquered sixty years ago. They are fortunate robbers one and all, and though I most decidedly condemn the way we entered this country; just as honest however as that by which the Talpoors got it from the Kalloras; I would equally condemn any policy that allowed these rascals to go on plundering the country to supply their debaucheries after we had raised the hopes of every respectable man in the country. This I consider to be Lord E.'s view and in that sense I act. If I thought Lord E. was acting on an unjust plan I would of course obey my orders, but should deeply regret my position. But I do no such thing: the whole injustice was committed by Lord Auckland, and such a course of injustice cannot be closed without hardship on some one. It is likely to fall on the Ameers, and on a crew

* Cross note here by Sir C. Napier—"Outram had told me so and persuaded me it was true: it was not."

more deserving to bear it hardly could it alight. It falls heaviest on Roostum, an old worn debauchee, a man drunk every day of his life, breaking his own religious ordinances, and even the habits and customs of his country.

"You say they are all children and fools. Are these then the men for whom we should sacrifice the interests of a whole population to preserve them in secure possession of their plunder? Are such men fit to rule a realm? If we are unjust in being here at all at least let the people and ourselves draw from that injustice the benefits of civilization. This is my view, and I really think the Ameers' interests form a very minute ingredient in the business: least of all Roostum, who seems to have no one good or manly qualification. Why then support Ali Moorad? I will tell you. It is not that I think higher of him than of the rest. Is he better than Roostum? Yes! because a man with three ideas is better than one who has none! in morality perhaps he is not better, except being more sober. Besides I heard from all of you at the Residency, that Ali had boldly wished to oppose us at first but when he saw it was vain became friendly; that he had acted loyally from that time, which the others did not, except Sobdar, and he only from the tyranny of his family towards him.

"But I cast all these matters to the dogs, not caring if Ali be the devil incarnate. We wanted a head, and one not made by us but by their own rules, he falling naturally into the position. Accident opened a way of thus making Ali this head, and I saw if the opportunity was lost it might not again occur so favourably; therefore I promised to make him Rais if Roostum resigned. This Lord Ellenborough approved, and I am confident it was right. I learned Ali Moorad's consistency of character from *you;* I learned the strength and justice of his claims from *you,* and have never seen anything to make me doubt the justice of your then views both of the claims and the man. I have no more doubt of it than I have that they are intriguing against

him; but that is no affair of mine, neither his nor their intrigues will make me march a *coss* or halt an hour! And if they assassinate him, as he told me they mean to do, and that the assassin is not the Rais in succession, the only effect will be changing the name of Ali Moorad to Ali something else.

"It is the *Rais*, not the man we have to deal with; and that Rais must be our slave, dependent; his real interest and that of the population are one, and that one must be ours also, viz. *good government!* Can the Scindians expect this under Roostum? or under the intriguing posse of Talpoors? Certainly not. I see but two parties with one interest:—my own country and the population of Scinde. The Rais I consider a convenience: the Talpoor family I do not consider at all, nor see why we should support their unjust power, or secure to them the amassed plunder of an unhappy population. I cannot abandon this general view to enter into the details of family arrangements, and a vile family too; still less do I think the governor-general can enter on such minutiæ: we have to do with the rulers of Scinde only. They are you say eighteen in number; we can reduce them in Upper Scinde to one, and if possible we ought to do the same in Lower Scinde; then the population will have a chance: one robber may be controlled but to control a gang of eighteen is more difficult.

"These rulers by breach of treaty have obliged the governor-general to inflict a penal treaty; he gives up all tribute and takes land, and what we have to do is, so regulate the details of exchange as to make the sacrifice of the value of land taken, beyond that of tribute remitted, fall upon those deemed guilty and not on those deemed innocent. I originally proposed an exchange of tribute against territory, giving Lord Ellenborough all the information you and I could collect. I believe it was tolerably correct. He considered that the Ameers deserved signal punishment and decided upon the draft treaty sent down; it leaves, as

you tell me, about £100,000 yearly for the punished chiefs: you must agree therefore that they are not left to '*starve.*' I have thus given you my view from first to last, and do not believe it very different from your own; but in any case it is right to explain it in order to remove any objectionable ideas.

"It is true that, right or wrong, I throw the whole burthen of the treaty on Lord Ellenborough's shoulders. To be sure I do. He is the responsible authority, I am only answerable for the information I furnish him. If Parliament impeached him, as it did Warren Hastings, he could not throw his responsibility on me, he would be laughed at. All he could do would be to say, I acted on Napier's information, that was good or bad. I gave him such orders, he executed them well or ill. Now I maintain that I gave him correct information, on which he has issued his draft treaty and we have to arrange the details: i. e. so to apply its provisions that the forfeit may be paid by the opposing, not the friendly Ameers: but whether it leaves the former one, or one million rupees does not come within our competence.

"I will give up the whole of this day to the re-perusal of your letter and the deepest consideration of all it contains, to see if there be any way left, in which I am authorized to act, that can make the provisions of the treaty fall lighter on the parties who lose: not as thinking they are unjustly treated but to prevent them fighting or rather plundering their own people, which they would do without mercy to annoy Ali Moorad, as he would otherwise have the plunder to himself. However one robber under surveillance is less mischievous than eighteen uncontrolled.

"I make no apology for this long letter. You and I have one object, which is to arrange the treaty with all regard to honour and justice the case admits of, that we may not sacrifice the great primary interests of the British government and those of the great population on the banks

of the Indus, to the very secondary interests of a worthless family of robbers. If my view be erroneous tell me so and give your reasons. Believe me, I am too impressed with the responsibility of my position to listen to your arguments with prejudice; on the contrary, everything you say has full weight. Prove to me that I am in error and you shall see that I will correct myself; but a deep consideration of the subject has produced the foregoing reflections and no light that my mind can furnish gives a different view of the subject. I am not likely to be influenced by every whipper-snapper chap who fancies he can govern: nine years at the head of a government taught me that very few know anything of the matter; and those few constantly commit errors. Therefore, were I to assume that I am one of the few, which I do not, still I should feel bound to attend to and give my best consideration to everything said by such a man as you, for free discussions produce truth. You have my full view, put hastily together and without connection for I have written my letter in an hour. But if in talking this matter over with Brown either of you differ with me, tell me your reasons and if I persevere in error it will be with my eyes open, and you will have done your part to the public and increased my deep regard.

"P.S. I think your going to Hydrabad good, but let us first see what a few days' delay and a march on my part towards Hydrabad on the 27th will do."

Outram had proposed to go as an envoy to Hydrabad, saying he could surely bring the Ameers to reason; for in defiance of all secret information and rejecting all ascertained facts, he persisted in asserting that the Ameers had no design to war, and that his presence at Hydrabad would allay all uneasiness: he thus thought to justify the assertions of his Bombay associates, namely, that he only could conduct the affairs of Scinde. Happily for England and the oppressed people of the country those affairs were in the hands of a man of talent and character.

"Journal, January 23rd.—Peer Abubekr. My troops from Dejee have joined. Heard from Outram: the Ameers are very tricky, which worries him but does not worry me. He enters too much into their intrigues; at least he attaches much importance to them, whereas I attach none! They may intrigue as they please, my road is clear. If I depended on all, or any one Ameer, the case would be different: if a man trusts a rotten branch he will tumble from the tree; but my trust is in my three thousand men here and the eight other battalions I can bring down. What have we to do with their petty rascally intrigues? I will walk over them all as I do over the stubble before my tent. It is clear that we must move on Hydrabad to quell these fighting cocks.

"January 24th.—Outram is a clever fellow, but he seems to have been so long accustomed to Indian tricks that he thinks them of real importance. He is now so full of Ali Moorad's intrigues that he draws conclusions quite erroneous: all Ameers are knaves, Ali Moorad is an Ameer, ergo Ali Moorad is a knave! But this syllogism is not sufficient for Outram. He has worked up such a superstructure on Ali Moorad's foundation of knavery that he fancies the man cannot eat his dinner without having a deep intrigue in his pillau: and thus exciting himself he daily adds to the virtues of the other Ameers until we might imagine them the most ill-used persons alive. They are daily committing themselves and Outram attributes it all to Ali Moorad's advice. How is this? They know Ali as well as Outram knows him, being his brothers, nephews, and cousins; they are also his enemies, and he theirs as Outram says and probably truly; yet they choose unaccountably to take his advice in preference to mine and Outram's!

"They are furious at the penal treaty imposed for their treason to us; this naturally produces a desire to resist, and they try to oppose my operations by bullying, by robbing

my dâks, raising troops, pretending submission to gain time, and so forth. Outram attributes all this to Ali Moorad! That Ali, like all barbarian princes, is inclined to any and every trick is likely; so are the other Ameers, but that Outram overlooks, and in his indignation against Ali Moorad he every day puts such a fresh coat of whitewash on the others that they will soon be apostles: they are indeed fifteen, but as he condemns three, namely Ali, Nusseer Khan, and Meer Mohamed, the right number is obtained. These apostles are however daily drunk with bhang; they are daily playing tricks on us; daily robbing their own people. Outram's own letter to Lord Keane proves clearly that they pillaged that officer's army in the grossest manner and nearly starved it; and a more base and disgusting set of knaves never made a land unhappy. Yet he, Outram, now thinks them a second edition of the apostles, and also of martyrs, and abuses Ali Moorad! who by the way has always behaved loyally to us, as all the politicals, Outram amongst the rest, have told me.

"I much fear this will cause great delay in our treaty, and that I have made a mistake in appointing Outram. If he will become a partizan for that old animal Roostum there will be no end of our negociations. Roostum has become old and silly before his time by drunkenness and debauchery. Outram calls him '*venerable old man.*' Venerable because he has grey hair. So have I without being venerable.

"January 25th.—Outram says the vakeels will not meet at Kyrpoor; and he is daily growing a stronger partisan of the inimical Ameers whom, awhile agone, he abused to Sir John Keane, '*pis que pendre,*' and most justly. And because I will not suffer them to train me into a similar state he calls them ill-used! not by me, but deceived by Ali Moorad! Now the least consideration would fix the truth. Roostum has known and been in constant intercourse with Outram for years; he knows that Outram wishes him well, and Outram has twice seen him, twice advised him

within the last three weeks: twice he has promised to act by Outram's advice and twice done exactly the reverse the very next day! Yet Outram believes that Roostum, his sons, and nephews, are all under the influence of Ali their bitter enemy—so called by him and them, yet take Ali Moorad's advice in preference to the advice of Outram himself whom they all believe to be their friend! And in the same breath he says Ali is a fool, and that they are fools! When it is objected, that to influence enemies against friends demands talent. Oh! Sheik Ali Hussein, a clever fellow, rules him! Does that choice mark folly?

"I see the whole case. Outram has fallen from the vast power given to him as chief political; he admits the propriety of this and tried to school his mind to what he feels is right; but during that hard trial for an enthusiastic mind he had another blow to bear for which he was unprepared. He felt his own merit and that of those who served under him, and when he expected thanks, and where rewards even were due, Lord Ellenborough offered personal insult and contumely in a way that—were he Mr. Ellenborough, Outram would have made him answer personally. His position precluded that, and the insult has rankled in his mind so that he can no longer judge impartially where Lord Ellenborough enters. That Outram is out of favour is wholly the fault of General England and his defeat at Hykulzie. England tried to save himself from odium by crushing Lieut. Hamersley. Lord E. believed Hamersley in fault, Outram defended him; Lord E. vexed at the defeats, and not over-conversant with military affairs, fell on both, and does not see how unjust he has been: this is a serious wrong."

It has been shewn that all this animadversion was founded on the false information given by Outram: Lord Ellenborough had done no wrong, and was safe in any capacity, Outram's taste being to be fiercest at a distance.

"January 27th.—Allee ka Tanda. We left camp this

morning, a fifteen mile march. The Ameers are collecting forces to meet me the 29th. I am ready. I thought this possible, though unlikely, and ordered Jacob to march with the Scinde horsemen by the Dâk road while I marched by the river road, which runs nearly parallel. The Dâk road skirts the desert and turns all these wild chaps in upon me: if we meet I will turn their right again if I can; they cannot pass the river and must surrender or be shoved into the Indus.

"Helleanee, January 28th.—A very large village with several mosques, a town in this land of sheds and castles, slavery and tyranny, of great riches and great poverty—everywhere ruins, nowhere anything arising. Outram calls it a '*patriarchal government.*' Oh dear! How prejudice deceives the view. These Talpoor patriarchs found Scinde 60 years ago flourishing, and now every town is ruined, agriculture and commerce all but annihilated, the people little better than wild animals and living in straw sheds, or such wretched mud houses as would '*beggar all Ireland.*' Patriarchs!

"I have bullied the Ameers of Hydrabad. They have at last sent vakeels with full powers to Outram: the Kyrpoor Ameers still hold out and I am marching on them. The Indus on their left is impassable; Jacob skirts the desert on their right with 600 horsemen; the Hydrabad Ameers refuse them shelter and I bear down on their front. This will tame them or the devil's in them, and will make them fight, when of course they must have a devil of a thrashing: but they will cry peccavi or disperse.

"January 29th.—Kundiaree. Short march, road good. A large village, pretty, clean, and on a hill, overlooking a magnificent plain alluvial and boundless!"

Affairs were now coming to a crisis. Each hour events and changes happened, and being only cursorily noted in the journal require a continuation of the explanatory narrative.

The period first appointed for the assembly of vakeels at

Kyrpoor was, as shewn, extended to the 26th of January; it was again extended to the 1st of February, so reluctant was the general to hasten on war. Meanwhile the Hydrabad vakeels were, although without full powers, sent back with compliments because Major Outram had now obtained a reluctant consent to go to Hydrabad. Sir C. Napier however, as seen, continued his march to give effect to the negociation and in that view wrote amicably to the Ameers, but ended with a stern intimation that he would effect his object by force if necessary. They were then however themselves intent on war: they had stopped the dâks, had stolen by means of emissaries the general's correspondence with Outram, had sent armed parties down the Indus from Hydrabad to slay the British detachments and followers and to plunder the military posts; had thrown the country into confusion and called on the whole Beloochee race to *fight for Islam*. The most distant tribes, north south and west, from hill and plain, were hastening to Hydrabad, whither Roostum had also now repaired, leaving his sons and nephews with 7000 men and seven guns at Khoonhera on the left flank of the British. Moreover Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor, although in no way menaced or mixed up with the penal treaty, had prepared a large force to join the camp at Hydrabad, and had offered Omercote in the desart as a base and refuge for the Kyrpoor vagrants.

To give time for assembling all these forces every deceit was practised on the general and his Commissioner Outram; and with the latter the Ameers succeeded even to their own amazement at his folly. Persuading him that no troops were assembled, even while they were entrenching a whole army within a few miles, they signed the treaty in solemn dhurbar one day and next morning, bribing his moonshee to steal it from his desk, tore it in pieces, having previously prepared a plot to murder him in the dhurbar—relinquished only in the hope of getting the general into their power. This hope had been excited by Outram, who told

them that he had written to ask the general to quit his army and place himself before them: three times in one day he had thus written, and with the most strenuous entreaty to comply: nay! he urged him, not only to put himself thus into their power but to move his army towards Meerpoor on the side of the desart, where separated from its supplies and line of retreat, having its back to the waste, surrounded on all points and without a leader, it must have perished! What his object was cannot be affirmed, but his conduct would render any assumption plausible. His expression was, that the general's coming to Hydrabad *would remove all difficulties.* The keen answer was, *yes! and my head from my shoulders.*

At the time he made this insane proposition, sixty thousand Beloochee warriors were entrenched at Meeanee, a few miles off; the Lion of Meerpoor was preparing to join them with twelve thousand; two tribes, counting at least eight thousand, were crossing the Indus from the west with the same object; the Chandians, ten thousand strong, coming from the north, were closing on the British rear; the Kyrpoor Ameers, seven thousand, were on the left flank, and not less than forty thousand other warriors were gathering behind the Chandians. In fine the Ameers' plan was now ripe, and no longer able to hide it even from their miserable dupe Outram, having lost the opportunity for murdering him and, being foiled as to getting the general into their power, they assailed the Residency in arms.

Meanwhile the second set of vakeels or deputies had met Sir C. Napier, and he, willing to give Outram's negociations free play, again extended the terms of peace until the 6th of February, with a promise not to advance before that day: they in return promised to bring the Kyrpoor Ameers to submission, protesting with all imaginable earnestness that the Hydrabad princes were entirely obedient: and partly he believed them thinking their masters had not courage to fight and undervaluing the Beloochee

chivalry. He however knew the danger was great, and worse it proved than he thought; yet what he knew was enough to trouble the firmest spirit. His spies agreed, one and all, that more than twenty thousand warriors were encamped at Meeanee, and that ten thousand others would be there soon: but his principal and surest emissary affirmed that forty thousand would be found there by the 17th, and that finally eighty thousand would be gathered. It was an awful storm cloud to face, but with the heart of a hero he bounded forward.

"Journal, January 30th. Beria.—Our march tardy because of the *nullahs*. Watercourses is the right name, but we get here a slip-slop way of writing quite contemptible. We have *mutual* instead of *common* friends: we write, not to the person but to his *address*, and all ditches are *nullahs*. This day deputies from the Ameers met me when riding ahead of the advanced guard; they knew me by my retinue but I passed without noticing them. Glad they were there though. For the troops just then appeared, and these Scindian grandees were on a slight rise and saw the column which could not have been less than a mile and a half long. We had a long confab: the fat knaves did their best to make me procrastinate, for the hot weather was in their heads, and in mine also. However I gave them six days to bring in the Kyrpoor Ameers, which they said they could not do if I moved. After making a great objection to halting I pretended to yield; my object really being to wait for supplies from Sukkur and for Outram's arrival at Hydrabad. Now they are gone, convinced their arts held me back though able to go on, which on necessity I indeed could but would rather not. My foundation for defence if attacked in England is thus widened, having given seven days beyond the period of right to act vigorously. This sounds and is fair: my object is to be fair without being duped by these chaps, who are as full of cunning as an egg is of meat; but neither fair play nor convenience shall keep me from hostilities beyond the 6th of February.

"My God how I hate war and all its garnish! The exercise of the creative faculties is my nature, my bent, my happiness. It is also John Kennedy's. Never did we differ, except in the slope of a road; but if he ever reads this journal he will learn that I was quite right about the slope. He has it now all his own way in the north of Ireland: but John Kennedy, a constant slope for twenty-five miles will not do. You have but one fault, you would keep a poor horse on the drag for twenty-five miles! and for that you will hereafter have to walk up a hot iron slope, one in twelve, with bare feet. War is natural to me but I love it not. I hate to destroy. Everybody was delighted to see Emaum Ghur blown up; to me it was pain, I was cast down, thinking of all the labour and pleasure constructing it had given. Yet I also thought of its object: that it was a hold for robbers, tyrants; a fortress surrounded by wilds where the poor had only hurdles to shelter them from the sun while their substance was consumed by the lords of the fortress. Ali Moorad, delighted like the rest, fired shells into it himself! Man loves mischief. Well, so best, it keeps the world sweet, but for that we should stagnate.

"His sister. Nowshara, January 30th.—The deputies left my camp this morning, with my promise to halt here five days while they persuade the Khoonhera Ameers to be submissive. On the 5th day I will declare open war, but I have risked this loss of time to spare blood if I *can*. I have also let Outram go to Hydrabad with the same view, yet am almost sorry for doing so: however my intention has been good and there is still time to strike, having already gained above a third of the distance to Hydrabad. The Kyrpoor chaps, being refused entrance into Lower Scinde and cut off from the desert, must give in, fight or disperse. If they give in my game is won; if they fight, they will be destroyed; if they disperse I take possession of their territories and my orders are executed.

"There will be violent attacks on Lord Ellenborough's

treaty, but that's his affair. You have now the history of my operations in the abstract and in a day or two this letter shall be closed with an account of the result. Of that I feel sure, but whatever it may be it will decide my character as a commander and a politician, being too old if I lose to make another. Government would indeed be inexcusable to trust me again, nor would I wish to be trusted: an unsuccessful young commander may regain reputation, an old one has no chance. Having done all my mind suggested a failure will be from want of calibre for the difficult negociations entrusted to me, but which I never sought. The most difficult part is being neither at peace nor war, but a week will settle all. The desert march was a *nervous* matter I assure you!"

Here this letter suddenly breaks off, but will be resumed after the battle then impending.

"Journal, Nowshara, January 30th.—Charles the First lost his head on this anniversary, my hope is not to lose mine, but I am in a dangerous position. Hardly able to spare one day I have yet given the Ameers five after they had forfeited all claim to even an hour: nor should they have had that hour if a halt had not been necessary for my troops. I have secret information that their affected submission is mere deceit and they have assembled a large force to attack me when off my guard: but I am on my guard and they may attack me when they please. If they would turn out thirty thousand in my front it would relieve me from the detestable feeling of having to deal with poor miserable devils that cannot fight and are seeking pardon by submission. Twenty times a day I am forced to say to myself, trust them not, they are all craft, be not softened.

"February 1st.—I have spoken very seriously to the commanders of corps about the ill-treatment of the camels. These poor patient creatures are cruelly loaded, and when they sink under the weight are beaten and their nostrils torn to pieces by pulling and working to make them rise; which they only do for a while and then fall to die. Three

days ago fifteen died on the road under cruel treatment, no one denies the fact: the government order, reinforced by mine, limits a camel's load to 330 lbs., and this is the maximum under which an inferior camel can work. Yet I have seized and weighed the loads of many camels on the march which have passed 800 lbs.! A camel is as different from a horse in his nature as in his appearance and anatomy; he never recovers being knocked up but grows weaker and weaker till he dies. Rest recovers a horse, it will not restore a camel; if he does not die outright he remains a poor weak object, piteous to behold.

"The camel also gets the mange, which kills him if not early attended to; no rest or food will relieve his sufferings, and I am told they absolutely tear their own flesh with their teeth: his strength seems a sort of fixed capital which every exertion diminishes. Their strong legs bear a great weight, and their hardy nature bears up long with little food or water, from the powers of the second stomach: if fairly loaded he does his work right well, but only in the desert can he rival the horse or mule; he requires great nursing and is altogether an inferior animal. I was however struck by one peculiarity, which makes me hope the camel does not suffer from the horrid treatment inflicted as much as a horse or mule. When struck with a heavy cutting whip by the most rigorous and merciless arm he never flinches, nor springs, but keeps his solemn majestic walk with his nose in the air as if not touched: if he is drawing, you perceive a gradual increase of energy but no sudden pull, no indication of pain: nor does he groan.

"Poor patient brutes. I pity them much and hope to save them and ourselves from the cursed fools who overload them, and who will cripple my operations: we lose about five camels a day now. In the desert the camel has no rival; his great splay feet never sink in the sand, the heat never worries him; he defies thirst beyond all other beasts and eats all that is to be had: nor does he require a great

deal. All he asks is not to be overloaded, and nature has pointed this out so clearly to him and us, that this beast who shows no sign of pain or complaint when whipped makes most piteous moanings and growlings when too much is being put upon him: they are his remonstrances, which the two-legged beasts will not listen to and the poor camels are killed by brutes.

"Nowshara, February 2nd.—Marauders last night plundered near our camp. Charged on the Beloochees, but it would not surprize me if it was our camp followers; yet having flogged a dozen or two for such things they would hardly have had courage. To a Beloochee plunder is a virtuous exercise of his gifts, but I doubt their venturing near our camp.

"February 3rd. — Jacob's horse, 500, are at Synd Nawab; all communication with the desert is thus cut off. I am nervous about the heat. Five days ago we had ice, and now the sun keeps everybody stripped in tents! There is no sickness yet, but this sun will soon form an hospital; however, being on the river my sick can go up by water to Sukkur. I will stand no more blarney, at which the Ameers would beat any Irishman that ever drunk whiskey. How can Outram be so deceived by these men? they have humbugged our politicals for five years; every dog has his day, so have the Ameers; but if I am not self-deceived their reign of humbug is now over.

"February 4th.—My spies say reinforcements are pouring in: fifteen hundred of them said to be passing near Jacob, and my orders to him are, to avoid a collision if possible but to stand no insult. Nusseer Khan, Mahomed and Shadad, have sent me a most impudent tricky letter, it shall not be answered.

"February 5th.—The Ameers of Kyrpoor are not gone, they said they were going but are not gone: they shall not deceive me. The 'Bombay Times' has a ridiculous *fanfaronnade* about Outram. Luckily I am not of a jealous dis-

position or this would make me angry; it will make Outram so, it places him in such a ridiculous light to those who know he had nothing to do with the affair: he is too delicate and fine a fellow to sit quiet under such false praise."—He not only did sit quiet, but was reasonably suspected of having written it himself.

"February 6th, Sudooja.—The politicals fancy the Ameers are fools, but they are adepts in diplomacy and will fool me if I am not sharp. This day I sent those of Hydrabad an injunction to turn the Kyrpoor Ameers out of their territory, or they should be all treated as enemies. It was on the 18th December that, by Lord Ellenborough's orders, I directed them to dismiss their troops, and to this day I have refrained: my patience has been great, and if I delay longer it will be disobedience of orders and risking the safety of my own troops. Outram is therefore directed to tell them, that if their armed men are not dismissed instantly they shall be by force of arms. The question is now brought to this point. My orders are precise and must be obeyed. The Talpoors and their Beloochee robbers oppose us, the people flock to us and follow us. Our bazaar is larger and better supplied than that of Sukkur, though the Ameers are working heaven and earth to starve us; but my rigid discipline, and money, brings them all to us. The richness of the soil is indescribable; it is Egypt; yet waste and desolate because the robber rules: when he falls the peasant may cultivate in safety, not till then.

"Moorah, February 7th.—Abuse in the newspapers: one says I do nothing; another that I do all myself: a third that I take no advice or suggestions—not far wrong. A fourth that I am aware of my own imbecility and am entirely guided by Outram! Ain't I a funny fellow? However a letter from Lord Ellenborough attributes the prospect of peace in Scinde mainly to my 'decision and enterprize;'—alluding to the desert march, which now appears to people

an easy matter: it was before looked on as an *ugly job*, and it might easily have been so.

"Doutulpoor, February 8th.—Nothing new, save my having given a hard-headed native a blow on the forehead with my fist for brutality to a camel, and as my horse sprung forward at the instant my hand was horribly sprained: had it knocked my friend down it would have been some comfort, but his head was like an anvil. These chaps will, for a bet, butt with their heads like rams, running at full speed, sometimes two or three courses before one is stunned.

"Kaja Ke Gote, February 9th.—Just heard that the Beloochees swear they will march against me the 11th.

"Sukurunda, 10th.—Long march. Fitzgerald arrived with a letter from Outram; and he found Jacob near this, who has thus left the desert open! Well it can't be helped, there was not water or food, and as I have cut them off their desert fort they cannot fly there. Fitzgerald thinks they can collect eighteen thousand horse and some two or three thousand infantry, all badly armed: — twenty thousand against less than three thousand! If they have courage they may annoy me sadly by a harassing warfare: but all this I expected, it is the nature of these things and must be met with resolution, activity, and some severity; the latter by far the most disagreeable part, but in war one's point must be won, gently or roughly, but it must be won."

The Fitzgerald mentioned above had been detached from Emaum Ghur to explore the desart road to Balmeer, on the side of India. "He volunteered it from a spirit of adventure," said Sir C. Napier, "and he is a zealous, bold, and very powerful young man, and a good surveyor." He was then beginning to ascertain the qualities of the young men around him, and at this time again tells Lord Ellenborough —he has "met with few men of Lieut. Rathborne's calibre, who is unassuming as he is able; that he knows not if he is a '*splendid Persian*,' or has '*passed in the languages*'

which seem to be the acme of genius and knowledge in India, but he would serve well in any post."

"February 11th, Sukurunda.—Halted at the request of Outram, and because my camels were tired. The sun very powerful. My spies say the Ameers' plan is to fight if I march on Koonhera; but if on Hydrabad the Kyrpoor Beloochees will march northward to attack Ali Moorad: a good plan but not so easily executed as they imagine.

"February 12th, same place.—A provoking thing has occurred. Some armed Belooch cavalry passed Jacob's camp and he arrested them of course, but they refuse to come in as prisoners, or to be disarmed. A squadron of regular cavalry has gone to bring them here, and my hope is that numbers will bully them into submission: if not, some will be killed and it would be no surprise if a rescue was attempted on the return. If they get slain it will be bad, as Outram has just written that the Ameers have faithfully promised to sign the treaty as yesterday.

"February 13th.—The Ameers did not sign the treaty on the 11th because it was the last of the *Moharŭm* or holy feast: they are humbugging Outram again. He writes, that the Ameers had not yet signed; this was on the 12th. Another despatch at 3 o'clock P.M.; they had not then signed! He says '*not a man in arms is at Hydrabad.*' Why they have been marching on that place from many directions, and thousands have got there: all our spies are agreed on this. I am puzzled. He prays me not to move. I must move. What work he makes about Roostum's nerves! but I have my soldiers' health and safety, and my own character to think of: I have driven these wolves into a sack and will not be their dupe.

"The twenty-five chiefs seized yesterday are all of the great Murree tribe. What luck for me! On their leader, Hyat Khan, chief of the whole tribe, was found an order for Mahomed Khan the Hydrabad Ameer, who is assuring Outram that there is no intention to resist—directing Hyat to *assemble*

every male able to wield a sword and join his victorious Beloochee troops at Meeanee on the 9th. This letter is dated the same day as one to me, wherein the same Mahomed swears his devotion to the British government, and entreats me not to frighten the Kyrpoor Ameers by advancing before the 9th, by which time he would persuade them to sign the treaty."

When Hyat Khan was arrested he exclaimed, *Why do you stop me? There are 600 Beloochees in a village only a coss off; there are plenty everywhere.* This was the moment Outram took to urge the general to quit his army.

"The knaves thought to assemble their troops before I was upon them, but accidents intervened. The Beloochees would not move until the Moharum was over, which only ended the 11th: meantime I had got in the way. The Murree *tribe* indeed passed my camp in the night, but we were not looking out, we were waiting for the signed treaty; moreover, being in a large jungle twenty thousand men might pass without our knowledge; but we pinned their chiefs, who being a small party expected to pass unmolested. To-morrow I march to attack all that meet me armed. Outram has at Hydrabad one hundred Europeans 22nd Regiment, and thirty Sepoys, which, as he says there are no armed men in Hydrabad beyond the usual attendants, can defend the Residency; the armed steamers are also collected there, and the house is on the edge of the river. I am glad to have had the foresight to send the light company to him, they would thrash five times their number: moreover Sobdar, the most powerful Ameer, is our ally; so is young Hussein Ali. To-morrow may be a day of events. God knows, but with his will I mean this week to end the vacillating state my desire to save these fellows has placed us in.

"Syndabad, 14th.—Got here without an attack. A *Cossid*, foot messenger, from Major Outram. Yesterday the Ameers all signed the treaty in full dhurbar, except Nusseer Khan of Kyrpoor: the Beloochees are furious at what they call

the cowardice of the Ameers. Rightly they call it if prudence be cowardice; we call it the better part of valour, and it is clearly the wiser part, a great point in war. Outram had no sooner quitted the dhurbar than he was insulted by an immense mass of armed Beloochees, who had laid a plot to murder him on his way to the Residency. He is now it is to be hoped satisfied that there are armed men in Hydrabad! His three letters yesterday all assured me there were none!!! I have mistaken the man. He expects to be besieged in the Residency and applies to me for ammunition provisions and reinforcements. He took a guard of thirty Sepoys from Sukkur, but I, having misgivings of what would happen and being convinced he was duped by the Ameers and his own anger against Lord Ellenborough, sent the light company of the 22nd after him in a steamer, and more magnificent soldiers nature never *turned out of hand* as Sir Thomas McMahon says. But for those chaps my uneasiness would be considerable. Even they may be, as Outram now suspects, too few, and another steamer has therefore gone down with 50 men and 10,000 rounds of ammunition, and in three days I shall be within cannon shot to beat up their quarters.

"At midnight we march for *Hala*, where there will be choice of two roads; one by the river by which we come slap on their front, leaving their rear open; one by my left, through *Shak-i*, and *Jamalaka-Tanda* which turns their right and forces them to battle with their back to the Indus: to this my inclination bends, but it is dangerous. 1st. Because 2800 men will be opposed to 25,000 or 30,000, and these are stiff odds. 2nd. A reverse would cut me off from the river and my supplies. 3rd. A repulse would add 20,000 men to the enemy; for barbarians hold no faith with the beaten, and numbers are now abiding the issue of the first fight. Meer Sobdar sent word secretly that, if I approved, he would join the other Ameers with five thousand men but turn to me in the fight! My answer was that I would attack

all who joined them and his men among the rest: I wanted no help. This vagabond is aiming to keep well with both sides and fall upon the weakest. If there was the least danger of my being beaten it would be by such a rascal's taking an opportunity to cause a panic with the Sepoys. I floored his proposal with scorn. All the doubtful would on a repulse turn upon us, and certainly it is no over-estimate to say, that with a beaten force I should have to fight a way to Sukkur through fifty thousand men: this would be κακιδουλιὰ as the modern Greeks say.

"On the other hand, if victorious I should utterly extirpate the Beloochee army, and I am as sure of victory as a man who knows that victory is an accident can be. Now for the river road. It is shorter and my right flank is secure; if worsted, my provisions are safe in the steamers; the nearer the river the more ditches, and as the Ameers have most cavalry that suits me best. They have twenty thousand horsemen; mine are but eight hundred and a victory will not therefore be so decisive: still I can pursue them with vigour. Yes! I will march along the river and trust to manœuvring in the battle for turning their right, without losing the river myself.

"Hala, 15th.—Sent orders for more troops to come down the Indus with supplies. My resolution is firm now to attack at all hazards; I could not bring more men into the field for want of camels, but to fall back would raise the country. There is but one thing—battle! Had Elphinstone fought he would not have lost his character; had Wellington waited for Stevenson at Assaye he would have been beaten. Monson hesitated, and retreated, and was beaten."

At this time Outram's absurdity became so glaring that the general, fearing with reason that he would commit the government to some dangerous promise, forbad him in the most imperative terms to take any further steps. It was full time, for he had already added to his other presumptuous

meddling that of stopping the march of the 41st Regiment, then going to Kurrachee by order of the governor-general!

"16th, Muttaree.—Outram has rejoined me. He has thrashed his assailants at the Residency. Of the Beloochees one hundred were killed by the 22nd men, whose conduct Outram says was capital, but he was compelled to give up the defence from want of ammunition." Here a cross note of later date says "His men had twenty rounds each left! All these things come out after an action. Who in my position ever inquires at the moment, or doubts detailed statements? Those who do lose their game as well as time.

"Journal.—I gave orders for each man to have sixty rounds but was disobeyed, and Outram says with sixty rounds more he would not have budged, confident of my coming to his aid; which by the way he had done his best to prevent! I did however march rapidly towards him, and sent ammunition by water, which reached him just after he abandoned the Residency. He tells me the Ameers have eighteen thousand men now, that our battle will be desperate, and he wishes me still to wait a day while he fires a shikargah from the river! I have refused to halt an hour, it would give heart to the enemy; and were these 36,000 instead of 18,000 I would attack them to-morrow. I have therefore allowed Outram to fire the wood from the river, while I fire it with my howitzers from the front."—They had 36,000.

Outram is here found voluntarily going away from a battle, which he declared would be desperate, and his first demand was for Europeans, of which not more than four hundred were in the whole army! he was forced to content himself with Sepoys. The ground of his proposal to delay a day was still, that the Ameers were pacifically inclined! Bedlam, not the Residency, should have been his destination. Battle was now inevitable: it was Charles Napier's

first essay as a commander, and under adverse chances which might have appalled the most experienced general.

"John Kennedy, February 16th.—To-morrow I march towards Meeanee, where report says the Ameers have thirty thousand men, but have not the pluck to lead them in person. I march at midnight and may begin the battle sooner than the tribes who have sworn on the Koran to destroy us expect. I can take into action about two thousand eight hundred men and twelve guns; they have about the same number of guns, but their cavalry is called twenty thousand, and on a smooth plain; mine are about 800, long odds, but to-morrow or the day after we shall know each other's value. I have one British regiment, the 22nd. Magnificent Tipperary! I would not give the '*specimens*' for a deal just now. There may be no time to write to-morrow to my best-loved friends, and with my battle luck my letter-writing may be altogether interrupted: if so, you and my brother William will find in my journal and letter-books ample materials to defend me from the Indian press, the editors of which are perhaps the most infamous and degraded set in the world.

"Lord Ellenborough has interrupted the robbery of the treasury by certain civilians in India, and has held up the glorious Indian army for admiration, and the Company's officers are superb: but because he has done this, those civilians, living cheek by jowl with the editors, have turned the press against him. And because he has given me latitude of command, have also fallen on me in a way to be sure which draws ridicule on themselves: if I am killed there will be no end to their lies; but through the English papers, whose editors are men of some character and gentlemen, William and you can set me right. God bless you. To fall will be to leave many I love, but to go to many loved, to my home! and that in any case must be soon."

Such were his feelings, and when told by his spies that

the Beloochees would soon have sixty thousand in the field, "*Let them be sixty or a hundred thousand I will fight*" was his private note.

"Journal, 16th February.—My troops are in high spirits, so am I. Not to be anxious about attacking such immensely superior numbers is impossible, but it is a delightful anxiety. Three hours I have to get some sleep, and at nine o'clock to-morrow my gallant soldiers shall be launched against these brave Beloochees! It is my first battle as a commander, it may be my last! At 60 that makes little difference, but as my feelings are it shall be *do or die*. Beaten I could not shew my face, unless the fault was with the troops. I would not be in General England's place for worlds—poor man, I did my best to comfort him. Had I listened to Outram I should have now been three marches northward, and the Ameers would have leisure to assemble all their hordes! Well, I will just visit the outposts and then lie down to sleep, for I had none last night, having been constantly called up by some foolish report or other.

"Poor Mr. Howel, the Ameers' master-general of ordnance, refused to fire on his countrymen and they put him to death:"—a false report—"now if I win to-morrow, and catch Nusseer Khan, as may probably happen, he shall be tried by a military commission and hanged for this murder. A poor American aimed wide at our steamers, and they cut off his nose and ears and then slew him!"—a confusion of Howel's story. "Outram is not now so full of the *amiable qualities* of his Ameers. If I ever write again in this journal these matters shall be related. Should we be beaten a stiff stand shall be made, with my back to the river, until troops come to me from Sukkur. God bless my wife and precious girls, my hope is to live or die worthy of them: no Cabool for me to make them blush.

"Meeanee, February 17th.—We have fought a hard battle and won the victory. The enemy has lost more than five

thousand, and we nearly three hundred, of whom nineteen are officers: one-third of the number engaged. I am too tired to write more.

"18th.—Hydrabad has surrendered: six Ameers have given me their swords, which I returned."

This was the battle of Meeanee.

THIRTEENTH EPOCH

SIXTH PERIOD.

If the greatness of mind shewn in resolving on battle, the disproportion of force and the terrible fighting be considered, the victory of Meeanee was an exploit scarcely to be matched in history. With young soldiers of different races, some of whom had been before beaten by the same enemy, Charles Napier, at the age of sixty, and for the first time commanding in chief, attacked in open day and defeated twenty times his own numbers strongly entrenched! Not men unused to action and seeking an excuse to fly, but stern robust warriors, religious fanatics, fixed to conquer or perish—yet confident to win, being of great aptitude for war.

A general historical description of the contest and of the previous combinations have been recorded in the "History of the Conquest of Scinde;" but the victor shall now speak himself: and be it remembered, that while thus speaking of the terrible fighting he did not forget what he owed to the fighters:—for the first time in modern English military history, his dispatch recognized the valour of non-commissioned officers and private soldiers by name. This innovation on aristocratic habits has since been partially adopted, and claimed by a minister in the House of Lords as a merit of government. A merit it is, but with Charles Napier it originated, and he thereby gave offence which was never pardoned.

Sequel to the private letter interrupted at Nowshara.—"I know not what has been already said in this letter, and have not time to look, but we have closed affairs with a most

bloody battle! Riding over the plain of Meeanee afterwards, I said to myself, *am I guilty of these horrid scenes?* My conscience reproached me not! I am weary. I expected another day of blood, but Hydrabad has surrendered and six Ameers are prisoners in my camp.

"Captain Kennedy.—We beat them John at Meeanee: the battle was terrible. I afterwards rode over the horrid field and questioned my conscience: this blood is on the Ameers not on me! How I escaped Heaven knows, I do not. We were for three hours and a half only one yard apart, man to man: fearful odds, and they fought like heroes. Covered by their shields they run upon us sword in hand with desperate fury, but down they went under the musket and bayonet: all fought hand to hand."

It was at midnight, alone, while the army was sleeping, and amidst the piled heaps of dead that he thus invoked the Deity to absolve him!

"Journal, February 18th.—An alarm this morning, and I was so fast asleep in my cloak that Outram, who had returned in the night, could not wake me: it was caused by camp followers, who are enough to destroy an army, yet we cannot do without them. They were decidedly one of the primary causes of the Cabool destruction; any alarm makes them rush in upon the troops, break the ranks, obstruct the fire, and produce a mass of confusion in an instant. To prevent this I had formed my troops in square after the battle, baggage in centre; the followers had thus no point to run upon, and at nightfall my orders were to fight, if attacked, on any side of the square, firing on enemy and camp followers alike; that order saved us in this alarm, for had we been in line they would have broken us. There are even now, five or six columns of Beloochees within cannon-shot, each 2000 or 3000 strong; they hanker about and we do not know what to make of them—I am crippled with wounded men and our baggage, and the cavalry is too weak to go through another fight—they are perhaps followers of wounded

chiefs who cannot be moved. With two more regiments of horse what punishment I could inflict; but the battle and the previous march have knocked us all up, the camel battery could not drag the guns a mile further. However we have done our job well.

"In the battle I rallied the 22nd twice, and the 25th N. I. three times, when giving way under the terrible pressure; all the officers behaved well, but had I left the front one moment the day would have been lost: many know this. Had I not been there some other would have done the same; but being there, and having rallied them, to have gone to another point would have lost all; for while I was there no one felt responsible, no one dashed on like Teesdale of the 25th and McMurdo, I mean those immediately about me. We ought to have gone slap over the bank, and had the 22nd been old soldiers they would have done so: but such young lads were amazed, they knew not what to do, and the swordsmen in such masses making at them, covered by their shields, were very ugly! Well, it was a fearful fight! I feel now frightened at my own boldness, but having worked my courage up to try have been successful. The 22nd gave me three cheers after the fight, and one during it. Her Majesty has no honour to give that can equal that, if indeed she gives me any. I do not want any, none at least but what awaits a victor from history. I shall be glad though of a medal with the officers and soldiers; sharing with them will be an honour of more value to me than any other that can be given.

"19th February.—Hydrabad has struck and all the Ameers are prisoners: had I taken their swords my armoury would have been full.

"20th.—There is great delicacy required in taking possession of the town, for on the least alarm they would cut all their women's throats: the guards are therefore slipped in gradually. This day however up went the British colours on the great round tower of Hydrabad, and at two o'clock we fired a royal salute and gave three cheers, which the

soldiers made into a dozen: I thought they never meant to stop.

"22nd.—The three prize agents have found immense treasures; they talk of two millions sterling!

"His sister.—I mourn over the whole thing, and did all that could be done to prevent this bloodshed as every officer in this army knows, for they used to say *The general is the only man in camp who does not wish for a battle.* However, I have only obeyed my orders. It is curious that a soldier gave me on the field a sword all bloody, and it turns out to be the sword of the grandfather of those Ameers who conquered Scinde.

"Lord Fitzroy Somerset. Compressed. February 20th.—To Lord Hill and yourself I owe this command, and my first wish is to have your approbation. To do otherwise than fight was not possible, though my force was so disproportionate that in other circumstances it would have been rash. Lord Ellenborough had been absolutely defied by the Ameers. Nothing could put things to rights but forcing the Ameers to sign the treaty, by advancing with all the troops capable of moving. I knew they could assemble a large force, but two days before the battle they had only ten thousand: suddenly they called troops over the Indus, and in an instant their numbers rose to twenty-five thousand. Had I retreated those numbers would have been doubled, and other thousands would have crossed the Indus between me and Sukkur, and I should have been surrounded: my resolve was to attack and the result has been very decisive.

"If my conduct be approved of by the Duke, Lord Hill, and yourself, it will fully reward me for my great anxiety to do right: the duke's letter on Col. Monson's retreat decided me never to retreat before an Indian army. If I have done wrong abstractedly success like charity covers sins, and it was the great Master led me into error; but my conviction is that I am right, and that my admiration and study of

his deeds and words, as rules for war, have caused this victory.

"I could not turn the enemy's flank, the ground was impracticable; and I also judged it best to attack before the soldiers *saw* their masses. His grace will tell you what an awful affair the baggage of an Indian army is; especially in this desert country, where no walled villages were within miles of me and my force was too small to furnish a proper guard: had I attempted to overcome the difficulties of turning either flank, my baggage and baggage guard and hospitals would have been lost!"

Instead of twenty-five, there were above thirty-five thousand conquered at Meeanee; and how the Duke of Wellington judged the conqueror, who thus apologized for gaining a great victory, will be seen further on. This voluntary apology addressed with such simplicity of feeling to so great a man was graceful and becoming; but when the Indian commander in chief, Sir Jasper Nichols, in profound ignorance of facts took upon himself to censure the victor for daring to conquer, he with the rebound of conscious genius repelled the assumption of superiority in a letter remarkable alike for vigour and comprehensive views. It will be found at length in the *Administration of Scinde*.

"Sir T. McMahon.—The two lines were not a yard asunder for three hours and a half: it was butchery. My present calculation makes the enemy's killed and wounded above five thousand.

"Mrs. Teesdale.—The only consolation I can offer you under the loss you have suffered is one which, when time has alleviated your grief and that of your noble husband's family, will be a consolation and a source of pride. I beheld his conduct from first to last, and a more glorious example of the highest courage and devotion never was exhibited by a soldier in the service of his country. His family must ever be proud of him, as one whom the most appalling danger could not check; and who, casting himself into the

midst of the enemy, fell because he would not flinch before overpowering numbers. May this be your consolation under the dispensation of that great God whose will it was he should die gloriously in battle. Believe me madam your faithful friend and fellow-mourner.

"Mrs. Jackson.—I cannot say too much in praise of your brave and lamented husband. I did not say all he deserved in my dispatch, my limit was too narrow; I had to speak of many, yet of none more worthy: he slew seven Beloochees ere he fell. Nothing that the India Company can do for his widow and his child can exceed the deserts of Major Jackson; and if at any time you think I may be useful to you, I beg of you to write to me without hesitation, and be assured of my desire to serve you: that I may have the power I cannot say. May time soothe your sorrows!"

The Company's gratitude to this brave man was evinced by an attempt to deprive his widow and child of his fair share of prize money, as the records of the prize commission prove.

"Lord Ellenborough. Extracts.—The two days following the victory were of great anxiety; the retreating masses of the enemy might have renewed the battle, and with our small force every precaution was necessary.

"The treasure left in the Ameers' camp was, they tell me, five lacs, but was pillaged by the camp followers and some of the cavalry: probably also by the Ameers' people.

"I have not made Sobdar prisoner. I believe he had troops in the field, but against his will: he is not valorous and was afraid of being killed by his own Beloochees. Meer Roostum and, I believe, all the rest were in the battle, but at present it is impossible to ascertain all details.

"May I entreat of your lordship to give precise orders about the seizure of treasure; I believe it is immense: and the greatest favour you can confer on me is not to let me have anything to do with the affair, but to order the

prize agents named by me to report and refer direct to your secretary."

Many anecdotes of this battle will be found in letters of a later date; but how terribly they fought on both sides may be judged from the following facts. A 22nd soldier, bounding forward plunged his bayonet into the breast of a Beloochee, yet the firm warrior did not even reel; seizing the musket he writhed onwards and with a blow swept his destroyer's life away: they fell dead together! No Belooch would take quarter: the general in the midst of the fighting sought to save an exhausted yet unyielding chief, but a soldier drove his weapon deep into the proud barbarian, with this terrible laconism. "*This day General the Shambles have it all to themselves.*" Six thousand had fallen but none would fly. With shield thrown over their shoulders they stalked in retreat, shaking their swords and casting back glances of such fierce import that the conqueror checked pursuit on the open plain, fearing they might turn: they were overthrown and amazed, not beaten.

Outram's share in these transactions now demands notice. It has been already shown that by earnest entreaty he obtained a command which led him from the battle; he returned after it, to assure the general that he had largely contributed to the victory by raising a smoke which alarmed the enemy! Smoke ten miles off to alarm desperate men, fighting hand to hand and falling by thousands! Yet with this tale of folly he came however, and with another more pernicious proceeded to dim the clearness of the general's judgment in the following manner. At daybreak it became known that the Lion of Meerpoor was a few miles off with ten thousand men, who would have been in the battle had Outram's demand for delay before the action been acceded to: indeed the Lion, never dreaming of defeat, had purposely kept back his troops, fearing his brother Ameers in victory more than the British in arms. Hearing the result of the battle he knew not what to do, and the general guessing his

state resolved to march against him. But wishing to get Hydrabad first, if possible, while terror was rife, he in that view summoned it on pain of being stormed, and instantly vakeels appeared to demand terms. *Life and nothing else*, was the reply, adding with fearfully significant humour, *Decide before mid-day, for the dead will then be buried and my soldiers will have had their breakfasts.* Then came forth Roostum Khan the aged; Nusseer and Mohamed, Khans of Upper Scinde. Nusseer Khan, Shadad, and the young Hussein of Lower Scinde followed, and all laid their jewelled swords at the conqueror's feet. They were worth thousands, but compassionating the Ameers' state, and disdainful of lucre he, as already said, refused them and turned to fall on the Lion. But then crept Outram to his ear, saying he knew that Ameer well, who would not fight, and would in fear submit at once were he, Outram, allowed to write to him. It was the folly of the Hydrabad mission again; but always accessible to a plea for saving blood, and still retaining some slight faith in Outram's sense, the general assented. Thus, instead of a storm of fire falling on the Lion, a friendly warning carried him assurance of present safety and future hope: he professed submission, retreated to Meerpoor, and instantly rekindled the war.

After this mischief-making Outram departed to Bombay, his career under Sir C. Napier having been short, but most remarkable for a man who had in print claimed peculiar distinction in arms. As a political commissioner he had with curious pertinacity pressed on the general the most incorrect information, and the most dangerous advice; both tending directly to the absolute destruction of general and army. As a military man he had claimed credit for the defence of the Residency, where he had remained within the house while Captain Conway repelled the enemy outside. He had carried off two hundred men in the night before Meeanee, knowing that a battle must be fought next morning; and having now prevented another fight by his letter to

the Lion, terminated his mission and quitted the army when a second battle was inevitable. From Bombay he went to England to prefer charges against the man who had, at his own risk, upheld him against Lord Ellenborough's just displeasure, and who he had left struggling amidst formidable dangers brought down by his wretched deception as to the Lion's character. For that prince soon rallied the broken tribes from Meeanee on his own feudatories, and pressing round the handful of British soldiers called all of the Belooch race to aid in their destruction.

This new war soon attained great activity, and was indeed very dangerous and well conceived by the Lion, as a rapid sketch of his position will at once make clear. Behind him, as a base, was Meerpoor on the edge of the desart; and behind Meerpoor was the fortress of Omercote in the heart of the desart, well furnished and cutting off the British land communication with Bombay. On his right run roads through the desart to Shah Ghur and another fortress, both held by a nephew of Roostum with some thousands of followers. On his left was the Delta, his own territory, full of jungles, nullahs and malaria. Thus based, and advancing from Meerpoor, he changed the line of operations and even the nature of the war; for rapidity was before necessary for the safety of the British force, but here delay: and fortunately its general was capable of both. Meanwhile, in Upper Scinde Ali Moorad's authority as Rais was opposed by the Chandians, and other tribes on the right-bank of the Indus: there also a hostile chain of Beloochees extended along the mountains to the country of the Jokeas, whose great chief, called the Jam, had descended from the Hala range to menace Kurrachee. Thus the whole Belooch race was gradually closing around the handful of victors, the circle being completed by bands of roving swordsmen which had, south of Hydrabad, attacked the British stations and intercepted the dâks, plundering and murdering isolated men, and chasing flying families and non-combatants: in

fine, the original scheme of the Ameers was now in full activity, Meeanee had only caused a momentary recoil: the army had been saved from destruction but was still to struggle for victory. A signal proof was thus given of the power of the Ameers, of their great designs, and of the daring genius and promptitude of the general who saved India by baffling them.

Lord Ellenborough, with the foresight of a statesman comprehending the requirements of war, had on hearing of the battle instantly sent reinforcements down from Ferozepoor to Scinde; and Colonel Roberts, commanding at Sukkur, with like promptitude had forwarded supplies by water to Hydrabad, where the British position was become gravely critical. For the heat had reached 112° in the shade, the force was much reduced, the Indus was the only line of supply, and there was not even carriage to move the stores that arrived on its banks from thence to Hydrabad, less than four miles! Four hundred men were required for the garrison of the fortress of Hydrabad, leaving less than two thousand for field operations: thus with a mere isolated handful of men Sir C. Napier had to sustain his conquest amidst an insurgent nation, and against a powerful army, almost within cannon shot, under a prince of vigour boldness and skill, for such was the Lion.

Here must be noted an error of gravity in the public dispatch of Meeanee. The adjutant-general Wyllie had been desperately wounded and no morning state of the army was made out; hence the general hastily adopted a state of the week before, which gave 2800 men fit for duty: but sickness had reduced them, Outram had carried off two hundred, four hundred were in charge of the baggage, one native regiment of grenadiers was scarcely engaged, and the battle was really fought with less than eighteen hundred men and officers of which less than four hundred were Europeans! On the other hand the Beloochees' force was called twenty-two thousand, but was really little short of forty

thousand. The best spies had said they exceeded thirty-five thousand, but one spy rated them only at the number adopted: he was right at the moment, yet two strong tribes had afterwards suddenly crossed the Indus in the night and joined for battle. Charles Napier's rooted dislike of vaunting made him adopt the lowest number; but subsequently the Ameers' pay roll was found, and more than bore out the highest estimate of the spies.

With less than two thousand disposable men and a large hospital the British general could not now seek the Lion, but like a great commander he made his enemy seek him. Entrenching a camp on the bank of the river to be near his supplies, he also constructed a fort on the opposite bank to protect his steamers from the tribes on the right bank; then securing his hospital and stores within the camp, he sent to hasten the reinforcement from Sukkur which he had before called for: it was to come by water, and he also ordered that a column of all arms should march by land while the terror of the recent battle was abroad. This was the stroke of a master knowing the value of moral force in war; and while awaiting these succours, with admirable art he promulgated stories of his own fears and weakness to excite the Lion's confidence, arguing thus:—"If he assails my works he will be beaten; if he does not the delay will exhaust his money, seeing that the Beloochees are rapacious as they are brave." With the fine caution of a great captain however, he at the same time made his own men encamp outside the entrenchments, which he in conversation purposely ridiculed, lest his artifices against the Lion should shake the confidence of his own troops.

His field enemies were not however the most formidable: an anti-Ellenborough faction was in full activity at Bombay and its newspapers were in full cry of abuse; especially the "Bombay Times," under the editorship of one Buist an unfrocked priest of St. Andrew's. This faction was incessantly calling on the Beloochee tribes to rise and destroy

the army; they were told in detail all its weak points, plans of attack were promulgated, and the Sepoys were incited in distinct terms to mutiny and murder their general. Outram was the idol of this faction, and certainly its active tool against Sir C. Napier. Amongst other calumnies Buist published, that the Ameers' women had been abducted by the officers from the zenanas and were living in their tents, and that it behoved all the Mussulmen of India to avenge the insult: the answer was a document signed by the whole of the officers denouncing the statement as an infamous falsehood, without even an accidental or doubtful occurrence to excuse the fiction.

Another difficulty, a great one, was how to deal with the captive Ameers. These princes were still formidable as enemies because of their conqueror's generous treatment. His first care had been to protect their women, not from his own soldiers but from the savage passions of the Ameers; for the zenanas were within the fortress, and under the name of attendants eight hundred robust well-armed Talporees were left, bound by orders and their own notions of honour as men of the Talpoor blood—on the slightest insult, to cut the women's throats and fight their own way abroad. These swordsmen, knowing how such a catastrophe was dreaded by the general, were most insolent, as men prepared to die were likely to be: they made their charge also a mask for constant communication with the Lion, which their numbers and the general's care for the women's lives rendered it impossible to prevent.

The captive Ameers had been meanwhile placed in one of their own luxurious gardens close to the Indus, and had for attendants many hundred Beloochees, most of them Talpoors; from thence they also corresponded with the Lion and the men in the fortress, giving and receiving military intelligence. Thus the general was by Outram's insidious meddling placed in a more difficult position than before the battle; one so perilous that "*he will be Caboold*," was an

expression common in Bombay, in the Lion's camp and in the Ameers' garden, all animated by the same wish: the faction indeed said he had been Cabooled, and even caused it to be so believed for a time in England. His correspondence touches constantly on this triple hostile combination; but for the baffling of it the Duke of Wellington shall speak.

"Sir C. Napier gained the camp of the enemy, got possession of his guns, and obtained the most complete victory, taking up a position in which he was not likely again to be attacked. Not only did he secure Hydrabad and the portion of the Indus which lay in his rear, he brought up a reinforcement and placed himself at the head of a stronger army than that he commanded before the battle. He thus manifested all the discretion and ability of an officer familiar with the most difficult operations of war."

From factious enmity the general turned with scorn, but strove to check the Ameers with this stern intimation, which was afterwards quoted in the House of Commons as an instance of uncivilized ferocity! "*I will not kill you as you advised your people to do to the English; but I will put you in irons on board ship.*" Even this failed, and finally he did put them in a steamer, but not in irons: had he shot them it would have been but simple justice.

In their treasury had been nearly three millions sterling, besides the women's ornaments, but he forbade the slightest enquiry as to the last which could give the barbarian guards an excuse for their bloody purpose: he allowed the ladies three days of free action, meaning that the slave girls should secure some plunder for their future support. But he was not prepared for Eastern female activity in such matters; it subsequently became known that they carried off above two millions, leaving scarcely half a million behind! All the women, wives and slaves, were allowed either to join their lords or remain in Scinde, and all chose the last: not one would again place herself under an Ameer or accept him as a lover—or a *Patriarch!*

Previous to the battle a dhurbar had been held to decide on the fate of the British after victory, and the resolution was, to collect all the men women and children found in Scinde and cut their throats on the field of battle. "*So shall we make it famous!*" The general alone was to be reserved for greater cruelty. Knowing all this he had yet returned their swords, and while living himself in a small tent under that raging sun, resigned to them their luxurious garden: Roostum only was excluded, but by his own brother Ameers, because he was destitute! They drove him out, refusing even a carpet or cover from the sun, and thus at eighty years of age he would have perished if the general had not furnished him with comforts: yet Outram had pretended that the only cause for hesitation with the Ameers about signing the treaty, was their pity for Roostum who had been despoiled! Now let their conqueror again speak, a week after the battle.

"Journal, February 25th.—My hope is that Lord Ellenborough's dispatch may go home before that from Bombay. Outram is an honourable but an angry man, and exceedingly vain, and will do mischief: his foolish friends at Bombay will so flatter him as to strengthen the erroneous view he has already taken of affairs, which is *diametrically opposed to that he gave me on my first arrival at Sukkur.* He has been spoiled by the power he possessed. He and Mr. Robertson, Governor of the N. W. provinces, and Sir George Arthur, have all taken the same wrong view in my opinion; and though I have only executed my orders they know Lord Ellenborough's general conduct is approved of by me; the Bombay dispatch will therefore go home accompanied and blown upon by their adverse views, in which many, jealous of my success, will join."

Here a cross note written years after, runs thus. "Thinking Outram at this time an honourable man I believed what he had told me of Lord Ellenborough's conduct to him and Hamersley. Now I know that Hamersley ought to have

been dismissed the service, and Outram knew it then, yet falsely painted Lord Ellenborough's proceedings as harsh and wrong.

"These men however cannot change results, nor will Outram do anything not loyal, so far as he is aware of his own conduct; but he knows not what he does, for had I listened one instant, beyond what I did, to his advice and urgent prayers my army would have been cut to pieces. Even the night before the battle he wanted me to *wait one day longer*, which would have just enabled twelve thousand men then in our front, and ten thousand in our rear to have joined in the action! They were within six miles of us when the fighting closed. One great mistake however I made; Outram persuaded me to let him try a diversion with 200 men, whom he carried *out of action!* No general ought to detach even a tailor before a battle.

"Lord Ellenborough.—I much wish that your lordship's account should first reach the English government. There are good and honourable men, quite incapable of any injustice, who have taken a very different view of Scindian politics and of my operations from that which your lordship has taken, and they cannot as honest men, holding those views, approve of what I have done: those who think the Ameers ill-used can scarcely be expected to look favourably on a victory which has rolled them over. I have confidence in Sir George Arthur, but some time ago he wrote to me, hoping we should not kill the poor Scindians. I told him he had mixed two classes that are distinct, namely, the Beloochees, who, being conquerors, are idle warriors and robbers, and the native Scindians who are slaves or serfs, and over whom the Beloochees' rule is an unqualified grinding tyranny. Now the Scindians are to a man in our favour; so are the Hindoos of Scinde; ninety Scindian shops were opened in our bazaar and followed us everywhere: the Beloochees alone are our enemies.

"—— Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor has seven or eight

thousand men; he had none in the battle, and I told him I should consider him a friend if he dismissed his troops: he has not done so and I will march against him when my reinforcements arrive. But having a great city to guard, and vast treasure, and our victory being complete, I will not risk any division of my troops: they are too few to bear it and very hard worked: which they bear admirably. But your lordship having lifted the army from the degradation into which the *politicals* had cast it, has raised a spirit that makes them reckless of danger. Had I not seen that spirit I could scarcely have dared to attack such an overwhelming force posted so formidably.

"—— Meer Sobdar I have now made prisoner: he staid away from the battle, but five thousand of his warriors fought and I see no reason why he should shelter himself under his cowardice. Old Roostum and the others were there, but not absolutely in danger; they are the most contemptible set of wretches I ever met. I have three wounded Beloochees in hospital, and wanted the Ameers to send people to attend upon these brave fellows; but they would take no trouble about them, although their tents were not fifty yards off. I regret to say we could not make prisoners; the overwhelming numbers, and the combatants being hand to hand, made it impossible to spare; it was a butchery such as I never beheld: no quarter was given on either side, the wounded Beloochees fought as they lay on the ground. Some of our officers counted after the battle four hundred bodies within a circle of fifty yards diameter, where the 22nd and 25th fought; and I fancy as many fell opposed to the 12th Regiment, without reckoning those killed further off: these clumps of dead had fallen where none of the antagonists were three yards from each other: only four of our guns were engaged, but they made tremendous havoc.

"We had but three officers instead of the ten which twelve guns ought to have: the Company will never give full effect to their troops unless more regimental officers are with their

corps. The disproportionate pay of the staff makes every officer seek to be on it, and the command of companies is left to inexperienced youths, full of courage but not fit to command companies, much less regiments, which last is sometimes the case. Never did I witness more individual courage than in this battle, especially among the European officers: there was no flinching among the native officers, but there is a vast difference between the energy of the European officer and the apparent indifference of the native officers, though some of them behaved admirably and the native soldier right well. Amongst the treasure is the battle-axe of Nadir Scha, a very beautiful piece of workmanship all studded with precious stones; it is the only thing amongst those riches that I had a curiosity to see. I have desired the prize agents to ascertain if possible the history of anything of this kind, as it adds to the intrinsic value of the article.

"Journal, February 26th.—This day captured my royal mistress"—Chalon's Print—"in the palace of Hydrabad: being one of her knights she shall not be left among the pagans. The Ameers are carrying on some conspiracy, we cannot make it out, but probably for an attack; if they accomplish it they are dead men, I will bayonet every mother's son, my soldiers shall not be killed thus. The only effect of my kindness as to their comforts has been to enable them to risk mine and their own soldiers' lives, and cause another day of blood; but God has put his finger on them.

"27th.—Positive intelligence that we are to be attacked the 6th of March by thirty thousand Beloochees, said to be at Khoonhera—fudge! Thousands were beaten from a strong position and they will not attack me in a strong one: yet nothing shall be left to fortune, and while believing they dare not attack me we are ready if they do—having: 1°. Strict guards and night patrols. 2°. A very strong fort, so repaired as it has not been for many a year. 3°. A battalion in garrison. 4°. Provisions for three months; it is impreg-

nable except by a regular siege, and they have neither guns nor science. 5°. My own camp on the Indus, strongly entrenched and provisioned for two months. 6°. Reinforcements in March. 7°. A large plain swept by our guns and those of two steamers. Yes! Beloochees, we are snug, and glory shall be yours if you drive us into the river: but even if you do drown us you cannot get the Hydrabad fortress, it will be defended: God may destroy us, but the Beloochees cannot."

When it is considered that all these works and preparations for renewing the campaign were completed within ten days after the battle, the Duke of Wellington's eulogium will be accepted as a simple truth.

"February 28th.—I have sent the Persian prince, Agha Khan, the assassin king of the mountain, and divinity according to his sect, to Jurruck on the right bank of the Indus: his influence is great, and he will with his own followers secure our communication with Kurrachee. He is lineal chief of the assassins of the Crusades, who still exist as a sect and are spread over all the interior of Asia: they have great influence though no longer dreaded as in days of yore. He will protect our line, along which many of our people have been murdered by the Beloochees: Captain Innes certainly has been, and a Parsee merchant, and a poor conductor, with his wife and child at Vikkur. Spoke to all the Ameers yesterday. Poor old noodle Roostum took hold of my garment and prayed for protection: the old man has been roughly used by his family. My reply was, he should be protected from them; and he shall be.

"March 2nd.—Killing of Dâk runners on the road to Boog; this cuts our communication with Bombay, is disagreeable, and the right warfare for the Beloochees, but I will bother them. Innes was designedly murdered: the Ameers sent orders everywhere to spare neither man woman nor child of the English! My fear of the heat is great, having lost a good week by Outram's having been so humbugged as

he was." Here a cross note says:—"When on my way to Simla as commander in chief 1849 I heard from Dr. ——, who had charge of the Ameers, that they acknowledged to having, at Hydrabad, secretly directed insults to be offered to Outram to make him believe they had no control over their Beloochees.

"March 4th.—News from Sukkur, the Dâk is free again. Roberts is worth his weight in gold: the moment he heard of the battle he sent ammunition sappers and miners, all we wanted, and I am now strongly entrenched, with plenty, and ready to fight. The Bengal cavalry, a regiment of infantry and troop of horse artillery, marched yesterday from Sukkur by my order, and I think are safe from being intercepted. The 21st N. I. are coming down in boats, and should arrive the 6th or 7th:—then look out Shere Mohamed.

"5th.—Eighteen thousand Beloochees are said to be assembled at Meerpoor, and the Chandians are crossing the Indus from Sehwan and Larkaana to join them: however, Roberts has orders, if he feels strong enough, to stir up the Chandians at home. Ali Moorad also has my order to plunder the Chandians, who will find me a troublesome customer.

"6th.—Too hard worked, my body wastes away, however duty must be done and self put aside.

"7th.—Report that Shere Mohamed has certainly eighteen thousand: in four days I may perhaps have three thousand, and then 'blind harpers have among ye.' If I wait till the 20th, six more guns with cavalry and infantry will join, but the weather will be infernally hot, and that makes me undecided; chances must be weighed; it is good to let thoughts settle in the mind, they grow clear and fit for use.

"This day I got hold of the two murderers of Innes. I told Meer Shadad his servants had done the bloody work, and he should die if they were not given up; in half an hour they were in my tent! Poor Innes begged hard to keep his shirt, he was so ill and it was so cold! the answer

was cutting off his head at a blow; it fell in the water the body in the boat.

Lord Ellenborough, March 8th.—A military commission has found a Beloochee guilty of murdering a Parsee. Cold-blooded murderers of prisoners I will hang, and I have caught three: one slew the unresisting Parsee; the other two murdered the equally unresisting Captain Innes. In the course of the investigation it appeared, that the Ameers issued orders to their Kardars to kill all the English. If I can obtain a written order to that effect, signed by any one of the Ameers, I think that Ameer ought to be hanged in preference to the officer who obeyed his master? One of the men at once said yes! I murdered the Englishman, and then added, my master was fighting you and we had orders to kill all of you. All the country knew this, so I killed the man as I was ordered. Very well, I said, then I must hang you. You are welcome: but that man is innocent, he was sitting down—I alone killed the Englishman. Now my lord I confess it goes sorely against my conscience to hang these men and let the greater ruffians, the Ameers, escape. They are the real offenders, and I never met with such villains; they are quite a match for all I have heard of Acbar Khan, without his redeeming qualities.

"I am as yet unable to ascertain Shere Mohamed's force, my spies talk of 8,000 up to 40,000! The first we should not be able to catch; the last would be too strong to venture on before the 3rd cavalry and Leslie's horse artillery join me. That we could win I do not doubt, but the victory would not be followed up to my wish; and any reverse would make me sink in shame for not waiting the arrival of that column. We have yet cool weather enough to admit of my waiting, and if the Ameer has so large a force his expences will soon exhaust his treasury. I hear he has closed the wells from Meerpoor to Omercote, and has poisoned those between this place and Meerpoor. I think I can manage this difficulty, though it is the warfare most to be appre-

hended : there is only one way to meet it, namely, to obtain the good-will of the mass of the people."

The next letter is in answer to one pressing on the general, Outram's and Mr. Robertson's views as to the injustice done to the "*Patriarchal Princes.*"

"Sir George Arthur, 12th March.—Detesting the shedding of blood, as I do from my heart, I feel more inclined to mourn over this carnage than to exult, or wish for honour; but my conscience assures me it was the Ameers not I who brought it on. There is a feeling of excitement in the human mind, which arises on occasion of success or defeat, that no man can be free from at such moments; and a man bred in war, *egg and bird,* as I have been, cannot throw off those feelings entirely, though a career of fifty years cools them down. Since I have been here and studied the Ameers closely they appear the most thorough villains. At first I felt pity for their misfortunes which made me return their swords, though it would have been no trifling trophy in a private gentleman's family to have the swords of nine dethroned princes surrendered on the field of battle! They were mine by the rules of war, but I would not take them at such a moment. Such were my feelings towards them then; now I would hang them all without remorse! Such brutes never were seen: they issued orders to murder all the English, man woman and child! Are we to consider men of this stamp as '*full of honour and entitled to commiseration?*' I think not beyond that which we have and ought to have for every malefactor!

"I have served with the wild Indian, the wily Greek, the brutal Turk; with Spaniards, Portuguese and Italians, and amongst all there were some redeeming qualities: at least the chiefs had some dignity of character. Amongst the Beloochees generally there is also a nobleness much to be admired; but these Ameers are unqualified brutes. Nusseer of Hydrabad is by far the best, because he is the boldest and most open; and the one, if Lord Ellenborough restores

them, who I should recommend as chief: I sincerely trust however that his lordship will do no such thing, though personally it would be to me delightful, as removing me from the country and permitting me to rejoin my family before the monsoon sets in.

"The nature of things prevents Scinde long continuing as an independent government. It is good occasionally to profit by reading history, and deducing principles from facts to apply them. Here is a very powerful state, India, having these natural boundaries. On the N.W. the Indus; on the N. the Hymalayas; on the E. Bharampootra; and having weak uncivilized nations between it and its natural boundaries. These weak nations though enveloped have yet the folly to insult her, to oppose her commerce, to leave immense tracts of land and a great river idle, though capable of bearing golden fruit: is it to be found I say in history, or the human mind, that such a state of things can long last? No, the larger body attracts the smaller. In the case of Scinde there is also as it were a *chemical affinity* to the larger one, for the people of Scinde, one and all, are our own in their hopes and aspirations. Yet these people Outram and Robertson throw out altogether and wish to leave in the misery to which the Ameers have reduced them; because, as they maintain, and I, being ignorant cannot deny, other Indian princes treat their slaves more brutally! How this can be I do not know: the Beloochees take the wives, the daughters, the labour and the lives of the Scindians at their pleasure!

"What Mr. Robertson means 'by one letter,' not proved to be written by Meer Roostum, as the only cause of Lord Ellenborough's conduct, I am utterly at a loss to say. Not only was that letter but two others detected by Outram, who told me on my arrival that they were undoubtedly authentic, though he believed Meer Roostum had signed one from imbecility. But he also extracted, to use his own words, *a camel load* of infractions of our treaties by the

Ameers: two quires of foolscap may be vouched for! Such a state of political relations could not long continue. The invasion of Scinde by Lord Auckland was the first step; had it not been in 1838, it would have been in 1848: had the battle not been fought in 1843, it would have been in 1853. Both events were necessary results of the state of affairs; the battle was merely the lancing of a great ulcer, which sooner or later must have come to a head from natural causes.

"Journal.—How ignorant all the political agents were of these people! They thought and said the Beloochees were fools and cowards; but they are brave as lions, and have outwitted our politicals from first to last, except Brown, whose eyes were first opened, and I think he was not led away by the system he is so able a man.

"March 9th.—Contradictory intelligence as to enemy's numbers: I think of going myself to ascertain, but do not like moving till my reinforcements come.

"10th.—Letters from Bombay, all full of our fight. To be praised by the Bombay newspapers is more disgusting than to be abused; in England there are gentlemen editors, but in India they are generally scoundrels turned out of private society. This country will not be quiet until Shere Mohamed is put down; but I have issued a proclamation, securing all men their places property and rights: this will do much.

"12th.—Enemy said to have twenty thousand, and to be entrenching. I will turn his works and torment him with artillery if his flanks are not secure; if his works are circular I will storm them unless he can be shelled out. It is not pleasant though to storm these chaps, they fight so wickedly that much blood will be shed. Yet out of Meerpoor he must be driven. Intelligence just come that the Ameer means to decoy me to the *Run of Cutch*, where he purposes to make me run: he is a great officer, for a Beloochee, but it is not clear how he will take Meerpoor with him!

"March 13th.—This day the murderer of the Parsee was hanged: I cannot bear this work, it is horrible. Yet I am here to protect society and my soldiers' lives; all laws forbid the massacre of unoffending prisoners; the Parsee was a prisoner and not even a soldier: could I allow of his cruel murder? No! If those who look to me for protection do not find it they will use their own means, and be justified: I am here the law and must not shrink from the painful pre-eminence.

"14th.—The Beloochees are gathering to a head. I will let them alone, it will give them confidence to come closer, when, being still unmolested, their audacity will augment and they will be joined by those who were before fearful: these last will eat and talk, but won't fight; they will make the army more unwieldy and yet more boastful. Patience.

"15th.—All well. Shere Mohamed comes nearer, he is but twelve miles off and lately sent an insolent offer to let me quit the country if I liberated the Ameers, and restored what we had taken. Just as his messengers delivered this letter the evening gun was fired. There, said I, do you hear that? Yes! Well, that is your answer! Off they went, and the Ameer will now in his pride lay plans to cut off my column from the north.

"16th.—The enemy is clearly collecting, and is called forty thousand: half that may be true.

"17th.—Anxious about Stack's brigade coming from the north: however he has fifteen hundred men and five guns, and ought not to be stopped.

"18th.—Explored towards the enemy for two reasons, 1st, as I took took two regiments of horse and two guns the Beloochees will be alarmed, afraid to detach against Stack, and will concentrate: he is five marches off. 2nd. It will cool their courage, for my quietness has made them boastful; they thought we dared not quit our position; yet, my entrenchments have never been entered lest my soldiers should become timid, as they and the enemy would justly

infer weakness. I ridicule the works before the men, and say, when these things are finished we will attack the Beloochees.

"19th.—They mean to give battle. I cannot understand this; they have no ammunition, no money: however all my arrangements are made as if a battle was certain. With luck my reinforcements might come from Sukkur and Kurrachee before I march, but that seems almost hopeless.

"20th.—Went out with a strong party to bring the enemy's forces out, but not to fight. Found him posted at Jam-ali-ka-Tanda, with a wood and village on his right, a nullah in his front and a plain on his left, but covered by a wood which he occupies: it is not unlike Meeanee. I got letters concealed in quills from Stack this day: all right as far as Hala. A squadron shall go to-morrow under M'Murdo to meet him at Muttaree, and if the enemy is seen I shall have an express and will instantly move on the Lion's rear.

"21st.—Two o'clock and no report from M'Murdo, who has therefore seen no enemy and must have joined Stack at Muttaree. I will to-morrow march to Meeanee and meet Stack; with no fear of his being attacked, but I will trust nothing to accident that can be done by legs and arms: Fortune is a woman that don't like old men and I am 60! There! By Jove! No abuse of my own dear beautiful sweet dame Fortune! Here comes my whole fleet of boats down the river with reinforcements and guns: in short, with all I wanted, and at least five days before they were expected. Again! Was ever luck like mine! Another steamer arrived up the river with a reinforcement of artillery-men and officers: exactly what I wanted.

"22nd.—Stack's brigade joined and we are all ready for a fight; he marched 20 miles, a double march, when he was reinforced at Muttaree with M'Murdo's two hundred cavalry: after passing Meeanee the enemy appeared, but a few artillery discharges repulsed him. At 3 P.M. an officer came in

to say that Stack was attacked, and within an hour I joined him with a troop of the 9th cavalry, followed by two six-pounders."

This simple account hides a very able and delicate operation most successfully executed, for which see the "Conquest of Scinde."

"March 23rd.—All ready for battle to-morrow. They have, it is said thirty thousand. I have only five thousand, but we shall beat them; so no more till after the fight: God bless my wife and children: if I fall it will I hope be in a way to make them glory in my name.

"March 24th.—Dubba. Six miles from Hydrabad. Victory! The first four miles we marched in one column from the right, but then a peasant told us the Beloochees had shifted their position and were about two miles distant on our left flank. I instantly sent off the Scinde horse to explore, ordered my advanced guard to join the line, and bringing up right shoulders continued the march in one column: Jacob soon sent word the enemy was before him in position, and quickly we came in sight. I formed line, but having little aid, and only inexperienced majors and captains in command of brigades, was compelled to bring each corps into line myself instead of reconnoitring. When this was effected I found my left was within range of eleven guns, and was obliged to throw it back: more delay! Having at last got free to examine the enemy's ground I found him posted behind a nullah, one of those ravines which intercept the flat country for miles, and at every mile, like a grating. Here was a double one, the line nearly straight. The first was 8 feet deep and 22 feet across; then a bank 43 feet wide; then the second ditch, 42 feet across and 17 deep. The inner banks were highest, and from behind them they opposed us, first with matchlock fire then with sword and shield; the ditches were also filled with groups rushing on the flanks of the soldiers as they descended into them.

"I could not before attacking see the second ditch, the vil-

lage of Dubba was on their right and rear and I thought, as did every one, that it was not occupied: their line did not seem to reach there, and my hope was to gain their right flank by rapidity at the intervals. Hence, ordering the horse artillery from right to left of the line, I advanced by *échelon of battalions*, the horse artillery leading but having in support two cavalry regiments resting on the Fullaillee, which run perpendicular to the enemy's position. Then the Beloochees closed at a run to their right, and the village was before really full of men. My reasons for the échelon attack were two. First, there was a large wood away on our right out of which several enemies had come singly, apparently to watch us, and my strong expectation was that a column would issue on our flank when we attacked. If so my right, being in échelon, could have been thrown back and present a defensive front, having also two regiments of cavalry on its right, ready to sweep down on the left of the attacking enemy. Second. My troops were all young, but half-drilled, and had scarcely been together in brigade. Had they advanced in a long line of eleven regiments they would have wavered to and fro like a sea, and got into confusion before the nullah was reached; but in single battalions they did it well, even beautifully.

"In this order we fell on, the ever-glorious 22nd leading, as at Meeanee, and it carried the nullah with great slaughter and great loss; but here I will leave off till I can collect the acts of valour and record them. My orderly dragoon had his horse cut down behind me; the same thing happened at Meeanee. The hilt of my sword was struck by a ball, and I was close to an enemy's magazine when it blew up; yet I was not even singed as all around were, and some burned: others were killed I suppose, but we were fighting desperately at the time and could not inquire. The enemy's left retired towards his right, which brought my right forward, and when the army was formed again our front was at right angles with the first front, and lining the bank of the Ful-

laillee, except the cavalry which was in pursuit. I could not tell which way the enemy would go, and by dispersing they would be merely people of the country as all wear arms alike: further pursuit would therefore only have augmented the carnage without necessity and I encamped on the field of battle. Our wounded had to be sent to Hydrabad; had we left them on the ground we must have also left all the hospital establishments behind, not having carriage for two: when the doolies and palanquins returned, on the 26th, we marched forward.

"26th, Aliar-ka-Tanda.—Passed the position of *Targepoor*, and a very strong one it is: we found three guns. This place had before been examined, so far as the officer sent dare approach; it is tremendous. An immense nullah well prepared with a fort in rear of the centre, and other nullahs and low jungle: my first design had been to attack here and we were marching on it when we heard of the enemy being at Dubba. I bless my *star* that Shere Mohamed changed his position; this one would have doubled our loss. We should have had it, because the 22nd would have carried anything and the Sepoys would have followed, there was no slackness; but the loss would have been great. I was surprised at the improvement in the men's fighting. At Meeanee they shewed hesitation and wonder; at Dubba they were like cucumbers. As to myself I felt a different man, my confidence in the soldiers and in myself being complete: I felt at ease and could have changed my whole order of battle in the fight if it had been wanted. At Meeanee the struggle was desperate, all would have been lost if the 22nd and 25th had given way, and I had to lead them, to rally them, to risk all to keep them to their work: when the battle ended I was ready to drop from the fatigue of one constant cheer, and encouraging the soldiers for three mortal hours of butchery.

"Meerpoor, March 27th.—This is mine enemy's capital. It is a strong fort, with a beautiful little palace and the

prettiest painted rooms, but all in ruins from white ants. I will repair the works and place a garrison.

"28th.—Sent off Fitzgerald with a squadron to reconnoitre Omercote, but remain here myself to watch the Indus, which will soon swell and may cut me off by the inundation.

"29th.—No news about Omercote, it is annoying. Sent off Whitlie's battery to make progress, so far as water can be found, for I am between Scylla and Charybdis; to the east of Meerpoor impeded by want of water, on the west in dread of inundation.

"30th.—Fitzgerald writes that he has been hard put to it for water and forage, and that Omercote is defended by four thousand men! Here's a kettle of fish. I have sent more troops forward to bully them out of a defence, for I cannot besiege as the river would be upon me, forming a mighty sea between me and Hydrabad: so people say, probably all exaggerated, but enough to destroy my guns and baggage.

"March 31st.—Nineteen long letters from Lord Ellenborough! He has made me Governor of Scinde, with additional pay; and he has ordered the captured guns to be cast into a triumphal column, with our names. I wish he would let me go back to my wife and girls, it would be more to me than pay and glory and honours: eight months now away from them, and my wife's strange dream realized! This is glory! is it? Yes! Nine princes have surrendered their swords to me on fields of battle, and their kingdoms have been conquered by me and attached to my own country. I have received the government of the conquered province, and all honours are paid to me while living in mine enemy's capital! Well, all the glory that can be desired is mine, and I care so little for it that the moment I can all shall be resigned to live quietly with my wife and girls: no honour or riches repays me for absence from them. Otherwise this sort of life is life to me, is agreeable, as it

may enable me to do good to these poor people. Oh! if I can do one good thing to serve them where so much blood has been shed in accursed war I shall be happy. May I never see another shot fired! horrid, horrid war! Yet, how it wins upon and hardens one when in command. No young man can resist the temptation, I defy him, but thirty and sixty are different."

The wife's dream, or vision, was this. While living at Caen a vivid one shewed her that he would be rich and powerful, and have a great name! and that the scene of his aggrandizement would be India!

"April 1st.—Those sent on to Omercote mismanage sadly, I get neither information nor anything else.

"April 1st, Jourbee.—Came on a day's march to avoid going mad with those in front. Would I had gone myself: but if a failure takes place, it would not do to let the *Bahadoor Jung*, so they call me, be repulsed by a little fort; it would tarnish our laurels, whereas a captain of artillery being foiled is nothing. Just heard by an express that the waters are rising with fearful rapidity. I must recall the advanced troops and leave Omercote for next season: this is bad; it will be a rallying point for all our enemies in Scinde, and another army will arise; but I cannot stand against the Indus! We should be shut up in Meerpoor for four months—the die is cast! Whitlie shall come back with his guns.

"April 1st, Meerpoor.—Returned this evening and had no sooner arrived than news came of Omercote being abandoned, and my order will bring Whitlie back unless he is a wise man! an express gone to prevent his return.

"April 2nd.—Brown just come. Whitlie had got my order and heard of Omercote, but was afraid to disobey; it is very distressing: Brown begged him to halt while he came on to me. He, Brown, returns instantly with orders to march on Omercote, for I will have it if it costs another battle! If the river catches us we can leave the guns in

Meerpoor for the hot season; but I would give six guns for Omercote at this moment."

Had it not fallen the Lion would have had a point on which to rally another army, and six months time to reorganize the war; meanwhile the civil government could not have been established: the rapidity and daring of the operations after the battle were therefore among the highest efforts of military skill.

"Could I have gone myself it would have been good, but a repulse would have made mischief from the sources of the Indus to its mouth: I dared not. Oh! Cabool! Cabool! you have done a world of harm; the nations of the Indus will not believe an English general can be victorious: they begin now to suspect it though. What a fellow Brown is! eighty miles over a desert in this dreadful heat, and in broad day! He arrived here, forty miles, at 12 o'clock in a burning sun, and did not stop longer than to saddle Jack Sheppard, my horse, who will carry him back the 40 miles in good style, though I fear it will kill both man and horse: eighty miles in Scinde! Well I hope not: poor Jack will have his wickedness taken out of him, he will not kick or bite for a week after.

"April 3rd.—No news from Brown, but a spy has arrived, who says he was in Omercote, that my advance frightened the Beloochees and they fled; the Scindian inhabitants then got arms, shut the gates, and are resolved to keep the place till we arrive! This is capital, and all now seems safe. The river indeed comes thundering down and the Fullaillee is impassable; but boats are to be got, and my elephants are coming up to help the guns over the nullahs: famous chaps they are for that work.

"April 4th.—The spy's story not exact, though not quite false. Brown has got to them long since, and various intelligence shews Omercote is not wholly abandoned, nor likely to be defended. Five elephants with fifty horses and mules

have come from Hydrabad to help the guns, and shall go on one march to be fresh for Whitlie.

"April 5th.—Omercote is ours! Brown reached it in the night, sixty or seventy Beloochees surrendered, were disarmed and went to their homes. This completes the conquest of Scinde; every place is in my possession, and, thank God! I have done with war! Never again am I likely to see a shot fired in anger. Now I shall work at Scinde as in Cephalonia, to do good, to create, to improve, to end destruction and raise up order.

"On the 27th of February I wrote to the political agent at Balmeer to attack Omercote, because he told me he could take it when he pleased. I have taken it before he marched from Balmeer. Being now in our hands it prevents Shere Mohamed rallying his Beloochees, and he has no Emaum Ghur to go to: it was a providential thought to destroy that fortress. He has now only the sand and the sun, and nothing can stand them but a sandfly; another fortnight will drive him from the desert. My endeavour shall be to make him surrender, but he will not: he hopes to raise another army, which he cannot do, and if he could it would be cut to pieces, for I am now a better general. If he fights again, my cavalry instead of being in line, or rear, shall move round his flanks, lie in wait, and when the battle begins fall on his rear. This could not be done at Meeanee; at Dubba it might had there been assurance that the wood on our right was empty. Knowing my enemy now well, things may be done which could not have been ventured before: they will never rush out mad with *bhang* as was said, and by me believed, at Dubba; they may do so for a few paces but not for a distance; and then the musket and bayonet are too many for sword and shield: close array is too powerful for the wide array required to wield the sword with success.

"April 7th.—All retreating. Omercote is secured, the

conquest is complete. There will be ruffling for a year or two to come; tribes will probably have to be chastised and severe lessons given to those in the mountains beyond the Indus; but no strong head can again be made."

This anticipation proved correct to the letter, so clearly did he thus early solve the complicated problem of war and government presented to him. His political sagacity was equal to his military genius, but to the latter his own notices do not do justice. As a great military exploit, forming part of a profoundly-reasoned campaign, the battle of Dubba will appear with increased brilliance. On that field twenty-six thousand men were entirely defeated; yet with no light play of arms; for all the dead, and they lay in heaps, were grim robust swordsmen, and so strongly did they fight that the 22nd Regiment alone lost one hundred and forty-seven soldiers—one third of their whole number! At Dubba also, as at Meeanee, a leader, the same at both and worthy of all praise, animated the fight. Hoche Mohamed Seedee, an Abyssinian slave! Heroic in strength of body and mind, this brave man and his brother slaves, who formed the domestic guards of the Ameers, forced their dastard lords to fight at Meeanee, and having vainly opposed their final surrender sought the Lion, and at Dubba, fighting with unbounded fury, fell to the last man under the bayonets of the 22nd Regiment.

"General W. Napier, April 16th.—Shere Mohamed acted entirely in concert with the captive Ameers, whose intrigues were so incessant that my patience almost failed: deceived by my quietude he thought me afraid, but I was thereby gaining four points of importance. 1°. His Beloochees were plundering the country and rendering his cause odious. 2°. Time was gained for the Sukkur column to arrive. 3°. He expended treasure. 4°. He grew bolder, fortified a camp only five miles from Hydrabad, and prevented my camels from grazing. Now fighting close to Hydrabad was for me a great advantage, because of my wounded and the want of

carriage; but I expected an attempt to cut off the Sukkur column, then only a few marches off, and made preparations to prevent that. First, knowing their superstition, I judged that the Beloochees would not go near Meeanee, they feared their own dead. I therefore looked for an attack, either beyond that field or on the hither side, and in this view sent cavalry to join the column at Muttaree beyond Meeanee, trusting that their numbers would be exaggerated by the spies. These horsemen, led by McMurdo, effected a junction the 21st, the column moved on the 22nd, a regiment of cavalry went forth to meet it, and I followed close with another: the enemy assailed the flank of Stack's column, but some cannon shot drove them back and by midnight all were safe in my camps.

"This was a clean and delicate operation, for my spies told me that the Ameer had quitted his first position to approach nearer, had detached eight thousand men to fall on the column, and five thousand to assail my camp when I should leave it to succour Hydrabad, which his main body was then to storm: it was to be Cabool again! The Sukkur column was so tired that the 23rd was given to rest and reorganization, but the 24th we marched, and after seven miles found the Ameer was to the left and consequently nearly on our communications; but I had still five hundred men in the fortress and eight hundred, with two guns, in the camp.

"This country is traversed by deep canals with high banks, the canals varying in breadth from sixty inches to sixty feet, dry in winter but rivers by inundation. We could see nothing, but I sent out my cavalry, turned my march to that side, found the enemy at Dubba and beat him: it was sharp work. No Beloochee assailed me personally, though several came near and one I covered, but did not shoot, having great repugnance to kill with my own hand unless attacked, which by some fatality was not the case. There is fate in these things, for they were all around me when alone, yet none struck, and not even my horse was touched in either

battle, which at Meeanee was inexplicable, except by fate. My fate or luck has indeed been great: whatever seemed uncertain turned out exactly to my wish. Even the governor-general's letters, thanking us for Meeanee and promising rewards, reached me just six hours before the battle, the only letters that did come; the others were all cut off. Such bits of luck make a whole. When we carried the village the enemy's right tried to gain the cultivated district on the Indus, which they would have passed and got to the hills; but our cavalry of the left turned them back on the cavalry of our right. These last had indeed charged without orders, but so opportunely that fault could not be found; yet, had the enemy issued from the wood as expected that charge would have laid open my flank.

"In my dispatches many persons are mentioned by name, for Indian officers get no promotion save by seniority, and to be praised in a dispatch gives a claim to staff appointments; therefore I had no other way to reward the exceeding gallantry displayed. Hardly was there one officer who had not fought hand to hand, and it was indeed very extraordinary fighting. After the battle a day's halt was absolutely necessary, from our deficiency in camels. Fifty thousand were destroyed in Lord Keane's expedition! By great care of mine our loss is only forty! yet we have been constantly in march for four months: but then I rode with my columns, never quitting them. Keane, it is said, travelled in a palanquin and had three or four hundred camels for his personal baggage: five animals sufficed for mine.

"When our wounded were cared for we marched on Meerpoor, and then as many men as could get water were pushed forward to win Omercote in the desert: a failure was probable but to level the enemy's last stronghold was important, and there was no time for besieging because the inundation was rising behind me. Luckily the fools surrendered when they might have rallied and fought me again in September after the heat and inundation. The Ameer fled to the Thur

or great desert with only forty followers, the rest have dispersed. I employ all who submit as they were under the Ameers; and have also resigned all debts due to the Ameers, which will induce their debtors, very numerous and influential, to abandon a cause entailing payment, for one which uses the sponge.

"Omercote is one hundred miles from the field of battle, it surrendered the 4th and yesterday our guns and people were back here at Hydrabad in safety, though the river rose with extraordinary rapidity. That alarmed me, but the moment we begun to retire down it went, and then begun rising again just as we reached camp! It has risen unusually early, for all my calculations gave until the 15th. Now I am *coosh*—a Persian word for comfortable. My camp and strong places are well supplied; the Scindes and Hindoos are delighted to be rid of the Belooch robber, and Belooch himself not altogether displeased, for he has no peculiar affection for his prince; and as I have given him back his *jagire*, or estate, no cause appears to me for apprehending future insurrection. The river also is between us and the mountains which form the real Belooch country. The river furnishes a good barrier, because these chaps are all keen for money and will soon join in the petty trade on the Indus that must quickly spring up: this will keep them quiet in time, and I will play *Belted Will Howard* for the next year, and hang all who cross the borders in arms. And I have another hold on them: if they cross to my side, troops from Kurrachee and Sukkur shall lay their own lands waste, which will call them home.

"This wild work is the only way, and is in their own style; we cannot control them at first by any other; we should be soon beleaguered and driven into the jungle to perish. My utmost efforts are directed to civilize our warfare, but no one not engaged can tell how difficult it is to do; the blood gets heated by the barbarism we are in the midst of, and those who receive no quarter will not willingly

give it. Our men are very ferocious. Captain Innes was a favourite with the Sepoys, and they will not give quarter; every man they reached at Dubba was stabbed with the cry of Innes! Innes! There is no dealing with this. The campaign is over, yet hard work is before me, there is no law, no government, and the great difficulty will be to get fit men for situations as a knowledge of the language is indispensable: meanwhile the heat is fearful, I am sixty, and labour tells heavily on me—but all is fate!"

His sixty years had not prevented him from defeating a great army, capturing two strong fortresses, and marching under a Scindian sun, above two hundred miles; all in sixteen days! and his ready talent in critical moments was thus shewn.

"Clibborn conducted my espionage, and well too; but Stack, when coming down with his brigade got a small note in a quill—they are thus carried through an enemy's camp, how or rather where you must guess. It was from Clibborn, saying—Halt for God's sake! You will be attacked by at least forty thousand men to-morrow, &c. Stack sent the cossid back to me with quill and note, asking what he should do? I was at dinner with a large party in my tent, and to counteract Clibborn's alarm read aloud his note, wrote on it with a pencil, *Clibborn's men are all in buckram, come on*, and then sent it back. This made a terrible joke and ridicule against Clibborn throughout the camp, and though ruin to him did what I wanted: reassured the nervous! I was by no means sure Clibborn's information was not true, but he had no business to send it to Stack; for whether 20,000 or 40,000 were there I was watching them as a cat does a mouse. Shere Mohamed, thus lying in wait for Stack, made me very anxious. I believed the Ameer had thirty thousand men, for my information varied from that to forty thousand, and to fight without Stack would have been at such disadvantage, that though they might have been beaten the risk was too great to warrant a battle

not forced upon me. I felt sure of victory however if the Ameer attacked Stack, because he had a first-rate brigade of experienced soldiers from Nott's force; and before the Beloochees could walk over him I should have been upon their rear. Still the whole affair was very awkward.

"On the 23rd I said at breakfast, now my luck would be very great if I could get my other reinforcements, either *down* from Sukkur or *up* from the mouth of the river; but that cannot be for a week, perhaps longer, and I will not let this chap bully me within five miles of my camp all that time. The words were scarcely out when some one said—*there are boats, look!* We run out, and lo! my Bombay reinforcements were there! *Hillo! what are those masts?* cried another, and behold a grove of masts appeared over the low ground coming down the river! my reinforcements from Sukkur were there! In an hour I had five hundred recruits, two 8-inch howitzers and a host of artillerymen with entrenching tools: before that only three officers were with my sixteen guns. At 7 P.M. my troops were brigaded and manœuvred to make them know their places, and at that moment vakeels came to desire me to surrender: they were taken along the line and told to report all they saw; but then came a fresh one and all kept talking to discover what they could until two in the morning, when I lay down finished with fatigue. At 4 o'clock I got up and marched: at 8 o'clock we found the enemy. All this wear and tear tells on sixty-one.

"This country is very difficult for war; a dead flat, yet without a view: banks of nullahs and jungles entirely intercept sight. The Beloochees get down into holes and ditches and when you appear, let fly with their matchlocks, spring up, and covered by their shields fall on sword in hand. They cannot indeed escape when beaten, but as to running, devil a bit! they lounge off, as at Meeanee, slowly, and indifferent to your musquetry though vollied into their backs at five yards' distance! They are most determined

fatalists—and most terrible swordsmen; they cut through everything. Heads fly off at a blow! it has been repeatedly done, and it is the same with an arm: I have not heard of a leg, but it would be the same, for they will behead a bullock or cut a goat in two at a blow. Lieut. Wilkinson had an iron helmet with yards of turban rolled round to keep off the heat; a chief cut through turban helmet and peak! a wicked blow. Wilkinson gave a Roland for the Oliver: he hit him down with a sheer-cut through the turban, and though the shield was raised at the instant the blow broke into both shield and skull, sticking fast, and as the chief fell dead his weight nearly pulled Wilkinson down. Many were upon him and he would have been slain had not Lt. Thompson arrived at the moment, and the two fought until others came and cleared the house. It was in the village this happened.

"Lo! I have mistaken names. It was Nixon, not Wilkinson, who killed the chief and had his own helmet cut through; but Wilkinson also killed a chief: there were so many feats of daring I puzzle names. McMurdo slew three Beloochees in this battle, hand to hand, and two at Mecanee. A Sepoy fought five in a ditch and killed them all! Tait's horsemen were there and could not get down to his help, but witnessed the whole affair.

"Montagu McMurdo cannot keep clear of single combats, which I tell him are not dignified in a quartermaster-general. A Beloochee nearly finished him on the 24th, laying him open from the navel to the shoulder: he was absolutely ripped up! Luckily McMurdo's counter-blow fell heavily at the same moment and split the Beloochee's skull, so that his sword did not go through the breast-bones and ribs, but it was a large wound. At Meeanee he was saved by a sergeant; for while engaged with two or three in front another got behind him and was cut down by the sergeant just as he struck at Mac, so the blow fell harmless: next moment McMurdo saved the sergeant; for a Beloochee was

in the act of striking at him behind when Montagu split his skull. A horseman has no chance against sword and shield; the Beloochee gets on the bridle hand, holds his shield high and cuts the left thigh or the horse's legs; and he cannot be reached over the bridle arm, for his shield parries the blow effectually. A fellow cut down young Fitzgerald's horse and Fitz fell under him, but being the strongest man in Scinde parried two blows while disengaging himself from the horse; then rising, his counter-blow went through turban and skull down to the teeth: the shield was of no avail against that terrible arm!

"Lord F. Somerset.—The enemy was concentrated at Dubba, and the Ameer boasted that we were fewer and he had more than were at Cabool. His force was above twenty-six thousand, with eleven pieces of artillery: I said twenty thousand in the dispatch to keep bounds, but all my spies concurred as to the Ameer's force being above twenty-six thousand. The dispatch will tell your lordship that Shere Mohamed did not Cabool us. On the 27th we got possession of the fort and town of Meerpoor, and on the 4th of April took Omercote, 100 miles from the field of battle. I hope his grace may not find much to condemn; but I know that in trying to adhere to the rules of a great master men make sad blunders, while imagining they are applying his principles: of my own conduct I am no fair judge, and can only say, if it meets with the duke's approbation it will be the greatest gratification and the utmost of my ambition.

"I see all sorts of attacks made on Lord Ellenborough's policy in England as well as here. As regards India, the cause is this. Lord Ellenborough puts an end to wasteful expenditure of public money by certain civil servants, who were rioting in the plunder of the treasury: at least such is the general opinion. These men are all intimate with the editors of newspapers, and many engaged with them; they therefore fill the columns of the papers with abuse: but men begin to see through this and justly to estimate his excel-

lent government. His lordship has destroyed a system calculated to ruin India, or any country, and to which our misfortunes in Affghanistan are justly attributed: the army was degraded, vilified, run down until it really became infected with a bad opinion of itself. When I arrived at Poona, I really saw such things, and heard such, as to leave no difficulty in accounting for our misfortunes: the military spirit seemed to have gone! Lord Ellenborough arrived, he gave public expression to his confidence in the army, the troops felt they had a protector and their spirit came back, for they were no longer commanded by ignorant political agents.

"All this was effected by Lord Ellenborough in ten months, and I assure you I chiefly attribute my own good fortune to the spirit infused by him; and to those admirable general arrangements which enabled me to apply that spirit with effect: yet this is the man abused, though no error can be brought against his government. Let facts speak. This time last year India was all gloom and despondency; now everyone is confident and cheerful. The armies in Affghanistan were then supposed to be lost; they became victorious, are safe on the right side of the Indus, and all is safe and flourishing: but the treasury is no longer pillaged and in that lies his lordship's crime.

"I did fervently hope from your note, some months ago, that Lord Hill was recovering, and was much vexed to hear of his death: we are born to die, but it is lowering to the spirits to lose the great and the good, and he was both!"

THIRTEENTH EPOCH.

SEVENTH PERIOD.

After the battle of Meeanee Lord Ellenborough issued a manifesto, proclaiming the offences of the Ameers, the justice of the war, and the annexation of Scinde to the Indian empire. After that of Dubba he made the victor an absolute governor, responsible only to God for a clear conscience, and to the supreme government for general policy. This was so offensive to the directors and the Bombay faction, both looking to the plunder of Scinde through their relations as civil functionaries, that an insane fury of vituperation seized them, and lasted for years. On the other hand Charles Napier illustrated Gibbon's remark, that "love of action when guided by the sense of propriety and benevolence becomes the parent of every virtue; and if those virtues are accompanied with equal abilities, a family, a state, or an empire, may be indebted for their safety and prosperity to the undaunted courage of a single man." His heart and brain indeed expanded, simultaneously with the sense of power, when he contemplated the Scindees' misery, the Beloochees' ferocity, the natural riches and enforced misery of the country:—abject misery which he was intent to abate by softening barbarian passions, exciting industry, and spreading the healing balm of justice over the wounds of society. He will be now found, without cruelty or harshness or bloodshed, and in an incredibly brief time, presenting the astonishing spectacle of a people, composed of distinct races,—one fierce and warlike the others revengeful and having much to revenge—uniting under

his rule in peace, abandoning evil habits and joining in a common pursuit of trade and agriculture. And this with such sincerity of feeling that the Beloochees, fearing him at first as the incarnate spirit of ill and calling him so, bowing, when they had experienced his sway, to his justice, their fear and amazement at his prowess merging in love and veneration.

His first step was the announcement that all who submitted should retain their property, rights, and public situations: his next was to free the Ameers' debtors from their obligations, by which very many influential persons were drawn off from their cause: then he organized his civil functionaries from the officers of his army, giving this wise injunction:—"Make no avoidable change in the ancient laws and customs, the conquest of a country is sufficient convulsion for the people without abrupt innovations in their habits and social life." His fourth step was to mollify and conciliate the great sirdars and chiefs by honourable treatment, by adroit flattery and honest promises of future protection, adding thereto an act of great vigour which gave assurance of his sincerity; for finding that the camp followers, some twenty thousand and very lawless men, were plundering the Scindians, he suddenly disarmed them: it was the stroke of a master who would be obeyed.

The times were however too wild, and the elements of mischief too copious for the country to settle down in quiet without further demonstrations of force. Shere Mohamed had fled to the desart, but being without a refuge there hovered about so long, where water could be found, that the Scindees in irony called him the "*Jungle Wallah*," or keeper of the jungle. He was however by degrees reinforced, principally from the right bank of the Indus, where several large tribes were disposed to accept his pay for a new effort. Thus towards the end of April he was able to take post with eight thousand men at Khoonera, Roostum's old lair, sixty miles N.E. of Hydrabad. His followers were however no

longer the swordsmen of Dubba, they lurked rather than collected for war: still the state of affairs was very critical. On the left bank of the river, northward of Khoonera, Roostum's son, Meer Hussein, having two thousand men at Shah Ghur, menaced Ali Moorad, who had moreover to contend with refractory killedars on the right bank, and with some independent tribes—amongst them the formidable Chandians. On that side also, Shah Mohamed, the Lion's brother, had gathered some thousands of warriors with four guns and come down to Sehwan, designing to pass the river there, having concerted an insurrection about Hydrabad; but for objects of his own, for he had previous to Dubba offered to assassinate his brother, and been repelled with horror by Charles Napier, who sent the Lion notice of the designed villany. That prince had gone northward after the battle although his own territory was in the Delta, a wild unhealthy district not to be entered by the British in the hot season, and then filled with predatory roving Beloochees, some twenty thousand, calling themselves his soldiers and ready to take his pay. Eastward of the Delta, beyond the Poorana branch of the river, was also a tribe in arms, five thousand, intercepting the communications with Bombay. Insolent and elate they were too, from Captain Jacob's misconduct: he had moved against them without orders, thereby marring a combination of the general, but had not resolution to attack and retreated to Meerpoor. At the same time the Jam of the Jokeas menaced Kurrachee, displaying great arrogance, which was too tamely endured by the commandant, Colonel Boileau.

These events demanded some decisive measure, but the heat had become so great that to take the field was certain death for many soldiers, and thus a complication of dangers and difficulties again required a master stroke. For if the Lion were permitted to unite the roving bands on the left bank of the Indus, and receive help from the right bank, he might throw himself into the Delta and remain unmolested

until the cold season, when a new and more difficult warfare must commence. The Lukkee tribe was already collecting boats to join the Lion's brother, and everywhere commotions were beginning; wherefore seeing that the tranquillity of the country could only be secured by immediate action, the general resolved to brave the dreadful sun and once more take the field. This was a great and most dangerous operation, but was not more bold than the combinations were skilful, both being of the highest class in war. For holding the Lion to be the nucleus of all mischief, he resolved to strike at and capture him before he could gather head or reach the Delta. In this view, he reinforced Ali Moorad with Chamberlayne's irregular horsemen, for resistance to Hussein; Colonel Roberts was directed to bring a column of all arms from Sukkur to Sehwan; and Jacob's force was augmented on the side of Meerpoor by degrees, under pretence of establishing posts; the connecting fortress of Ali-ka-Tanda, between Hydrabad and Meerpoor, was repaired, and troops were called from Deesa to strengthen Omercote. An intercepting line was thus drawn between the Lion and the Delta, while Roberts menaced him from the north, and Chamberlayne and Ali Moorad prevented a junction with Hussein. Having thus spread his web, the general watched every vibration from Hydrabad, ready to sally forth and seize the Lion.

That prince after a short stay at Khoonera approached the Indus and passed his family over to the right bank for safety, but at the same time looked to favour a counter passage of the Lukkee tribe. The Rhins also, the most powerful of all the Belooch tribes, had promised him twenty thousand warriors, and he knew of the projected insurrection at Hydrabad. Thus once more the Lion and Charles Napier were pitted against each other in generalship, both acting on the same plan, namely, to surround each other: for while the great outward chain was being formed around the Belooch by the Englishman, the former, with his confe-

derates was encircling Hydrabad and looking for internal insurrection. The Lion's movements were however known to his opponent, whereas the British general's were too wide and too profound to be discovered; some of his closing columns had to march sixty, some a hundred, some even two hundred miles to attain their object. And yet even the nearest were most skilfully hidden. The combination was as delicate as it was vast; for the inundation and the heat were to be taken into calculation, the first coming on swiftly, the last already raging—terrible in prospect also, seeing that the thermometer was sure to mark more than 130° in the coolest shade! Certainly to resolve on taking the field in face of such obstacles evinced extraordinary resolution, and to succeed surpassing talent.

This reappearance of the Lion was hailed with a treasonable exultation at Bombay. "He was a great commander; his force was overwhelming; the war was a religious one; the people adored their patriarchal princes; the whole Belooch race was rising in arms; they would be supported by the Affghans, and the British troops, deprived of Major Outram's protective genius and led by an incapable old ruffian, would be destroyed." This faction, taking Outram for their oracle, had always predicted such an ending, and through Dr. Buist's newspaper, the known organ of some members of the Bombay government, took active steps to insure such a result. His articles, which were always translated, shewed how and where to attack the troops with most advantage, and the chiefs were assured, most truly, that persons of authority and influence in England and Bombay would hail their success. Afterwards, when the general's ability and energy had baffled these traitorous schemes, the secret authors declared as earnestly, that there had never been danger or difficulty and Sir C. Napier had ferociously slaughtered some half-armed barbarians! Accompanying this with such direful announcements of their own public virtue as the following, taken from Buist's columns.

"Alas that this man bears the name of Englishman. Alas! that he is born in the glorious age of Wellington, which he disgraces!" This sketch shall now be illustrated by the general himself.

"Journal, April 7th.—Now my fearful work of settling the country begins, and the heat is violent. I have to collect revenue, administer justice, arrange the troops, survey the country, project improvements, form civil officers, and appoint proper functionaries. I have to get a thorough hold of a conquered country, and establish a government; and have really hardly any one to assist me: all is confusion, and the military movements are still going on. The last alone are enough to occupy one mind, and but for young McMurdo I should hardly get on. I am gradually finding out fine fellows, but there are no great number to select from; I am a stranger to many, and those I am most acquainted with have duties already. It is a fine field to work in, but I am too old and the climate is not invigorating. We have abolished slavery here, at which all the Auckland faction carp, as they do at all Lord E. does. '*He is too quick, he is in too great a hurry.*' The slave girls of the Harem differ on this point. I have sent off the Ameers to Bombay.

"April 13th.—The people at Kurrachee are frightened to death by the Jam of the Jokeas, though they have a stronger force than I had at Meeanee. I find that twelve wounded men of the 22nd concealed their hurts on the 21th of March, thinking there would be another fight; they were discovered by a long hot march which they could not complete, and when they fell owned the truth: two had been shot clean through both legs! How is it possible to defeat British troops? It was for the Duke of York to discover that! This day the Ameers quit their conquest. Their dynasty has lasted sixty years, and they were all-powerful, a family of tyrants living for selfish enjoyment and destroying the people they had conquered. Not one of their concubines will go with them: they are all girls, torn by force from their families, shut up

for ever in the zenanas and hating their ravishers: no wonder, for except Shadad and Hussein who are rather good-looking, Shadad has a throat-cutting look though, the Ameers are very disgusting men. Poor girls! I am now anxious to abolish the system of presents. The poor cultivator pays one-third of his produce to the Ameers, and *bakshis* to the collector, to this, that, and t'other, until he has only one-fourth left for life and cultivation: if I can abolish this *bakshis* system he will have three-fourths; but who can say what his produce will be in this land of produce unbounded!

"April 14th.—The war is decided. The princes of the land, that is the conquerors of Scinde not the Scindian princes, are deposed, I am master and am going to quit my tent for the palace of my enemy. Thus ends the seventh volume of my journal. The eighth shall begin with an account of my work as administrator. I hope to be as successful as in my military progress, but it is far more difficult. However I succeeded at Cephalonia and may do so here by diligence and zeal. Yet it will not do to govern in a tent with the thermometer at 110° notwithstanding the aid of *tatties* to cool the air.

"Richard Napier.—You must not take Outram's account of the war if you see him; he is mad on that subject from rage. What think you of his writing to me, three days before Meeanee, that the Ameers had not assembled a man. '*Except their servants they have not a man:*' the next day he was attacked in the Residency by seven thousand, and two days later we had to fight the battle! Had his ridiculous ideas of the honour and truth and ill-usage of the Ameers, those *patriarchal princes* as he called them, made any impression on me there would have been another Cabool massacre: as it was his opinions, which all the papers are crying up, influenced me too much. If ever a man saved his army by adhering to his own judgment against popular outcry I saved mine — and under every

ridicule and insult from newspapers, with their outcry that '*Outram was the man: he had ruled Scinde for years, knew India, and must know best in this matter!*' My troops however placed their faith in me; and though many officers wrote anonymous letters, abusive enough, they are now as quiet as mice"—it was a *few* who wrote *many* letters. "From first to last my soldiers stuck to me; and from first to last Outram was deceived. The Ameers' preparations had long been made, and only yesterday, on a trial, it came out that while writing the most violent protestations of faith they had issued orders in all their villages to murder every English man, woman, and child!"

Let his journal now be interrupted to trace Outram's conduct in England. Accepting the friendly greetings of Sir Charles Napier's family, and professing unbounded admiration and friendship for him personally, he secretly strove to ruin him with the government and the public by whispered charges of wrong. And from the moment he reached London many of the leading London journals, freshly primed or adopting the falsehoods of the Indian press, presented the conqueror of Scinde as an ignorant brutal soldier, who had forced on an unjust war despite of the humane remonstrances of the "*accomplished Major Outram*"—a man so illiterate that he could not write his own publications! His superior capacity for governing the country was especially insisted upon in England, still more at Bombay, where the slanderous anti-Ellenborough faction and the creditors of Outram were alike eager to obtain for him a lucrative appointment. His power to injure would have been small had he been alone; but the Bombay government had, as the general anticipated, adopted his views and transmitted them to the directors, who listened eagerly to anything that aided their enmity against Lord Ellenborough: nor was the home government averse. An expression attributed to Outram at the time was characteristic of the man and of what was going on. "*I did not*

think Sir C. Napier had so many friends in England or I would not have attacked him."

Foul play soon became so evident that the writer of this biography publicly rebuked Outram for suffering the promulgation of falsehoods detrimental to his benefactor, and tending to his own glorification. He evaded close explanation, returned to Bombay, and from thence, at a safe distance, commenced a long course of shameless abuse against the man who had saved him from the just anger of Lord Ellenborough: and in that course he will be found obtaining from men in office support, shameless as his own conduct. Before leaving England however he drew up what he called a *protest*, which being shewn to the Duke of Wellington was by him cast upon the ground with an expression of unmitigated scorn. Nevertheless supported as he was, his tales had an influence on the ministers of the day sufficiently disgraceful. No guns were fired in honour of the victories, no thanks were moved for in Parliament; and rumours of misconduct which "government could not countenance!" were freely circulated in excuse.

A chain of political causes may here be clearly traced. Lord Ellenborough was hateful to the directors because he had stopped their rapacious folly in the East; they were powerful in England; Sir James Weir Hogg was powerful with them, and if he is to be believed Sir Robert Peel was at that time soliciting him to take office. Now Sir C. Napier's victories had consolidated Lord Ellenborough's policy when the directors were denouncing it as impolicy. The chain of hostility was thus completed. Instead of thanks and acknowledgments for the great victories, Lord Ellenborough received from the secret committee of the India House a demand for explanation, on certain "*notes of conversations*" with the Ameers, held by Outram. These had been given by him to the directors and embodied all his foul charges against Sir C. Napier, who was thus officially required to explain by the Indian government. His formal

answer, to be recorded further on, drew the following report from the governor-general in council.

"Sir C. Napier has entered at some length into the justification of his proceedings before the battle of Meeanee. In doing this he has placed upon our records a mass of most curious and interesting matter which we regret it was not in our power to lay before you at an earlier period. We strongly feel, that it was to Major General Sir C. Napier's penetration and decision that our army owed its safety. And we are astonished at the extent to which Major Outram suffered himself to be deluded by the Ameers!"

This testimony from a supreme government, in favour of a public servant, joined to great victories, would in other cases have secured the highest honours: it did not even protect him from injury and insult. Meanwhile he pursued his own course of honour and usefulness with more than his usual diligence and fortitude.

"Journal.—This 30th day of April my quarters were moved into Hydrabad, and I occupy the palace of the chief Ameer, Nusseer Khan! So ends my campaign, or rather so my reign commences. At Cephalonia my work was that of a horse, the fatigue endured under a burning sun was immense: I cannot so work now, but I must work to do some good in Scinde, and try to make the poor rejoice in our government.

"May 1st.—Shere Mohamed has again collected ten thousand men, and I will disperse them if they do not disperse themselves; but it will be good to give them time to do so; for by conciliation one or two chiefs may be coaxed to come in, and then others will follow. They are now alarmed, and conscious how ill they meant to use us expect the same treatment. Their intentions were indeed very ferocious previous to the battle; for thinking nothing could prevent victory, it was settled that all the fugitives, prisoners, man woman and child, were to be collected on the battle field there to be slaughtered! I alone to be saved. My nose

was to be bored, a ring placed in it and a chain to the ring; Nusseer Khan was then to mount his horse, and holding the end of the chain lead me in triumph from the field. A dispute arose. Nusseer was averse to the whole thing, but said, if I was to have the ring and chain they should be of gold. Shadad swore it should be of iron and heavy; and so it was decided. A pleasant walk of six miles I should have had, with a heavy chain dangling to my snout. Well, I owe Nusseer *gré* for wishing it to be of gold: I was however a chicken counted before hatched—the ring is in their noses!

"May 3rd.—Dispatches from Lord Ellenborough come. He says, 'General I send you my order, prefixed to your dispatches, but you have done so much for the army and for our empire in India that my resources in the expression of gratitude and praise, and all my ingenuity in devising rewards for service in the field, are quite exhausted and I see the inadequacy of my own work. I trust you may live long to enjoy the honours England will bestow upon you, and to perform more services to India. Believe me general, with the most sincere admiration and esteem your ever faithful friend and servant, Ellenborough.'"

Honours! Not even a salute for his victories! The thanks of Parliament delayed a year, and then alloyed with personal insult! He had leave indeed to change his red riband from one shoulder to another, and to substitute G. for K. in the initials of his knighthood; and he got a regiment, which was his right on the score of former services:—but from the Duke of Wellington, who paid no court to a body of men, called by his brother Lord Wellesley "*the ignominious tyrants of the East.*"

"Journal.—I strive to curb pride and vanity. Get thee behind me Satan! But it is not easy to make Satan obey when one is a conqueror. No mortal praise does really affect me, but I am grateful to Lord Ellenborough. I care not for the Grand Cross, which I dare say they will give me;

but I do want a medal in common with the private soldiers: our danger was alike and so be our reward. As to riches, which they say are to come, I am equally indifferent, so far as regards myself for my habits require not riches. Not so as regards others. My victories will enable me to provide for my family and my relations, and to give something to John Kennedy's children: however I have no faith in riches." — These were not mere phrases: he gave freely as he wrote.

"May 4th.—Two chiefs have come in, and more are coming. I will not now attack Shere Mohamed till the 14th or 15th, to give his people time for reflection on my proclamation, securing all men's property and former appointments: it will make half of them leave him. I have however sent a steamer up the river to do a little mischief and prevent the mountain tribes crossing. Captain —— is a person indeed who will do no good, but my orders are positive to chase all boats away so that no Beloochees can get over from the right bank; and probably the battle of Dubba has given them an excuse for not coming. The river has risen and I am crippled by want of boats, by the sun also, and by the want of camels: still I will attack these chaps once more if I can get carriage. More chiefs have asked to come in and I pardon every one, it is nonsense to make exceptions on these occasions. Nobody thinks he is wrong, or that those who helped him are: exceptions only turn cut-throats into heroes, and I would rather pardon a cut-throat than fight with a hero! Lord E. has ordered me not to pardon Ahmed Khan Lugharree, yet I will slip him in quietly: he is not a bad fellow though he did lead the attack on the Residency.

"May 6th.—Shere Mohamed is alarmed; he sent proposals which I rejected, insisting on unconditional surrender. He must clear out or this land will have no peace: nor I neither. In ten days I shall have camels and will then drive him into the desert, where he cannot abide unless he is a salamander. Well, God only knows, he may beat

me; but '*Dieu est toujours du coté des gros canons*' said Turenne, and I have the *gros canons:* he has none at all for I took them. I like him for the good fight he makes, but let him beware of the middle of May! Still my hope is, no more fighting, no more slaughter. My object now is to create, to make roads, buildings, open streets, to insure justice. Oh! how I long to begin thus to live, and to rest after the horrid carnage of these battles! At times I almost wish for death!

"General W. Napier, May 8th.—I am very severely worked under heat almost unbearable; the thermometer is above 100° in an artificially-cooled room with walls five feet thick! Yet I am well. My work is easily stated: there is no government. The Beloochees are hostile and well armed; the Scindees in our favour, but slaves to the Beloochees and unarmed; were they armed incautiously they would plunder their neighbours and my convoys conjointly with the Belooch. The robber has so long ruled here that he has become a glorious fellow, and the moment a chap gets a *tulwar*, i. e. a sword, be his race what it may, he sets up in trade: all my own camp followers, twenty thousand, have arms and rob everything. I have now forbidden them to carry arms and shall see how that works; the Scindee is too poor to buy a sword, and is by habit a labourer, the only labourer, for a Beloochee scorns labour. You know him by his swell cut, his slow rolling lounge, his shield, his sword, matchlock and dagger: the spade don't suit his hand, but your gold watch does; and there are still twenty thousand of these fellows roving about. I must keep the whip hand or be thrown in the race, and for that my force is small and widely spread.

"The Ameers were personally disliked. Outram will tell you the contrary, but the refusal of all their wives and concubines to accompany them is one among many convincing proofs. I have the whip which hung up in Nusseer's zenana to flog the women with: it has two lashes made of twisted brass wire! Yet Nusseer is accounted the most noble and

generous of them all: Shadad is a monster. Outram is puffed up by a faction, which uses him as a tool against Lord Ellenborough: he believes all that faction says of himself, yet thinks it far below his merits, which are really only those of a partizan: his head is turned.

"I have not read any story of the Affghan war. I have not time to read; but three regiments that were in that war are here, and all swear there was no other cruelty than refusing quarter, which they thus excuse. We did not begin, the cruelty of the Affghans to our camp followers was so great that we found their bodies with all the marks of torture, and then the soldiers were beyond control. The feeling was evidently very fierce and sanguinary. I hope to get it under gradually in Scinde. There are very excellent men here, officers, who tell me they never saw any cruelty except refusing quarter: no deliberate cruelty. We have had none; it was indeed beginning, for plunder is the first step, but I quickly stopped that and all the papers are abusing me for flogging plunderers by the provost-marshal: they are calling upon the men and officers to mutiny, and '*put an end to this fellow's breaches of law.*'

"You know Lord W. Bentinck abolished flogging, so there is no punishment, save by the provost, for Sepoys, except confinement or death. On a campaign confinement is impossible, and a villain takes his ease, guarded by a corporal and three men who have this extra duty while the gentleman sits all day on his heels, the great enjoyment of an Indian. If I had flinched before those editors, of whom he of the 'Bombay Times' is the worst, this country would have been ravaged. Now, no atrocity has been committed, and the poor Scindians flock to us, bringing provisions, but fly into the jungle before the Beloochee forces. The Scindian has been a slave, and has not been '*roused to courage and mortal combat by our injustice,*' as Buist of the 'Bombay Times' asserts; for not one has fought against us; instead of '*bravely defending their invaded hovels*' they have got a good deal of our money and are

delighted. The Indian press never takes part with the people, but with every fellow who is discontented and rascally. They support a *clique* of 'respectable servants of the Company' who are robbers of the first class, and he who attempts to put any one of these from his prey will have the whole press upon him.

"As you thought so I thought in the beginning, viz. that the Upper Scinde Ameers would not turn my left, but rise behind me in the ceded districts; wherefore I sent Wallace there and called the Bhawalpore man to aid him; and then, as you say, had only to think of the time and place for fighting. My march was on Kyrpoor and I expected them to assail Sukkur as they promised, but they fled south. Seeing then their plan was concentration in the south, I left the mass of my troops, who were safe in their numbers, under the guns of Ali Moorad's fortress of Dejee, taking him with me to the desert as the best hostage. You know what followed, just what you supposed would follow; only, instead of a battle at Kyrpoor that place was taken without one: it was not walled but was capable of a powerful defence. My enterprize in the desert was a mere preparation for the greater movement south; but then, as you say, my march was at my leisure.

"They opened the gates of Hydrabad from cowardice, for their Beloochees would have fought like tigers. The walls are from forty to fifty feet high, of solid rock, with a soft brick revetement in which a cannon shot makes only a hole, around which all becomes more compact and solid. It could have been taken by mining, being almost without flank fire, but then every house also is a citadel of mud, with walls five feet thick.

"My bazaar order about violent riding shocked all the Indian editors so much, that having other fish to fry alone prevented my proposing a weekly bulletin of the state of their livers. My conscience was indeed sorely troubled at the irritation caused to them by preventing half-caste clerks and subaltern officers riding over poor Hindoos. I have

this very minute sent one of those clerks for trial, he having in breach of that order ridden over a poor young Sepoy, who is much hurt: the fellow will be flogged and all the editors will open upon me *naturally!* Sir G. Arthur has supported me with energy and loyalty. Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, quartermaster-general, son of my old friend Sir Neil, has behaved ill. He and Sir Thos. MacMahon—but it is Campbell's doing—have attempted to ill-treat the finest fellow in my army, McMurdo, superseding him now the campaign is over by a son of the chief man in council, who has been snug at Bombay all the time! Campbell has got as good a lecture as I could give him, and I have applied to Lord Ellenborough to back me up.

"Journal, May 9th.—I can do nothing against Shere Mohamed. I have no carriage, and the sun and the river chain my movements: yet with carriage I would try. I do love this fellow for his firmness. He has made many offers to come in, but he shall not, except unconditionally. I expect Ali Moorad: he says he has fought a great battle and killed three chiefs with his own gun; not unlikely for he is a capital shot. He comes here on pretence of doing me honour, but really '*pour se faire valoir*,' by appearing to get me to pardon the Belooch chiefs who come in. I will not deprive him of that honour.

"May 10th.—No news of Ali Moorad, he will probably not come, there is no calculating on these chaps. It is strange that the Indus has not yet given signs of swelling; we had all sorts of stories about the rising in April the first days; then the 15th; and on the 2nd and 3rd it did rise suddenly, but fell as suddenly and no rise since. Now the 15th of May is fixed for it, but officers here have seen the inundation complete early in April: it is very uncertain and hampers me; for if I go out against the Ameer and it rises it will cut me off, and unless sufficient provisions are taken we may perish. Provisions for five months! And how carry them? Until I know when, and how high, and where the Indus will roll his mass of waters I dare not move.

And the heat has come so suddenly that I should lose half my people. A government general order says no troops shall move in Scinde after the 1st of April: it is death.

"May 11th.—In various oblique ways I have endeavoured to bully Shere Mohamed, and this morning a message came from him to say he would surrender if his treasure was spared. His treasure is safe, and he shall have everything except his principality, which he has lost by warring on us; my belief is that he is the bravest and best of the Ameers. He did not kill his women.

"12th.—Lieut. Anderson, Outram's brother-in-law, has arrived to supersede McMurdo; this shall not be: at least I hope to stop this piece of injustice and folly.

"13th.—Mohamed Khan of Ka Tandah came in this day. He was in a funk until assured of not being hanged, but went off apparently well pleased at having received back from me his father's sword.

"14th.—Two more chiefs: they will come in fast now. These two are, Golam Sha and something else Sha, they seemed fat good-humoured laughing cut-throats enough.

"May 15th.—Four more come in. We shall have all quiet soon, but the main chance must be looked to, and care taken against conspiracy; these barbarian robbers are smart chaps at throat-cutting, yet I can manage them: the thing is to be wide awake.

"Sir G. Arthur, June 1st.—I have only now been able to bring my plans to working order. I have made peace with the tribes along the right bank; and to shew how little I feared them marched a column under Colonel Roberts from Sukkur to Sehwan, through those tribes. Their great chief Wullee Chandia was my prisoner, taken by Ali Moorad: he expected to be hanged but had freedom with full pardon, and has gone up the right bank swearing eternal friendship, like the ladies of the anti-jacobin. Everywhere Roberts met with friendship. Shah Mohamed, the Lion's brother, has sent to ask forgiveness. Anderson, with some troops in a steamer, knocked about his boats and killed forty of his

men, aiding the effect of Roberts' march. Steamers and boats have now gone up pass Roberts to the left bank.

"I hanged a Beloochee lately, to the astonishment of his chief. '*What? hang a Beloochee for killing a Scindian woman?*' The life of a Scindian woman under the patriarchs was worth about 200 rupees. Life, social happiness, security of property, public advantage, were, one and all, sacrificed to the sensual gratifications of the Ameers. Mr. Robertson, when he said this was the mildest native governor in India never made a greater mistake, nor a more unfounded assertion.

"Contrary to my system, and without my knowledge, thirty policemen were lately sent down the river to a district I had strong reasons for not meddling with until the cold season: the consequence was that a Belooch force killed six. We had no business to poke our noses into this southern district of Meerpoor, all around which I had made friendly by negociation: it was thus isolated and sure to fall without a life lost when Shere Mohamed is crushed. This disagreeable event has, or may, injure my plans much: but it is told to you in confidence; for there is such an extraordinary coincidence in the opinions put forth on Scindian affairs by the 'Bombay Times,' and those in Mr. Willoughby's private notes to me—identical words appearing in both, that I fear an attack on the person who unintentionally got me into this scrape. For myself I care not. A man must have a miserable opinion of himself who cares for the attacks of the 'Bombay Times' and Dr. Buist: your order for his prosecution has given great satisfaction to the officers here. I fancy Buist and his writers would greatly rejoice if there should befall in Scinde a *pendant* to the Cabool massacre."

The prosecution noted above was never instituted: probably from the influence of Willoughby, the secretary of council and secret adviser of Outram.

"We are anxious to hear from England whether the intriguers against Lord Ellenborough will succeed in restoring to the Ameers their unhappy victims the Scindians. I do

not like to venture on promised improvements unless we are to keep the land. Meanwhile I have much fear of the Lion getting into the Delta district amongst the rivers; a fear however which I do not mention; for if that man Buist got hold of it he would urge the Lion to do so, in hopes of destroying us in the marshes next autumn. Already the Bombay emissaries have been hard at work, trying to stir up resistance in the way most likely to succeed, namely, murdering our stragglers. Luckily the Beloochees do not join in the wish; but as Buist is sure to do mischief there is no time to be lost in attacking Shere Mohamed.

"June 1st. Journal.—I have been so unwell with fever and dysentery as to think I was on *the march!* My pulse was scarcely above fifty-four. Now I can walk again, but the labour is heavy in this heat. By the Lord Harry it is heat! 150°! Well, a man must die at his post, be it where it will and his work what it will: if God so wills I am now ready to die at mine without wincing.

"Roberts has brought his column safely to Sehwan; the effect of his march has been, as designed, to calm down the country, and will, if the heat admits, puzzle the Lion: in ten days this will be his position, if he has courage and folly enough to remain where he is.



"If he marches N.E. he may escape before Jacob gets across, but he can thus only reach the desert where there is

no water, and a sun that will roast him up in five hours! He has no chance if Jacob can move, but that is hard to do for there is but little water: however the same reason will shut off the Ameer and he is in a trap. It has taken me a month to arrange this movement of troops, two hundred miles asunder, and under a heat that mortal cannot face

"June 4th.—This is the Lion's last day for treating and I shall move against him: the monsoon wind has come, and though the heat scorches the flesh of man and beast I will try what can be done. This evening two guns and four hundred infantry go to Jacob and will reach him the 7th. The steamers will be with Roberts this day to pass him over. On the 8th Jacob will move on Khoonhera; and on the 9th I will move to prevent the Lion crossing between Hydrabad and Meerpoor to establish himself in the marshes of the Poorana River, whence it would be no easy job to dislodge him even in cold weather.

"5th.—The infantry and guns will this evening reach Aliar-ka-Tanda, and shall halt as Mohamed has made a demonstration in that direction: he shall however shew his dispositions more clearly, and I will wait for two things, 1st. To hear of Roberts being fairly over the Indus, which is rising fast. 2nd. To hear what Ali Moorad does with Shere Mohamed.

"6th.—It is not safe to quit my cantonments till I hear from Roberts, and therefore Stanley is gone to halt Jacob. I will not expose my men to this heat while there is a chance of avoiding it, for a great many will be killed by the sun-strokes.

"Colonel Roberts, 7th.—God send our combinations may succeed, but I always doubt in war.

"Journal, June 7th.—There is evidently a general commotion preparing, and some treason is going on amongst the Beloochees about Hydrabad: it is necessary to be on guard, and an example shall be made of traitors. Very

anxious about Roberts, I can make no move till his place is known. I think he will attack the Ameer, he has sufficient force with Ali Moorad's help; so patience for me, with readiness to take advantage of what may happen. Roberts has orders, if possible, to attack on the side of the desert and drive the Lion bodily into the Indus. I do not like to move on him if Roberts can do without me, for I have not half carriage enough and fear we must dip into the desert and lose many men. I am still very unwell, but must go, for there is no one of rank to command that can do the work but Roberts and myself.

"8th.—Sent orders to move the troops from Aliar-ka-Tanda to Meerpoor; they will be there the 9th and ready to move with Jacob into the *Registan* or desert.

"June 9th.—Roberts has done a famous job. The Lion's brother must forsooth move his three thousand men within fifteen miles of Sehwan, to see what Roberts is about and have credit for driving him away when he shall cross the river. It is dangerous master Shah for beasts to go near an old huntsman. Roberts got wind of him, turned, and surprised him at daybreak, killed a hundred of his men, burnt his camp and took himself; and here is Shah Mohamed a prisoner in Hydrabad! This will have the greatest moral effect throughout Scinde.

"Lord Ellenborough, June 9th.—This exploit of Colonel Roberts has been most brilliant: I knew he only wanted opportunity. I hope the troops will not suffer from the heat, but the lying reports spread everywhere by Shere Mohamed and Hussein, Roostum's son, have put the country in a ferment, and forced me to act at all risks. I expect Shah Mohamed in an hour, and have ordered a high tower to be prepared for him, there to await your orders. Mischief has been brewing for some days, to rise on my rear when I go forth, but this achievement of Roberts will have a great effect."

This high tower was one of his subtle counter-strokes.

The combination of Beloochees formed for insurrection in and around Hydrabad, to aid Shah Mohamed when he should come down with his forces was ripe for action, and his capture was not at first believed; hence the ferment went on, until the general exhibited the Ameer in an open balcony of the high tower; he was then recognised and the combination dissolved.

"Sir G. Arthur, June 7th.—The Jam of the Jokeas has a fever: it seized him just as the brothers Mohamed reached the two banks of the Indus and planted guns to command the stream. A report being then abroad that we were too sick to meet *Shere* or *Shah*, the Jam went for purer air to the hills while some of his Beloochees begun a little plundering. I fancy the dispersion of the Shah's force, and that prince's captivity, will reduce the Jam's fever, and I expect to hear of his return to Kurrachee: however he never grew delirious, and our posts came regularly, so I am not called to be his doctor. If the Shah had beaten Roberts the Jam's fever would have continued.

"Journal, June 8th.—Roberts will be over the Indus this day, and to-morrow Jacob will push into the desert. Shere Mohamed is not so close to Khoonhera as to get there before Jacob; he is not aware either of Roberts' exploit, nor can he hear of it until this day; therefore he will scarcely make up his mind to go from the river until he hears particulars. His great object is to cross the Indus to his family and he will not quit the water for two days; and then probably try to negociate with Ali Moorad, who has my orders to keep him in play. I have every hope therefore of Jacob getting two days' start, and so catching the Lion. If he waits to fight Roberts and Jacob will take him in rear and I in front. A report just come that he means to fight Ali Moorad: this if true will give Jacob two days.

"10th.—Collecting boats to cross the Fullaillee to-morrow. Jacob marches to-night, and will be on the 13th

within hearing of Roberts' guns. On that day Roberts will be at Sukkurrunda, but will not probably attack before the 14th, when Jacob will also be in the fight.

"Colonel Roberts, June 11th.—You have done your work like a soldier and set us up here. I propose to advance with my left to the river, and my right spread out eastward as far as I can; but I do not expect to make above two marches and will be about to Hala, where I shall hear that either you or Jacob have done the job. On the 13th he will be surrounded and must surrender or disperse: turn him towards the river if he fights. I want you to get your brace of brothers and he will prefer you to Jacob, I am too strong. I like his pluck and will do my best to get him favour; he is quite different from the lying cut-throats I sent to Bombay: the 'fallen princes.' How Bombay sentimentals make me laugh. I took Shah Mohamed's sword away: it is yours.

"Journal, 11th.—Part of my force crosses the Fullaillee to-day, but those confounded boats have dawdled sadly: however it is necessary for me to be a day or two in arrears, or the Lion would bolt into his den before Roberts or Jacob could reach him. I now leave him quiet to *mamock* Ali Moorad, if he can: it will do Ali good thus to pull down his vanity. It is said the Lion has shut him up in the fort of Sukkurrunda without any *grub:* I hope he will not get out until half-starved. Ali assured me, when I told him to be cautious as Shere Mohamed was too strong, that he would capture or treat with him as I wished; that he could kill him or make him prisoner according to my wishes—anything I liked! If my own arrangements were not so far in blossom Shere Mohamed should be left to thrash him for his vanity.

"12th.—The cavalry and artillery are over the Fuillaillee, and only one man and a horse drowned: they march this evening to Ali-ka-Tanda. This will spread through the country and turn back the fugitives if Roberts has beaten

the Lion; and if any evil has happened my advance will check it. Intelligence just come that Shere Mohamed's army is dispersing fast.

"13th.—The Lion has marched south, and is, or was yesterday, at Shah-i-Khaut, 16 miles from where my cavalry and guns are. I shall therefore march this evening to gain Ka-Tanda, pick up cavalry and guns, and march all night to fall on the enemy at daybreak, which will end the war.

"14th, Nusseer-Poor.—Arrived here at 12 last night, very much fatigued, mind and body, by having personally to command the —th Regiment. Colonel —— may be a good man but he is a bad soldier; out of the whole regiment only 120 could come in, and I was obliged to send all back after marching two miles; all were on the ground, sick or drunk, most of them the last: one fellow died drunk on the roads. I hear Roberts has defeated the Lion, when or where I cannot learn but have sent to block the Muttaree road. It is said he has fled to the desert, but this may be to prevent my look-out towards the river.

"15th, Nusseer-Poor.—I shall halt for news till night, and then make one march towards Hala. I must have some news before morning, and I have dispatched a number of cossids in various directions with letters for Jacob and Roberts; some must find them to-day. That Jacob has been engaged is certain, that Roberts has I also believe. Had the first been worsted he must have retreated either upon me or not far to my right, and I must have heard; therefore my mind is made up to advance gently, sending out for intelligence and guarding the Muttaree road. I cannot go to the east, it is too sandy and too hot: my Europeans could not stand it, our livers are on the *simmer* now and will soon boil: the natives cannot stand it, and I have been obliged to take Red Rover into my tent, poor beast, where he lies down exhausted and makes me very hot. I did not bring a thermometer, what use would it be to a lobster boiling alive!

"24th.—I had hardly written the above sentence ten

days ago when I was tumbled over by the heat with apoplexy: forty-three others were struck, all Europeans, and all dead within three hours except myself! I do not drink! that is the secret: the sun had no ally in the liquor amongst my brains. Unable to walk I flung myself on a table, and luckily one of my staff came in, I think McMurdo. He called the doctors, two were with me in a twinkling, wet towels were rolled round my head, feet in hot water, bleeding, and two men rubbing me. I was so drowsy as to be angry that they would not let me sleep: had they done so it would have been hard to waken me!

"While they were tying up my arm a horseman came from Jacob to say, he had defeated Shere Mohamed and dispersed his forces, which did not stand a moment and Jacob had not a man hurt. I knew Dubba had taken their heart out, and said we should not have another shot fired in Scinde. Lo! I am right. All is now quiet, all the chiefs have laid their swords at my feet; above four hundred and worth many thousand pounds, but all were returned. Jacob's message roused me from my lethargy as much as the bleeding: it relieved my mind, for then I knew my plans had succeeded, and the Belooch had found that his deserts and his fierce sun could not stop me: we lost many men by heat, but all must die some time and no time better than when giving an enemy a lesson."

These extracts scarcely display the skill of his operations, or the unyielding resolution with which he bore up against sickness, prosecuting his design until he actually fell against the door of death, half open to receive him. Thus, when staggering and expecting to fall suddenly, he was so intent on his object that he sent his whole scheme to the second in command, who was at Hydrabad, giving him a positive injunction in case of his own death to push the movements without faltering. This was a noble proof of his public spirit, for it was not an operation to gain glory, but merely a means to attain to a civil government. Writing to Lord

Ellenborough on the 14th he says "We heard guns this morning which I am sure were a salute on the Ameer's arrival, for they were too few for an action with Jacob or Roberts. I know not where either are, and shall not risk moving in the heat of the day. We must have news to-morrow, unless Jacob has let him slip past."

The cannonade was no salute: it was Jacob's guns that spoke. The Lion's men then dispersed, and he with a few followers fled across the Indus to the Khelat hills, where he will be hereafter found, robbed, maltreated, and finally obliged to fly to the Cutchee hills. But hardly had the sound of Jacob's guns passed over his camp than the general fell from the sun-stroke. He was carried to Hydrabad, but so unyielding was his energy that he is found, only three days after, writing long letters on important matters both to the governor-general and his own subordinates of the civil government: his journal however discloses the terrible struggle for life. How he endured the labour thrown upon him was indeed marvellous; for the dâks, after several months' stoppage, had been suddenly freed and an accumulated correspondence arrived at once. The Bombay portion was a heap of vexatious communications—purposely heaped and vexatious; amongst them very long and very lying memorials from the captive Ameers, concocted for them by the faction at Bombay, which he was called upon to answer in the midst of his military operations, and in heat so terrible, that the Europeans could only march at night, remaining in the day under tents with wet towels rolled round their heads, and yet fell dead by forties. Nor did all this labour make him neglect his own civil government, which he had already launched to float like an ark of peace on the flood of war. The date of the following letter speaks for itself.

"Captain Pope, collector, June 7th.—Too much to do to say much. Brown's letter found no fault with what you have done; and it was very disagreeable of Shere Mohamed

to make it necessary to leave Ali Moorad's kardars where they are for the present. When an enemy has fifteen thousand men he will not do as one wishes, and like all others who make war I am obliged to consider what is necessary to success rather than to what is pleasant to you, or any other person: it was necessary to maintain Ali Moorad's kardars or risk Roberts' safety. There would be no end to work in war if every order is to be accompanied with *whys* and *wherefores*. You acted perfectly right and no disapprobation was felt or expressed; but my plans demanded perfect confidence by the people in the power given to Ali Moorad, and I found that displacing his kardars was doing immense harm: therefore I instantly recalled my orders. Then came a report that you had refused to obey, spread by a man called *Devan*. I could not believe this and wrote to you in all haste: as I expected, you had obeyed, but the mere report broke off all treating with Shere Mohamed when, as I hoped, we were on the point of getting him to lay down his arms! By a prompt proclamation, and replacing the kardars, I have in some degree palliated the mischief Devan's lying had produced; but it has broken off all treating and will cause much loss of life." This Devan was afterwards, on strong grounds, supposed to be an emissary of Buist.

Thus harassed, overworked, and sun-stricken, it is not surprising to find body and mind sinking, though the spirit remained untouched.

"Journal, July 30th.—I am very weak and my legs have fallen away, yet they swell at night, and with a tired feeling hardly bearable though keeping to my room all day. I have been overworked, body and mind, under this sun: I am sinking. However, I have now quieted all Scinde, despite of Outram's predictions of war for ten years. Four months has sufficed for tranquillity! Last week I ordered eighty police, Scindees, to march a man from Kurrachee to Tattah, one hundred miles, and hang him; and it was done on the

right bank of the Indus, amongst all the mountain tribes, without disturbance! We shall have peace.

"All my troops are now in cantonments and I am relieved from much labour. My staff also is now excellent: my nephew William, McMurdo, Green, Drs. Grey and Gibbon, and last McPherson, who diversifies my letter books thus—having to copy between *Scylla and Charybdis* he wrote between *scythes and carabines:* quite as good. Then Brown, Rathborne, Pope, Blenkyns and young Nixon, are all excellent: the four first rare fellows indeed in their departments!" These were his soldier civilians, for only to men who had aided in the conquest would he give posts: hence the fury of the Bombay faction.

"If the Beloochees move a finger in the cool weather, they shall be worried with fifteen thousand men in a way they never were before. I can turn out here 5000, who have all fought under me, except the 28th Regiment, the old *slashers*. With these five thousand I would take forty thousand in hand to-morrow, since the two defeats: in short my position is a hundred times better than it has yet been. Meanwhile my brothers' and sisters' affection to me is great, their letters are dearer to my heart than all the honours Her Majesty can give, for which I care not. It is curious that William sent me his speculations, and everything he proposed was done before his letters arrived. What a general England lost by not employing my father! I am not bad. I have by long experience and some study made myself *un petit* general, as Napoleon would call me; that is to say, a third-rate chap, like Blucher and Marmont and others; but not a first-rate like Napoleon, Wellington, Moore, and perhaps Soult. I may indeed do amongst some of our Indian generals, such as —— with his nose full of grog and heels full of highland reels, but that is the length of my tether.

"I am however so done up that to get through another campaign would be impossible: to mount my horse even is an exertion. I who ten years ago did not know what

fatigue was, and even at Poonah knocked off fifty-four miles in the heat, am now distressed by four miles! Well, a man must die somewhere and some time, and I am ready. Where my services are wanted there they must be given, and assuredly they are wanted here: live or die, here I must remain till a successor arrives. He should come soon though, for more fighting is not in me, this last illness has floored me, and even my mind has lost energy: yet it is good to die in harness. To see my brothers and sisters once more, and Kennedy, is my wish but not my expectation, and I fear to tell them how ill I am. Prize money before going I hope for, to leave to my wife and children and to my nieces; as to myself, money was never cared for by me except for those I love.

"July 31st.—I have but a short race to run, unless some change happens a few months must close the scene: my life has exceeded my father's by ten years, and why should I live? I really don't know. Dying is unpleasant, but worst for the survivors. I fear death most for my wife's sake: too old to marry again, too young not to feel life spoiled! To God I leave my girls. Their arrival here and the cold weather may however set me up yet, for I do get better a little, and my brothers' and sisters' affectionate letters cheer me up like a flickering lamp getting a little air."

THIRTEENTH EPOCH.

EIGHTH PERIOD.

THE opinion of the governor-general in council, passed upon Sir C. Napier's answer to Outram's *notes of conversations*, has been noted; the answer itself shall now illustrate the generous temper which could withhold such proofs of his accuser's misconduct until compelled to disclose them or sink under calumny. The *notes* embodied all Outram's perverse representations as to the Ameers' designs before the battle; but with this addition—that the general had heaped honours on Alì Moorad; had made a treaty with him and given him territory, and had withheld from Lord Ellenborough information that would have prevented the war.

The honouring of Ali Moorad and the treaty with him were simple fabrications, without even a distorted fact for foundation; and Lord Ellenborough's grounds for using force were Outram's own charges against the Ameers, as laid down in the *Return of Complaints*. Outram also had adduced as worthy of belief Roostum's false statements, but withheld Sir Charles Napier's public contradiction of them, though it was addressed to himself officially! In this spirit of foulness, Ali Moorad was said to have been bribed by the general with honours and territories: and in this spirit also the Bombay faction and its tool, always spoke of Roostum as the "*venerable patriarch*" and Ali Moorad as the "*villain, coward, ruffian,* and *traitor,*" because he had not broken his alliance with the British. Sir C. Napier's comments are to be found at length in the parliamentary papers on Scinde: here they must be compressed, as touching on matters already made known.

"The governor-general, July.—As Major Outram has sent his statement to government, it is incumbent on me to shew what weight is due to his judgment and what weight was due to the assertions of the Ameers—that they *wanted to keep the peace with us:* for upon their sincerity depends any value which may be supposed to attach to their conversations with Outram. I shall for the present confine my remarks to the 10th and 11th February.

"Major Outram had been deceived by the Ameers. On the 10th and 11th he sent me two letters, following each other by express and containing three important things. 1st. A request that I should halt the troops. 2nd. That I should go in person to Hydrabad. 3rd. Information that the Ameers had dispersed all their troops. Now my lord, at the moment when Major Outram wrote the above, 25,862 fighting men were—a portion of them strengthening their position at Meeanee, about six miles off; the others round Major Outram's house, preparing to attack it. Ten thousand men of the Chandian tribe had crossed the river and were coming down the left bank of the Indus in my rear; 7000 of Meer Roostum's men were within thirty miles, in rear of my left flank, at Khoonhera, and were about to march on Meeanee; 10,000, under Shere Mohamed, were marching from Meerpoor: in the mountains also, on the right bank of the Indus, thousands more were preparing to come. Thus I had, as my spies correctly stated, 25,000 in my front, and 25,000 more marching upon me in all directions, without reference to the tribes gathering in the hills. All these, as the Ameers affirmed to Major Outram, were entirely beyond their control; yet Major Outram sent me two letters in one day, assuring me the Ameers had dismissed all their troops, and asking me to let him give them a pledge that I would not march. Thus, in a most perilous position, would the major's advice have completely shackled my movements, and placed my small army beyond the power of being saved except by a miracle.

"Let me now draw your lordship's attention to some very important points. The Ameers did not want peace; they were confident of victory and had accurately calculated the day I should arrive at Meeanee, namely, the 17th of February: but they could not assemble their full force of 50,000 men till the night of the 17th, or the morning of the 18th; hence all their diplomacy of dissimulation procrastination and protestation was put in force to deceive Major Outram, and obtain a pledge that I should halt if only for a day: I think he would have so pledged himself, had I not positively forbidden him to give any pledge without my consent. That this was the real motive of the anxiety exhibited by the Ameers to suspend my march, if only for a day, is made more apparent by the fact, that there was no advantage to be gained by delaying the signature of the draft treaty. On the contrary, to sign would have enabled the Ameers to discuss and formally protest against any and every part, while it would relieve them at once from the presence of our troops: but they were confident of victory and wanted to fight.

"There were 25,000 men to be obtained by one day's delay in my arrival at Meeanee, and if the Ameers could have gained a week it would have brought us into the hot season, which they thought would paralyze our movements and finally destroy the troops; they were in a great measure right. Had I been persuaded to believe in the Jesuitical protestations of the Ameers I should have sacrificed the troops, and another great catastrophe would have befallen the British arms. Now my lord, when I considered these matters, I saw I could place no faith in the truth of the Ameers, and their *conversations* appeared to me so much waste paper. But this was not all. Outram asked me seriously to go to Hydrabad alone, and recommended me to send my troops to Meerpoor. My throat would have been cut of course; and the troops, having lost their general and

been removed forty miles from their line of communication, the Indus, would have been placed as follows:—



"From this position they would very quickly have been pushed into the desert, and every soul must have perished. Even a victory could not have saved them; they could never have regained the river, harassed for forty miles by a repulsed but hourly-increasing force; a force more than twenty times their own numbers before the battle.

"As Major Outram seems to have forwarded his *notes*, I think he ought also to have forwarded my denial of Meer Roostum's assertions. This does not appear to have been done, so I take the liberty of sending herewith a copy of my letter, being indeed the same letter in which I acknowledged the receipt of his conversation with the Ameers on the 8th of February. And though much harassed at the time by the unavoidable labour which attaches to the command of a young inexperienced force, suddenly assembled, I am not aware that I left anything unreported to your lordship that I considered of importance; but in case of accident I have copies of all my letters to the Ameers, as well as my proclamations, together with any letters to Major Outram which bear on the subject. I believe all I have do so, and they will enable your lordship to shew the English government that I did all but sacrifice the honour of our arms to maintain peace; for which I believe both your lordship and myself were as anxious as Major Outram, or any other person."

Such were the wretched accusations Charles Napier was called upon to refute after his great exploits, at a moment too when from illness he stood on the edge of the grave, pushed thereto by overstrained energy to repel dangers which his accuser had not faced. Nor was this all. The Bombay faction, cherishing the captive Ameers, especially the filthy murderous Shadad whose acquaintance was a contamination for men, prepared for each separately memoirs embodying every falsehood that could be invented, and making those Mahometan princes, none of whom could read, invoke Christ and his doctrines! Their allegations were answered, were disproved by the rebutting testimony of all the officers involved in them, and so transmitted to the governor-general, who treated them with merited scorn. Rebuked then, they now concocted fresh complaints, chiefly relating to their women.—"They were outraged, insulted, robbed; their ornaments had been torn from them to satisfy the rapacity of the general for prize money, and they were actually starving!" And these infamous slanders were not only spread over India but accepted in England, by a party, as monstrous facts disgracing the English name. Sir C. Napier's letters will disclose their true character.

"Lord Ellenborough, July.—The Ameers' women refused to accompany their lords to Bombay. They demanded rations in money. I offered rations in kind, but for a long time they gave no answer: at last I received a multitude of complaints from Bombay, one to say the ladies were *starving*. This we knew to be nonsense, as the prize agents had allowed them to take away from the treasury a great quantity of jewels, in short all they claimed. Lieutenant Brown took all pains to ascertain their state, and it was decidedly not as their moonshees asserted. However, aware of the stories which would be concocted at Bombay by the people of the *set* there, I ordered the moonshees to give in a statement of the money rations they required as indispensable for the ladies, and they have sent in what I enclose a copy of!

"Now my lord this is the real state of the case. These moonshees being the only channel of communication between the ladies and the government, and with the Ameers, put every farthing advanced into their own pockets; and were I now to furnish any that would be its destination. About 3½ lacs would make a pretty little fortune for these rascals, though from it should be deducted their payments to the editor of the *Bombay Times*, who no doubt understands his trade as well as these moonshees. Having discovered this secret, and that the poor ladies would not profit, I have told the moonshees I will not pay them a farthing; and that, unless by to-morrow night, they obeyed my orders and furnished a list of rations in kind, I would put them in prison, which I mean to do accordingly.

"I asked your lordship to give these ladies jaghires, but since I have discovered this system of robbing, carried on against both Ameers and ladies by these moonshees, I think you will pause before allowing a jaghire to be given: one thing may however be said in favour of a jaghire; though the ladies and Ameers will be inevitably robbed, it furnishes an answer to all attacks! But it appears to me that a very plain question arises from the refusal of the ladies to join their lords, viz. the government has given an establishment to the Ameers and their families; if the latter do not choose to obey the Ameers and take advantage of the provision made, is government bound to find another establishment? However, I should be sorry to advocate any harsh treatment of the ladies, and I believe their horror of returning to the Ameers is well founded. I am inclined to believe that only wives daughters and mothers of the Ameers remain in the zenana; that all their concubines, being wives and daughters of Scindians and Hindoo subjects and taken by force, have returned to their families, to see whom was forbidden to them after they entered the zenana, even until their deaths!

"Sir G. Arthur. Extracts.—I must lift the curtain of

the zenana, which Mr. Buist says I have already done for coarse purposes. The women of the zenana are not in want, and they know nothing of the application for money, which is made by their moonshees. The Ameers went off leaving directions for their women to follow them, but the ladies, having heard that slavery was abolished refused to go. I have good cause and so has Brown to wish the ladies with their lords; send me an order to put them on board, or on camels, and they shall go and my blessings with them, but they say they will not go. The brazen lies sent from hence will be doubly gilt at Bombay by the wailing friends of the '*fallen princes*;' and by the time they arrive in London will be pure gold and pass current against me: at all which I feel disposed to laugh.

"The ladies left the zenana at their own desire when we took possession of the fortress: had they not done so they must have been removed, for I had no time to build barracks and had no shelter for the troops, inside or outside of the fortress, and the sun was upon us. We had no room for tents in the fort, which is filled by the zenanas even to want of air. Now the sacred way in which we protected these zenanas from the slightest insult in the native sense, viz. any man approaching them, made it impossible to put a full garrison into the fort even if there was room for tents; for the sentries on the walls would have looked into the yards, and the poor women would have been shut up in their rooms. We were in the midst of enemies; no one knew the fort, but we know a great quantity of arms were in the zenanas, and the commandant and prize agents, none but officers on duty being admitted inside the fort, saw hundreds of able-bodied Beloochees go in and out of the zenanas: there was a prevalent idea that some 800 or 1000 well-armed strapping fellows were there concealed, awaiting the attack of the Lion's 20,000 outside the town. Against these 800 Major Reid had only a guard of recruits, half of whom never had a firelock in their hands. Had not the ladies asked through

the Ameers to be removed I must have removed them, and thoroughly searched the zenanas before giving battle to Shere Mohamed: arms we afterwards found in abundance, and the men had been there. We got rid of them without a search; but it could not have gone on long as we were kept eternally under arms in the fortress. When the Ameers applied to me about their women I gave camels, everything they asked for; they did all themselves, no one of us saw them or tried to see them; no insult whatever was ever offered to them, nor was there the slightest ground for Buist's infamous libel: no man in the Scinde army believes his assertion that one of ourselves wrote him word of the story."

In connection with the Ameer zenanas, a curious circumstance, ascertained long afterwards, calls for record as an instance of the Lion's chivalrous feeling. When that prince suddenly ceased to assail Major Stack's column on its march to join the general, his motive was not fear, nor inability to cut off the baggage, which was quite in his power; but seeing many women with it he withdrew, saying Sir C. Napier had respected the Ameers' women at Hydrabad and he would do the same by the Feringhee women then in his power! To this record of the Lion's fine feeling, in connection with Major Stack, may be added the reparation by Sir C. Napier of an involuntary wrong to a very brave and excellent officer, which he thus set right in the continuation of the above letter to Sir G. Arthur. "I am sadly vexed at having said in my dispatch, that Major Stack led the brilliant cavalry charge at Dubba: it was Captain Delamain, whose modesty is so great that he never said a word on the subject. I am not in charity with Stack for allowing me to mistake his report, if I did mistake, on this charge.

"John Kennedy. July 18th.—I am very ill. I had fever and was but ill recovered when the sun struck me down. I have never been well since, and am so weak as only to be able to write lying down: a sickening feel, indescribable, comes over me. The doctors say I must give

myself holydays: I ask how? if one day's rest is taken the work doubles the next. How can I take rest? I want it, but they can't tell me who is to answer, perhaps *one hundred* letters which at times come at once from Bombay, from Calcutta, Delhi and Agra. It is impossible without quitting this for ever to have rest, and yet I feel unable to go on: even this letter knocks me up, and twenty sheets of stupid nonsense await at my elbow! two reasons forbid rest. There is no one to do the work; and we are locked up for five months by heat and the monsoon."

From the constant reiteration of demands for explanation on minute points, misunderstood purposely to be reiterated by the Bombay government, he afterwards came to the conclusion they were designed to hurt his health; being always most copious on errors and trivialities when he was known to be ill!

"I am very low, though not as minding dying; yet for God's sake tell no one of my illness, perhaps I may get better before my wife and girls can come here: if not it is no great matter. The girls are young, and for my wife, she and I know the world is full of suffering, and he who believes it to be only a sojourn makes his mind up to its roughs and smooths. And who is to prophesy? A week may recover me; the weather is cooling and the peace of Scinde is secure; only yesterday came news, that the last chief, Hussein, had fled over the Indus with a dozen followers, and already that has made me better. Want of public tranquillity weighed heavy upon me, for my last point of personal strength would be, I felt, the surrounding of Shere Mohamed. He was a bad soldier to let me pin him up, yet like a good one he slapped at Jacob, who was the weakest, and tried to regain the desert: there he had no fear of me, for even the few men with Jacob could hardly find water. Poor Shere Mohamed! His men would not look us in the face; the 24th of March took their hearts out: four thousand, with two guns fled before 900 with 2

guns when only one or two shots had been fired. I wanted then to go and drive out Hussein, Roostum's son, from Shah Ghur, but was too feeble, which fretted me sorely. Now all is quiet and I shall throw as much work as possible on others, which, with the cool weather, may set me up.

"Lord E. writes that he has proposed to give all the prize booty to the army, which will give me little short of £50,000. I opened my eyes wide when told this, having in fact never thought of prize money, or anything but my work, and though, when Hydrabad surrendered, I knew some must be got, £8,000 or £10,000 was the utmost that crossed my mind, being too occupied to think on the subject. Between Meeanee and Dubba my position was indeed too terrible to think of anything else. Hold of river fortress and town, Ameers, prisoners, immense treasure, and, as it was said, forty thousand enemies gathering upon me; a large hospital, and, including officers, only 2,500 men to guard the whole! Add to this anxiety about Stack's brigade which I had ordered at all hazards to push with double marches to Hydrabad; and had the Lion gone to assail him high up I must have pursued with only two thousand, an awkward number to follow forty thousand! But all the chiefs have now come in and laid their swords at my feet, the whole country is quiet and rejoicing to be rid of the tyrants.

"—— says '*I wish you had not been opposed to men fighting for their independence.*' How they do blunder in England! Why! we have fought for the liberties of the people! Even Belooch himself is glad at getting a good master for a bad one.

"Sir A. Johnston. July.—I have seized the chief of the rascals who killed our Dâk-men on the Bhag road, and we have 90 prisoners. I did not dare attack those robbers before Shere Mohamed was put down, because while they had a head it would have been to work up a guerilla warfare in the Delta, our *La Vendée* it might have been, so full it is

of nullahs, fevers and armed Beloochees. I left them unopposed till Shere Mohamed could be finished; then I seized the Delta forts and now have seized the robbers, of whom an example shall be made. They before called themselves Shere Mohamed's men, but I have baptized them anew to suit their deeds, i.e. robbers and murderers. I could not put them down as Shere Mohamed's *soldiers* in this way, so did not try, but as robbers they can be put down: they shall be hanged up at all events, for the country-people betray them to us now that they are no longer the Lion's soldiers! I well knew how much there was in a name amongst barbarians.

"The Beloochees thought they could murder and plunder us. Their constant theme in dhurbar was, '*We are braver and more numerous than the Affghans under Acbar Khan, the Feringhees are not so numerous as at Caboot.*' They are now content, and though the 'Bombay Times,' as usual, is trying to excite a guerilla warfare, it can do nothing against us: conciliation on one side and hard fighting on the other will succeed.

"Henry Napier, July 15th.—At Meeanee we killed all, they would not take quarter, and turned on us from behind when passed. Even if they had accepted quarter I could do nothing, our men would not give it: we were in the midst of masses, and to let a mass of those faithless chaps in amongst us would have been too nervous an experiment. I doubt whether a man of us had courage to leave one of them behind: to disarm them was impossible; their shields cannot be broken and a broken sword in their hand is little the worse: but the ground was strewed with arms. I own to you Henry being shocked at myself, but when I saw their masses, each strong enough to have smashed us, I saw no safety but in butchery: it was they or we who must die. I urged no man to refuse quarter and tried to serve one or two, in vain; however had the war lasted this matter should have been brought to a better tone by degrees. At Dubba

it was so, but things of this nature are too stiff to be carried by assault: however we only killed men in battle. An army is an awful weapon to wield. Another cause of such slaughter was that the Belooch slaps at you with a matchlock which takes time to load, and our men poured volleys into their thick clusters before they could get a second shot: then came their rushes up, met with fire and steel in serried array, and so we stood, pelting them down till every man was dead below: our artillery also swept them horribly

"I care more for the duke's and William's opinion than for all the honours they may choose to give me: I say the truth when declaring my utter indifference. Honours! I had honour sufficient in both battles. At Mecanee, when we forced the Fullaillee the 22nd Regiment seeing me at their head gave me three cheers louder than all the firing; and at Dubba when I returned nearly alone from the pursuit with the cavalry the whole line gave me three cheers: one wants nothing more but the praise of men who know how to judge movements. I am vain enough to think myself as good as other Indian generals, who I have heard were never seen except in action. That would have lost me: I was never from my men, and always discussing our operations and striving to keep down over-confidence of victory from contempt of the Beloochees; for I saw at first that if the Beloochees made fight it would take us aback!

"General W. Napier.—Before this campaign I dreamed not what a difference years make in war, and now am too sensible of the unfitness of sixty to command an army: there is no strength in me to do what I feel can and ought to be done; I have so stretched the string as to have destroyed its elasticity. An old man can order, but you know how orders are executed if not overlooked; and in this strength-consuming climate the mind has to whip up the body to work worse than a hack post-horse. I have got to the end of the stage but am quite groggy on my pins; no metaphor, they are spindleshanks in the morning and before

night like chairmen's. Cool weather may set me up, and to-day it is even cold, only 85°, and the bracing is delightful. The sense of being crushed by work is also gone; but it was strong when the letters of *four months* arrived together, having been before cut off by the enemy: they poured in from two governments, but I have worked through them all at last. When they first came all my military movements were coming to a crisis; yet I held on till the 15th, but was then sun-struck, when no result of our movements was yet known, though I had heard a cannonade. All was then anxiety for me, but just when being bled came a horseman to say Jacob was victorious. I think it saved me, I felt life come back: but only to me it came:—forty-three others were dead.

"My thought is to tell Lord Ellenborough he must find another governor; yet I feel the cool weather already favourable; if it proves so, no flinching despite of the doctors: they want me to go at once but I am not so easily beaten as they suppose, and absolute necessity only shall make me abandon Lord E. To go just as these Beloochee chaps have knocked under might make them rise again, and a new coachman would have his horses off before he could gather up the reins. If we did not carry matters here with a high hand, John Company would find some of his allies in Hindostan very restive: we must be everywhere *dictators*. The Affghan work is not over. Everywhere but in Scinde we are considered beaten cocks, who left Cabool because we could not stay. We have had continual rains, not known before for fifteen years, and it has produced an extraordinary feeling. The people say that when the Ameers *murdered* the Kalloras, that is the Scinde name for the Beloochee conquest, no rain fell for six years and famine and misery were in the land: a sign of God's displeasure. This was the universal belief even with the Beloochees, and the present extraordinary fall has been accepted as a sign that God signifies his approbation of our conquest.

"Five months ago every Beloochee was strutting about armed with sword and shield, none now carry a weapon but chiefs: to these I gave their swords with this speech—'take your sword you have used it with honour against me, but if, after this you use it against me I will hang you like a dog.' And I am on the watch, for it would be advantageous to hang a traitor. The great Jam of the Jokeas is the chap my eyes are on. He is a thorough grandee, and a superb robber. He intercepts our dâks, having the mountains to retreat to, and is inconvenient in every way; and so confident in his hills as to be very troublesome indeed, and very insolent. He has betrayed me once he shall not do so again. He would not have done so once, if I had not been cut off from Kurrachee, where he was allowed by Colonel Boileau to invest the garrison, of two thousand men and a battery, with only seven hundred! My Jam indeed walked into Kurrachee to surrender, in consequence of a letter from me menacing him; but he went slap into the cantonments at the head of his 700 clansmen and would not go into a room without six armed attendants!

"When this came to my ears I ordered him to come and salaam in Hydrabad without a single follower; and I made arrangements, if he refused, to cut him and all with him to pieces. He was in such a funk that he prayed the Kurrachee collector, whom he had before treated like a dog, to come with him, and so arrived meek as a mouse. He is eighty years of age, and defended the Kallora *Meahs* against the Beloochees until those princes gave up. The Belooch conquest is ridiculously likened to our Norman conquest; but *Harold's* son is alive in the Punjaub, and lately wrote to ask for his kingdom: my answer was—I fought two battles to win the whole, but when you will give me back my soldiers' lives, my expences and a tribute, you can have your kingdom. The poor Meah has not given tongue since. Will he appeal to the governor-general? Probably not, for here they think me master and my references to the governor

mere humbug: they know he is above me and think he may possibly hang me some day, but that it will be a tough job, not lightly to be undertaken and success doubtful.

"I introduce all the chiefs who come in to Chalon's print of the Queen; if this is forgotten they ask for the Padisha. A curtain hangs over it, and they are told servants and common people must not look at her. They however do not understand a woman ruling, and one shrewd Beloochee said, Sahib, she did not beat me at Meeanee, you are everything now. Another asked, how far off is she? So and so. You are next to her. No, the governor-general. Oh! how far off is he? At Calcutta. I have heard of Calcutta, it is far off,-you are at Hydrabad, I am your slave. I always joke and tell them what fine fellows they are in battle, and that my wish is to go against the Affghans at their head, and plunder all the way to Persia: this they like, and I am going, if Lord E. agrees, to make all their jaghires their own property. We shall resign all right to turn them out, and exchange their military service for that of assisting to open watercourses, so far as those run through their lands. If I retained the governor's right to military service it would continue their right to have armed retainers, and I have forbidden the bearing of arms: not by proclamation though, for that would have excited apprehension, but practically, for I disarm every man seen with weapons, giving the latter to the soldiers as plunder.

"When they see their jaghires secured as personal estates they will be delighted, for the Ameers kept the right to turn them out bright: a favourite would covet a jaghire, and if the jaghiredar was not a favourite out he went, unless he could fight, which was not seldom. But there is work for an antediluvian in this country. All I can do in my short time is to stop murder, form a strong police, and fortify some important posts; if I can also mark out a few roads, especially in the Delta, it will be lucky. I think the great point I have at heart may be effected—namely, that of

turning the military chief into a small farmer, or in plain terms turning the robber and his band into farmers, all being small proprietors. Now the Belooch holds sword, shield, matchlock and jaghire altogether; he does no work and has his Scindian or Hindoo slaves, called his labourers, who receive about twopence worth of grain in kind for a day's labour. Labourer and master are noble-looking men, but a pretty woman is never seen; perhaps the rich may be pretty, the poor are disgusting to look at. It arises probably from the abject slavery of their condition, for they have fine features, but distorted by a look of despair in every line, and they are all Scindees; no Belooch woman is ever seen.

"This is a wonderful land unlocked to civilization, before unknown but teeming with resources; and when we establish barracks and good houses the climate will be healthy: now we have not proper protection. As to carpenters, smiths &c., there are none, the Ameers drove them away. When one worked the Ameers took half his earnings, and out of the other half he had to give a moiety to the tax-gatherer as a present, so all left the land. None but Hindoos could earn bread; but when any of them were too rich to hide their prosperity the Ameers used gentle *persuasions*, according to the value the man put on his nose or ears and other parts, which he had to bid for with his own money! The progress of improvement is slow everywhere, but in this exhausting climate almost hopeless. A man who can live on a handful of grain, and will not work while he can live without doing so, is a fellow hard to deal with. An increased population will increase the price of food, and give a stimulus to exertion: it is *in* them, and so far as the Scindians were concerned the Ameers took it out of them. The Beloochee struts with sword and shield, the Scindian sleeps till kicked; the Hindoo goes about all eyes, and fingers as supple as his conscience, robbing everybody: to him the English are as a feast. Since we came the Hindoos have grown fat, swelling visibly, like the ladies at the tectotal

drinkings, and as we do not interfere with their projections are happy beyond measure.

"A deputation of these Banians tried to turn me to account. They claimed from me a debt, of God knows how many rupees, due by the Ameers: I had they said, taken all their treasure and ought to pay their debts. Your claim said I was no doubt just on the Ameers; but I never heard of people fighting to pay other men's debts, and cannot possibly set such an example. But then we shall starve and die. Just what is wanted, for I am making a beautiful burying-ground and you shall be buried there gratis. Set your hearts at rest. This joke settled the business. The whole treasury would not cover such debts. I collect no taxes due previous to 17th February, and will pay no debts previous to that period; I give out that as money lent the Ameers before that period was to enable them to war on me my intention is to levy similar sums as fines: so that question is becoming *obsolete!*

"This is certainly a little despotic, but my conscience is quite easy; these money-lenders are only unhanged rascals, and the whole story is generally believed to be a lie: that the Ameers took money is certain, that they borrowed is not true, and it would be a pretty job to begin repairing holes in their moral obligations. The rains will produce great crops; and there was no fear of agriculture being hurt by the war, for with the war the labourer had nought to do; he fled to us from the Beloochees: all the Kandahar people are now also floating down to Shikarpoor to be our subjects." A few years will change the face of this country, merely considering it as an agricultural one without reference to the commerce of the Indus, of which I cannot yet make up my opinion: it will come, but not till Kurrachee and Sukkur have more capital. Agriculture will certainly make great progress, because there is the land, so rich it may be tilled with nails, and surrounding people will come where they are

protected in person and property. Would I were but forty and could remain here!

"I have no time to study antiquities, but strongly suspect from the formation of ground that Hydrabad is the site of the ancient Patala. If a little leisure comes I will read what the wise say: that is if good books can be got, but they are seldom worth reading. The real study is the ground. Look at the grand features which a thousand years cannot change, not at small matters which a dozen years would alter. Burnes does not please me, and Wilson's big book is little worth. A family library volume by Williams seems to me the best; but all want topographical knowledge, which I mean to have in abundance. I observe that Hydrabad is built on a mass of rocks, which, with some high ground near Meeanee, must always have split the river and formed the bason of the Delta.

"Burnes, Del Hoste, and Wilson, make conjectures upon ruins, and channels through a flat alluvial soil every part of which changes annually: from a boat I have seen twenty acres go into the river in an hour's time! But Schwan and Hydrabad are fixtures; and if the river split at the last, as it must because of the rocks, it would run one branch down at the foot of the hills to Kurrachee; the other would frisk at pleasure through the flat land to the East, changing its channels a thousand times since Alexander's day. Now we trace Alexander below Alore, and evidently at Roree; and even below Sehwan and near Hydrabad he must have been. At the time he was here, we may suppose the Fullaillee was, as it is now, a great river, and my intent is to trace its course, of which we know nothing; to examine also the point above Meeanee, where it branches off; and I think, ere the cold season passes to form a good guess where Patala stood, taking rocks as my guides.

"What you tell me about Outram is incredible"—his secret accusations in London—"I cannot believe, I think him so

honourable. I have indeed been obliged to write a letter to Lord Ellenborough, and send you a copy; it will I fear injure Outram, which I regret, but must defend myself, and have told Outram so: do not therefore make use of my letter unless you think defence of my character requires it.

"Shere Mohamed's great friend and relation, Mahomed Khan, has surrendered. Mahomed, said I, how came it man that you made so bad a fight with Jacob? You twice fought me well and I honoured you as a stout soldier: now I hold you cheap. You ought to have killed half Jacob's men, and he had only to fire a few cannon shot and had not a man wounded.

"Mohamed Khan laughing, Why, general, it is just because you did fight us twice that we did not like the third time, we are afraid of you. But to tell the truth I know as little of Jacob's fight as you do. I commanded the right wing, the Ameer the left; he had the guns and I nearly all the cavalry; it was hardly light when I heard the Lion's guns and thought Jacob was upon him as nothing could be distinguished in my front, therefore I rode full gallop expecting to charge Jacob's flank. You know our horrible dust, I thought I was followed, but when I reached the Ameer he was almost alone; then the dust cleared up and behold only twenty-five rascals had followed me. Had Jacob been there I should have been killed, for all had run under cover of the dust; so the Lion and I run too. That is all I know of the battle.

"Well, the Lion is a fine soldier, I honour him, and if he is taken all in my power shall be done to get the governor-general to pardon him and give back his estates.

"Mohamed.—The Lion is a fool. After the battle of Dubba we all saw our people would not stand again. None of us will stand again: you are hawks and we are little birds.

"The frankness of the man's manner and his gentleman-like address, perfectly well-bred and at his ease, gave me the

notion that he was in earnest: he is a fine resolute-looking fellow, very fat but strong. I said, Mahomed how did you get so fat in the jungle? Me fat! you gave me too much work for that; wait till I am some time at ease under your good treatment and you will see what I shall be. This clever turn of flattery shews these people are not dull, and my hope is to do them much good.

"Mismanaging the waters is one cause of poverty. The Persian wheel is their great resource, but being expensive and a fixture does not do for the poor. Rathborne was going to send for a newly-invented hydraulic machine, but it struck me that the Archimedean screw is the thing, and I am trying to make them of pottery, in which the Scindians are very expert. It can be carried by a man and laid down where necessary, and thus little rills, so much wanted, can be spread. When going to Emaum Ghur we crossed a fine ridge of rich hills in the desert, with wood and control of the Narra River on the west bank, where it has water. Lord Ellenborough has, at my request, given a corps of engineers to survey this line, and my hope is, if I remain, to make this dry bed a canal full of water without injury to the Indus. Then for a desperate fight with the desert; for I am sure, except where the great sand-track rises which no mortal can deal with, a great stripe of what is now desert may be made like Kent. I shall never see the result, but if it is shewn that this fertile land, ten or twelve miles broad and four or five hundred miles long, can be cultivated; that it is rich and has healthy hills for retreat in the heat, I shall do much for the people of this grand country, to which I have done no injury, no wrong.

"It would be an indescribable pleasure to see you all again, but when the wind is strong and the lamp flickers!

"Lord E. and the council have sent me power, to act in all things as seems good; and have taken me from Bombay in toto: this was done only last week, and is an immense relief; for though Sir G. Arthur has supported

me there is an anti-Ellenborough faction of understrappers, whose oracle is the 'Bombay Times.' At first they believed I was with their party, but quickly found out the reverse. This makes them mad, and the patronage being given to me, which they were expectant of and ready to pounce upon, makes them worse. Lord Ellenborough sent three gentlemen from Bengal for my civil service, one a nephew of an old friend, but they are useless, and in despair. They came to shoot, to hunt, to live well and sign their names to whatever a host of clerks should lay before them. I give them no clerks and a good deal of work, or rather have so ordered, for they are at Sukkur. They are furious at Lord Ellenborough who, '*quite deceived them as to work!*' Now my soldier-civilians work like horses. Brown, Rathborne, Pope, all capital. And my frame-work of government works well at present; for my first month's revenue was 30,000 rupees, this month 100,000 rupees.

"In each village there is a kardar, all of the Ameers' appointment, Beloochees and Scindees: thus I hope to diminish the shock of revolution in conquest. If any behave ill they shall go out on complaint of the villagers, which will please the last and probably change all in two years. My police are entirely people of the Ameers, and amongst them many who have suffered from their cruelty, chosen by me in preference. My spies are numerous, and scarcely can a conspiracy be unknown, as the rich *Banians*—Hindoo merchants—know everything: their numbers are great and they hate the Mahometans. The personal interests of large bodies, even of Beloochees, are thus enlisted in our favour. The kardars will have £200 yearly, and have great influence. Hitherto they have been slaves to the Beloochee chiefs: now, sure of support if well conducted, they will defy those chiefs.

"I shall thus give a deadly blow also to the clan system, without appearing in the matter. For the kardar will be supported by the villagers when no longer dependent on the

chief; and the government will never appear except in favour of the villagers, who dare not be in the wrong yet: if they are they will be punished, and then the chief will be proud that government defends his acts. Moreover, by these arrangements my regular force is kept in three masses, at Hydrabad, Sukkur, Kurrachee, safe from acquaintance and familiarity with the people—regular *Bugaboos*, at whose name the slaughters of Meeanee and Dubba arise in the mind. Next to them come the irregular horsemen; more divided, yet only in four or five posts as a chain of connection between the three capital collectorates. These irregular horsemen are of high caste and will only keep company with such, they are a sort of yeomanry. After these come the police, in immediate contact with the people on all occasions."

Sir C. Napier is here found putting in practice the plan for employing troops and policemen in civil commotions, which he had so strenuously endeavoured to impress on the ministers when he commanded the northern district—there unheeded, here crowned with success!

"As our taxes will be light there will probably be little squabbling with the collector's people; if there is the police will settle it, pending reference to the collector, who is also a magistrate. So are his sub-collectors and all military officers in command at outposts where garrisons are placed. These last decide all minor questions, the higher ones are decided by the collector; but those involving death go to the governor, who is assisted by the chief commissioner for civil affairs, the sentence being signed by the governor alone.

"Every month the collectors report their receipts and expenditure, which last can only be made under my authority. Other matters go to the commissioner for civil administration—originally called government servant, who lays them before me: I thus check as well as order expenditure. The balances improve fast, and I hope soon to fill up my report

as to irrigation, roads, public buildings, height of waters; but my chief engineer is slow; a trump card though in all other matters, and does his work right well when he does do it.

"The frontier is not yet settled, the heat will not let me go there at once in my weak state, but the moment it abates I will examine the range of hills running from Soonomeeanee to Shikarpoor. That will be a job, for I must take a strong escort, as all on that side are wild Beloochees quite up to '*taking a dirty advantage.*' Meanwhile I am forming a fighting camel corps, and I have long since proposed to form the army baggage also into a regular corps, able to manœuvre as well as the army, and if necessary defend itself. At Mecanee the camels were made to squat down in a circle with their heads inwards, having the men between their necks; it was a living redoubt, impenetrable for cavalry. My arrangements for the *baggage corps* are very minute and require time, but my *fighting corps* will soon be formed. We shall be peaceable, but if not shall make a good fight.

"We are getting up our drill with field days: the Indian officers do not vote it a *damned bore* as the Dublin garrison officers do. I am going to build a fort at Sehwan, but know not how to find salamanders to live in it, nothing European can: my design is to get some native officer to manage it, and failing there some native chief—for a consideration, sufficient to make him faithful: this will protect my steamers."

This fort had become very necessary, because Dr. Buist had in his paper especially pointed out to the Beloochees what parts were most vulnerable, accompanied with a detailed plan of attack—Sehwan being marked as peculiarly favourable for such warfare.

"The newspapers say we shall not be quiet. *Beware Cabool* is their cry. Well, I am aware of the Cabool affair, and also that everybody except McNaughten and Burnes knew there was a conspiracy. But in Scinde there is not one person who believes in danger from disturbances, and it

is impossible for general conspiracy to go on without some inkling of the mischief brewing: however I am on my guard and ready to meet any event."

The fighting and baggage camel corps mentioned in the foregoing letter were military creations of the highest scale in war, and were afterwards organized in despite of obstacles thrown in the way by factious authorities. The fighting corps was suggested by Lord Ellenborough, simultaneously with Charles Napier's own conception of it, and indeed was an imitation of Napoleon's dromedary corps in Egypt, but extended and in some points improved. Two soldiers and one camel were trained together, and so furnished with arms and clothing that man and beast had all that was required in a portable form, and thus enabled to act as cavalry or infantry, yet with much greater power than either. To keep the wild tribes of Scinde and Beloochistan in order they were designed, and a march of eighty or ninety miles without a halt, bringing them suddenly upon a refractory chief, was within their action. Dismounted they presented the irresistible array of European discipline as infantry; and if overpowered by numbers their camels carried them safely off to seek reinforcements and return with the same swift power to strike again. They were admirably organized, and being placed under the brave and strong Fitzgerald performed excellent service.

The baggage camel corps was a military organization of a far more important nature; it was in fact the one thing wanting to complete the European machinery of war: that is, it brought the whole baggage and transport service of armies under the same discipline and organization as the fighting men, rendering them as supple and effective.

These two corps, so admirable in conception, and afterwards found so well adapted to actual service, were by Lord Dalhousie and the Bombay government abolished; and as their avowed organs of the press asserted—to vex Sir C. Napier! It did vex him deeply; but it vexed the public

good more, and the home government has since been compelled to restore the principle of the baggage corps. For the '*land-transport corps*' of the Crimea, organized by Sir Charles Napier's two sons-in-law, Colonels McMurdo and Wm. Napier, the first commanding, and both taught by him in Scinde, is but a reproduction of his scheme, which was however more extended in principle and therefore better.. The Crimean corps has not yet embraced the personal baggage of regiments, and is therefore only a half measure of the government, wanting that vital part of the scheme. Baggage has always been the clog of armies and torment of generals, but Charles Napier rendered it subservient to the fighting interest instead of the contrary, obeying instead of thwarting the commander; in fine as supple and sure for calculation as the combating masses, and moving as their shadows. It was a great conception!

"August 15th.—Napoleon's birthday. I am better but am not what I was last year, having had a shake I cannot recover. We expect all sorts of honours. I expect none that I care for—for I care for none. They have given me the 97th Regiment, which is pleasant as being the climax of my profession. Being now colonel of a regiment I have reached the top of the tree after perching on all its branches! The money is not my care: I never had anything but my pay, and pension gained by wounds, and yet reckon that I have given away in money £8000 since becoming a soldier. But what have I now to do? Scinde is quieted. This gives me more joy, more pleasure than the two victories, aye! five hundred times more. It was the sole object of my attack on Shere Mohamed, my success has been complete, and all Outram's foolish, lugubrious prognostics, have vanished. He said I could not put the Ameer down, I thought I could, and was resolved to try: the fact was he could not. Oh! that I was forty, I could at that age work like a horse; now I work like an ass, without its strength. This is not fine, but alas very true!

"August 17th.—We are all—that is every one but myself, on tiptoe of expectation for the English mail about the battles, and the honours to come. I have no anxiety. I know very well a grand cross will come to me, but when —— and * * * and 0 0 0 0 are grand crosses, it cannot be felt as an honour; we soldiers judge by deserts, and so far it may be honourable, but then it is not the decoration that is so. I hear that I am accused of fighting to get prize money! This does not worry me; it is a matter between a man and his conscience, and as mine is clear as a diamond on that score I laugh. Yet, though denying the public right to meddle with that, the accusation is foolish: he who attacks above thirty thousand men strongly posted with only two thousand is not likely to gain much prize money; he must feel his chance of life to be small, and would hardly risk such a deed, and his own eternal salvation, for a few pounds of gold! and even that by no means sure of being got—on the contrary, all but impossible. Who could have thought Hydrabad would surrender without a shot, or even conditions. What I expected, and what every man of sense expected, was that the fortress would stand a siege and at last offer terms, viz. To accept the draft treaty, pay expences, and save the Ameers' thrones. This any men but such cowardly fellows would have done: had the Beloochees changed generals after Meeanee no fortress should the British have had; for Hydrabad is immensely strong, and the Belooch with his sword and shield just the chap to make a breach a shambles. Any breach also must be a high one, for ten or fifteen feet are of living rock and we do not know that within the revetement the wall is not still rock. I must stop writing, feeling so ill. The *coup de soleil* has I suspect finished me; there is no recovery for me: I am never right. Next month I shall go to Kurrachee, when change of air may set me up, but it is very doubtful.

"August 21st.—Mail arrived, and, as expected, I am grand cross. There are gross mistakes about the C.B. but it

cannot be helped. The honours given are popular, but we all long for and expect a medal, without which the world must come to an end! And so it will, for Wolfe the missionary says so:—in 1845! The fellows here are wroth, very, that only a grand cross has been given to me. I tell them, and think so too, that a regiment and grand cross is more than enough for one man; and it is idle to suppose, because the Whigs gave Lord Keane a peerage the Tories are to do the same by me: a precedent for a good act should be followed, not for a bad one!

"Roberts has come from the Delta, and brought up two scoundrel kardars who have been riding roughshod over the ryots. I will make such an example as shall shew the poor people my resolution to protect them. Yes! I will make this land happy if life is left me for a year; nay, if only for six months they shall be sorry to lose the *Bahadoor Jung*. I shall then have no more Beloochees to kill. Battle! victory! Oh! spirit-stirring words in the bosom of society, but to me! Oh God! how my heart rejects them. That dreadful work of blood, sickening even to look on: not one feeling of joy or exultation entered my head at Meeanee or Dubba; all was agony, I can use no better word. I was glad we won, because better it was to have Beloochees slain than Englishmen, and I well knew not one of us would be spared if they succeeded: to win was my work for the day, and the least bloody thing to be done! But with it came anxiety, pain of heart, disgust, and a longing never to have quitted Celbridge, to have passed my life in the '*round field*' and the '*devil's acre*,' and under the dear yew trees on the terrace amongst the sparrows: these were the feelings which flushed in my head after the battles. Well, we are born for war in this good world, and will make it while men have teeth and women have tongues. But away with these feelings! let me go to work, let me sink in harness if so God pleases; he who flinches from work, in battle or out of it, is a coward.

"There is one great secret in the art of governing long since learned by me. People think, and justly sometimes, that to execute the law is the great thing: this they fancy to be *justice!* Cast away details good man and get a general view; take what the people call justice, not what the laws call justice, and execute that. Both legal and popular justice have their evils, but assuredly the people's justice is a thousand times nearer to God's justice. I well know that these kardars who are to be tried will prove themselves innocent as lambs; but all their tricks and subterfuges and lies will scarcely save their necks; for if it be found they shed blood their blood shall be chilled by death. The poor under them suffered but made no complaint; they saw a British officer come amongst them and sought his protection; this shews their truth, and nothing shall save the kardars from punishment. My good friend —— is full of protecting his kardars. They were only getting what was really due to government: yes! such dues, so collected, would soon shew us the road to Hindostan out of Scinde, and cause half a dozen battles; I shall teach these sort of chaps, these kardars, to find a way of doing their duty without unpopularity: there is no smoke without fire; justice must go with the people, not against the people: that is the way to govern nations and not by square and compass.

"August 31st.—Tried the kardars, who are two rascals, and were, as I suspected, quite in the wrong; however, turning them out of their offices has sufficed to satisfy the oppressed villagers that I will protect them, and they are pleased: the poor are always pleased with the smallest portion of justice if they see a will to do them substantial justice. It is not easy to rule men, but the best mode is not to intrigue and circumvent, but to be bold and honest and kind towards our neighbours:—a good, manly, kind-heartedness, yet telling bad ones your mind freely.

"Fever last night and very poorly now. I go to Kurrachee to-morrow. At Bombay they want to weaken my force,

which must not be; for if the Punjaub gets up the mountain tribes will get up; then, unless we have a strong force, the chaps here will prick up their ears: our being quiet will depend on the Punjaub being so. Every chief in Scinde has made his salaam. This is wonderful. A country conquered and perfectly tranquillized in eighty-one days! And this peace may be kept I think by a just balance between the suaviter in modo and fortiter in re.

"Would I were younger and a prince, the first for strength the second to reward: how rich my army would now be. Instead of the richest I should be the poorest. The finest sword should be taken for myself, and then the prize money should be divided in three portions; the officers should have one, the privates one; the third should go to beautify and improve Hydrabad, which should be made magnificent. Yet Kurrachee should be my favourite. It should be made the mouth of the Indus, and that wild river should not stir from its bed without my leave: it should be chained like a malefactor; it should run close along the hills to Kurrachee just giving me an elbow to Hydrabad! Well these are notions of pleasant dreams, which shall be realized now so far as beginning to open a fine wide street in Hydrabad goes."

FOURTEENTH EPOCH.

FIRST PERIOD.

When the flight of the Lion and submission of all the great sirdars had ended war, the conqueror thus described his situation.

"Richard Napier, July 18th.—I have had nearly all the chiefs of Scinde in this room laying their swords at my feet, which would, if taken, make a rich armoury, all having gold scabbards and each worth full £100. Certainly I could have got thirty thousand pounds since coming to Scinde, but my hands do not want washing yet, our dear father's sword which I wore in both battles is unstained, even with blood, for I did not kill any one with my own hand. I rode pistol in hand and might have shot a Belooch, but thought some one else would, and as he did not rush at me let him alone: a 22nd soldier killed him. At Dubba I got them into a better spirit, but at Meeanee, as the soldiers said, '*the shambles had it all to themselves.*'

"This country is a rich wild, and all the tribes on the eastern frontier, hitherto wild robbers, have offered to come in and turn agriculturists under me. They say We are Scindians driven into exile by the Ameers, and we could only live by robbery. The Khosas, the Juts—dozens of tribes are in this category, and in the desert, and all willing to give up arms and live as ryots. I could with these tribes only drive the Beloochees out of Scinde to their own country on the right of the Indus, but prefer conciliating even these

robbers, for they are a fine people. I have found a sulphur-mine, and saltpetre in quantities: in a few years our revenue may be very great and the people happy instead of miserable. The lowest tax of the Ameers exceeded half the produce, exacted rigidly: we took a farm, gathered the tax exactly by the Ameers' scale, and a little more than a quarter remained for the ryot: if he offended the Ameers some of that was also taken. We go at present by their registers, but are gradually abolishing these atrocities and next harvest the ryots will be rich, for I am reducing our share to one-third. My life here is that of a prince in Alexander's time: I could write an entertaining account of it but have no leisure.

"The same, August 7th.—My turn out against the Lion lasted only a few days, yet the preparations for it were long and dangerous, especially for us Europeans: a fearful number were struck dead. When the mercury stands at 137° in your tent it is like being poached alive: it is devilish, to call it by the right name. My calculation was to lose one hundred by heat: only fifty died, but my resolution was to smash the Lion cost what it would: I was the better lion. A few cannon shot sufficed, and thus my prophecy has come true—that there would be no more fighting in Scinde.

"Now my firm belief is, that I could raise a corps of Beloochees and trust it in battle to-morrow; to try the experiment on any great scale is not my intent, but on a small one it shall be done. I collect the revenue merely by runners of the police, and if I remain will shew a province conquered and tranquil and attached to our government. I will say more: in five years my life should be pledged on the people's defending the whole frontier without a soldier; for both Belooch and Scindian are fine characters. The Belooch is the gentleman, and I know them all personally I may say, for they are so few. We have not had a single murder of our people, and don't I keep the latter tight?

"Government secretary at Bombay, August 31st.—The

28th Regiment would benefit by change of air; but withdrawing a European regiment without replacing it is a different question. Scinde is now quiet, yet I know not if the Beloochees of the mountains are so; nor if the Punjaub be so, and if the latter becomes disturbed the former will not be quiet. No man can expect that the Mahometan population of a country like this, in its present state, will not be liable to the external influence of nations holding the same faith. The people of Scinde are like the people of all parts of the world; there is no *arcanum* in Indian government. The people are quiet when they believe it for their interest to be so, but when they believe their interests demand a rising they will rise: and as the Beloochees are all robbers, they will probably rise if an attack from without gives an opportunity of plundering the Scindians and Hindoos.

"Sir G. Arthur.—I am going to try two kurdars by a court-martial, of which I am chief: the example will, I think, have a great effect. This union of legislative, judicial, and executive power in one person, is the essence of martial law, and its exhibition, though contrary to English ideas, very necessary here. Personally I dislike it exceedingly. I am one of those who doubt the right and effectiveness of death as a punishment; but the reasons all apply so clearly to a polished state of society, that a man who stuck to them in Scinde would soon be chucked into the Indus! Beccaria and Livingstone would find it hard to rule Beloochees without capital punishment. It is a trial for one's nerves, but God, who knows that I have only used it in the conviction of its being a duty to society, will, I trust, not condemn what I do. And I have no prisons: the poor were destroyed not imprisoned by the Ameers."

In September he abandoned Hydrabad as the seat of government.

"Journal. Vikkur, Delta, September 3rd.—This day year I steamed from Bombay: then I was going to a very dan-

gerous command. Now my task is executed. In one year I have risked shipwreck and cholera, been desperately wounded, and fought two great battles, that is, great in their results: I have conquered a large province, added millions to the Indian revenue, and saved 160,000 rupees annually; for all my work has been done at a less cost, by that sum, than Outram expended merely as political agent! I have also had fever and '*coup de soleil.*' I am now visiting the Delta to check any disturbance; not as having reason to expect any, yet such strange events attend my steps that nothing beyond the day seems certain.

"September 4th.—We are trying to work up to Tattah, but the river is powerful; for two hours we made not an inch, and then were washed back. I have seen two of the great mouths of the Indus, and they are grand! I am satisfied that in time they can be mastered by art. The heat is too great to write, to read, to do anything but perspire, yet the trip has made me another man; once more strength comes though we are not in good air, for as far as the eye reaches there is swamp.

"Kurrachee, September 10th.—This day year I was blown up by a rocket, and at the same hour my ride has now been across the piece of grass where I then lay bleeding! My entrance into Scinde was a bloody one to me, and I have seen sad bloody work since: more blood, more personal strife of man to man, more men fall by the sword and the bayonet than I ever expected to see in modern warfare, where fire is all in all.

"September 27th.—Battle of Busaco! How well one remembers every day of battle in which wounds were gotten. Self! self! self! God of our worship! what beasts we are! I have been very ill again here, but am now well. I find all public works at a stand-still: want of energy very apparent. I see plainly this port will be nothing till a mole be made from the Bunder to Kamaree point; I must set to work about this, and hope Lord E. will approve: the expense will

be considerable, but what signifies that for a public work without which a town cannot thrive! How strangely people confuse things: scarcely can one be met who discriminates between œconomy and extravagance; they won't do it! People, generally of good sense, cannot see that £100,000 may be expended with a view to the most rigid œconomy, and be the most œconomical thing; while the not spending it would be the most extravagant and impoverishing to a country. This mole will be, I am told, ruinous; yet it will change Kurrachee from a mud-built hamlet to a large flourishing city, and save money in other ways! Three years ago they would not build a storehouse here for the commissariat, from œconomy! I have had an exact calculation made, and fifteen thousand pounds—I *write* it, so none of your cock-up-nose look with 'that is an error of figures, he means 1500 rupees,'—*fifteen thousand pounds' sterling* worth of costly stores have been destroyed by exposure to weather, which would have been saved by laying out £500 on a storehouse! This stupidity runs through all our 'œconomy.' In India œconomy means, laying out as little for the country and for noble and useful public purposes as you can; and giving as large salaries as you can possibly squeeze out of the public to individuals, adding large 'establishments.' What is an establishment? An immense number of half-caste and native clerks to do the work that ought to be done by the head of the office: then add, a large number of messengers, or as they are called '*peons*' or *chuprassies*—Anglicé, servants for the private convenience of the chief."

Here the Journal breaks off for more than three months, but letters supply the void.

"Miss Napier, September 3rd.—The sun-stroke was a staggerer; yet my hope is to die by one, for never can death come in an easier shape. I was just deadly sleepy: it was deadly had I been let alone; but the only feeling of the transition would have been a tiredness, like that experienced

at being suddenly waked up before time. This was to a degree almost to be called pain, but then came a pleasant drowsiness, with anger that the doctors would not let me sleep. Were it not for others, would that my hour had then sounded: so easy, so delightful I may say, was the approach of death.

"The officers of the Hydrabad division gave me a great dinner. One hundred and forty people sat down in an immense tent, or rather tents joined, on the plain under the walls of Hydrabad. The scene was beautiful and interesting: beautiful because of the great variety of military dresses, the decorations of the tent, the place and the guests; cavalry, artillery, infantry uniforms were there, brilliant in colours; and behind each man stood his black or copper-coloured or yellow servant, the shades of skin all differing, and dresses as different as the hues of the wearers. And there was not only a contrast of colours but of form, their turbans being of a hundred graceful shapes. Their fine intelligent faces and their steady positions awaiting the call of their masters in varied attitudes, formed an admirable background to the more animated lines of talking officers sitting before them—you in England would say, with dull John Bull faces. Not a bit! If you only saw how picturesque the moustache and beard make the John Bull face you would give up the notion of its being dull: the variety of form, of colour, of beard, of moustache, of modes in dressing and cutting them, is endless, and picturesque beyond description.

"Unless thus seen in masses, in arms and uniforms, you cannot imagine the effect. The dark bronzed faces, the pale men struck with sickness, the sunburnt fair fat face, gaining quite a different look from a light thin curling moustache which gives prominence to a round chin, at once sweeps away all the red unmeaning John Bull look. Then, over these warriors, or rather this brigand-looking mass, hung festoons of our own colours, and the colours of the

Beloochees taken in battle. And through the openings of the tent were seen, high and dark, the towers and castellated walls of Hydrabad; and a little further on the magnificent monumental towers of the Kalloras and Talpoors: and beyond these, closing the horizon, the fields of Meeanee and Dubba! That I could sit there unmoved amidst the men who had won these battles was impossible; but to the most indifferent person this scene on the plain of Hydrabad must have been impressive. There the conquerors were giving a feast close to the tombs of two dynasties, and in sight of two fields of battle: and I, the chief actor in the drama, passing rapidly from the stage where it was exhibited! Nothing would satisfy these comrades of mine but drinking my health to the sound of cannon. It was then dark, and the lurid blaze of the guns and their thunders, added to this strange scene on the bank of the Indus which, then at the height of the inundation, rolled its waters around us, seeming to say, One foot higher and I sweep you all with your follies to the ocean.

"My thoughts went back to the 24th and 25th of December, 1842, when on a fine night I stood at my tent door on a hillock, and looked down on the widely-stretched camp beneath: the next day I was to march, old and experienced in war and therefore well knowing what to expect, but for the first time commanding an army. Twenty thousand human beings were there, their tents stretching far on the beautiful plain: all these lives depend on me thought I, one error and a butchery follows! Now sitting at this feast, all I had gone through came back to me, I had done my work and the multitude entrusted to me was safe. We had fought desperately, but no atrocities had been committed; nothing had gone on like what passed in Affghanistan; all in Scinde, except the fighters, had been tranquil, and the slain died well and quickly: how can a man die better? Had I died of the sun-stroke who could have regretted my fate? Scinde was then safe, no man

would have spitten upon my grave as a tyrant, and without pain I should have died!

"When these thoughts came across me I said secretly, here is my flock, it has been brought through all difficulties, we are victorious over tyrants, we are the liberators of a suffering people; from this time security and peace and civilization will spread over a land hitherto the prey of the armed robber, the spoil of the bandit. Feeling thus, and that my conduct had been more than justly appreciated by those whose lives had been my care, I could have nothing to regret, save that when I leave this army I quit for ever companions whose courage has done so much for me. With the 22nd Regiment I in some degree remain connected, but from the Company's officers I shall be entirely severed when I return to England, and amongst them I have formed intimate friendships. I feel myself amply rewarded. I have the approbation of Lord Ellenborough and of the troops, and what more can I want? Nothing! As to a peerage, of which I never thought and laughed when people thought of it for me, what good would it do me? No power on earth would make me take a pension, and a peerage would therefore ruin me.

"General W. Napier, September 19th.—The loss of the Memnon will save you from a letter of 16 sheets. I thought myself dying and scribbled everything as the best way of bringing you as it were to Hydrabad. It was during great debility of body and probably of mind, and at various times, according to my strength, half an hour at a time, that it was written, and probably there was much trash. Still it contained some strong facts amongst the chaff, which you would use for me I hoped, for my mind was so enfeebled from the sun-stroke as to make me fear becoming idiotic. However when roused by the danger Outram's proceedings caused I wrote to Lord Ellenborough, and it did me good: then the rest my mind got restored me on board the steamer, where I slept continually for several days. Dr.

Gray told me at Hydrabad that I must go from thence or die; and as I felt dying and matters were well wound up I went, and have recovered: yet my wish is to quit Scinde; and next March, if not required I think of going, not to risk another May and June. This however I do not talk of, as ere that my strength may return, and if my intention were known, others, not Lord Ellenborough, but others would push to expedite me.

"The whole of the Belooch chieftains have made *salaam:* —about four hundred. Had I taken their swords it would have been a fortune. Instead of their swords I have their good-will and confidence, and peace for Scinde. Yet you are right as to there being danger in the mountains on the right bank. I have no confidence in those chaps; but no fear of them, having picked out two dashing lads, lieutenants Chamberlaine and Fitzgerald; one is to command some irregular horse, the other my camel corps. The horsemen will be at Shikarpoor the camels at Larkaana, and they will check the hill robbers down to Lake Munchur. At Sehwan also there will soon be another squadron of wild horsemen to guard the plains from Lake Munchur to Kotree, opposite Hydrabad. At Jurruck a detachment takes up the chain: and if an enemy ventures into the re-entering angle formed by the Indus, tending to east at Hydrabad, a regiment from Garah will sally forth supported by troops from Kurrachee upon his right flank; and from Hydrabad and Kotree on his left. All these posts are connected by steamers: and there is besides, Ali Moorad's force.

"*I break up no corps to do this, the only* detachment is at Jurruck: Kurrachee has a large garrison, Garah a *whole* regiment; Kotree has part of the garrison of the entrenched camp of four regiments opposite. The wild horsemen have no discipline to lose. Sehwan is hell, but no troops have been put in there yet: the inhabitants are few, and live through the summer by keeping their clothes constantly wet

through! Most of them indeed go to the hills, or to Hydrabad. I mean however to execute my plan in due time, that is, build at Sehwan a good fort and barracks after my own scheme, and then relieve the fort monthly. Why is it now harder to live there than in Alexander's time? It is heat, not malaria that is feared, and air will certainly grow bad from change of soil; but the winds from the S.W. blow now as then, and were interrupted by the same hills then as now: yet in Alexander's time a large city flourished. I must examine this.

"Do not take up my defence, unless I die here. You will then get my letter-books and journal, eight volumes. These will furnish you and Kennedy with what is necessary. Meanwhile my public letter to Lord Ellenborough will probably be printed and set me right about Outram: a paid-up revenue, with general order, and no risings, will defend me in the long run from all others. It is good you should know, that Dr. Buist is constantly at the house of Mr. Secretary Willoughby of the Bombay government; that Mr. Willoughby is Outram's bosom friend"—he was also his coadjutor, adviser and director in his publications against Sir Charles Napier—"and is, the world says, chief proprietor of the 'Bombay Times.' I know that Outram is in debt, especially to the powerful house of Rivington, which house is known to be in union with the 'Bombay Times,' and is said to cry up Outram with a view to their claim on him: I know, for he told me so, that they lent him 10,000 rupees to go to England. Truth will finally come out, and to wait for it is best, because it would be impossible for me to keep you well informed even if I had time.

"I keep all your letters with care, for it is curious how complete is the concurrence of our views in war: your letters were written while I was doing the identical things you mentioned. You say Outram's hobby is that the cost of Scinde will be greater than its revenue. If he was in my

place it would be so. He told me when I reduced his political agency, that I could not carry on the work with the establishment I retained; yet I have done it with even a smaller establishment, and done more I think than he ever had to do. Much of my work indeed has been the bringing up the arrears of his political work! My monthly contingent charges are 6—10—150 rupees; his were ten to fifteen thousand! If I remain here a year they shall see. I have paid every shilling of the cost of government out of the revenue raised while in active war! I have not calculated rigorously, but let me do it in a rough way as my ink flows. I defy all Khorassan and Affghanistan to match my twelve battalions and three troops of horse artillery; but what the cost of a battalion is exactly I cannot put down, and it is too far gone in the night to get at papers. In the Ionian Islands it was reckoned at about £25,000. Now the Sepoys are nothing like this, but take it so, and my force costs some £375,000. The Ameers raised £660,000 of revenue, and all the collectors here believe that in ten years two millions will be the mark: take the Ameers' revenue and there remains £225,000 after paying all the troops!

"But why should a frontier province be charged with the cost of troops belonging to the whole country? I will keep up the fortresses, a thousand policemen, and twelve hundred irregular cavalry for fifty, or say, sixty thousand pounds; there remains six hundred thousand for a civil government, which I will do for less than one hundred thousand: thus half a million will enter the general treasury. This is a rude estimate, but certainly on the outside as to expence. These Indians know nothing of government, this country will be a mine and they don't see it. While on the river I discovered that the centre only has a strong current, the back water is not so strong: a few small piles driven into the bank and backed with brush-wood completely defies the water. In twenty years the river may be fast bound in its actual channel, never more to burst in wild courses over the

land: then will the channel deepen and shallows will no more interrupt commerce. Outram knows about as much of public and private œconomy as my Arab, Red Rover. An honourable and protecting government will treble the revenue here: but what are these Indian men's ideas? I am reckoned mad because I will not put a tariff on the day's labour; because I allow the working man to charge his own price! The Ameers allowed them to have about a penny a day when working for others; when working for their highnesses, a little grain and no money: under me they earn a shilling sometimes, always tenpence, and are of course delighted. My objects in adhering to this free system are two. 1°. It is just that the poor man should get what his labour will sell for. 2°. If the English government gives back the country to the Ameers the poor will no longer work for a handful of grain: then the Ameers will cut off noses and ears, pull out eyes, &c., and in six months Scinde will be too hot for their tyranny—the seeds of justice will have been too strongly rooted.

"I have called in to me whole villages that were tyrannized over by the government kardars, and punished the latter, and the villagers have gone home rejoicing and exulting: these things will not be forgotten. On the other hand I have made fearful examples. Two Beloochees, armed and mounted, plundered and murdered a merchant on the road; they were caught, the proof was complete the crime not denied, but thus palliated. Our chief ordered us, the goods are in his house. He was a Lumree chief in the hills: I ordered his tribe to deliver him to my police, and it was done. He was tried and hanged with his two followers on the same gallows, sixty miles from any soldier save Marston, the chief of the police, who had only 150 policemen, and not a finger was raised; nay, the poor all approved of the deed. I passed the gallows on my journey here and could not but pray that my doings were justifiable: murder must be stopped. These men went to death with great indiffer-

ence; the rope broke with one, he fell, and his first words were—No harm done, accidents will happen, try again!

"Another man was hanged for murdering a husband to obtain his wife, and the night before his execution the magistrate asked him if he had any particular wish that could be gratified? Yes! I killed that fellow to get his wife, bring her to me. Yet with all this I am told these executions have great effect; the people say, we are just: that the *Padishaw kills no one for himself.* And where I pass for the first time the villagers run out asking which is the king? for except being well armed and mounted I am not dressed much like a king. Both Beloochees and Scindians are a very noble people, our officers walk and ride and shoot everywhere in perfect safety. In Affghanistan, if they passed the double sentries a knife was in them: here the peasants are all civility and good-humour. The secret is, though it be somewhat vain to say so, in my rigid discipline. This day a letter has come about the prize money: nothing seems decided, but the tone of the letter is against our having any. We however took a good deal in the fight which they cannot deprive us of; it is ours by regulation."

An intriguing attempt to get the wedge of jobbing into Scinde was thus met.

"Lord Ellenborough, September 15th.—The camel corps cannot be commanded by an individual at Simla; it must be led by a daring soldier and has been given to Lieut. Fitzgerald, a man not easily fatigued or daunted. I think that he will make a good partizan, being a man of ability, very accomplished, and the most powerful of body in this army. He is said to want perseverance as an office man, but it is rare to meet good out-door men, good for in-door work also. Fitzgerald is an excellent draughtsman, and ambitious to distinguish himself: he and young Chamberlaine are fast friends, and will prove a match for the mountain tribes if the latter try a partizan warfare, which we may suppose they will; for how can robbers carry on any other?

"Work goes on slowly in the engineer department: the Scindians require constant watching, and to get cover for the troops has been a work of some labour: three engineers have been ill, and I am apprehensive for the troops during the next three months. I feel again equal to my own work, which really overwhelmed me in June, July and August. I seemed to have lost all power to labour from overpowering weakness; I hope now to earn my pay more honestly, for I assure you I have not been satisfied with myself for the last three months. Had I not seen the youngest and most powerful men equally crushed I should have thought my constitution broken, and that duty to the public and your lordship demanded my resignation.

"Let me now point out that there are, still unpromoted, to the great regret of every one, Captains Hutt and Henderson. The first, with great resolution and difficulty got his guns on to a perilous little rise of ground at Meeanee, the Belooch mass being in a hollow a few yards off: Henderson with his Madras sappers fought desperately to protect those guns while being so placed. These officers were conspicuously cool and courageous, and very terrible to the enemy, but Hutt was the most conspicuous from the great destruction he dealt. Captain Whitlie's two guns dealt with the enemy in front, but Hutt's guns swept the columns endeavouring to turn our right flank, and Henderson's sappers broke down part of the park wall under cover of which the Belooch columns were getting round us, and through that breach Hutt checked their progress.

"I am aware no personal service gives a claim to honours; our best exertions and lives belong to the sovereign and country: it is our position to which honours belong. But the position of Captain Hutt was more commanding than that of Captain Willoughby who has been promoted. Hutt and his battery had been distinguished through the whole campaign, from Affghanistan to Roree, and from Roree to Hydrabad. Captain Willoughby arrived only the day before

Dubba, from a lucrative post, long held at Bombay: he fought in that battle, and immediately afterwards returned to Bombay to his staff situation. Willoughby's battery fired at long range; Hutt's followed up with a close and severe practice to the edge of the enemy's retrenchments. These circumstances placed in prominent contrast the services of these two artillery officers. As to Captain Henderson, his labours with two hardy sappers were great in the sandy desert, clearing roads for the guns; at Meeanee in defending those guns; at Dubba in making a road under fire to let Willoughby's heavy howitzers into action."

Now happened in England an event which gave Charles Napier's enemies all the countenance and support they needed for their flagitious hostility: Lord Ripon became chief of the Board of Control. The Cephalonian leaven was still working strongly within him, but he wrote a letter to the governor of Scinde affecting a frankness and sincerity quite foreign to his real feelings. It was easy thus to deceive the honest-minded man he addressed, and he was thus answered by Charles Napier.

"It is difficult to tell you the effect which your lordship's letter has upon me. I cannot do it. I must content myself by saying:—that to get a regiment gave me pleasure, because I am poor; that the grand cross gave me pleasure, because it marked my sovereign's approbation; that your flattering compliment gave me pleasure, because it is agreeable to receive praise: but more than all was the pleasure I felt at your frank and noble confidence in offering me the hand of reconciliation. I thought you had ill-used me; you have generously proved that you did not do so intentionally; and you have made me regret that I ever for a moment thought otherwise. A beloved wife was dying, Adam had treated me basely, grief and anger were at their height in a disposition, prone at all times to admit the domination of those passions. Having thus spread my faults at your feet I remain &c." Having thus disarmed a noble forgiving

nature, Lord Ripon commenced a course of unmitigated hostility, still pretending friendship!

At this time the Affghans and mountain tribes were said to be in a ferment to reinstate the Lion, who was with the former, and that a religious combination was being formed in his favour.

"Lord Ellenborough, September 21st.—Scinde continues quiet, but there is a necessity for unrelenting vigilance and undiminished force; for if the mountaineers come down we can hardly expect a province so recently conquered not to be in a state of excitement. For this reason I am anxious to have the police thoroughly organized; and have told the Bombay government I cannot let a regiment go without a relief: we must go bridle in hand until the storm, apparently gathering in the hills, either bursts on us or dissipates. If it be a religious one it will probable come down in strength: if it is, as I apprehend, a mere flourish of the chiefs to get Shere Mohamed's money, of which he is said to have a deal, it will probably end in his throat being cut by his friends."

To get his money was the object; but the Bombay faction was loudly proclaiming it a religious combination for war, and striving through the "Bombay Times" to encourage it. The Lion however soon fled to the Cutchee Hills to save his throat. Meanwhile the Bombay intriguers, finding they could not with all their cries and abuse drive Sir C. Napier from Scinde, and could not get the loaves and fishes which he reserved for the brave men who had conquered the country, they changed their policy and became obstreperous for the restoration of the Ameers—the "*injured patriarchs*" being now the watchword.

"Sir G. Arthur, September.—I am glad you think my facts convincing in opposition to Outram. I do indeed, concur with you in wishing I had given all these details at first, but was little aware that Outram intended to prove me the author of the war. I was quite ready to forego any

credit to be gained at Outram's expence, and cared nothing about the newspapers making a puff character for him, though thinking his friends might have stopped that folly, which rendered him an object of ridicule. I have nothing to accuse myself of towards him: I did more to save Outram from exposure than many people would have done, but his conduct was that of a man in a state of delusion. If the Ameers were restored this country would quickly be in confusion: we have filled it with friends, and having given the poor a relish for high wages, the Ameers could not pull them down without resistance.

"The case of Ali Moorad and Meer Roostum, as to the cession of the turban, has been decided by the great Mahometan court of law at Calcutta, and an irrevocable decree passed in favour of Ali: the most minute points and evidence were poked out by Captain Pope, and I believe no more force or intimidation was used by Ali Moorad than by you. However, I never gave or promised him an iota of land or money, and I can see no justification of Outram's conduct in this matter, except his utter want of head. I am glad you approve of my system of conciliation: the Beloochees, like all others, can be won by proper treatment. Man's feelings are everywhere alike: old Indians fancy an arcanum; they go round and round in their own mill and think there is no other road.

"The same, October 1st.—The enclosed letter is just going to Lord Ellenborough in answer to one from the council, containing false assertions by Outram about Ali Moorad. They will not let any expression remain ambiguous in Outram's letters: he has almost made them think I entered into some treaty with Ali Moorad though they do not say so! When I received Outram's letter of the 24th January I laughed. I saw how his head was turned, and until I got Lord Ellenborough's letters I never gave a second thought to Outram's. This letter to Lord Ellenborough you will, of course keep in your pocket. I long to see the *Blue Book*,

but as far as Outram and I are concerned the pith is not yet known in England!

"Lord Ellenborough, October 13th.—I enclose a memorial received from Shere Mohamed's brother—Shah Mohamed. This memorial is a specimen of the assertions made unceasingly by the ex-Ameers, with a degree of impudent falsehood absolutely laughable. I informed your lordship at the time, that this Ameer, Shah Mohamed, sent a messenger to me just before the battle of Dubba, offering to assassinate his brother and naming the conditions! I kept his messenger in custody and sent the letter by a confidential man to Shere Mohamed to put him on his guard, but he never acknowledged this good office, though I know he received my letter with that of his brother. I have ordered the Ameer Shah to Bombay; his remaining here disturbs men's minds, and the ex-Ameers never cease to send messages to say they are coming back.

"October 14th.—Your lordship's private letter, 20th ultimo, has given me very great pleasure. We were all longing for medals. There was not an officer or a soldier, from myself downwards, that would not have given up the hope of prize money, the decoration of the Bath, promotion, everything for the medal! We rarely talk of the prize money; if it comes so much the better, if not we shall not break our hearts. I confess I did not feel as deeply as I otherwise should, and now shall, the high honour of the grand cross. I could not have met with satisfaction those who stood by me in battle and received no honour, save that which danger undauntedly met carries with it: now all will be rewarded, and though my portion be larger so was my responsibility. While the officers and soldiers received nothing my ribbon sat uncomfortably on my shoulder; now I can meet Corporal Tim Kelly and Delaney the bugler without a blush. And Lieut. Marston of the 25th N. I.! Casting himself between me and a big Beloochee he received on his shoulder a blow intended for his general; it cut nearly

through the brass scales on Marston's shoulder: the red ribbon will not grace mine more."

A note in his letter-book thus describes the conduct of the two soldiers Kelly and Delaney.

"Alas! these two brave soldiers of the 22nd Regiment are dead: they fought by my side, Kelly at Dubba, Delaney at Meeanee, as my orderly bugler. Three times, when I thought the 22nd could not stand the furious rush of the swordsmen, Delaney sounded the advance, and each time the line made a pace or two nearer the enemy!"—Here be it recollected that the fighting was hand to hand, that each pace in advance was under a descending sword, and that to sound his bugle Delaney resigned all self-defence! And that these heroic soldiers had a general worthy of them, the subjoined extract from a memoir addressed to Lord Ellenborough will disclose, completing the story of Meeanee with a simple description of a stroke in generalship, similar to that by which Marlborough won Blenheim.

"Victory depends less upon numbers than the concentrated quantity of force thrown against a weak point, by which the smaller army outnumbers the larger at that point: fortune gave a remarkable instance of this at Meeanee.



"From A I saw, through the gap, that troops were at B in the wood, that the wall was not loopholed and had no banquette, because a man sitting astride on the top and firing

matchlocks at us evidently stooped to reach them from men on the ground who handed them up. There were no heads on the wall either, which I well knew discipline could not have prevented, had there been a banquette. I therefore concluded that if Captain Tew's company were pushed into the gap, the enemy at B would be paralyzed, or obliged to rejoin their main body; but before they could effect the last, my hope was to make a decisive impression on the centre and divide the wings. Poor Tew drove them from the gap and died there; but they continued to hold the wood until we fell on their line at C; we then made a breach in the wall at D, and Hutt's guns drove those masses from their position. Thus an accident of ground, and the enemy's ignorance, enabled us with 60 men to paralyze thousands of Beloochees.

"Mrs. Garrett.—It was unnecessary to apologize to me for writing. Yourself and the widow of every soldier who fell under my command have a lasting claim upon any service I can render them, and if I fail in serving them it shall not be from any want of exertion. I have taken the liberty of turning the copy of your memorial into an original by putting a note at the foot of it, and I have no doubt the directors, whose generosity to their servants has never been arraigned"—he did not then know them—"will see how severely fate has stricken you, even above others; for where honours and promotion awaited your brave husband, and joy would have been your lot, the decree of the Almighty has changed all and left only tears behind! That it is best as He decrees we know, but He has ordered man to assist his neighbour, and following that rule I have no doubt the Court of Directors will be guided towards the widow of one who fell maintaining the honour of the Company's arms and adding to their possessions! No one fell more honourably or more regretted than Captain Garrett.

"Captain * * *.—I am as conscientious I hope as you are with regard to signing a certificate; and I am also I

trust too conscientious to forget the command of our Saviour to 'Do unto others as you would they should do unto you.' Now Sir, it would greatly grieve me were you to force me to bring you to a general court-martial; yet your refusal to sign a certificate called for by the regulations will oblige me so to do if you persist in your disobedience of orders, which you do not do from conscience. Excuse me Sir, I am bound to speak truth, and no man can act from conscience who gives no reason and has no reason to give for his conduct. In matters of faith we can give no reason for that which we believe, but although unable to explain ourselves one reason is a plain one, we have the divine word for believing: but in matters of works we are required to obey the law. The Saviour of the world said He came on earth to confirm the law, and to prove his words He conformed to the law. Now I do think it presumptuous in any man not to do the same, unless the law is one involving wickedness. If you were called upon to vouch for an account you could not verify, then I should respect your scruples; but you are not; it is your idleness, your indifference to the Almighty's command to do your duty in your station that stops you. You are the bad steward that was too lazy to look to his master's talent and buried it in the ground.

"Were you a man acting from conscience and religion you would devote yourself to the examination of the accounts, and prove whether the work was done; and if it was not done at the time specified in the certificate you would very properly refuse to put your name to it. You would examine whether the receipts agreed with the charges, and if they did you would sign; if they did not you would justly refuse. But all this would require trouble, patience, labour; and you want to escape the labour for which you receive pay, and thus defraud the public of that pay. You thus unjustly and irreligiously, and under the false pretence of conscience, endeavour to put the money in your pocket without fulfilling your agreement. This is truth, and to a con-

scientious man truth is valuable. I defy you to disprove a word I have written, I have for conscience sake, and pity for you, endeavoured to shew you that I am not deceived by your pretence of conscience when you give no reason, no cause for your conduct. I speak to you as a friend, and as one who humbly trusts that he has as deep a sense of religion as you have.

"I have but little time, but my duty to a brother officer is superior to ordinary business. Love one another is a command not to be forgotten, or disobeyed for ordinary matters; therefore I write this hurried letter to try and save you from the effects of your want of just principle. However I have also a duty to do. I am placed at the head of this government to enforce all just and lawful orders, and if you, or any other man, wilfully tries to pocket the public money without fulfilling the conditions to which you have as a conscientious and religious man bound yourself, my duty will oblige me to bring you to a general court-martial on a charge of endeavouring to defraud the public. Hoping this letter may open your eyes to your, in my opinion, very irreligious and unjustifiable conduct. I remain, &c.

"The same, October.—You had gotten a wrong view; and a wrong view is like a dislocated shoulder, requiring a strong jerk to set it right. I felt assured your religious principles were right, and to shew you that the mode in which you had applied those principles was wrong, and would lead you into the same course that a bad man would pursue, I gave you the necessary jerk by placing your conduct in a startling but a just light with severity; I wished to save an honest man from ruin, which was impending; for had you persevered there was no choice but to bring you to trial. All is now right, and I am sure you will take a correct view on all future occasions. Whenever your religious views come in collision with duty, be assured that a deeper examination will shew you that you are wrong; for one of our

most sacred injunctions is to do our duty in that state of life to which the Almighty has called us.

"Captain J * * *.—I know nothing about political agents, except that, praised be God! the governor-general has cleared them all away, after they had sacrificed British honour, and fifteen thousand men. But I know, that though the governor-general has given me authority to appoint a commanding officer in Bhooj, to act as government agent at the court of the *Rais*, he has not imparted to me any authority to appoint a deputy assistant. Now, of all things I avoid most what is called taking upon myself; and I really believe the confidence with which Lord Ellenborough honours me, arises from his practical knowledge that I never assume any authority he has not directly and distinctly given, except on emergencies. Should Captain Duncan resign I really am not aware whether I can appoint a successor or not. If one be named from Calcutta or Bombay, I have nothing to say; but if it is left to me no one shall be appointed to this *punch-like title*, or rather, punch and his *wife*, for assuredly the *old woman* enters into such nonsense! I will never appoint a political.

"Captain * * *, October.—When I took this government I appointed three collectors, and several sub-collectors; a captain-chief of police for the Collectorates, and a lieutenant of police at each under his exclusive orders, and not under the orders of the collectors who have no right whatever, and whom I will not allow to interfere with the police. The only thing is that the collectors call upon the police for any men they may require to arrest defaulters, or collect revenue. This arrangement was made before you were a collector, and was approved of in all its details by the governor-general and the supreme council. Now Captain —— has delayed so long in coming, that I have written to tell him I can wait no longer and must dismiss him. As he was appointed by the governor-general to be employed somehow

in Scinde I suppose other employment must be found; but meantime I have appointed Captain Brown, lieutenant of police at Hydrabad, to act as captain of police. Either he or Lieutenant Marston, or Mr. Mackeson must do so, and I prefer him as most fitted. Now really, to be called over the coals by you, whenever I choose to exercise the authority vested in me by government, is what I tell you fairly I will not submit to. I have the greatest admiration for your zeal, honesty and ability as a public servant; but if you were the most honest and zealous, and able servant the public ever had, I will not place my authority in your hands. If Lord Ellenborough thinks you would govern Scinde better than I, and I think you easily might, let him make you governor; but while he leaves me here I will not be governor with a collector king over me!

"As to the country not being yet 'ripe for the proposed measure,' I do not know what measure you mean. If you mean the arrangements of the police, pray give yourself no uneasiness in the matter; let me judge for myself. As I never take advice, or suggestion, about my own duty, if I throw Scinde into confusion I promise the collectors that Lord E. shall not hold them responsible. Meantime do your best to fix the number of police, for on that point I want your advice because, and only because, I ask it; but I by no means bind myself to take it, though probably I shall as I think you are the best judge, much better than myself: but I ask you as Captain —— not as collector, because it is not in the competence of the collector to settle, or interfere in this matter. As to Mr. Mackeson being *dark*, I wish he was as black as the devil, as a Seedee! I prefer black men in these countries in many situations; if he is such he cannot help it. However he will not plague you, as I am going to send him to Shikarpoor, or it may be elsewhere. You begin your letter by saying you know I '*dislike business.*' You seem to think I play! I would change what I go through for what you do each day, and

do not think you would gain much! at least there are not many that would: but I do not like to add other people's business to my own.

"P.S.—I am deeply grieved to hear of your wife's renewed illness: I wish she was here, for though I have not much room in my house to give her comforts, she shall have all that we have.

"Major Brown, October.—I have the Khosa chief's petition, claiming your protection from something imposed upon him by Capt. Jackson"—political agent—"but I do not know Hindostanee and have no one in my family who does. However, my answer would be to afford him any protection you think just till the arrival of Colonel Roberts at Bhooj, to whom I beg of you to refer all these chiefs of the desert tribes:"—the Khosas had been made robbers by oppression. "I dare say this chief's past offences may be pardoned. St. John lived with virtue in the wilderness, but I fear we cannot expect the Khosas to do the same, and had better be guided by the saint's advice to forgive: the only point I am stern about is deliberate murder for plunder. Colonel Roberts will soon be at Bhooj, and put these wild people in a good train, and when I have given them the means of living honestly, at least as much as is possible at first, I shall treat them more roughly if they return to their devilry. Allow me now Major Brown to express the pleasure it gives me to make acquaintance with an officer whose conduct has done such honour to our profession. I have just been reading an account of your unflinching defence of Kahun, and masterly retreat.

"Collector at Sukkur.—You are hereby ordered to execute the murderer Jumedar Jufar Khan.

"You are hereby ordered to execute the murderer Moojoodeen. These murderers are to be hanged at Shikarpoor on the road leading to Khelat. Upon the gallows you are to affix a paper declaratory of the crime for which the culprits are hanged. You are also to affix the accompanying

proclamation on the walls of Shikarpoor, Sukkur, Roree, Larkaana, and in all parts where it may be practicable—for instance at Khelat.

"Proclamation.—Scindians! Beloochees! Affghans! Hindoos! I have caused two men to die because they murdered two Affghans. Every man who commits a murder shall be put to death. I have no command in Affghanistan, but when Affghans come under the protection of the British, vengeance be on those who injure them. Men shall find safety and protection in Scinde. The merchant and the traveller shall pass along the roads with safety. Death to the robber and the murderer. Such is the law of God who rules alike over the Mahometan, the Hindoo, and the Christian. Let His will be done!

"Collector of Sukkur.—You are hereby directed to cause to be hanged the murderer Sydoo, who hanged upon a tree at Shere-Mohamed-Ka-gote, the man Pyara whom he, Sydoo, called his '*slave*.'

"Lord Ellenborough, October.—There are some remarkable circumstances attending the execution of the chief who robbed and murdered travellers. 1°. A *chief* was executed. 2°. It was immediately after the war had ended, yet no symptoms of anger were evinced: the people said it was just. 3°. Not a soldier was within two marches of the place; yet on that very road, and not far from the spot, two months before a detachment had been attacked and lost some of its convoy. An officer came yesterday from Hydrabad, and as he kept abreast of some natives asked if the country was quiet? The answer was very Eastern. '*Quiet! Yes! it is quiet. If you catch a wasp in your hand he does not sting you.*' This last is a trifling matter, but with other things helps to give confidence in the tranquillity which appears to reign on the left bank of the Indus. The right bank shall now be taken in hand, and I dare say it will be sufficiently troublesome.

"A regular band of assassins was captured at Shikarpoor;

they had murdered two Affghan gentlemen who had engaged them as guards, and I have ordered two to be hanged immediately. I think three should be hanged, but the collector, Captain Pope, and Captain Young, judge-advocate, differed with me so strongly that I have spared the ruffian till Captain Young gets answers to some inquiries. The principle on which these gentlemen founded their opinion is that the chief of the band ordered him to cut off the head of the Affghan, who, they say, was lying in the agonies of death from a wound inflicted by one of the others. Now we have no other testimony than that of the murderers and robbers that the murdered man was 'in the agonies of death:' for aught we know he might have been vigorously fighting for his life! I cannot understand why Pope and Young, two able men, so strenuously defend this villain. However to put a man to death is at all times so repugnant to one's feelings, that I shall give the assassin the benefit of their intercession; but have resolved not to admit the principle of obedience covering sins in those who follow a leader in assassination."

The state of the Punjaub was now become very menacing. Successive murders of the reigning princes and entire military insubordination clearly indicated a growing political nuisance that was sure sooner or later to require abatement in self-defence.

"Sir G. Arthur, November 1st.—I cannot see clearly as to the Punjaub affairs. On one hand, the Affghans are dangerous enemies for the Sikhs; on the other we are more dangerous friends; and between us the Sikhs are cutting each other's throats! Quere, Will not fear of the Affghans unite them? Will it not prevent them from insulting us? What excuse have we for interference? Suppose they do not unite, and that our party calls upon us for help? We must go, as they did when called to help us. Suppose the only remaining case that I can see, viz. that they offer us some insult. What then? The Punjaub will be ours!

They are numerous, well armed and half drilled; they were quite so but have lost it. Still seventy or eighty thousand under General Ventura might do good service; but Gough with thirty or even forty thousand men would beat them.

"Outram's disclaiming being responsible for newspaper opinion has done away with the respect I still had for his character. Every one knows that he commands the 'Bombay Times,' and I shall not repeat how he used the power he had over it, or rather how I heard he used it, for I have no proof. However that is neither here nor there; I know he has no right to call false assertions to injure my character and exalt his own, '*newspaper opinions*.' They were not mere opinions, and have now been made into a book, and he avows his intention to remain silent.

"It is a thousand pities Clibborn wants other qualities, for he is the best regimental officer, except Roberts, I have met with. Poor Teasdale was not much behind him, and was daily improving:—a nobler soldier than that man I never saw. I cannot mention his name without emotion. Alas! the thought of this brave man has taken me far from my subject. To return. We have native officers and soldiers here, who have been tried five or six months ago, and are still prisoners, perhaps declared innocent! Yet we cannot get their courts-martial from the Bombay head-quarters! This is really very cruel. They were tried when our communication was stopped, and I previously had given Boileau orders to forward all trials to Bombay, expressly to avoid such detention after trial. I have written about it but no answer is come: really this is very wrong.

"November 9th.—You say you think '*my head runs on the Outram controversy*.' Indeed it does *malgré moi*, for I constantly get questions from the supreme government, sent by the secret committee. Lord Ellenborough evidently despises them, but I must answer them. That gives me no difficulty but a great deal of labour: I am obliged to hark back to days when coming hostilities gave me little time to

record every circumstance in my journal, or my letter-books, and I must trust to memory for facts and motives; besides hunting through letter-books and letters, all of which takes time and thought. Thus it is my mind is obliged to run upon the Outram controversy, or rather Outram's anger; for his letters shew that he was ready enough to be severe upon the Ameers before he fell into disgrace with Lord Ellenborough! I think I have now sent home enough to satisfy the secret committee. If not I can go on: they may be assured I am not tired out, neither am I averse to any inquiry into what I have done or said. I acted honestly from first to last; whether wisely or not on all occasions is another question. Certainly not wisely when I did not bring —— to a court-martial; it would have saved a world of trouble: but one feels so low-spirited, and so miserable after victory, so unhappy at all the noble fellows that have fallen on both sides, that there is aversion to do anything harsh, when misconduct has not produced disaster: if it has one grows proportionably ferocious! This is not philosophical, but a man cannot be philosophical when up to the eyes in blood!

"'*What was the name of the officer of the* 14*th who rode his horse in so inhuman a way?*' How such base-minded brutes make one's blood boil! Brown's exploit was performed on three horses; the one who did most was my big white horse Jack Sheppard, whose kicking propensities you I dare say recollect."

The question to which this reply was made, at once discloses the hatred and the detestable baseness of the faction at Bombay and in England. It was not enough to insult Sir C. Napier because his victories supported Lord Ellenborough's policy, it was necessary also to insult and depreciate and defraud every officer, aye! and it will be found to insult even the poor soldiers who served under him. This Brown, this inhuman horseman, was the man who risked his life to insure a true operation against Omercote:—that is, the

man who rode three horses, but never spared himself, to serve his general and the wretches who thus sneered at him. But now the enmity of the Bombay and English Anti-Ellenborough factions was become so virulent, and Outram so avowedly acting with them, that Sir Charles Napier could no longer be blind to his real character and broke off all acquaintance: it was full time.

"Sir G. Arthur.—I send you Outram's letter. I ought to have said at first all I have now said; but I did not mean to say it at all; Outram has himself produced this critical examination of all he did. My wish was for him to have closed his Scinde career with the credit of his defence of the Residency"—which belonged to Captain Conway—"but he was filled with two passions very apt to lead men of weak heads astray: anger and vanity. His fury against Lord Ellenborough had, I hear, no bounds at Bombay, and his vanity made him believe those who told him he was himself the greatest diplomatist in India. He had been foiled by the Ameers, and very unwisely determined to prove that Lord Ellenborough wanted war, and that he, Outram, was resolved there should be no war, to show that his influence over the Ameers was greater than Lord Ellenborough's power: this was blunder one. He then resolved to prove that he had in fact succeeded, but my 'headlong march of military folly' overturned all his skilful arrangements, and gave Lord Ellenborough the victory over his plans. To prove this he denied all treachery on the part of the Ameers; denied all wrong. The attack on the Residency was an act of virtuous and '*Christian war*'—this is Buist's expression and a curious one:—and we soldiers were all robbers and murderers. Blunder two. But to prove my march an act of military folly and mischief, required more than Major Outram's assertion; and the secret committee, and the Queen's government demanded what Lord Ellenborough and myself had to say on that head. The answer gave the measure of Outram's ability as a diplomatist, and his head

for war is even less. I have had a letter from him, meaning nothing: he says that to *save me*, he never went into private parties, though he told the ministers his opinions. This is rather amusing.

"General Simpson.—I have written to break off all intimacy with Outram. My brother gave him an opening to contradict all the falsehoods put forth by the 'Bombay Times,' to injure me and to exalt him. He answers, that he will not. I could not contradict those lies at the time they appeared without condemning Outram, and so held my peace for his sake. Yet now the same lies are embodied in a book. I thought he would one day give a sweeping denial; instead of that he makes himself a party to them by declining to contradict them. I have therefore cut his acquaintance. I could not sleep if I saw my friend calumniated for the purpose of making a puff character for me! I could not bear such humiliation! Outram thinks otherwise, so I will no longer have any correspondence with him.

"Lt.-Colonel Outram.—Sir, I regret that a controversy has arisen between you and my brother. I regret also that there should be such just grounds for it. My letter 22nd July will have told you what has passed; it is needless to refer to it"—informing him of the official exposure of his conduct at Hydrabad.—"In your letter to my brother you '*disclaim any responsibility for newspaper opinions.*' You have declined to contradict falsehoods in newspapers and falsehoods in a book, which were put forth to exalt your character and render mine contemptible; your practice and your principles seem to be consistent and I have no right to question either. As my brother justly remarked, *it is a matter of taste.* I have lately given two proofs that mine is diametrically the reverse of yours. I could not for an instant submit to what I considered a deep humiliation, and in both cases contradicted the fallacies put forth. With such discrepancy of feelings it would be inconvenient to both that any intimacy should continue between us."

Outram was but a tool of powerful factions, working in concert at London and Bombay, and wilfully adopting his misstatements as grounds for insulting and thwarting Sir C. Napier in his government: adding thereto all secret foulness to raise up enmity. Amongst other miserable expedients attempts were made by whisperings to embroil him with the Duke of Wellington. With the directors this feeling was very prevalent. Some of them were indeed too honourable, but the leaders of their court were with a nauseous affectation of public virtue eager to affix crime upon the man who had so greatly advanced the interests of their empire in the East; thus shewing that with them the personal advantages of nepotism far outweighed national interests. Nevertheless they complacently accepted all the general advantages while striving to decoy and injure the general whose courage and genius had won them, and whose toil was now rendering them permanent. However the official answer to Outram's charges, when transmitted home by Lord Ellenborough, cut away all ground for longer withholding the thanks of Parliament: they were given at last, and Sir Robert Peel's speech was very warmly eulogistic of the general.

"General W. Napier.—As to thanks of Parliament you know the estimate soldiers make of that matter! Sir Robert Peel's speech has made people here believe that I am to be made a peer. I do not believe this to be the case, and I do not wish that honour to be conferred, because I will on no account take a pension with it to end my career by robbing my starving countrymen; and without an income of considerable amount it could not be well sustained, for you know how shopkeepers tax a title.' If the fat fellows of the Honourable Court of Directors chose to give me a pension for adding a million sterling to their revenue it would alter the case: it would not come out of starving labourers' toil.

"With regard to the duke, I cannot believe the foolish rumours I hear; I cannot believe him jealous of a little

success attending one of his disciples; he whose whole life has been one blaze of glory, unrivalled except by Napoleon. I suspect these things are said by his and my enemies; this silence arises, probably, from a cautious desire to have every information before him, and so pronounce an opinion which shall embrace the whole Scindian affairs, political and military: meanwhile I have too much on my hands to trouble myself about what any of them think."

The writer of this biography knew at this time by a direct message from the duke, that he was actually striving against the foul enmity of the directors; and he was unsuccessful because the ministers would not second him: this last was not indeed stated in the message, but the writer from other sources knew that it was so.

"Lord Ellenborough.—I have the honour to enclose some more information relative to the conduct of the ex-Ameers. I hope it may prove satisfactory to the secret committee, because the further inquiry is pushed the more will the treachery of the Ameers become apparent. I could have sent this information last February or March, had I chosen to spend my time in an employment suited to a chief of police, i. e. receiving depositions. But I hope that the secret committee will pardon me if I recall to their minds, that at the period in question I had not the power of drawing up above fifteen hundred men in order of battle; that no reinforcements had then arrived; that twenty thousand men under Shere Mohamed were within a march of my camp; that we were in the midst of an insurgent population, warlike and well armed. That I had the magazines and hospitals full of wounded men to guard on the bank of the Indus; that I had six sovereign princes in my camp, intriguing as hard as they could to arrange an attack on my camp by overwhelming multitudes. That I had a large fortress to guard; that this fortress was three miles from my camp; that I had an immense treasure to guard. That I was obliged to respect the zenanas in the fortress, to the

hazard of the regiment in that fortress, which regiment could not muster above four hundred men, while in those zenanas were about eight hundred powerful Beloochees, well armed.

"When all these things are thus brought before the eye, exclusive of a number of details which a general officer must look to, I imagine the *secret committee* will approve of my having attended to the safety of the troops and the honour of our arms, rather than to making a *formal inquiry*, &c. I well knew the treachery of the Ameers, or I should not have been so unjust as to use the terms I applied to them in my dispatch after the battle of Meeanee; and which term of *treachery* the secret committee appears to think was an invective of mine! The honour of our arms, the lives of the troops, my own honour, my own life, called for whatever exertion I was master of to ensure success; and if the secret committee have no confidence in my assertions it is easy to remove me. I shall not complain. My rewards have been in the approbation of Her Majesty, and that of your lordship; I want no other and shall do my utmost to preserve those. In conclusion I hope that your lordship will assure the secret committee of my readiness to prove the truth of every assertion I have made; and I am equally prepared to prove, that the letters and complaints of the traitorous Ameers are a tissue of palpable falsehoods."

The secret committee did not want such proofs, the object was to insult and vex the general, and if possible obtain some ground for further insult. A new opportunity for further insolence did occur and was eagerly seized but was again rebuked and thrust back with shame, as will be seen further on. Meanwhile Charles Napier had not only to resist these intrigues but to enforce the rights of his soldiers upon the neglectful parsimony of the factious Bombay government.

"Bombay government secretary. October.—I request of

you to represent to his honour the governor in council, that the troops in Scinde are in want of pastors; Protestant and Catholic. There is one Protestant clergyman here, but no Catholic priest. At Hydrabad and Sukkur there is neither Protestant nor Catholic clergyman. The Mussulman and the Hindoo have their teachers; the Christian has none! The Catholic clergyman is more required than the Protestant, because the Catholics are more dependent upon their clergy for religious consolation than the Protestants are; and the Catholic soldier dies in great distress if he has not a clergyman to administer to him. Moreover I have not the least doubt that a Catholic clergyman would have great influence in preventing drunkenness. But exclusive of all other reasons, I can hardly believe that a Christian government will refuse his pastor to the soldier serving in a climate where death is so rife, and the buoyant spirit of man crushed by the debilitating effects of disease and heat. I cannot believe that such a government will allow Mammon to cross the path of our Saviour, to stand between the soldier and his God, and let his drooping mind thirst in vain for the support which his church ought to afford! Is his widow to be without religious consolation in the depth of her affliction and in a land of strangers? I hope not sir, and therefore earnestly request that Protestant and Catholic clergymen may be sent to Kurrachee, Sukkur, and Hydrabad."

END OF VOL. II.

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